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Preface 
This volume represents the first of a series of 
studies which , it is hoped, will eventually embrace a 
considerable portion of Roman law. I ptopose shprtly 
to publish a monograph entitled 'General Observations 
oft the Law of Stipulation', in which a number of subjects 
incidentally touched on in the present work will be con- 
sidered in more detail. I have also in course of preparat- 
ion a, translation of Professor's Riocobono's 4Stipulatio 
ed Instrumentum nel Diritto giustinianeo from vols 
35 and 43 of the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, which 
will show English students the methods pursued in elucid- 
ating the law of stipulation by one of the greatest 
modern masters of our tee science. It is impossible tp 
exaggerate the debt which research on numerous branches of 
Roman law owes to Professor Riscobono's efforts, zxtx and 
I take th *s,opportuni ty of grafttfully acknowledging my 
personal obligations to this learned and courteous 
teacher. Another master to whom I must acknowledge 
S 
special indebtedness it Professor Î Ernst Levy, of 
Frankfurt-am-Main. But for the assistance derived from 
Professor's Levy's writings, the present work could never 
have been accomplished. 
The method which I have adopted for indieat - .d 
what I believe to be interpolationsA noting possible 
restorations will best be explained by means of a immix 
concrete example. Let us take Ulpian. Dó(45.2)3 pr., 
infra p.53. For the sake of convenience this pr, is 
divided into three periods6q.,,tje, If the reader 
ignores all interpolation marksIt'restoration marks <> 
and all italics, he gets the text as appearing in the 




In /duobus Tkelsoi promi t tendi (^J 7 frustra ka 
timetur novatio 
The square brackets enclosing the words Cduobus reis 
promittondij indicate that in my opinion these words did 
not form part of Ulpian's original text; the fact that 
they are in italics indicates that in my opinion the 
compilors tax= invented them afresh and did not merely 
borrow them from some other part of the context. The 
following mark indicates that in my opinion other 
words originally stood in the place occupied by the pre- - 
ceding duobus it reis promittendi, the compilors having 
substituted the one set of words for the other, Note 1 
shows what I conjecture Ulpian's original words to have 
been, viz., sponsors vel fidepromissore adioiendo. These 
words are in italics, because I have imagined them afresh 
and have not merely borrowed them from another part of the 
Context. 
Enam licet ante prior responderit posterior y 
etsi 
v exit- 
ex intervallo accipiatur L,conseutens^dicere 
pristina obligationem durare et sequentem accedere: 
The square brackets enclosing Lnam ... poster - 
ior have the same effect as before. 'Nam' is in ordinary 
small case letters because, as 1 conjecture, the compilors 
did not invent it afresh, but merely borrowed it from 
another part of the context, viz,, the beginning of period 
j:; the remainder of the enclosure is in italics on the 
same ground as before. The enclosure is not followed by 
maymmuriqxkgmmammxtx the mark <011-'> , because in my 
opinion the compilors simply added the words in question, 
without deleting anything standing in their place.. The 
following enclosure Lconsequens... acce;1 needs no 
further remark. 
iii 
) C<+>' p,rveí refert simul --7 <^-> <ti 
an separatim Lpromîttnt] cum hoc actum inter eos 
sit $ons `i) _` ) ---,' <^> ut ¡uo i]^'> ti tua,nturj <ti> [no clue] i 
WaxWax novatio rfieq ''`'>q' o 
xx= 
)nain 2lcum reo 9 apondeat 44e1 fidepromi ttat 
P--_ ----- 
5J 
i ta, mix interrogetur 
c ons ti tuatur 











have substituted et for something 
(1-) 
further that this something now 
appears in another part of the context. Note i shows 
that in my opinion the 'nam' now standing at the commence- 
ment of ,originally xtkt stood in this place, I 'Nam' is 
not printed in italics in the note because I have not 
imagined it afresh.; The mark < > after 'simula shows 
that in my opinion the compilors have here deleted something 
without putting anything in its place. Note 2 shows the 
deleted words to be 'cum reo italicised because I have 
imagined them afresh. The square brackets enclosing 
LI- 
spondea1tJ shows that this wordz did not, in my opinion, 
stand in Ulpian's text, but the fact that only the Pis in 
italics further shows that only this letter is dux to the 
compilors. The 8zálssga following mark <'-'> and note 3 
shows that in my opinion Ulpian wrote 'spondeat' ; none of 
the lettere of the latter word as standing in the note are 
italictsed,because they are all found in the Digest text, 
The following mark <+> indicates that something now 
-r- appearing (in whole of in part) elsewhere in the context 
originally stood here. Note 2 4 shows that in my opinion 
'vel fidepromittant' origi;.11y stood here, the compilors r^ 
having deleted the 'vel fide' and transferred the 
iv 
ìiitmmicttx 'pr. omi tt tt' (altered to 'promi ttant') to a 
little farther down. The remaining marks require no 
farther explanation. 
Now let us consider the reverse ga process, 
that is to say, let us print the text of say, period 
as in our opinion Uipian wrote it, and mark the compilors 
supposed manipulations thereof; 
J) L 
E^- 1 <nam> parvi refert simul < cum reo> f^-] `spondea.t> 
< vel fidepromi ttat'> an separatim L +)3; cum [^' <i tit 
interrogetur>ut C- ]S, <sponsor vel fidepromissor 
<constituatur)L' ieve> ulla novatio L ] <fiat. 
2) 3 





duo rei zxaa$tGconstituantur neve 
Again,instead of placing either our restorations 
or what we believe to be the compilers' interpolations in 
foot notes, we may print both side by die side in the text 
thus: 
Let] < nam> parvi refer t simul < cum reo> L spondean-t] 
spondeat> (or simply spondea En] t) (vel fidepro- 
mittat > etc. 
The reader will no doubt find tkita these systems 
perplexing at first, and may be inclined to regard them 
as turning restoration into a Chinese puzzle, Really 
however they are all designed to bring out the 'mosaic' 
i 
workmanship of the compilors on the classical texts. I 
have found them exceedingly helpful myself, and if the 
reader will persevere with them, I think he gat will 
have the same experience. 
i 
see Ri ccobono, ZSS. 3 5. p.242. 
v 
Finally the following abbreviated citations are 
to be noted: 
Beseler. G., Bei tAge zur Kritik der rom. 
Rechtsquellen (1910T-11,-13) 
Binder. J., Die Korre ,lobligationen im rom. 




Girard. P.F., Manuel élémentaire de Droit 
romain. (6th ed. ,1918 ), Girard, Man. 
Lt 
Kruger. P., Institutes Vol.]. of Corpus Kruger, Indri. 
Digest Juris Civilis Kruger, Dig. 
Code 
(13th ed. 1920). 
Vol.2 of Corpus Kruger, Coda. 
#sdg Juris Civilis 
(9th ed. 1915) 
Lenel. 0., Palingenesia Juris Civilis (1889), Lenel, Pal. 
Das Edictum Perpetuum (2nd ed.1907 )_ Lenel, Edict. 
Levy. E., Die Konkurrenz der Aktionen und 
Personen im kiass ram. Recht (1918) Levy, Konk. 
Sponsio, fidepromissio, fideiussio, 
(1907). Levy, Sponsio. 
Zeitschrift der Savigny -Stiftung 
fax 
Bullettino dell' iltimixixtuat Istituto di 
Diritto romano. 
Vocabula.rium Jurisprudentiae Romanae 
if 
Heumanns Handlexikon zu der Quellen des rom. 




Heumann., Seckel . 
Basilika, Heimbach's edition. Bas. Heimb. 
Chapter 1 Introduction, 
Modern History of the Correality-Solidarity Doctrine. 
To students of Roman law no subject is better known 
than the Correal- .obligation as the source of a vast and 
barren literature. The modern history of the problem 
dates from the year 1827 when Keller published his cele 
brated work 'Litiskontestation und Urtheil' which was 
followed four years later by Ribbentrop's 'Zur Lehre 
von den Correa.lobligationen'. In these works a clear 
and definite distinction was for the first time drawn 
between ' correali ty' and 'solidarity in the narrower 
sense' (otherwise called 'simple solidarity') as differ 
wnt branches of 'solidarity in thaxwkdommaxami the 
wider or general sense'. Since then all but isolated 
writers have admitted the fact of this distinction; 
the question is, wherein does its basis lie? 
'Correal obligations and simple solidary obligations 
are to be distinguished; on this point no doubt pre- 
vails. But as to the dividing principle there exists 
a wide difference of oponion.' 
With regard to this distinction it must in the 
first place be observed that the recognition of two 
classes of solidary obligations in the wider sense is 
in itself perfectly natural. For example, we must 
admit a distinction between the case where A. and B. 
by a single joint contract bind themselves as sureties 
for a debt incurred by a third party and that where 
each bihds himself as surety for this same debt inde- 
pendently of the other, pernaps without knowing of the 
other's existence. Again suppose A, and B. both con- 
l 
Dernburg, Pand. II, 
5 
71? TJL,d4,, p. 44.z. 
2. JlOtd0 
tribute to the commission of an injury against C., 
we must admit in theory a dsstinction between the 
case where both act in concert and that where ea ri 
acts on his own account, though how far, if at all, 
the law will deem it practically expedient to dis- 
criminate between these two cases is quite a differ- 
ent matter. In all this, it will be observed, we 
come back to the familiar distinction between sol- 
idary obligations which are joint and those which 
several, a ditinction which no mature body of 
jurisprudence can afford to ignore, though its 322 
effects differ widely-in different legal systems. 
Tile immediate basis of the Teller- Ribben. 
trop doctrine, however, depended on observations 
of the marking of process- consmption as the same 
is presented in the texts of the Corpus iuiis. 
In certain cases it was noticed that litiscontest- 
ation between the creditor and one of two or more 
soli l-ary debtors(,) freed the rest,- we shall express 
this result by saying that process- consumption 
operates 'extensively', - while in other cases it 
was noticed that the result was the opposite- 
s 
process- consumption^operatesy. 'intensivbly', On 
what principle must this antithesis be explained? 
The basis of distinction which Keller for 
the first time definitely laid down 
and. which 
Ribbentrop worked up into a systematic body of 
doctrine may be stated thus : Process- consumption 
/1 
only the passive relation is here of importance. 
(- -hn,u i ,,,,, d .,f -ti'- .. u, ,. , -w c ,e4 / ' a - v LL` tA a Ccw` kt,14 ""` .G4'7^ 
a, tL.,( ... dt / si oo ti.. .n L , l (;/ 
c,A, 
3 1 ctd. 
is 'extensive' when we nave a single obligation 
( in the objective sense) with a. plurality of sub- 
jective relations,- this is correality; process- 
consumption is 'intensive' where we have a, plurality 
of obligations di ro ted. to one and the same end,- 
this is simple solidarity. This doctrine was 
held to be capable of reconciling all the discord - 
ancies which the "orpus iuris presents as regards 
solidarity in the general sense. Where we have a. 
single obligation with a. plurality of subjective 
relations, any fact (litiscontestation., acceptilation, 
novation, compensation etc,) which deprives this ob- 
ligation of its 'objective substance' dissolves all 
the various subjective relations; where we have a 
plurality of obligations Atxmalmaltxtaxonexaxdxtkitaximom 
awl, the fact of one of them being deprived of its 
objective substance does not per se prejudice the 
subsistence of the others, but as all the obligations 
are ex hypothesi directed to one and the same end, 
when this end is satisfied by a single solutio, all 
are extinguished. 
The ?feller- Ribbentrop doctrine at once gained 
a wide acceptance and soon established itself as 
communis opinio j Almost from the first, however, it 
provoked strenuous opposition, The main point of 
...... . ......... 
No doubt one of the main reasons why this doctrine 
imposed itself so effectively was that it gave a 
clear utterance to tendencies which had previously 
been latent in juristic thought. The distinction 
between 'extensive' and 'intensively' process - consump 
tion could not escape the notice of the earlier jur- 
ists, and Raber, Cuja.s an'' Denollu5had ftmen operated 
with the idea of unity of obligation. See Binder's 




attack was the conception of a single obligation (in 
tiie objective sense) with a plurality of subjective 
rel ations) whi ch 4.1-ZZaaant writers pronounced to be 
untenabke, nay even absurd. The view that in correalr 
i ty, no less than in simple solidarity, we nave a 
pluizali ty of obligations gradually gained ground, unti] 
in the second part of last centurj, its adherents were 
probably in the majority, though the Keller -Ribbentrop 
doctrine still mainta,ine'- its position as an article 
of the orthodox juridical faith. 
So the struggle went. Volume after volume 
was published, theory after theory was propounded, but 
as to any possibility of the doctrine being settled on 
a rational basis there was never a sign. dear what 
Ihering, writing in 1861, says on the xxtex matter: 
'Amotng the most refractory "legal- figures" which are 
possessed with a truly demoniacal obstinacy, foremost-- 
of all stands the Correal- obligation. Do you wish 
me to cite the literature of the "common law" on the 
c.t.tarc 
subject? This 11.44rfttulas would fill a note a yard 
long. Jurists of the present day may be divided 
into classes: those who have written on the 
Correal- obligation, and those who have not. The 
doctrine of the "Three in One" cannot have caused 
more brain-racking to the theologians than that of 
the 'Two or More in One' has caused to our civilians. 
Have we here one obligation with several subjects 
(on the one side or the other) or 
are there as many 
obligations as there are subjects? Co around and 
enquire who has not laboured on this problem; count 
the sleepless nights it has caused to the students 
...... . . O F . . f ...... 
reprnoduced in Schertz u. Ernst in d. Jurisprudenz 
11 th ed, p.8. (-eir,er-ft. g4) 
. . . , 
.10 
5 ; 1 c td, 
of our science, .Jy head swims whenever I dip into 
this literature, and the moro I read of it, the more 
confused I become, If I ever have to decide a 
practical case on this matter, I shall only be able 
to do so by absolutely forgetting all I have wr 
heard or read of Correal..obligations. Between the 
latter and the so- .called solidary obligations (in 
the narrower sense) a prodigious distinction is said 
to exist as between two -footed and four -footed animals, 
But if we ask our civilian zoologists how this dis- 
tinction manifests practically, if the two- footer and 
the four- footer are put to the plough, the xz ±ìc 
majority of them will, I believe, be unable to give 
any answer and will evade the question by saying that 
zoology has nothin to do with ploughing,' From a 
certain writer on the sub je ;t, to whom I had pointed 
out this defect in his work, I received the following 
answer: "The practical side of the question I have 
fundamentally excluded from my enquiMies; I have dealt 
w1 the subject purely scientifically ° A juristic 
writing which fundamentally ignores the practical applb 
cation of its subjecte a cunningly constructed wateh 
which id not intended to go! Just herein lies the k 
eel; jurisprudence has been forced into a zoology, 
while really it is the art of ploughing with civilian 
oxen.' 
Another well -known passage from Ihering may 
suitably be applied to the literature on the 
correality- solidarity doctrine:9 'Then there arise 
C,kiakatxdmal Gheist d, ram. I'echts' II (2) 5th ed., 
ppJ24. 
6 4- 1 atde 
opinions and theories which can ma,intatn their life 
only in the place where they received the same, to 
wit in the lecturer's chair, but which, if they 
venture into the outside world, at once prove that 
they cannot bear the raw air of reality; xtaxzel xx 
opinions and theories in the highest ingenious, in the 
A 
in the highest degree learned, but also in the highest 
degree perverted,- hot..house plants without sap and 
energy, bastards of logic and erudition with law, un, 
sound lecture -.room jurisprudences,` 
It is easy for us at the present day to 
understand the cause of all the confusion, Undoubtedly 
as the fragments and constitutions of the Corpus suris 
7-- 
stand there is an antinomy between oeAtain passages 
ehich admit and others which deny the extensive bper -. 
ation of process-consumption$' ftsinstetxmitxttioattx3t§d2Ca 
xis}saxaathadmxxsyatamxralExaxpätaix*mgxtlataxamtigammy7xyet 
t txp[actxgazattmattxximposstklaxttaxsimgxtxaxdtx.tisrmttax: 
xxxx>solkxlmat4[s$axxxaamart$.tyxasad xxismpttaxaakts$xag ty : 
Ammambioagkyxtfxxxxattaxxsmmastadlektmmak2x2remx3faner 
axdxxitthaztaap tftaxxxxxlitaasttsedgmlamsndxtaxmanstametxzc 
zxxax xemaasakittyxsmktftr ityxofXktsxmsmxmmdxthaxxacatsty 
laxscouthxammtrmatiamaxxasxmotiflakixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
and this antinomy demands explanation, Henoe if a 
writer rejected the Keller..Ribbentrop doctine, he was 
practically bound to construct a, sk eorreality.solidar, 
ity theory # of his own and the variety of these con, 
struotions was manifold, Moreover PLibbentrop t s argu- 
ments and textual analyses were so defeotive that 
those who adhered to the orthodox juridical faith were 
compelled to seek for fresh grounds on which it could 
be supported; In the period of which we are speaking 
the science of textual criticism as we now l[d understand 
-k-sT 
it had rdly been born, and so the greatest legal 
7 1 y td0 
intellects of the day groped blindly in the dark, ig- 
norant of the only method which would clear up theAdis- 
oordarcies wnich. the Corpus iurLs presents, 
By the last decade of the nineteenth century 
i ight had begun to dawn both in Italy and Germany. 
The monograph of Am Ascoli, Sulle obbligazioni 
solidali and that of Eisele Correalitat und. Solids,ritat, 
deserve particular mention as harbingers of a new era 
in the history of our doctrine, The main position 
regarding unity of cause as the foundation of correaliju 
whioh,,and other writers of this period adopt may be 
pronounced absolutely sound, though in points of detail 
more recent criticism has shown their views to be un, 
tenable.` 
In 1899 there appeared another important 
f' 
work, namely Die Xorrealobiigationen im rem.' xm 
im heut, Peohtby Dr Julius Binder, which sought to 
eliminate the distinction between aorreality and simple 
solidarity altogether,' Following in the footsteps of 
glak untze,J this learned writer deposed,process-oon- 
AM> xsati lszttyxxxx 
sumpti.on from tt xx the chiel/seat itkxxxoxzs rxtya 
,.r 1 
dogma andconstruct a single institute of solidarity 
based On extensive solutio,eonsumption, Binder's 
method and results antic, it will now generally be ad, 
mitted, are unsound, but nevertheless his work has ex, 
ercised a considerable influence on subsequent doctrine, 
1,=uch of his exposition is characterised by great acumen 
and his manner of applying textual criticism to the 
solution of the various problems presented is in many 
respects excellent, 
q 
in the Archiv fur die Civilistische Praxis, 77, p,374 fib 
2) Die Dbli gation0 u,'die Singularsuecession (1856); Die 
4 
Obligationen u,' das ius extraordinarium (1886), 
3 1_ otd. 
The year 1913 saw the publication of a work, 
Die Konkurrenz der Mossy Aktionen und Personen im 
klass, rom,' joacht , by Dr Ernst Levy, which seems 
at last to have placed our problem on the fair way 
to a satisfactory solution,' Levy discards the terms 
' cotreali ty t and t solidari ty t altogether, and treats 
the whole subject under the general heading of *kit= 
Action -concurrence, :wo actions are said to tconour' 
in the wide sense employed by Levy, when they are so 
related that a question may arise whether litisoontest- 
a4014, in the one does not extinguish the other,` if this 
question is answere, in the affirmative, the concurr- 
ence is mss= determined in the sense of (process -) 
c onsump$i on,4 the two actions s tand4 to one another in 
a consumption -.relation; if it is answered in the neg- 
ative, the concurrence id determined in the sense of 
cumulation, the two actions stand to one another in a 
cumulation-relation. 
A distinction :crust however be drawn between 
(i) consumption which operates under the ius civile 
and is specifically described as 'civil -consumption', 
and (ii) consumption which operates merely by virtue 
ofthe officium praetoris or officium Ìtts iudicis, 
and is specifically described as praetorian consumpt -- 
ionI or judicial consumption, as the case may be. In 
P .th c000nc c io the concurrence is determined in the 
A 
sensex of cumulation under the civil law, but this 
cumulation is counter actedk by the officium praetor's 
or the officium iudicis.' 
Action,. .concurrence in the foregoing general 
sense is divided into Action-concurrence in the 
narrower sense and Person -concurrence. Action- 
concurrence in the narrower sense takes place when 
one single party has two or more dissimilar but 
9 a td 
related rights of action against another single 
party; for example, A, lends a specific article to B, 
Wiire 
who injures it, so tiìat0) has against B, both an 
actio cormmodati and an actio legis Aquiliaee' 
Person -concurrence takes place where a single party 
has similar and related rights of action against 
two or more parties respectively, or two or more 
parties respectively have similar and related rights 
of action against a single party. Person-concurrence 
is active or passive aoeordi ng as the plurality of 
parties is on the creditor or the debtor side, 
hen action -concurrence (in the narrower 
sense) and person-concurrence are combined, in other 
words when a single party has dissimilar but related 
rights of action against two or more parties, or 
two or more parties have dissimilar but related 
rights of action against á, single party, a double 
concurrence takes place/. or example A. is the 
exeroitor of a ship and B. is the magister, both 
being freemen; C. contracts with B, and hence acquires 
a direct action against B, and an actio exercitoria 
against A, 
Thus Levy's person -concurrence and the 'person. 
aspect of, his double concurrence are concerned with 
the same phenomena as the correali ty- solidari ty 
doctrine, In marked contrast to the theory 4-Binder, 
everything here xxxmat revolves round the dtermination 
of a concurrence of actions® In any given ease what 
we ask is, has litiscontestation an extensive or merely, 
an intensive consuming effect? It is fully admitted 
of course that other facts besides litiscontestation, 
notably solutio and aoceptilatio, may have an extensive' 
consuming effect, but this result is simply a corollary 
of the extensive consuming effect of litiscontestatia 
íi 
,1,4ja l,,.vdtrts. c..eet-our..,.. 
í,f- . 
` the traditional 
' ,.4) 
technical terms 'correality' and(^solidarity',' We 
..4, 
41,1 el_ tt may fully admit that' theae terms and the distinction 
10 1 ctd 
Now as to the general soundness of 
-2, & tr, 




L4Aa,-z- f a 
,2,. .l.,/1- ,c,(.aE- .444 `ZA.t4,7e.., 
s., 
f,,L( ty,t, 
'are connected with one of the most unpleasing ahapt.- 
'ere of modern doctrinal history'; also that the term 
'conreus', from which 'oorreality' is derived, is 
probably to be attributed to the compilers in the 
one passage where it occurs; also that the term 
'in solidum' from which 'solidarity'. is derived has 
in the writings of the classical jurists quite another 
2 
connotation fammx than its modern derivative,' Yet 
,t,A / 
to-shritesl--ter 
-zit; ottivy .e/Cir--: ( '444 yw.." -c , a...c -mot- 
' 
If it be objected that the ideas expressed 
e, 4 .-4- ß-f'(4) 
by the terms iì. quoattun are sac quite uncertain, 
that there is a wide diversity of opinion regarding 
the basis of the distinction between I reply that 
the basis of distinction as formulated by Keller and 
Ribbentrop is literally correct, and is indeed the 
only possible one if we confine our attention to the 
classical law of Rome, In oorreal¢ty we have two 
obligations objectively identified so as to form 
constructively one and the same obligation; in simple 
solidarity we have two obligations, not objectively 
identified, but directed to one and the same juristic 
end, 
Let it not however for a moment be imagined 
that we are followers of Teller and Ribbentrop; we 
adopt their basis of distinction indeed but that is 
all. For the rest, the advance of the science of 
)-P(4.3) 3.3. 
2) '&-u)., /4,4 ,k'G'. 
11 ; 1 ctde 
textual criticism during the past thirty year ors so 
entitles us to treat the netire literature prior to 
about the last decade of the nineteenth century in the 
way recommended by, Ihering, namely, t to forget all we 
have ever heard or read of correa2 obligations t 
12 The Theory of Solidarity and 
i Correality, 
The most pronounced element in the general 
r 
institute of Solidarity is that which we call 
tsubjeotive alternativityt,' This latter expression 
signifies that a first party, ' itius, js entitled 
to a prestation from a second party, Maeviuss or to 
a prestation from a third party, Seius, aryl so 3; 
or conversely, that Me is entitled to a prestation 
from i. or S. is entitled to a prestation from T.', 
and so on In the passive case, that is, where the 
plurality of parties is on the debtor side, the 
creditor is entitled to exact from any one of the 
debtots the prestation due by that debtor, but 
having done so, he has no further right against the 
others,' In the active case, that is where the 
plurality of parties is on the creditor side, any 
one of the creditors is entitled to exact from the 
debtor the prestation due to himself, but when he ha 
done so, the rights of the remainder are gone. 
C, 
The idea of sub j eXtive al ternativi ty 
then is that only one of the different passive 
L 
subjekts can be made to render a prestation, and 
the rendering of a prestation by any one of them 
has the same effect as the rendering of a prestation 
by any other; and conversely, only one of the 
c 
different active subjeßte can demand the rendering 
of a prestation, and the rendering of a prestation 
to any one of them has the same effect as the rend,. 
erring of a prestation to any other. In short only 
one prestation osas to be rendered, and it is a 
matter of juridical indifference by or to which of 
the various subjects it is renderedo 
I 
'`"" ,ti.c í , 3,2,- ,62t4 ti/' l-,: 




We may however 
alternativity is not 
X 
for e4ample T ' were o 
a sum of X from S,' we should hardly describe the two 
obligations as solidarily related, A solidarity relation 
as commonly understood demands what we call 'substantial 
objective equality of obligatipnt or 'substantial 
equaltiy 
of prestation'., In order to understand the force 
of 
these phrases we must consider briefly the 
manner in* xi 
which an obligation should be analysed from the standpoint 
of the classical -_oman law., 
An obltbgatioiz, regarded as a legal phenomenon 
Z0/ 
may be analysed in the first place in subjects 1 
( »/ 
per, --s.-) and content in the wide sense (i,e,' +he, act 
or 




taxe it that this idea of subjective T 
the only element in solidarity,' If 
entitled to claim Stichus from M,' or 
all modalities affectin the 
a 
g pre$tOility of such act 
or forbearance A (ii).,_hke content may be analysed into 
the narrow sense, these elements 
(4) obitect and lcontent in 
being particularly described as obligationssz.txxx 
object and obligation-content, by way of contrast to 
the prestation, -. object and prestation -content about to 
be mentioned,' (a) 'the obligation- object is the act or 
forbearance, otherwise called the prestation,.- the 
dare (dari) facere ( fieri) or minx non facere (non 
fieri)_ considered apart from any modalities affecting 
its prestability 09 The obligation -content consists 
L4.,t «mud 
of the modalities. The most important of these latter 
are suspensive conditions which render the obligation 
imperfect,- make the prestability of the act or 
2i t is quite immaterial wnether we use the active or the 
passive voice insuch connections; perhaps the passive 
is preferable as having a more abstract connotation, 
/ A- r J 
LUL /I`4y '({.,- -. / --eL ,, 
,- 
qC(,ry¡, p G-u-^-7 --v+l l 
' I 
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forbearance altogether problematical,- and suspensive 
terms (dies) which render the dibligation immature,. 
cause the prestability of the act or forbearance to be 
postponed. gesolutive ootiditions and terms seem also 
to belong to the obligation,con.tent. 
Ih the case of obligations dari the obligation.. 
object or 
(¡prestation 
must be analysed into two elements, 
Nobject and content, which are particularly described as 
prestationr.object and prestation..contentel (° JThe prestat- 
object is the . thing, physical or ideal, of which the 
obligation 'disposes', iThe prestation...content is the 
'disposition' itself,-the act of 'giving' abstracted 
from any object;" together with all modalities affecting 
such act, for example, a provision as to the place of 
payment, acs ! eat .waa,.s a 4' - 
Certain obligations fieri, for example an 
obligation rem tradi, for the pupposes of analysis 
correspond'o obligations dari (t xaotlyyi being excluded 
from the latter category solely on account of the narrow 
4 I) 
technical significance of dare. Other obligations 
fieri fall less naturally into the scheme marked out 
for obligations dari; in particular if we adhere to 
the analysis of prestation into object and content we 
have to construct a somewhat artificial prestation- 
object. k.or example, in the case of an obligation 
w 
domum aedificari, the ,Souse itself must be regarded as 
the prestation...objeot, though at the time of tk making 
the obligation its existence is purely prospective; 
again in the case of any obligation for rendering a 
certain quantity of service, the service itself, or 
: to make a. thing the property of the recipient; 
Ieumannr.Secket, s.v. dare 1)e) ), p.120 
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otherwise expressed so many units of labour, must be 
regarded as the prestation,.object," 
In the case of obligations non fieri the 
analysis of prestation into object and content is 
altogether unnatural and should not be attempted, 
The foregoing analysis nas no reference to 
the binding element,-'vinculum iuris',,'oportere', 
which is assumed to be present in every obligation 
and the nature and origin of which cannot be discussed 
here. An exact synonym for obligation, as above 
represented is 'obligatory relation'. The substantive 
right of the creditor may be described as his 'obligat- 
ory right', by way of contrast to his adjective right 
of suing on the obligation, called briefly his 'action. 
right', Conversely the substantive liability or duty 
of the debtor may be descriued as his 'obligatory 
liability or duty', by way of contrast to his adjective 
liability to be sued, or duty of joining issue in an 
action brought against him, called briefly his 
'action-liability or duty; The term obligation may 
be used loosely in the sense either of obligatory right 
or of obligatory duEt liability or duty, 
In the present treatise we shall be concerned 
almost exclusivi with obligations dari. When we have 
occasion to mention obligations fieri, we shall assume 
the same mode of analysis to be applicable in their 
case as in that of the fermer. Obligations non fieri 
lie without the scope of our enquiry. 
$ We are now in a position to consider the 
meaning of 'substantial obeotive equality of obligation' 
or 'substantial equality of prestation', as an element 
in solidarity,' In order that two obligations may have 
substantially equal objects or prestations, the following 
conditions must ae fulfilled: x *} (i) the two prest- 
ations must be homogeneous in the sense that each 
16 ; 2 c td 
must belong to the same category of act or forbearnace, 
and (ii) the two prestation- ob4ects must be equal, either 
in toto or pro tanto, 
In order to understand the second of these 
conditions, we must in the first place consider the dis.. 
tinction between 'generic' and 'specific' prestation.. 
objects, A prestation-.objet is generic when it con, 
s i s is of a sum of money, a quantity of some other fungible 
genus, or we must add, an indeterminate species of a 
non. ungible genus (e.g, a slave generally). A pest 
ation object is specific when it consists of a determinate 
species. The basis of this distinction lies in the 
fact that a specific thing (e0ge the slave SHichus, the 
fundus Cornelianus ete9 has, while a generic 
al 
th.ingo- 
(e.g. X sestercihas not, an'individuality'of its own 
apart from its position as pres tation..ob j ect of a part- 
icular obligation A generic thing is endowed with 
concrete existence simply for the purposes of the part- 
icular obligation; a specific thing has already an 
independent concrete existence which the obligation 
does not affect, 
For our present purposes the fact which we 
¡Lave to observe is this, namely,that while two generic 
prestation..ob jects may be equal though quite distinct, 
e, g, one sum of X is equal to another sum of ;on the 
other hand juristic equality of la specific prestation, 
object is impossible without identity thereof.' Thus, 
two obligations Stichum dari and Pamphilum dari have not 
equal prestation,objecte in the juristic sense, even 
though economically the twolt slaves may be of exactly 
the same value; the individuality of a specific thing 
prevents it being regarded as juristically equivalent yo 
another specific thing,' 
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In the second place it is to be ooserved that the 
r 
equalitk may be either in toto or pro tanto ql In toto 
equality means that the whole of the one prestation,. 
object is equal to the whole of the other; for example, 
one sum of X is equal in toto to another sum of 
Pro tanto equality means that some element in the one 
, the whole of, or /4 
prestation..ob ject is equal to ̂some element in, the other.' 
For example, consider two prestation..objects, XV and X; 
the XV ma4 be analysed lactd2 into X + V, and the element 
of X is equal to the other X. Again consider a 'compound' 
prestation,ob ject decem et Stichus, and a'simple' prestat- 
ion -.tb j ect1 decem; quoad X there is equali ty4: a9-also 
lie case of two compound prestation..objects decem et 
Stichus, decem et Pamphilusp'^ A more difficult case 
is where one of the prestation..ob jects is 'compound in 
the alternative', e. g, decem aut Stichus, and the other 
contains one of the same alternative elements eithelone 
axximixsamkimatianxwitkxag e.g. decem, or in combination 
with other element*, e.g. decem et (aut) Pamphilus, 
xxî This case will meet us in connection with D.'(4502)15." 
1 
Combining the ideas of subjective alternat 
i . I 
i vi ty and substantial objective equality we arrive at the 
ordinary conception of solidarity in the general sense,' 
To take an example of passive solidarity with generic 
prestation- object, suppose that T. is entitled to claim 
X from M. or to claim X from S.' Here T.' has the right 
of 'electing' whether he will claim the full X from M.' 
or from S.', and is not obliged to split up his claim 
between them; but he cannot exact more than a single 
sum of X,1 Again to take an example of active solidarity 
with specific prestation.,object, suppose that M. is entitl. 
ed to claim Stichus from T. or S. is entitled to claim 
1 
Stichus from T.. 
4-4-- fr. 16 g- 




'occupation', that is, either can claim the entire pro- 
perty in Stichus (and not merely a pro indiviso share 
thereof) and so can exclude the other for not more than 
a single prestation of Stichus or his value can be exact- 
ed from T. 
It will be observed that the objective equality 
necessary to the amamakma existence of solidarity has 
been qualified merely as substantial, not absolute. The 
here 
significance of this qualification is that we not /x4equire 
equality of prestation- content between the too obligations 
Thus suppose T,' were entitled to claim X from M. at Rome 
or X from S. at Oapua, the existence of a solidar* relat- 
ion will hardly be denied, in spite of the modal discrep- 
ancy, It may further be observed that solidarity is 
quite independent of any difference as regard modalities 
of condition and term, these latter belonging to the 
obligation -content, not to the prestationncontent. 
Now the present trearise will, I thinx, render 
it 'Alain that the civil law, by reason of its formalistic 
nature and its subjection to processual ideas, could 
c 
reach the conreptioh of solidarity as above explained in 
not merely 
one way only, namely, through the construction /Of an 
objective equality, but of an objective between ±Ìa 
two or more obligations in order that process -consumption 
might operate extensively. On the basis of such con- 
structive 1 L f the civil law institute of joint obligat- 
ion in solidum which we call aorreality was established, 
t 
and Laue its establishment there were two conditions 
precedent: (i) absolute and not merely substantial 
objective equality; two prestations cannot be identified 
as one and the same unless they are precisely equal; 
moreover the equality must be in toto and not merely 
pro tanto; and (ii) a single cause from which both 
i t i be obs: ,ved are .=ge k 
ci vi := inf p. 
4 
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obligations originate and which serves to achieve the 
identification of the two prestations,' Unless these 
two conditions were fulfilled , nothing in the nature 
of oorreality' was possible under the civil law,'' 
Ï±xtxxzxxxdmaktadxfmtxt If howver these two 
conditions were fulfilled, two(or more)obligations were 
produced with a. cohs true tive unity of pre s tati on (idem 
debitum); by construction of law the two obligations 
were deemed to make up a single correal obligationÁwhich 
On'the other hand 
had a juristic individuality of its own,' / it cannot 
however be too s;,rongly emphasised that this unity of 
obligation is a pure piece of legal constructiont for a 
*p xt certain definite end, jao wit, in order that process.. 
consumption may operate extensively Apart from this 
end each obligation maintains its own individuality, 
which faci.t appears prominently when the question of 
confusio4 arises.'. It is therefore immaterial 
whether we speak of a single correal obligation or of 
two (or more) obligations correally related; sometimes 
it is more appropriate to use the one, sometimes to use 
other of these expressions. 
It is an undoubted fact that the civil law 
institute of correality was xxmot evolved within the 
sphere of the formal negotium of stipulatio.' Here a 
correal relation could be produced only by means of a 
special stipulatory form which we call the correal 
sipulation.` The correal stipulation was governed by 
stringent rules which excluded any other result than 
tam the production of two objectively q equal and 
identified co- existing obligations, Any'inequality' 
0 it will be observed that we are here speaking only of 
'principal' correality ; vide infra p.72. 
except that under circumstances a correal stipulation 
incapable of fulfilling its proper end might produce a 
valid 'simplex' obligatió4 by ̀ simplex' obligation as 
opposed to correal obligation we mean an obligatory 
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or 'non.»identific ì,tiont appearing formally in the terms 
of the stipulation rendered the whole act null and void, 
andÁthc same result must, I believe, have occurred where 
rta-tA, 1 
x the sxx x1 stipulation was formally unimpeachable, but 
there existed some element in the situation which caused 
r , 
a material inequality or non,- identification,` 
At a certain probably in the early days of 
the Empire, jurisprudence extended the institute of 
correality to the real and consensual contracts of the 
ius gentium which nad now been received into the civil 
lawn' But in this transference of an institute which 
had been evolved on strictly formal lines to the sphere 
of formless negotia, the following change would seem to 
correal 
be inevitable: Suppose a Vixnt real or consensual 
contract contains some element which excluded the 
equality or identification necessary to the establishment 
of correality, it would be quite anomalous to hold the 
contract null and void, Hence, I conjecture, juris.- 
prudence was driven to invent a species of non- correal 
or RÌi simple solidarity wnich did not depend on the 
idea of objective unity of obligation and in which 
therefore lTtiscontestatio had not, though solutio had, 
an extensive consuming effect; I further conjecture 
that this institute of simple solidarity subsequently 
gained a footing within the realm of solidarity ex 
stipulatu to the extent that, where correality wa s 
excluded through a purely material inequality or non- 
identification, a correal stipulation was no longer held 
null and void on that aEcount, but was allowed to produce 
a simple solidarjrrelation,i is xthaa The dt details 
of this process are reserved for the sequel. 
Such then in outline is the correality-solid- 
arity theory which I propse and Shall seek to establish 
by a critical examination of a considerable number of 
passages. A supplementary point must be mentioned 
21 $2otd 
We may with confidence assert that anything in the 
nature of solidarity without unity of originating 
cause 
was abhorrent to the civil law." This principle maintain- 
ed itself even within the =Ix realm of the formless neg- 
otia, and I believe we are justified in holding that not 
even in the latest days of the classical jurisprudence 
could a legal solidary relation be constituted between 
two obligations were unity of cause was lacking. On 
the other hand we have clear evidence that two obligat- 
ions cumulatively related at law might in equity be 
related solidarily.' Hence we must admit the existence 
of an institute of equitable solidarity and investigate 
the principles by which it was governed. 
In conclusion of this section we must draw m±textik 
attention to certain facts connected with the division 
r 
of solidarity into active and passive; Passive solidar- 
ity is a conception which presents itself so naturally 
that every legal system worthy of the name must afford 
some form of recognition thereto,' Active solidarity 
on the other hand is a purely artificial conception 
which could without very great inconvenience be dispensed 
with altogether. The difference is that in passive 
solodarity we have only a single creditor with a single 
interest to be satisfy tad, and it matters nothing from 
what source satisfaction proceeds, whereas in active 
solidarity we have a plurality of creditors each with . 
a separate interest to be satisfied, and these interests 
have to be identified artificially as one and the same 
Riikgr by act a2 either of the parties or of the law 
itself. Active solidarity presents itself outwardly 
as a race for toccupationt; the creditor who wins carries 
off the whole prize and the rest get nothing, We _h,1, 
kz, /J ,,, f ..r 
A / áC ,. L,, -64e 
tr1 
A/ 
/N` ,` Al /1.,,,t Gt 4164.c /t-P4,- 
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Under these circumstances there can be little 
doubt that in Roman law passive xxxx correality was 
decidely older than active correality; in fact as we 
shall see, even in the mature classical period the thxxxy 
priples of active correality seemz still to nave been involved in 
some doubt? We may nowever assume that the incidents 
of the active correal relation were so worked out as to 
rim parallel, so far as was possible, with those of 
the passive relation,' Moreover the case of the active 
active correal stipulation affords some notable examples 
of the exclusion of correality and the introduction of 
i 
simple solidarity on the ground of material inequality 
and non -identification,' 
Jf 4n4- h13`t. 
7 
23 3 Scope and Disposition* 
A few words must be added as to the scope and dis- 
position of the present work. No attempt is here made 
to cover the subject of solidarity in all its manifold 
bearings. We merely seek to discover the essential 
principles underlying solidarity ex s-tiwIft.tu in the 
classical and Justinianian legal systems respectively. 
In future studies we hope to apply the results here 
attained in a variety of directions. Certain of the 
limitations which we have unposed on this work call 
however for some remark. 
In the first place it will be observed that 
the relation of principal and accessory debtor (or cred- 
itor) has been entirely eliminated,' This relation we 
call Acceesoriality and to its study a special monograph 
is being dedicated and will appear shorllyá Aecessorial 
ity, like correality, is based on the conception of unity 
of obligation, but, unlike correality, it does not place 
the different debtors or creditors on a co- ordinate 
footing. The conception of a formally accessorial 
relation was only developed gradually in Roman law. 
Originally, it would appear, two parties whose material 
relation was that of principal debtor and sponsor must 
bind themselves as co- principal debtors; it may be, 
indeed, that the earliest species of correal obligation ha 
had as its passive subjects parties whose material relatiax 
ion was as just described. The whole history of Roman 
suretyship was a striving towards the idea of formal 




creditor and adstipulator may at first have stipulated 
formally as correal creditors, though latterly their relat- 
ion assumed a formally accessorial complex ,on, 
An important distinction between correality and 
accessori ality is that, while the former relation depends 
essentially on unity of originating cause, the latter rei- 
a 
ation is antagonistic to ths unity. Thus there can be 
little doubt that the proper form for taking a, principal 
debtor and fideiusssor bound was by means of separate stip,. 
ulations; the employment of a joint stipulation for this 
purpose, though it seems to have been toleratedA can hard* 
ly be described as other than anomalous, 
In the seoond place we have omitted all refer- 
ence to these complicated questions which arise from the 
nature of the prestation.- object as imperfectly divisible 
or indivisible, The divisibility and indivisibility here 
referred to are juristic, and not necessarily natural; 
thus slave Stichus is divisible juristically inasmuch as 
he may be owned in pro indiviso shares, though naturally 
he could not be divided without destroying his existence 
as a living slave; But consider an obligation to give 
a slave generally; this obligation I describe as imperfect - 
ly divisibly on the ground stated by Paul in D.(45;1)2,1; 
op, also Julian D.(46;3)34;1. The standing sus example > 
of an indivisible prestation -object is a predial servitude,' 
In the third place we have omitted all refer 
ence to the case where a creditor or debtor dies leaving 
co.- heirs, the complications which this case involves being 
largely mound up with those just indicated' 
In the fourth place we have, as far as possible, 
eliminated all discussion of the 'inner' relatiorsbetween 
co-creditors and co- debtors and of the tights of regress 
which these inner relations afford,` is per se 
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quite independent of any question of inner relation 
between the different parties on the one side oi, the 
other, 
By means of these limitations we have endeavour- 
ed to keep the present monograph within reasonable 
bounds and to avoid digressions from the main problem 
set before us,' 
The correality-solidarity theory which we 
here submit to the judgment of the learned public is in 
oeaìtain respects quite new, and some of the positions 
taken up by us depend on a mode of textual criticism 
which is KR about as kakd daring as anything ax anything 
yet attempted in this line, I am only tmo sensible 
to what an extent I lay myself open to the charge of 
'presumptuously pretending to re. -make the ancient texts 
and of uselessly exercising an arbitrary prerogative 
to the destruction of all truth'; Yet without a 
certain boldness of oonjecture,it seems impossible to 
reach any solution of the problems nere presented,' 
The disposition of the sequel is as follows: 
Tn,&hapter II (04-- 20 ) we shall discuss Correality ex 
stipulatu in all its various bearings and seek to dis- 
cover the essential principles governing the civil law 
institute,' A brief appendix ) on correality from 
nexum, littoral contract and testament will be added. 
In chapter III (.0.22-I) we shall discuss Simple and 
Equitable Solidarity ex stipulatu, and in this connection 
we shall take the opportunity of demonstratiYg the antag- 
onism of the civil law to anything in the nature of 
solidarity without unity of xxxgx originating cause. 
In chapter 1V ( f )-S- ;2, ) we shall discuss Solidarity 
$xxtimxXL ex stipulatu in the Justinianian law, observing 
the immense contrast which the latter here presents to 
..s____. 
Rißcobono, ZSSo' 35. P e'242 
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the classical system. 
Finally in chapter V ( 33 - 37 ) we shall discuss 
Solidarity from real and consensual contracts, and shall t 
find nere certain authorities which shed a most important 
light on the subpCt in general," 
27 
Chapter II Oorreality ex stipulatu. 
4 Outline 
It is universally admitted that the civil law 
institute of oorreality was developed within the sphere 
of obligations ex stipulatu, and our main interest is 
therefore fixed on that special stipulatory form. which 
(III,`le 
the oompilors of the Institutes /have fortunately handed 
down to us and which we call the correal stipulation. 
The origin of the etipulatio is still involved 
in darkness; the latest researches on this subject may 
be said to centro round Mitteis's well 2:no :n hypothesis 
that stipulation as we know it had been evolved f ro m the 
processual suretyship of the praedes and vades, The 
origin of the correal stipulatio snares in the general 
obscurity, but Mitteis's hypothesis suggests some inter- 
esting speculations, Is it not possible that the earliest 
correal stipulation was a between a creditor on the one 
side and a principal debtor and a sponsor on the other? 
We cannot in this place undertake any invest- 
igations of an antiquarian nature, úut must, accept the 
existence of the correal stipulation as an accomplished 
fact. The questions we do ask are, why was this particu- 
lar form as described in the Institutes chosen? why 
these separate questions and in the passive case isma 
separate answers? why this Ìxtsags intermingling 
of questions and answers so that, uttil the interrogatory 
is complete, no response is given? why the inflexion of 
idea. (eosdem) in the second question of the interrogatory? 
The solutions of these problems is to be found negatively 
in the results which the oorreal stipulation was designed 
to exclude, and positively in the result which it was 
designed to produce, 
i) 
Über die Herkunft der Sti ulation: eine Hypothese in 
Aus rom.yx. bürg Hecht,( estschrift f,e Bekker, 1907), p, 
107 ff, 
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The results which the correal stipulation was intended 
to exclude are three in number: partttion, novation and 
cumulation; their exclusion forms the subject of the 
following coat-ions y 5---1/ 
The result which the correal stipulation was intended 
to produce was the simultaneous creation of two or more 
coordinate obligations with different subjects on the 
one side or the other, but with an identity of object 
(idem debitum) in respect whereof they were regarded as 
one and the same obligation (eadem obligatio; mkkkgattx 
eadem res),' In se 41Awas (2 a---< 13 we shall discuss this 
unity of obligation and a special element therein name - 
ly,'extensive responsibility' for 
_n.egl,e,o -s.. 
Thereafter we shall take 
of the requisites of the correal 
and then consider the vital quel 
civil consumptioné ( ) 
a comprehensive survey -I? 
stipulation (fI r4 ), 
tion of $adem res and 
Finally we shall consider the subject of . otionf 
) 
on a correal obligation ( ), to ), and by way of an 
appendix mention orreality from nexum, litteral contract 
and te s tamentÿ (4 it), 
This course of investigation will, it is hoped, 
place in a clear light the institute of correali ty ex 
stipulatu which had its roots deep in the civil law; 
The all important point is the necessity of a joint 
stipulatory act(so framed as to exclude paitition) in 
order that a civil law 
A 
correal relation may be produced,' 
Destroy the unity of originating cause and you inevitably 
have two formally diset obligations, in which case 
three 
one or other of ±xm results must take place: (i) the 
later obligation novates the earlier or (ii) both 
obligations co- .exist cumulatively so that neither litis- 
contestatio, solutio, nor any other fact bearing on 
the one alone can in any way prejudice the subsistence 
of the other, or (iii) the later obligation is null 
942 -i c du-_ .154; 
y'-41/4-6A. d h 
.v..- 21.-C -11-1-44. 
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and void. Maintain the unity of originating oause, 
under the strict civil law 
and /the only possible alternatives (partition being 
excluded) are (i) constructive unity of obligation, 
r 
ioe correa.lity, and (ii), Amaxasukk such unity is 
excluded on formal or material grounds, total or partial 
nullity of the ult.,' The other alternative, namely, 
simple solidarity, represents a derogation from strict 
civil law principles on the part of the classical juris.:, 
prudence,' 
Partial nullity takes place Where the joint act produces 
a valid simplex obligation, but quoad ultra is ineffect- 
ive. 
30 54 (Correali ty) vol Partition* 
The question of partition introduces to us the 
whole theory of joint contract, By a joint contract we 
do not mean simply that a number of agreements have for 
the sake of convenience been concluded more or less 
simultaneously, That we do mean is that several parties 
nave together made or received promises which purport to 
cover one and the same prestation,' 
Now when all the requisites of a joint contract 
are fulfilled, one possible result is 'partition' of the 
prestation promised, This means that each of the various 
debtors becomes bound to render, each of the various 
creditors becomes entitled to claim, a separate pro rata 
share of the prestation and that alone as sole debtor 
or creditor,- Whether the basis of division be equality 
or some other proportion does not here concern us, and 
we ignore the complications which arise hwere the prest- 
ation object is only imperfectly divisible or not divisa 
correality 
ible at all, Obviously partition and isandsstty are 
directly opposite results; the former must be excluded 
if the latter is to be produced,- Partition implies the 
creation of a number of independent and cumulative 
obligations; each of these latter has an object peculiar 
to itselr alone, and no fact bearing on one only can 
prejudice in any way the subsistence of the others 
There is however another aspect of the antith.- 
esis ee v, partition which has to be attended 
to. In order that partition may In= take effect, 
there must be a ittngkaximstitimaxxioxhaxdixidnd single 
whole prestation to be divided and this whole prestation 
forms the object of an ideal correal obligation. If 
then in any concrete case we find a decision in favour 
of partition or a discussion as to its possibility, by 
simply excluding this resul,t we at once arrive at Corr- 
maceality, The very suggestion or partition shows 
')411.4 4A4/htI If 
9 
A e- 
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that one and the same prestation is due by, or to= the 
various subjects and if we held each bound km or entitled 
in solidum instead of prdrata, we nave that identity of 
prestation on which the institute of correality is base 
We have already had occasion to observe that 
passive solidarity is a perfectly natural juridical 
phenomenon while active solidarity is something quite 
artificial. An important illustration of this prin- 
ciple is afforded by the fact that a passive joint con, 
tract naturally produces solidarity, while an active 
joint contract naturally produces partition,` Where we 
have a plurality of hm debtors in a joint contract, the 
creditor has only a single interest to be satisfied, and 
ne is entitled to look to all the debtors collectively 
and to each one individually for satisfaction of thin 
interest in its entirety. Where on the other hand we 
have a plurality of creditors in a joint contract, each 
of them has a separate interest demanding satisfaction, 
and paxÌ partition is the natural means of effecting 
a. compromise among these conflicting interests: fiunt 
concursu partes, These statements require detailed 
consideration as regards both (a) the active joint 
contract and (b) the passive joint contract; 
(a) If Maevius and Seius on the one side and 
Titius on the other make a contract by virtue of whica 
T. mmatxkx owes M. and S. a sum of money, but in which 
nothing is said as to the latter being entitled singuli 
in solidum, and we are asked what is the natural effect 
of this contract, we should probably reply that T. is lame 
bound to pay the total sum to M. and S. together, that 
is to say, he must by some means or other place the .......... _ _ .,.....=.^r..a: 
op. Levy, ISonk, p.' 178 222 f. These last statements 
require a slight qualification in the case where a 
prestation -object is 'individualised' by the person of 
the o reditor.iÁ_ - u Q-a 
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entire amount under the common control of both M. and 
S., who can then divide it between them according to 
their respective interests,' If T. pays the total 
sum to one of them, say M., on his (M.'e) acòount alone, 
ne is not thereby freed from S.; for by the terms of the 
contract he was bound to M, and So' together, not to M,' 
solely, S, can therefore still claim from T. his own 
proportionate share of the debt, and T, can claim from 
M. a refund of the amount overpaid, 
Again if judicial proceedings become necessary 
we should naturally say that M. and S. ought to ins tit- 
ute a single joint action, obtain a, single joint judg- 
ment and carry through a single joint execution for 
the full sum. But suppose joint proceedings are out of 
the question, for example, one of the creditors, say M., 
is absent or refuses to concur in the institution or 
maintenance of the pxmadadtmgx action, our natural 
sense supports the view that the other pa creditor 
should be allowed to take separate action for the re- 
covery of his proportionate a1a share of the debt, 
All this amounts to saying that the right 
arising from an activetsimplettxxxxxammaidarja joint 
contract naturally leads to partition, and if it is 
desired to render the co.- creditors entitled correally, 
the contract must be specially framed so as to achieve 
this result, 
(b ) On the other hand if under a joint contract M, 
and S, owe T. a sum of money, but they are not specially 
bound singuli in solidum, our impressions as to the 
e,g,by placing a bag containing the coin in the physical 
E.elirsto of both M, and S,`; by payment to their common agent; 
-, by making payment to one say M,, on behalf of both, M, 
having an express or implied mandate to act for S. in the 
matter, 
Z) -e., not containing any express statement, that the cred- 
itors are entitled singuli in solidum or that they are 
entitled pro rata.' 




natural result are quite different Tnere is certainly 
no necessity for M and S. to join in making payment of 
the amount due, for T,ts interest is equally satisfied 
from whatever source the payment comes,- whether from 
M. and S, jointly, or from one of them alone, or from a 
third party intervening on behalf of both or of either,' 
Again if judicial proceedings become necessary, we- -migh 
we might ve tempted to say that if 
possible T. ought to sue M. and S, together in a single 
joint actionf iut this carries us little way, for we 
immediately ask, will such as action lead to a single 
condemnation against M. and S. jointly of to separate 
condemnations against each pro rata, or to separate con- 
demnations against each in solidumÇ, Again if a single 
joint condemnation is pronounced, can the same be execit- 
ed against either in solidum or must it be executed 
against each pro rata? Moreover, if a joint action 
against both is out of the question, say one of them is 
absent or is so hopelessly insolvent that it would be 
plainly useless to sue him, we feel bound to hold that 
the other may be sued alone. But this again carries us 
but little way, for we immediately ask, can this action 
be in solidum or must it be pro rata merely? 
In order then to arrive at the natural effect 
of a passive simple joint contract, we must approach the 
subject from another side, M. and S have promised to 
satisfy a certain interest pertaining to T,, and they 
have promised to satisfy this interest in its entirety,' 
If M. and S. are both present and both are solvent, it 
may be thought moro equitable that T, ° s claim should be 
directed against them pro rata.. But if one of them, say 
M,, be absent or insolvent, on what principle can the 
other, S,, refuse to pay more than a proportionate share 
of the debt, and thus seek to transfer to T,ts shoulders 
the loss arising from Molts default? S, has undertaken 
34 §. 5otd 
entire 
to satisfy a certain /interest pertainigg. to T.', and 
though he has assumed this liability in conjunction 
with N.' and though under normal circumstances the 
burden may in equity be distributed between them, yet if 
M. makes default, T,, we believe, must on a natural con- 
struction of the contract bear the entire burden himself,- 
That is to say, a tat passive joint contract naturally 
leads to zaktrizx oorreality , and if partition is intended 
GG 
jI 
this result must specially be provided for the terms 
of the agreement, 
The foregoing remarks are of a perfectly gen- 
eral nature and, as we shall presently see, technical 
considerations may militate against their application 
in the case of formal z ±xxatz negotia.' Nevertheless 
this divergence in natural tendency between the two 
classas of joint contract is a fact of first rate import- 
ance and constantly asserts when not counteracted by 
other fórces. 
A further point is to be noted, In the case 
of passive joint contracts we have suggested the equity 
of granting the co.:debtors a beneficium divisionis 
where both are present and solvent, As might be expected 
however the civil law admitted no such equitable device; 
if correality were established its effects must be carr- 
ied out consistently, so that the creditor was entitled 
to exact the full prestation from either debtor under all 
circumstancesó True this rule was altered by statute 
in the case of co- accessory debtors! but it remained 
intact right through the classical period in the case of 
co- principal debtors and all indications to the contrary 
04.1 
Sponsores and fidepromissores taken bound in Italy were 
accorded an 'eventual partition' by the la lex Furia, and 
fideiussores d- a a, 3e-ra-t) a beneficium divisiones 
under Hadrian's rescript. YL. 
/A/.4 v` ,/f-4.7X 
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in the Digest must be attribued to the compilorso J 
A creditor was however 
at perfect 
liberty to 
to split up his claim among his correal debtors if he so m 
chose; this right is everywhere taken for granted and no 
proof thereof need be adduced,',, The only point that calls 
for remark is Levy's suggestion that only by aid of the 
f 
maxims tot esse stipulationes quot mmm summae Bunt totque 
1 
esse stipulationes quot species im cunt, was a creditor 
able to sue for part of a sum of money (or for part of 
a quantity of other fungibles or for a pro indiviso 
share of ER a determinate species) due to him under a 
single stipulation. Applying this doctrine to the case 
of a correal stipulation, we have the result that if T; 
stipulates for X from M. and S. correally, and he sues 
M, for VI and S. for IV, the original correal stipulation 
must be deemed to consist of two separate stipulations 
one for VI from M. and another for IV from k S,' 
Though obviously it would be out of the question 
to argue the point at length here, I venture to empress 
the strongest doubts as to the soundness of Levy's views 
on this matter. Any obligation having as its prestatioti. 
objemt certa pecunia or oerta res is by its nature 
capably of being divided 'vertically' into any number of 1 
lesser obligations at the pleasure of the creditor with- 
out any necessity of com-side -ring the originating cause of 
obligation^so divided, Again if T. having an obligatooy 
right to X against M., brings an actio certae pecuniae 
....- 
As to the beneficiuu div 
ision_is between co- principal debtors see Levy, ZSS, 37, p,i 
K 26 n02; also infra p. Z 3Y 
2) 
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credi tae thus: si paret Ma.evium Ti do sex dare oportere, 
could any one suggeiîthat such action was not competent 
or that it consumed T.'s right to the whole X? 
Assuredly not; T. Having a right to X is by the nature 
of things entitled to sue M for VI meanwhile, nis claim 
for the remaining IV being preserved intact. Hence it 
seems altogether superfluous to invoke the maxims cited; 
37 f 6 Joint Stipulations, Simple and 
Correa], 
In the case of formless negotia the condition pre- 
cedent to the establishment of a joint contract is purely 
namely, that all the various parties shall loutxm have acte 
with a common intention in the matter, when we come 
to a strictly formal negotium like stipulation, obviously 
a common intention is not enough; a form must be employed 
which will outwardly mark the act as consisting not of 
two or more separate stipulations but of a, single joint 
one,' 
Now the simplest form of joint stipulatory act is 
lemalEszig no doubt as follows: 
form a (passive) Titius: Naevi, Soi, decem dari spondetis? 
Maevius et Seius (simul): spondemus 
g. fix 
'(active) Ni, et S, (simul) : 
4 
decem dari spondes? 
T. : spondeo. 
And in point of fact it nas been conjectured that such 
z) 
was the original 2 form of joint stipulation. No 
reliance can however be placed on this conjecture, for, 
as we know, simplicity is by no means a necessary char- 
acteristic of primitive legal forms, But in any event 
43 
this was not the form em Toyed in classical times for 
creates correality; akx there is every reason to 
believe that the jurists held the same to be productive 
of partition,' 
The leading authority on this point is 
D01(45.2)11,,11, 2. Papinian., XI respons,' 
3 
1 Cum tabulis esset comprehensum 'ilium et ilium centum 
aureosstipulatos' neque adiectum 'its ut duo rei 
stipulandi essent', virilem partem singuli stipulati 
vide'oantur. 
2 Et e contrario cum ita cautum inveniretur:'tot aureos/ 
" h, z". 
2) see e.g. Merkel, Der rómisch,..rechtle eeriff d, ' Novatio 
(1892) p.15;x1mx cp. Levy, Sponsio, p.39, n.2' 
;) Papinian presumably wrote 'sestercia'. 
 
I) 
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reste dari stipulatus est Iulius Carpus, spopondimus 
ego Antoninus Achilleus et Cornelius Dius', partes 
viriles deberi, quia non fuerat adiectum singulos in 
solidum spopondismps, ita ut duo rei promittendi fierent, 
It seems impossible to doubt the substantial 
w 
genuineness of these tko responsa, and it seems equally 
impossibly to doubt that they give a true representation 
of the law as actually existing in Papinian's day.' I 
zimar opinion z) 
cannot by any means accept Levy's zzggmmtimx that the 
word 'videbantur' suggests 'a view lying the past and 
moreover clearly betrays some uncertainty'. We must 
remember that under the classical law a cautio stipulat- 
oria served mwrely to prove a contract clothed in the 
solemn oral form of question and answer; the formal 
constitutive cause of obligation lay solely in the 
verba used on the occasion of the oral solemnity. - 
Papinian is here Kim& asked for opinions on two caut-- 
iones which state respectively that two parties stip- 
ulated jointly and two parties promised jointly, xiikomt 
but which do not contain any words implying the con- 
stitution of a correal relation. His answers were to 
the effect that oautiones so framed could only be regard 
ed as evidence of verbal contracts it which pro rata 
shares had been stipulated for or promised. By means of 
the words 'stipulati videbantur' (= ï7r 1W4v «S fQ'd(VO C 
Papinian reports in somewhat Greoised form his own prev- 
ious decisions as to the evidential effect of the words 
We have of course no guarantee that i2 immediately foll- 
owed 1 in Papinian's Responsa, and the compilors may 
have made some formal adjustments of the text.` As the 
thstand, apparently 'videbanturr inl must serve as 
e principal verb of f2 likewise, so that in the first 
case it has a personal subject 'singuli', and in the 
second an impersonal subject 'partes viriles'; but such 
an inelegance is hardly to be expected of Papinian; we$ 
also note the use of the singular 'virilem partem' in fit 
and the plural'partes viriles' in £ 2, It seems more 
probabletherefore that 2 did not immediately follow t 1 
in Papinian's Responses, and that 'partes viriles deberi' 
was originally governêd by a 'respondi'.' 
Z 
o Konko p. 180, 




of the dxgammxtx first documents 
But what is the inference with regard to the 
form of the oral stipulation? Plainly this, that if 
the framework of a stipul -4tion is simply joint and no 
more, the result will be partition; if correality is 
intended, it must be expressly provided for. ° But the 
clearest example of a stipulation simply joint and no 
more would seem to be form a above; hence we con$lude 
that this form produces partition 
How then is correality to be expressly proa 
'c 
vided for an a stipulatory formula? We have no diffia4ix 
ulty in conjecturing how this question should be answer- 
ed. The interrogatory must be f framed 'distributively', 
that is to say, each of the several debtors must be ask- 
ed whether he will render the whole prestation to the 
common creditor, each of the several creditors muse ask 
the common debtor whether he (the debtor) will render 
the whole prestation to him (the particular creditur)A 
Now doubtless an interrogatory consisting of a 
single question may be distributively framed thus: 
-e. 
form. b (passive) T.: Maevi, Sei, uterclua vestrum decem dari spondet? or 
singuli decem dari spondetis? of the like. 
YL, f 
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M0et S0(simul): Titi, utrique nostrum decem dart spondes? 
or noble singulis decem dari spondee? 
or the like. 
But this form of distributive interrogatory, though its 
efficacy cannot be denied, was not that commonly employed, 
so far as our evidence goes. The form actually used in 
practice consisted of two questions each put to, or by, 
one of the several debtors or tredi tors individually, 
the second question being connected with the first by 
means of some inflexion of idem or is, so that both 
were shown to be parts of one and the same interrogatory 
Idem and is I consider to have precisely the same effecgt 
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*.thus: 
fog G (passive) Te: Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, eadem decem (ea decem, idem, id) dari spondee? 
(active) M0: Titi, decem dari spondee? 
S.: Titi, eadem decem (e tc l dari spondes? 
r 
This foem of distributive interrogatory with double quest, 
ions was greatly to be  preferred. to the previous ó n, 
the ground of distinctness, and for this reason 1 venture 
to regard it as the original and orthodox formula, of the 
civil law, any other formula being admitted merely through 
tolerance of the classical jurisprudence,' 
As regards the framework of the response, the 
essential point is that 'acquiescence? in the terms of 
the interrogatory must clearly be expressed. The interaa 
rogatory being distributively framed, it would appear that 
a simple non -distributive response: 
,form d (passive) Meet S. (simul) : spondemus 
(active) Te': spondeo, 
is sufficient. But this form, it seems clear, was not 
that commonly employed, In the passive case two separ- 
ate answers were in practice given, which answers appar- 
ently need not be connected by an inflexion of idem or is, 
their relation to the same interrogatory being a suffic- 
ient connection; in the active case the common form 
appears to have been a single answer in distributive 
form; thus:' ' 
.. .._. 
(e td from foot of previous page) 
that their insertion had any immediate connection with 
thÑ exclusionas is commonly supposed (see,e.g, H01 
Kruger, ZSS. 22,pe217). The distinction between idem= is 
(then same as something already mentioned) and idem = 
unus (one and the same ) should be Rattmaa4xthoughxktxtax 
milmst noted. 
The preciso function of idem (is) and the effect of its 
omtssion will be considered when we come to deal with 
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T,: utrique vestrum dare spondeo or 
vobis singulis dare spondeo or the like. 
A double response in the active : Maevi, spondeo .. Sei, 
spondeo' would however be quite unexceptionable, Ix By 
means of these forms 'acquiescence' in the distributive 
interrogatory is very clearly expressed,' 
Thus we arrive at the common form of oorreal stip- 
ula.tion substantially petrayed in Inst, ITT,'16 pr, 
r) 
orm f (passive) T,; Maevi, decem dare spondes? 
Sei, eadem decem dare spondes? 
spondeo 
S,: spondeo 
(active) Titi, decem dare spondes? 
Titi, eadem decem dare spondes? 
T,: utrique vestrum dare spondeo, 
If our speculations be sound we have accordingly 
Is 
two dg#.tinct forms of joint stipulation. 
(i)the simple joint form xxtx *ftxxx (form a) with non- 
distributive interrogatory, which produces partition, and 
(ii) the correal joint form (forms b .. f) with distributive 
interrogatory, which produces correality and which we call 
the correal stipulation. 
It will be observed that in the foregoing expositinn 
partition appears as the normal result of a passive, as 
well as of an active, joint stipulation; in both cases 
If the interrogatory be non -distributively framed, the 
fact of the response being distributively cannot, it is 
thought, render the stipulation as a whole distributive 
so as to give it correal effect, for the ppose of the 
response is merely to express acquiescence in the inter- 
rogatory; indeed a distributive response given to a non - 
distributive interrogatory might render the whole act null 
and void on the ground of 'non- a,cquiescenceg' ; cp, infra 
p. '6 
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alike correality is an abnormal result which calls for 
the use of a special distributive formul41 But we have 
already seen that a, passive joint contract naturally letds 
to correality; wherefore then this artificial departure 
4,441.;a 
from thefnatural j;endency of juridical -oaae}? The only 
possible explanation seems to be that the rule in favour 
of partition formed part of the old civil law tradition, 
being established long uefore the days of maturepristio 
xxf3xxtxx reflection,' The co- debtors have bouhd themselves 
collectively to render a certain prestation; hence, it was 
naively concluded, individually each can owe only a part 
of this prestation. 
Be this as it may, the position seems clear that 
as regards the antithesis oorroality v, partition the 
active and the passive joint stipulations were governed 
by precisely the same rules. Yet signs are not wanting 
that even here the divergency in natural tendency some- 
times made itself felt; an excellent example is found 
in the cautio damni infecti, J It is however only when 
we get into the realm of formless negotia that we see 
the natural tendency of the two classes of joint contract 
operating respectively without restraint 
Finally we have to note that in practice it is 
hardly conceivable that parties should employ a joint form 
of stipulation, active or passive, unless they intended 
to produce correality; if they intended to produce partit- 
ion their obvious course was to enter into separate stip 
x1x±kxxxx 
ulationso Thus the whole doctrine that a simple joint 
stipulation leads to partition comes to be little more than 
a pitfall for the unwary. The case in which the antithesis 
c-ty v. partition assumes vital importance is where 
a creditor or debtor dies leaving co- heirs, but this case 
does not fail within the scope of our present enquiry. 
> Another explanation which may suggest itself to some is nabt 
in my opinion, tenable, namely, that the passive joint 
stipulation macAmakoixtaxpixakmma simply framed was held to 
produce partition by way of analogy to the active joint 
(ctd at foot of next page) 
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4 7 Authorities. 
r 
(i) Papinian. D.(45.2)11.1,2 has already been considered. 
2 
( *) Inst.III.16 pr., 1 will be considered later. 
(3) D.(45.3)29 Paul. LXXII ad edict. 
Si communie servus sic stipulatus sit: 'decem 
domino, eadem decem alteri dare spondes ?t, dicemus 
duos reos esse stipulandi. 
Much of the Digest -title de stipulatione 
servorum (45.3) is concerned with the case of a stipulat- 
ion by a servus communia, and the analogy of this case 
with that of an active joint stipulation is apparent.' 
The general principle clearly was that if a common slave 
stipulated .on behalf of both masters, each of the latter 
acquired a pro rata right, though in certain cases a doubt 
existed as to whether auch rights maxaxpra was pro parte 
virili or pro parte dominica Y On the other hand, as tka 
our present fragment shows, it was perfectly well recog- 
nised that a common slave might, by using a distributilie 
simplex formula: 
decem Maevio meo domino eadem decem Selo, meo domino, 
dari spondes? 
confer correal rights on his masters. 
But the distributive simplex ie 
just d clearly corresponds to the distributive joint 
M.: decem dari spondes? S,: eadem decem dari spondes? 
(c td from foot of previous page) 
stipulation where the natural result was partition," The 
passive joint stipualtion must,' believe, be much more 
ancient than the active (Rap= vide supra p.22 ), so that 
any argument from the latter to the former is excluded,' 
2 
Levy, xonk., p, "180f. I cannot here enter into a discussion 
of this case. Tile reader is referred to Lenel, 
p.'527 (where the formula of the cautio is given); Paul,' 
D;(39.2)27; (11,'1) 20.'2. 
1) supra p. 37 W 
2) infra p. GG j, ?it/. 
3, 
/apt compare Ulpian h. t. 7 pr. and Pomponius kt h,t.' 37.' 
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Likewise the non -distributive simplex formula: 
Maevio et Selo, mois dominis, decem dari spondes?-ter, 
the lixe, which produced partition, clearly corresponds 
to the non -distributive joint formthla: 
M. et S, (simul) : Titi, decem dari spondes? 
A fresh piece of evidence is thus obtained that a simple 
joint stipulation produces partition, a special distrib- 
utive form being required in order to produce oorreality, 
D;(45;2)8 Ulpian, I responso' 
His verbis: °eaque praestari stipulanti tibi spopondimas'' 
Einteresse quid inter contr ahentes actum sit: nana si duo 
rei fasti Sint, eum qui absens fuit non teneri, praesent.- 
em autem in solidum esse obligatum, ( aut si minus, in 
partem fore obstrictumß3 
Here, as in Fapiniane Dq(45Q2) l_10 2, we have a 
cautio stipulatoria purporting to record a passive joint 
stipulation, but without any words indicating that the 
debtors were taken bound singuli in solidum,' Prima faoïe 
therefore we must, applying Papinian's decision, treat 
the cautio as evidence of a joint stipulaio in non - 
distributive form: 
T,": Maevi, Sei, decem dari spondetis? 
with partition as the result. 
The case in our present fragment however 
presents a speciality of grave consequence,' One of the 
two parties, M and Se, mentioned in the document as 
joint promisors, say M is proved not to have been pres- 
ent when the contract was concluded, and hence he cannot 
have taken part in the oral solemnity, In other words 
the oautio stipulatoria is proved to be false in a cert- 
ain respect,' No joint stipulation between T. on the one 
side and M. and S. on the other can have taken pawl 
place, and the document must be construed as attesting 
Lu_ 
merely a simplex stipu ition by T. from S, who admittedly 




law, M, ', having taken no part in the verbal stipulation, 
originating 
is not bound at all, for the /cause of obligation is the 
oral solemnity and that alone, The question then arises, 
is S. bound in solidum or pro rata? 
Now consider how this question is solved in the 
,it is held, 
fragment as it stands, We must /enquire what the parties 
really intended by the words quoted k from the document, 
If they intended to constitute M. and S. correal debtors, 
S. is liable in solidum; if they did not, he is liable 
only pro rata, That such a decision never proceeded from 
the pen of Ulpian we may assert with the utmost confidence' 
Here the document is plainly assumed to have per se a dia- 
positive value, and must be interpreted so as to bring out 
the real intentions of parties. The clausula stipulator. 
is itself is indecisive on the question of correality or 
partition, and accordingly we have to construe it in the 
1 ight of maxlmxásxaxthis remaining contents of the 
document and any other relevant facts showing the parties' 
intentions in the matter,' If it is thus ascertained that 
cozoality was intended, then- obviously S,' remains liable 
in solidum, though M. is detracted. All this, as we shall 
(4.4 Gyu Arta wet` 
, 
( see later,Jis perfectly good Justini,anian law, but it oert., 
, a,inly is not classical. 
S. 
Again the fragment bristles with formal defects: 
the phrase tinter contrahentes' is characteristically 
Tribonianian; the construction this verbis...interesse 
quid.. ,actum sit', this verbis' being governed by f 'actum 
es-44k, AL(tai, f1- 
sit' is harsh; after 'name j , nd 
t- ,03 led for; the concluding passage taut 
obstrictum' is inelegant in the extreme,' 
If however we delete the passages 'interesseg1,',' 
shit' and taut obstrictum', we get what was almost 
certainly Ulpian's decision, namely, that M. is not bound 
-4- F z wig. 
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but S. is bound in solidum, Though, assuming both M. 
and S. to have participated in the oral solemnity, the 
words of the document must be interpreted as evidence 
of a simple joint stipulation recul ping in partition, 
yet when it is proved that actually the stipulation was 
between T. and S. alone, the whole trestation promised 
is due by the latter. As to the soundness of this 
decision, no one will, I venture to think, entertain any 
doubt, 
D,'(45,12)4 Pomponius XXIV ad Sabin, 
7t 3) 3 4) 
Duo miler 7 promi ttendi <---, sive i ta <`> inter- 
9 rogati t <"pondetis? t, respondeant -7 tspondeot, 
Ì 1 ) aut I sive i ta 4.-- interrogati 
/°) 
e spondes? t respondissen.t <-- 7 t spondemus', recto obligantur 
l Sabinus ait 
2, 
duos reos 
3% ita interrogandos esse ut a, singulis tota res stipulatori 
ka debeatur, sed parvi Interesse utrum simul interrogentur 
vel respondeant an separatim,' quamvis =tam igitur ita 
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It seems impossible now to decide with any 
certainty wherein the original signifaeance of this 
awkward fragment lay ;' . If we delete the words 
'aut "spondemus "' as a gloss, we seem to have a 
reference to the rule that the response must be 
' congruent' with the interrogatory : this rule of 
'congruence' is not broken where the debtors reply 
in the singular to a question put in the plural 
and vice versa.' Emendations of this sort are 
however of quite an arbitrary nature, and we are 
bound to ask ourselves whether no other interpret- 
ation is possible. 
Taking the text of the fragment as it 
stands, we at once note the fact that three cases 
are mentioned: (i) wnere the creditor puts a single 
question in the plural (spomdetis?) and the debtors g 
give separate answers in the singular ( spondeo); 
(ii) where the 4reditor puts a single question in 
the plural (spondetis ?) and the debtors give a single 
answer in the plural ( spondemus); (iii) where 
the creditor puts separate questions in the singular 
(spondee?) and the debtor gives a single answer 
in the plural (spondemus), Nothing however is 
said of the fourth case where the creditor puts 
separate questions in the singular (spondes), 
and the debtors give separate answers in the 
singular (spon_deo). 
Is it not possible that here we have the 
clue to the original purport of the fragment? 
..._____-r 
J41.-4 fr.ro 
it is ha.,dly likely that a single answer 'spondeo3 
given by both speaking together is referred too 
48 
S 
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May not Pomponius have been dealing with the necess- 
ity of a distributive form in order to exclude 
partition? May not the substance of his argument 
nave bean that though the form aß with double 
question and double answer was the one regularly 
used, yet any of the other three forms referred to 
would suffice? If we adopt this suggestion we 
are bound to give the single question 'spondetis ?' 
a distributive force, which can easily be done by 
introducing ' singuli'. 
In the notes I have ventured an altogether 
conjectural restoration based on the foregoing 
suggestion. The structure of the fragment as it 
stands cannot be described as particularly eleg- 
ant, and I think it possible that Pomponius commenc- 
ed with a quotation from Sabinus and then gave 
explanations of his own. 
Assuming that Pomponius's argument was such 
as I have supposed, it is easy to understand why 
the compilors mutilated the same. Under the 
Justinianian law, as existing at the times when the 
r) 
Digest was compiled, the question whether a joint 
stipulation produced correality or partition 
depended, not on any formal words used, but on the 
real intentions of parties. 
avo en. ex - au 
Cum duR eandem pecuniam aut p miserint aut 
stipulati aunt, ipso re et singili in 
solidum debentur atxx galixdahant et singuli 
dak: at debent: : eoque petitions acceptilatione 
unius totaa,s'lvitur obligatio. 
As this fragment stands, it seems to cont- 
ai a general statement that where two parties 
fe,r, t+ r. VI, vriex-,44-' 
/ay 
GL'&-I Y.W !t. !/ - 
st' 3 q, fv2iL, al. 
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(6) D.(45.2)2 Savolen. III ex Plaut. 
Cum duo eandem pecuniam (aut promiserint aut j 
C8tipu1at<7sunt, ipso iure t] singuli in 
z 
solidum EebentuJ'- Let singuli debentJ : 
ideoque peti uione acceptilationeunius tuta 
solvii,ur obligatio. 
As this fragment stands it seems to contain a, 
general statement that when two parties promise or 
stipulate for the same sum of money, they are ipso lure 
correal ax zK debtors or olattxxx creditors; nothing 
is said as to the necessity of a joint stipulation 
distributively framed. The hand of the compilors is 
however nere evident.' The'final clause 'ideoque,.. 
ooliga,tio' makes it plain that Javolen only dealt with 
the active relation, and we must therefore delete all 
references to the passive relationi', M.e subjunctive 
'promiserint' standing side by side with the indicative 
'stipulati cunt' in the same clause, is another matk of 
interpolation; again the expression 'singuli in solidum 
debentur' is clearly impossible. 
But was jr may Javolen have written? T venture 
to think that ne dealt with the case of two adstipulatores 
acceding to the same principal obligation; As we know, 
the compilors frequently altered 'adstipulari' to 'stipules 
4 
ari' 0, Farther discussion of this fragment is accordingly 
reserved for my study on Accessoriality. 
,t +.t i (Z,G.4-t ---- 
actionem habent 
Mommsen: acceptilationeve 





50 8 (aorreaiity) v. Novation 
The classical law of novation by stipulation may 
briefly be explained by means of the following illustr- 
ation: An obligation has already been constituted 
between T. as creditor and M as debtor for the sum of 
X, the manner of constitution being immaterial. TA 1 now 
stipulates from a third party S, thus: 
T.: Sei, ( eadem, ea) ) decem quae Maevius mihi 
debet (spopondit, promisit, quae TJiaevium mihi 
dare oportet ex causa furti, etc), dari spondes? 
S.: spondee, 
Or a third party S,, with Tots authority, stipulates from 
M., thus: 
S.: Maevi, (eadem,ea) decem quae Titio debes (etc) dari 
spondee? 
M.: spondeo. 
In the first case (form g) M. is freed and S. steps into 
64. 
riffs pace as sole debtor; this we call passive novation. 
In the second place (form h) T.'s right is extinguished 
and S. steps into his place as sole creditor; this we 
call active novation. 
The formal requisites of novatio therefore are 
(i) diversity of constitutive cause; the obligation to be 
novated must first be constituted and then the novatory- 
obligation must be constituted a fresh cause; and (ii) 
j These words have merely a demonstrative value and are not 
2) 
in any way necessary; the identifying factor is thaxmaxxx 
the clause 'quae M. mihi debet',`(Idem, id) quod'may be 
substituted for t(eadem, ea) decem quae,' but proof will 
then be required as to how much M. did actually owe T. 
As to the equivalence of idem and is vide p. 
This material condition is clearly essential because T. 
cannot be deprived of his right without his consent; if it 
is not fulfilled, the second stipulation will either be 
void or will produce an obligation related cumulatively 
to the pre -existing obligation; we cannot nere discuss 
under what circumstances the one or the other of these 
results will take place, 
_ 
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identification of the object of the second obligation 
with that of the first; properly speaking this identifi- 
Maevius 
cation should be express (quae/kar mihi debet, quae Titio 
debes), but under certain circumstances it will be implied 
by law, 
If these requisites are fulfilled, novation 
takes place ipso lure, and the parties oannot, we believe, 
prevent this result by introducing into the stipulatory 
formula any modifications which the law itself does not 
xszagnicas 
recognise, Suppose, for example, T ®were to stipulate 
thus: Sei, ea.dem decem quae Maevius mihi debet, tu quoque 
(or praeter Maevium) dari spondes ?, in our opinion this 
stipulation would be legally void,l) The intention of -4& 
parties here is to add S, as a co- debtor with Vit,, but 
such intention is futile under the civil law, because of 
the legal rule that a promise by S,` of 'idem quod N,` debet' 
novates the pre -existing obligation of MST The parties 
have introduced into a formula to which the law attributes 
novatory effect words designed to prevent this effect, 
but the law frustrates such design oy nullifying the whole 
transaction, 
Obviously the correal stipulation, being designed 
to create two coexisting obligations, stands directly 
opposed to the novatory which creates a new obligation 
to take the place of one already constituted. The basis 
il contra (apparently) Levy, Konk, D 176 n.5 
z) We cannot here attempt to prove the 12 foregoing pro- 
positions or to enquire how far, if at all, the mature 
classical jurisprudence admitted derogations from civil 
law principles. In my future treatise on Accessoriality 
I shall shthw cause for believing that the classical 
jurisprudence admitted such a derogation in order to allow 
a sponsor or fidepromissor to be taken bound separately 
from his principal; cp, meanwhile my restoration of 
D,(45,2)3 pro infra pe g , As to the post -classical 
and Justinianian law of novation vide infra pe 
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of the distinction is above all doubt. While thartxxxx 
novatory and the novated Atk d ttx i obligations nec- 
essarily arise from different xxxxkXÌ constitutive causes, 
the two co- existing obligations making up a correal relat- 
ion arise from one and the same constitutive cause, namely, 
a single joint stipulation. 
This contrast enables us to see clearly wherein 
the jointness of a stipulatory act with a plurality of 
parties on the one side or the other consists, namely, in 
0 
the requirement that the interroge t.ry, addressed to or 
by the various parties, must be complete before any 
response is given. Of course when the interrogatory 
xoxx :xtm comprises merely a single question, the fulfil. 
ment of this condition is a matter of course, and the 
only case which we have to observe is where the interrog- 
atory is divided into two or more questions. Here if 
one question is put and the answer given thereto before 
the other question is put, they, even though the other 
question and answer follow at once, the result is two 
simplex stipulations and not a single joint one. All 
this is explained with perfect lucidity in Inst.III.io pr. 
As regards the response, even though the answers 
Isimxgaxaxxsayxxxtaky 
be given separately the one after the other, the second 
answer cannot possibly have any novatory effect,because 
it relates to a question put before the first answer was 
given. Tne two answers relate to one and the same 
interrogatory; hence the fact of their not being given 
precisely at the same moment is ignored and the two 
obligations are deemed to arise simultaneously. 
(1) 
53 9 e c.d u 
Inst. III. 16 pr.,1 will be considered later, 
E 
(2) D,'(45,2)3 pr. Ulpian, XLVII ad Sabin, 
w 1) c( In Cduobus reis promittendi, <'- ' frustra z timetur 
novatio 
9 
nam licet ante prior responderit poster:_ or etei 
ex intervallo accipiatur (consequons est dicer° 
pridtinam obligationem durare et sequentem accedere J 
3)/ pond°ant] 4> < +7V 
parvi refert sinro.1<'> zaffi xaxnxt <"'? Xn 
separati..m Im .ffigttatxx psrrmi ttar,ta 
,clIum 
[hoc ac tum 
inter eos sit <r`'1u t ['duo rei ](^rylonstituantur <^' % 
L 
necue,< -w ulla novatio Lfiet, <^'> 
d' 
r, 
Every one will admit that this principium 
has suffered greatly at the hands of the compilers, and 
in my opinion it originally referred, not to the relation 
of duo rei promittendi at all, to that principal 
sponsor° vol fidepromissore ge,toa adieiendo 






vel fidepromittat -a-, _ . 
) 
6J ita interrogetur 









debtor and sponsor or fidepromissor. 
In the first place I observe that almost all 
the hot fragments we posses from the forty seventh book 
of Ulpian's Sabinus commentary have some relation to 
suretyship, and there is apparently a close connection 
z 
between this pr® and D.(46.1)6. In the second place 
any suggestion that a classical correal stipulation could 
result in novation is absurdo In the third place the 
opening words of period«. 'in duks reis promittendi' 
standing alone are uarsh,- a gerundive 'constituendis' or 
'faciendis' should have been added, In the fourth 
place the statement in period, that solidarity could be 
created by thaxwititimaxaxxxxammulxmtipukattam the 
accession of a fresh obligation to one already constituted 
is now universally admitted to be interpolated in accord- 
ance with Justinian's constitution 0.(8,41(42))8, In the 
forth place period, as it stands is obviously impossible 
and there can be little doubt that the compilers have here 
made an exceedingly clumsy adaptation of Ulpa.in's original 
text. Finally the whole ;xis pr., however inelegant its 
diction, is perfectly intelligible from the standpoint 
3) 
of the Justinianian law, as we shall see later,' 
Believing as we do that Ulpian's original text 
reserve 
related to sponsio and fidepromissio, we shalldpentit 
detailed discussion thereof for our tveatise on Accessor - 
q 
iality, We have however noted meanwhile certain sggested 
restorations which, if substantially welllfounded are of 
immense importance for a proper understanding of the inst- 
itutes of sponsoo and fidepromissio, 
t) km= Lenel, Pal. II col01183, adds the following note: 
sitilis quaestio oritur si postea adpromissor adiciatur, 
cum expromissio isdem verbis fieri possit atque adpro- 
missio, 
L) see Lenel 1,c; and Kruger Dig. 
3) infra p, 
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(3) D,(46,1)43 Pomponius VII ex var. lecte 
oc Si a Titio stipulatus Lnideiussoremj<te Kmtxxxxx 
acceperim, deinde eandem pecumiam ab Lalio stin- 








y Fi C-? Econfideiussoreq<7--->Lnoril erunt <--7 Cquia1^' 
/o, 
diversarum stipulationv.zarfideiussores<^7 met sunt. 
Undoubtedly this fragment prima facie conflicts 
with our doctrine regarding novation Naturally inter- 
preted it means that if I first stipulate from T,: decem 
dari spondes ?, and take you bound as fideiussor, and then 
I stipulate from a thitd party Mp: ( eodem) decem quae 
Ti tïus mihi &xum dare spopondit, dari spondes ?, and 
take a fourth. party S. bound as fideiussor, in such case 
you and S.4 are not co-fideiussors (for the purpose of 
beneficium divisionis), because you are fideiussors of 




te non liberari pkzxfft constat 
nam duo pluresve sponsores eiusdem debiti separatim 
accipi posse procul dubio est 
proinde 
7,) manixpax consponsores 
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the stipulation from M. must novate the luarxxxxxxxxxxxx 
pre -existing obligation of T,, and hence must free you, 
as Tots fideiussor, altogether® The whole decision thus 
becomes meaningless. 
If we accept the fragment as genuine, the 
only way to get over the difficulty is that suggested by l 
Levy; That is to say, we must suppose the stipulation 
from Ism to have run simply ;d decem dari spondee ?, so that 
formally we have two quite independent obligations decem 
dari between me and To and between me and M. respectively, 
But we must further suppose that materially both these 
obligations are designed to satisfy the same economic 
interest on my part; for example, I have made a single 
loan of X to T., and the subsequent promise by M was 
intended merely to serve as a further security for this 
loan. In such a case the praetor will certainly prevent 
me from recovering more than a sthgle sum of X, so that 
a legal cumulative relation is reduced to equitable 
solidarity,) What Pomponiius decides is that no beneficït 
A 
dimes divisionis can be granted to fideiussore who accede 
to different obligations standing in a merely equitable 
. 
solidary relation to one another,' 
Though the foregoing interpretation cannot be 
pronounced ithpossible, to my mind it appears extraordin- 
arily improbable. I cannot believe that Pompontus would 
here 
inxdidatingxWithxatimastiox have used the expresthion 
'eandem pecuniam' otherwise than to denote a sum of money 
identifies with another sum by means of the stipgclatory î 
formula: kuxdx xdom (eadem) decem quae Titius mihi 
dare spopondit, and such identification, according to 
our theory /produces novation. 
xkdaxxx2xxxiax Sponsio, p, 160 ff, 
q(oV. vide infra po 
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In my opinion then either this fragment must be 
pronounced interpolated or our theory must be revised, 
and I have little hesitation in deciding in favour of the 
former alternative. In the first pllce it is to be ob- 
served that the fragment is perfectly intelligible from 
the standpoint of the Justinianian law, which we know to 
have differed strongly from the classical system in the 
matters of solidarity, suretyship and novation, and this 
fact at once arouses suspicion. In the second place we 
note the inelegancy of 'erunt' and 'aunt' standing in 
suon close proximity each at the end of its clause, and 
also the fact that both these these verbs should be in 
the second person plural. In the third place experience 
teaches us always to be on the lookout for .a substitution 
of fideiussio for sponsio (and fidepromissio), and when 
a passage purporting to deal with the former is in any 
way doubtful the chances of this substitution are greatly 
magnified. 
In point of fact I believe that Pomponius's 
original argument must have referred to the case where 
I first stipulate from TQ1 and take you bound as sponsor, 
and then I stipulate again for the same prestation from 
the same T.4F and take another party bound as a second 
sponsors I have suggested in the notes a possible 
restoration, but detailed considetation of this case 
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D.(46.'2)8.'5 Ulpian.' XLVI ad Sabin. 
) 
e - v .12 ^ Y Si <-> ab Ca,?.ic)<y romissam <^- sibi Ldoti <^'.? 
maritus -,s ? lab uxore Mi dotis nmmine stipu7_atus sit, 
1) non duplari dotem sed fieri novataonem placet <'> 
Csi hoc actum est: quid enim interest ipsa an alius 
quilibet promittat? 1 
quod enim ego debeo si alius promittat, L1jber me 
9' 
potent) < +, J 
E Csi novationis causa hoc fiat: si autem non novandi 
animo hoc interveni t, uterque quidem tenetur, sed 
altero solvente alter liberatur3 
r. non tarnen si quis stipuletur quod mihi debetur 
aufert mihi actionem, nisi ex voluntate mea xtipastaxi 
s tipuleturo 













i ta ut uxor a marito liberetur 
)) sed verius est dicere debitorem ab uxore lure non 
liberara 
7) liberat me etaimsi nolim 
59 
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This paragraph has evidently undergone funda- 
mental alterations at the hands of the compilors. 
Only the general statements in periods 5.- *9. properly 
fall within the scope of the present treatise. 
That period is entirely due to the compilors 
no one at the present will be inclined to dispute; for 
it states precisely the combined result of Justinian's 
constitutions C.(8.41(42))8 and (8,40(41))28, Further- 
more in my opinion it is practically certain that the 
conclusion of was 'liberat me etiamsi nolim', and 
that Ulpian's argument not ended with S. . The antithesis 
plainly is between passive novation which takJs effect 
irrespective of the wishes of the original debtor,* and 
active novation which requires the original creditor's 
consent. The zotkaitxr compilors, in older to prepare 
the way for have changed the termination of g, to 
'liberare me potest', and they have further constructed 
a new period 
i. 
at the end of the paragraph to set forth 
the rule that the original debtor's consent was not 
necessary to passive novation. 
As the' enim' in S. shows, the statement of the con- 
trast between active and passive novation was intended 
to xxxximm serve as motive for the preceding decision in 
periods ,c, and 
C, 
But in these latter periods also the 
compilors' hands are manifest. The words 'si hoc actum 
est' in 
l', 
are now generally to be interpolated on the 
ground of 0.1(8.41(42))8, and I have no hesitation in 
deleting thm as well the rhetorical question which makes 
up the remainder of the period. Again as regards X. 
there can be little doubt that the g words 'promissam 
sibi doten' originally ran 'dictam sibi doti', and 
this bo co there can be equally little doubt that the 
compilors have fundame t tT recast Ulpian's statement 
9 vide infra ¿j. 220, 23 f. 
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of facts. 
Further discussion of this paragraph properly 
belongs to treatises on dotal law and novation; my 
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By cumulation. we mean the co- existence of two 
obligations in such a relation that no fact bearing on 
the one alone has an 'extensive' action on the other,' 
From the standpoint of the oive1 law, this signifies 
that litiscontestation under the one has no consuming 
effect on the other; without extensive process-consumpt- 
did extensive 
ion the civil law /dmax not 
) 
dmit /ampm solutio- consumption. 
But, as we shall see later, the classical jurisprudence 
did recognise a relation in which solutio, but not 
litiscontestatio had extensive x.consuming effect ' 
r24-44  `s-e da 41 
In this section we have to consider what is the 
element in the correal stipulation which excludes cumul- 
ation. The distinction between generic and specific 
z) 
prestation -objects must here be taken into account. 
A. Obligations with generic prestation -object. 
Let us consider in the first place the ordinary 
of joint interrogatory with double questions: 
3) 
Maevi, decor dari spondes? 
Sei, eadem decem dari spondes? etc 
It is commonly amid that cumulation is here excluded by ,; 
4J 
the inflexion of idem (eadem), and the literal accuracy 
of this statent is undeniable. M tEa.demt expressly 
identifies the X mentioned in the seton_d with the x monatim 
mentioned in the first, and two cumulative obligations 
can never have one and the same generic prestation.. 
object.' Otherwise stated, the express identification 
of tkmx ±am the two equal generic prestation -objects 
forin 
T . 
ipso facts excludes cumulation. 
The matter does not h ever end there. Let us 
joint 
now cons'der aminterrog <.3Or'y with -'a single distributive 
que s ti o-1 
/infra i. 0-24 
2) vide apra, p. /G 
3) 1,, .17, -du 
-- ° 
(t) h 34 .4".. 
V 
form 1. 
1' ,, 3 9 ,, 
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T.: Ma.evi, Sei, uterque veetrum mihi ( eadem) decem 
dare spondes? 
Suppose 'eadem,be omitted, can it be said that M. and 
S. are liable cumulatively? The answer must, I believe, 
be a decided negative. Why? Simply because a single 
*Eduntxxtkpmk txristipulatory act can never produce obligat. 
in solidum 
ions /which are cumulatively related. The term ' eadem' 
therefore, if inserted, nas no special force at all. 
So in D.(45.3 )29, the stipulation by the common slave 
would, I believe, have precisely the same effect if the 
' eadem' before the second 'decem' were omitted, though 
its elegance would be somewhat impaired. A common 
ad- 
sla ve cannot by a single stipulatory, confer cumulative 
rights in solidum on his co- owhers, and. the ' eadem' 
simply shows that he has no intention of attempting such 
an impossibility. 
Returning now to ±lag form j. we ask wnat would be 
the effect of the omission of 'eadem' in the second 
question? 
4) 
my opinion we must dtmatlax reject any 
theory that tiara this omission would render M. and S. 
it 
liable cumulatively. ghat/actually does is to destroy 
the formal connection of the twb questions as parts of 
one and the same interrogatory, with the result that the 
stipulatory act becomes legally null and voici, either in 
whole or in part. 
Thus, suppose the stipulation to run: 
T.: Idiaevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, decem dari spondes? 
M.1 spondeo 
So: spondeo. 
Iiere between the question to Iii.. and his answer there 
We nave already dismissed the idea that this term has any- 
thing directly to do with the exclusion of partition, so 
that the effect of its omission cannot he to render Y. 
and S. liable pro rata merely; supra p. 31 h I. 
3 
Tif 44e supra p. 
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intervenes a formally uhconnected question to S,, which 
latter question constitutes an aliud negotiumJrendering 
Toits promise legally void on the ground of non -continuity 
of act, On Axg the same ground S, is promise is 
legally void through the intervention of Mots answer 
between the question to him(S.) and his answer. The 
stipulatory act is therefore wholly null and void' 
Suppose however the stipulation to have run: 
T.: Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, decem dari spondes? 
S.; spondeo 
M.: spondee. 
Here S.'s promise is legally valid, because nothing k 
intervenes between the question to him and his answer; 
but M.'s promise is legally void on the same ground as 
before. The stipulation therefore is only partially 
void, a valid simplex obligation,being created. 
We now perceive the possibility of construing 
N 
the teademt in form in a f$agx somewhat fresh light, 
namely, as the link connecting the two parts of one and 
j oint 
the same /interrogatory. If this connection is once 
established the joint interrogatory itself will identify 
the two sums of X as one and the same sum, so that cum- 
ulation is excluded just as if a single question had 
been employed. Moreover the two questions may, we 
think be connected otherwise than by the use of teademt. 
For example, if the stipulation were to run: 
T. : Maevi, decem dari spondes its ut tu et Seius duo 
rei promittendi fiatis? 
Sei, decem dari spondes ita, ut tic tu et Maevius duo 
rei promittendi fiatis ?, 
its validity would seem to be beyond doubt. By far the 
vide infra p. i3, 
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most convenient way of establishing the connection was 
however by means of an inflexion of zdam* idem (is),wnich 
expressly identified the two generic prestation- objects 
as one and the same. 
B. Obligations with specific prestation -objects. 
Though evidence on the point is lacking, we can 
hardly doubt that the proper form of joint stipulation 
with separate questions was: 
form o T. ; Maevi, Stichum servum dari spondes? 
Sei, eundem Stichum servum dari spondes? 
Here however the term 'eundem' is quite incapable of 
excluding cumulation.' It serves indeed expressly to 
identify the Stichus mentioned in the second question 
as the same slave as the Stichus mentioned in the first, 
but two or more obligations with the same specific 
prestation-object may quite well stand in a cumulative 
relation. Moreover any express identification of the 
two Stichus's in the stipulatory formula is really super- 
fluous, Before there can be any possibility of a joint 
stipulation. for Stichus, the 'individuality' of this 
slave must in the first place be ascertained. Here we 
see the difference between a specific prestation -object 
which nas, and a generic prestation -object which has not, 
a concrete existence apart from the stipulation," 
o 
What then is the element in form yí which ex- 
cludes cumulation? Only one answer is possible, namely, 
tne unity of the stipulation itself. Suppose a, xtgke 
single distributive question nad been used: 
T;: Maevi, Sei, uterque vestrum Stichum servum dari 
spondes? 
form p, 
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Any idea that M. and. S. are liable cumulatively must be 
dismissed, and the fact of the interrogatory being split 
up into two separate questions cannot make any difference 
essential 
to the result. The/ la function. of 'e em' is therefore 
to connect the two questions as parts of one and the 
same interrogatory and its omission will, as before, 
have the effect of rendering the stipulatory act legally 
void in whole or in part. 
It is instructive to compare the results 
above attained with the case of novation. 
A. If M. owes X to T. and the latter subsequently 
stipulates from S.': (eadem) decem quae Maevius debet, 
Bari spondes ?, the words 'quae M. debet' expressly 
identify the X promised by S. with the Y.' already due 
by M.' Accordingly Sets promise must novato the pre - 
existing obligation of M., for both cannot cumulatively 
owe the same sum of X. 
B. If M. owes Stichus to T. and the latter subsequently 
stipulates from S,: (eundem) Stichum quern Maevius debet, 
dari spondes ?', the words 'quern M. debet' certainly 
identify the Stichus promised by S. with the Stichus 
already due by M., but this identification does not of 
itself produce novation; it is perfectly possible for 
M. and S. to owe the same slave Stichus cumulatively; 
e, 
In order that novation may here take pace, and thore 
can be no doubt that it did so, the law must give the 
stipulation from So" an import beyond that which it nat- 
urally bears, EzxRÌX;C the import namely that S. here 
assumes the same liability to render Stichus as M had 
previously been udder. 
(1) Inst. III, 16 pr, 
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stipulandi ita, si post omnium interrogationem promissor 
respondeat 'spondeo': 
ut puta, cum duobus separatim stipulantibus ita promissor 
respondeat *atom utrique vestrum dare spondeo': 
nam si prius Ti tio spoponderit, deinde ilio interrogante 
spondeat, alla acque alla eri t obl.gatio nec creduntur 
duo rei stipulandi esse: 
duo pluresve promi 
aureos dare sponde 
spondee ?' responde 
tteridi ita fiunt: ' Nla.evi, quinque 
) 
eY Sei, Eosdem quinque aureos dare 
Q) 
ant sir_guli separatim 'spondeo', 
Tnis important principium nas a bearing on part- 
ition and 
postponed 
novation as well as on cumulation, but we have 
consideration thereof until now in order to 
give a single 
with later. 1) 
exegesis of the whole, 1 will be dealt 
We may safely infer tkxtxtkm from f 2 that the 
whole of this title 'de duobus reis stipulandi et pro - 
mi ttendi' is taken from the eighth book of Florentine's 
Institutes, but there is every reason to believe that the 
compilors have manipulated extensively the classical 
presumably the classical original had 'sestercta' and 
'eadem.', 
vß''1, et resp,; si resp. 'ut interroget stipulator' vel 
simile quid inter ' fiunt' et 'Naevi* a compilatoribus 
male deletum z censet Mommsen. (Krilger, Inst.) 
vide 
infrapx p. 12 7 g 
infra p, /Of 
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oribina1 In particular the pr. seems to contain only 
an abbreviated version of Jams Florentinets exposition, 
designed to give Byzantine students a general idea of 
the correal stipulation which was now quite obsolete in 
paractice.' 
A careful examination of the pr. seems to disclose 
two distinct lines of argument which at the compilorst 
hands have become hopelessly intermingled. These deal 
respectively with (i) the joint form which excludes 
novation and cumulation and (ii) ±tk the distributive 




.and el referring to the active case, 
are immediately connected. The debtor, it is laid down, 
must not reply until the joint interrogatory is complete. 
If he replies to the one creditor before the other has put 
the question, then we have two separate stipulations, 
not a single joint one, and the result cannot be ammutzk 
.) 
correality. 
(ii) By way of contrast to q. and periods 1', and . 
seem to have in view the exclusion of partition. Ind,. 
we note the insistence on separate questions (duobus 
separatim stipulantibus), though the splitting up or the 
interrogatory can have had nothing to do with the exclus- 
ion of novation and cumulation; again in £ the rorm of 
separate questions is realistically portrayed. As 
.y trIZ 
regards the response period ,Agives us a gle answer 
. . 
in distributive form, while period t. mentions two 
separate answers.' In all this, it can hardly be 
doubted, Florentine was seeking to exemplify tl4e distrib- 
utive framework of the common form of correal stipulation, 
Ovide infra, p. 3 
2J 4.` ̀ 
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namely, separate questions in the active and passive 
cases alike, separate answers in the passive case, a 
single answer (distributively conceived) in the active 
case. It does not follow that the classical juris- 
prudence insisted on a, rigid are adherence to thaaax2 xmi 
this form, provided always the interrogatory were dis- 
tributive, but we may infer that any departure therefrom 
was regarded as unorthodox,' 
If the foregoing observations be sound, we may 
surmise that Florentine dealt separately with the joint 
and distributive qualities of the correal stipulation, 
though any attempt to restore his argument would be 
futile. 
(2) D(45.3 28.2. Gaius III de verb. obligat. 
Si ipsi domini singuli oadem decem servo communi dari 
fuerint stipulati, et semel reeponsum secutum fuerit, 
duo rei stipulandi erunt, cum plaaceat dominnm servo 
dari stipulati posse. 
Here we have a correal stipulation: 
M.: Titi, decem Sticho servo communi meo et Seii dari, 
spondes? 
S.: Titi, eadem decem Sticho servo communi moo et Macvii 
dari spondes? 
T.: spondeo or Maevi,spondeo - Sei, spondeo, 
and like most other examples where a common slave is 
introduced, the case is highly instructive. We note 
the careful way in which Gaius sets forth the different 
elements necessary to the production of a correal relat- 
ion. tSinguli fuerint stipulati' denotes a distributive 1 
interrogatory consisting no doubt of separate questions, 
tEa,dem decem.' denotes an identification of the two sums 
of X. ' Semel responsum secutum fuerit' denotes a single 
joint response given after both questions have been put; 
69 11 ctd 
it is apparently indifferent whether this response 
consist of one answer given to both questions or of two 
separate answers. 
r) 
Thus the present paragraph seems to bear out in 
all respects the conclusions which we have arrived at 
in our foregoing discussions, 
(3) Do'(45.1)38,'19, Ulpian, XLIX ad Sabin. 
a) 
Eum qui di. cat : ' mihi decem et Ti ti o dwaffmkxRaa : omxxxx 
decem', eadem decem, non alla decem, dicere credendum 
est. 
Lenel's proposal to delete the first 'decem' as a 
gloss seems to destroy the whole point of this paragraph. 
In order to discover Ulpian's true meaning, we must assume, 
3) 
as seems highly probable, that he adopted the Proculian 
view as to the effect of a stipulation sibi et akk a.lii 
v 18 
dari.1 and then look at the preceding /SRN : in stipulat- 
i onibus mum(zmt cum quaori tur quid ac tum sit, verb& 
contra stipulatorem interpretanda cunt', 
Now consider a stipulation: mini decem et Titio 
decem dari. If we can interpret this as equivalent to 
' semel respor_sum secutum fuerit' rather points to one 
answer (spondeo) given to both ki-xx questions, but we 
must not interpret Gaius's words too narrowly; the form 
3 'Maevi, spondeo - Sei, spondeo' seems quite unexception- 
able, A single answer in distributime form is not pract- 
icable here, because both obligations are for payment to 
one and the same party, namely, slave Stichus. 
a) 
Lenel (Pala III? co1. 1194) notat: decem gloss? 
}) 4- 4 -4- h. 
Ga,i. III. 103, 
.)This rule is eminently reasonable' It is Vae duty of the 
stipulator to see that his interrogatory is free from all 
ambiguity, and accordingly, whether we are interpreting 
the terms of a stipulation directly or through the medium 
of a written cautio which records their purport, any p 
doubtful point must be decided against him, 
70 449d 
two independent stipulations:'mihi decem dart, and ' Titio 
decem Bari', clearly a full sum of X is duo to me, though 
the stipulation in T ®'s favour is invalid. If the Eisiiniï, 
stipulation in Tots favour had been valid, the result 
would have been cumulation, the two sums of X It not being 
identified in any way, and hence the detraction of T. still 
kamraxxxxxentitkrad 
leaves me entitled to X. Ulpi an however rejects this 
interpretation; the stipulation must have the same effect 
as if it had run: mihi decem. et Titio eadem decem dari', 
Why? Simply because the unity of the stipulatory aot is 
totally inconsistent with the idea of cumulation, We are 
certainly nk entitled to apply this argument to the case 
of a joint stipulation; for the latter is essentially a 
single stipulatory act, though two or more persons on the 
one side or the other participate there&n,° 
Here ends Ulpian_'s decision so zarxmixiitiarnatix 
faxx 
far as recorded, and up to this point it is against the 
stipulator; the latter cannot maintain that separate sums 
of X were promised to himself and to T ®, in order to rebut 
the argument that he is only entitled to V. This decision 
nowever is manifestly incomplete, for the question at once 
arises whether the form'mihi decem et Titio decem dari', 
though it relates merely to a single sum of X, can be 
e 
given a distributive interpretation , by virtu of which 
I can claim the sum of X in full; 
In this connection we may compare Julian. 
D,(45,1)56 pr,: 
Gma.xapx Eum qui ita. stipulatur: 'mihi et Titio deem 
dare spondes ? #' vero similius est semper una decem 
communiter sibi et Titio stipulaci, sicuti qui legai 
Titio et Sempronio non aliud intellegitur quam NA una 
decoro communiter duobus legare, 
This dictum of Julian's is carefully expressed and decides 
loarimpoz 
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two points in the case of a stipulation 'mihi et Titio 
decem daft': (i) that one and the same (una ê eadem.) 
sum of X only is promised to both To and myself, not 
different sums, and. (ii) that this sum is promised to 
us 'communiter', which can only mean that neither is 
wntitled to more than a pro rata share' Hence, though 
T. is detracted, I can still only claim a pro rata share; 
in other words, Julian, Sabinian though ne be, here adopte 
the Proculian view, 
The question now is, in the case of a stipulat- 
ion, not 'mihi et Titio decem dart, but 'mihi decem et 
Title (eadem) decem dart', the single sum of X should be 
regarded as promised to us, not ximpkxx *x mmaxtier simply 
jointly (communiter) as in the former case, but distrib- 
utively jointly (singulis in solidum)? In my opinion 
the probabilitlis are that this question should be answer- 
ed in the affirmative; the repetition of 'decem' (with x± 
i) 
or without 'eadem') seems to have the effect of excluding 
icata/G14k, just like the use of separate questionsin a joint stipulat 
ion. Hence the Proculian view in favour of partition 
only applied to the case of a stipulation. 'sibi et alti 
decem dari', not to the case of a stipulation 'sibi decem 
et alti decem dart's`' 
If the foregoing exegesis be sound we must assume 
that the compilons deleted the sequel to Ulpian's decision 
in fr ®38 419ó1 Perhaps in this context Ulpian gxoria 
entered into a detailed discussion of certain aspects of 
the stipulation sibi et x$ì alit dari, which seemed of no 
practical importance from the standpoint of the Justinian- 
ian law. 
c.b, 
fr. 3T 41. .,a h. 
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Having now dealt with the negative functions of 
the correal stipulation, namely, the exclusion of part- 
ition, novation and cumulation, we turn to its positive 
function, namely the production of two or more co- ordin- 
ate principal pbligations which are, by construction of 
law, one and the same. 
The idea of unity of obligation lies at the basis 
of accessoriality as well as of correality, but there is 
ari important distinction between the two cases. In 
accessoriality the unity is reached through a one -sided 
identification; the accessory obligation is identified 
with the principal obligation but not vice versa. In 
correality on the other hand we have two obligations 
standing side by side or/a co- ordinate footing, so that a 
merely one -sided identification is out of the question.' 
The only example which the classical law affords of a 
merely one -sided identification as between co- ordinate 
obligations is in the case of novation, where a later 
obligation is identified with, and so supersedes, an 
earlier one. 
In the case of correality, then, unity of ob- 
liagtion can only be reached (i) directly through a 
reciprocal identification of two principal obligations, 
or (ii) indirectly through each of two obligations 1 
being accessorily related to the same principal obligat- 
ion and hence being in a sense correally related to one 
another,' The second of these relations which we call 
'accessory correality' and which magxxxxxxximponfagtxx 
represents a unity of obligation only to an imperfect 
extent, be dealt with in our treatise on Accessor- 
iality4i, in the present work we fix our attention 
exclusively on the first relation, which, if need be,we 
shall particularly describe as 'principal correality',' 
., 
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Numerous passages can be quoted where the classical 
jurists refer to obligations correally or accessorially 
related as one and the same; For example: 
Julian. Dó(46,3)34.1 : 'obligatio communist; 
Pomponius D.(45.2)19 : 'exemptus est obligations': 
Ulpi<a.n, D;(4644)16 pr. s a ex duobus pluribusque eiusd 
(45,1)116 
'--" 1' ., obligationie pa,rticipibus' ; 
Paul. no te to P apini an,' : 'duo rei Tlaevius et Titius 
A é uiui sdem obliga.ti.onis' ; 
Q5 
Paul, De(4668)14 : 'eiusdem obligationis socius', 
_____That this unity of obligation was an objective unity 
is brought out by such passages as the following: 
African. Do (46, 1) 214'4 :'eiusdem pecuniae rei'; 
Pomponius D,(4542)18 :'ex duobus reis eiusdem Stichi) 
prendi factis' ; 
eiusdem 
Papiniano D;(26.7)38 pr.: ttaldwgz pecuniae debitores'; 
Paul,D,'(24'14)214'5 : 'qui eiusdem pecunias exactionem 
habent in solidum', 'eiusdem pecunias 
I mod. debi tore.' ..¿4,, , eiusdem 
Paul, D0(26.7)45 : 'duo rei lazdxm debiti'; 
Paul. D0(46,1)71 pr : 'duo rei eiusdem debiti', 'alterum 
reum eiusdem pecuniae'. 
On the other hand, in certain passages we find a plur- 
ality of obligations mentioned, for example, in Vklaisxxx 




D.(9.4)19 (relating to noxal actions) 'una 
In Ulpian, D0'(45.2)3.1, the clause'cum una 
una et summa, est' has been manipulated by 
vide infra p. i 3OÇ. 
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Ulpiano-.Julian, D.(46.1)5 and Veneleius 730 (4502)13; 
'ut fideivasor 
also African, D.(46.1)2101 : Mictimiumitox duabus oblï.g- 
ationibus eiusdem pecuniae 
nomine teneatur' , 
There is no$hing inconsistent in these different 
modes of expressions 0 If we wish to emphasise the 
'objective unity', we say that there is one obligation, 
one de14, one prestation and so forth; if we wish to 
emphasise the 'subjective plurality', we say that there 
are as Í,many obligations etc. as there are parties on 
the one side or the other. All this is perfectly 
natural and does not imply any idea of a correal oblig- 
ation as a mystic 'two or more in one'.' The terminology 
of the Roman jurists agrees essentially with our own; 
sometimes we find it convenient to speak of a 'single 
correal obligation', at other times of z 'two or more 
obligations correally related'. 
To the whole idea of unity of obligation as 
here conceived there is frequently opposed an objection 
which may be stated thus: An obligation is essentially 
a relation between a particular creditor and a particular 
debtor; the object of such a relation, that is to say, 
the rendering of a Itxxxta ±xax certain prestation, e.g0 
decem dari, has no 'individuality' of its own apart from 
the particular subjects of the relation; a 4decem dari 
Maevio4' cannot in any sense be identical with a . decem 
dari Seio', nor a ' decem dari a haeviol' with a katimamx 
" decem dari a Seio 'r0 In short, the whole theory of 
objective unity with subjective plurality is impossible; 
we cannot operate with the objective element in an oblig -a 
adory relation apart from the subjective element; a 
subjective difference implies an objective difference 
likewise,] 
The reply to this argument simply is that we 
s..ewt..+rr..a. .!si.a .....w.rarr..sesnry..a 
11 
vide infra p. (36 4(/. 
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are dealing with jurisprudence, not metaphysics; the 
objective identity which we speak of is something purely 
juristic, being constructed to serve definite legal ends, - 
to provide a theoretical basis for cert 3n_ practical 
results. Moreover there is nothing repugnant to common 
sense in the conception of a single o .1±go± objective 
obligation with a plurality of subjective relations, - 
any intelligent layman to whom this conception is explain, 
ed will at once appreciate its reasonablenessT- and this 
being so the lucubrations of our would-be legal philosoph, 
er may be summarily dismissed. 
The idea of objective unity of obligation 
must now be analysed with the greatest care. Two obligat- 
ions are objectively one and the same when they contain 
one and the same prestation; This identity of prestation 
implies an identity both of prestation- abject and of 
prestation - content; both obligations must 'dispose' of 
one and the same thing, and both'dispositions' must be 
one and the same, 
& In the first place we must distinguish 
objective unity of obligation from mere unity of juristic 
-F -- T' 
end, The fact that two obligations decem dari are direct- 
to the same juristic end ( are based on the same material 
cause, are designed to satisfy the same economic interest) 
does not of itself render them objectively one and the 
same,- does not make thee prestation_5of i X one and the 
same prestation of this amouftt. In order that objective 
nn its 
unity may result the two prestations must be identified, 
in the case of formal negotia, by some formal process, 
in the case of formless negotia, by the intentions of 
parties.' 
Unity of juristic end without objective unity 
of obligation can best be illustrated by the contract of 
mandate"! M. and S. ,each independently of the other, give 
To mandates to lend X to Gaius; T. treats these ffixd 
9 ,(1-. 31241. 324 t 
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mandatos as referring to one and the same loan of X 
which he duly makes to G,; G fails to re py this loan, 
Both Y. and S. are liable to pay X to T,, but the latter 
will certainly be prevented,-whether by law or by equity 
does not here concern us- from exacting more than a single 
payment of this amount; key the two obligations are 
directed to one and the same juristic end , Yet these 
obligations are not objectively one and the same,- M. and 
S. do not owe one and the same prestation of X but differ- 
prestations,- because, the two mandates having been given 
independently of one another, there was no common intent- 
ion on the part of M, and S. such as would effect the 
necessary identification. The unity of juristic end 
without objective unity of obligation which appears in 
Binple solidarity will be discussed later. 1) 
n 
In the second place we must, observe that two 
objectively 
prestations cannot be identified/unless they are object- 
ively equal in every respect. 
As regards prestation -object tht question of equal- 
ity presents no difficulty. Two generic prestation-ob- 
jects are equal when they consist of equal sums of money, 
of equal quantities of the same fungible genus [other 
than money), of indeterminate species of the same non - 
fungible genus. Two specific prestation- objects cannot 
be equal without being identical.1) 
The case of the prestation-content is more com- 
plicated,` In odder that two prestation- contents may be 
equal the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
(i) The two acts must be homogeneous, 
(ii) The modalities, if any, to which thRxxot each act 
is subject must coincide. This rule does not apply to 
modalities of condition and term, which were deemed to lurk 
belong to the obligation. -content, not to the prestation- 
content!-)But, though on the point is lacking, it would 
appear that modalities of place were treated as part of 
-74 
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of the prestation- content, and if this ire so, an obllgat- 
ion4decem Romae dari *and one *decem Capuae darimu.st be 
pronounced unequal, 
(iii) In each case the debtor must incur the same degree 
of responsibility for failure to perform the act. As 
regards obligations dari this point practically arises 
only where the prestation -object is specific. Thus 
suppose we nave two obligations4Stichum dari; and in one 
of them the debtor is liable if he fails to give Stichus 
through culpa, while in the other he is only liable if 
his failure be dut to dolus, clearly these obligations 
t 
are unequal in prestation- content. 
In the third place we have to note what the mutual 
identifications of two equal prestations precisely signif- 
ies. 
Identity of prestation- object requires no remark 
where the latter is a determinate species. Nor does the 
identification of two equal generic prestation- objects 
present any serious difficulty. A generic prestation- 
ob ject has no 'individuality' of its own, but is endowed 
with a concrete existence simply for the purposesx of the 
particular obligation. Hence there is nothing to prev- 
ent us endowing a sigle sum of money, a single quantity 
of P, fungible genus (other than money), a single indtter- 
minate species of a non -fungible genus, with a concrete 
existence as the common prestation-object of two oblig- 
ations. 
The identification of two equal prestation-conta . 
enta, on the other hand is a more abstract process. 
(i) We must identify the two equal acts ms one and the 
e 
same act. For txample, if M and S. each promise X to 
T., identification of the ±xxx two prestation -contents 
implies that the *a Maevio darit and átuxgìmx2mirxx the a 
Seio dari ïmxxdxx are deemed one and the same act, irresp- 
ective of the subjective difference. This being 
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done, the identification of the equal modalities, if any 
affecting the two acts, xf follows as a matter of ooursa, 
(ii) We must identify the two equal responsibilities 
for failure to perform the aforesaid one and the same 
act, What does this mean? As regards the passive case 
the only possible meaning seems to be that the xxxlmaxibk 
responsibility of each debtor is rendered'extensive'; 
in other words mutual extensive responsibility seems to 
be a necessary element in mutual identification. For 
example, if M. and S. are bound each to render Stichus 
to T., and each is liable if he fails to fulfil 1xix this 
duty throughR identification of the two prestation- conta 
ente seems to imply that each is liable on the ground of 
the other's culpa as well as of his own. As this quest- 
ion of extensive responsibility as between correal debtors 
is t much debated one, we shall devote the next section 
specially to ite discussion. 
As regards the active case, e.g. where To' is 
bound to gixxxi render Stichus to M. and S,', and is 
liable to each for culpa, identification of the two 
prestation--contehts implies th wt any culpa incurred 
towards the one of the creditors has the same effect as 
if it had been incurred towards the other likewise, This 
point is however of no practical importance..' 
in the fourth place we have to note that the 
essential factor in obi c-stive idrntirisa tion oiaf« ._ 
(a) 
differs according as the prestatioa-object is /generic 
(b) 
or/specific. 
(a)Where two obligations have equal generic prestation 
objects, say X, and we identify these as one and the 
same, then, if in addition the two prestation- contents 
are equal, identification of the latter and therefore 
,-skAW#& .$ ..- 
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full identity of prestation will naturally follow, unless 
there be some element in the situation which excludes 
identification, for example, if two parties stipulate 
9 correally dotis nomine. 
(b) Specific pretation.- objects cannot be equal without 
being identical,' Hence before there can be any question 
of identity between two obligations with specific prest- 
ation-objects, the latter must first be admitted to be 
one and the same. This identity of prestation -object 
does not however imply identity of prestation, even 
though the two prestation.- contents be equal, for two ob- 
ligations may have one and the same p stationiwob ject and 
A 
yet be related cumulatively.' In order then to achieve 
identity of prestation, our efforts must be directed 
to identification of the two prestation- .contents.' 
The essential factor in case (a) is therefore ident- 
ification of the two prestation-objects, in case (b) kaimmi 
identification of the two prestation.- .contents. 
Having thus endeavoured to bring out all that is 
implied in the mutual objective identification of two 
principal obligations, we now enquire regarding the stipulatory 
deans for producing this identification. There can be 
no doubt as to the decision of the civil law on this 
point. Two co- ordinate principal obligations ex stip.- 
ulatu Ink can only co -exist as one and the same when 
they arise from one and the same joint stipulation, the 
latter being distributively framed in order to avoid 
partition. The joint nature of the correal stipulation 
identities the two resulting obligations reciprocally, 
gives them the quality of co-ordinate branches of a 
single correal obligation, and in no other way can 
gxk obligations ex stipulate become so related 
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inconsistent with novation, mumamoxhomaxwal&mmaxxxxx 
because in the case of the latter we have merely an 
one -sided identification which causes an existing 
obligation tobe superseded by a fresh one. Likewise 
unity of cause is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with 
accossorbality, because in this case we have merely a 
one sided identification which places the one obligation 
in a subsidiary relation to the other. But unity of 
cause is essentially consistent with correality, for it 
presents the sole means of constituting two co- ordinate 
obligations which from the first moment of their existence 
are mutually identified the one with the other," 
ce... c_( 
A / t-1//H/ cat - 'v^4 A y " -..1 Ca r., . / -a 
4,1,.,...,c ; /, "-i)f( 4 1..2 _ 
81 13 Extensive Responsibility, J 
Paul says, D.(45.1)91.3: sequitur videre de eo quod 
xxtxxemxxxxxtkax 
veteres constituerunt, quotiens culpa intervenit debitor6. 
is perpetuari obligationem, quemadmodum intellegendum sits` 
et quidem si effecerit promissor quo minus solvere possit, 
expeditum intellectum habet constitutio: si vero moratus 
sit tantum, haesitatur an, si postea in mora non fuerit, 
axtx extinguatur superior more, 
Here at first sight we appear to have recorded an 
ancient maxim, ' quotiens culpa intervenit debitoris, 
perpetuatur obligatio', or, as it is commonly abbreviated 
by modern writers, 'culpa perpetuatur obligatio', which 
covers two cases: (i) that of wrongful act or neglect on 
the debtor's part causing loss or deterioration of the 
prestation- object, so that specific performance becomes 
wholly or partially iffipossible ; this conveniently de- 
scribed as 'culpa' in a special technical sense which 
of course includes actual dolus; and (ii) a wrongful 
failure on the debtor's part to fulfil the obligation at 
the proper time; in other words, moran In the first 
case the obligation is perpetuated in the sense that the 
debtor remains liable to pay the creditor's pecuniary 
interesso, though specific performance is now wholly or 
partially impossible.. in the second case the obligation 
is perpetuated in the sense that the debtor remains 
similarly liable though the prestation -object should, 
subsequent to the default, be lost or deteriorate through 
a cause for which he would not otherwise be responsible, 
o ss+ 
See on the whole matter k Levy, Konk., p.210 n.5. 
,k..4-- 2 cr' 114.-7 F-',, 
e,-.7 4-4 zì 
ti ud,.1 1,y`// 
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í) 
Gradenwitz has however proved that the formulation of 
the rule in the passage quoted must have been due to Paul 
himself, and cannot have been a verbatim reproduction of 
the ancient maxim. Pomponius ( ) ^, , _'.1 5, gives us an idea 
how the :ancient maxim actually ran: quod te mihi dare 
oporteat si id postea perlent quam per te factum erit 
quo minus id mini dares, tuum fore Toi id detrimentum gma 
constat. The traditional mode of describing a party as 
in mora appears then to have been: 'per eum factum est 
(devu.0 '67- ,e4 ,C4 
(state quo minus det' _t ; and further the case 
of 'culpa', where the debtor 'effecit quo minus dare 
(t)'6a- 
possit/ í4 appears to have been regarded s .mply as an 
aggravated form of 'per eum factum est quo minus dot', 
and to nave been governed by precisely the same principles. 
Paul's formulation of the rule in D.(45.1)91.3 is perfect- 
ly intelligible` . What he has done is to size upon the 
element of 'fault' inherent in both cases and made this 
element the basis of a general doctrine of perpetuatio 
obligationis. 
Now for our present purposes the significance of 
duo results established by Gradenwitz lies in this, namely, 
that in applying the d octrines of 'culpa' and mora to the 
correal obligation, we must abandon any idea of discrimin- 
ating between their respective consequences. Suppose T. 
stipulates for Stichus from M. and S. correally, and 
subsequently sues M. on the contract; M. pleads in def- 
ence that the slave is dead and the obligation is there- 
fore extinguished; T. in replying admits the death, but 
alleges either li) that it occurred through 'culpa' on 
the part of S. ( Seius effecit quo minus Stichus dari 
possit) or (ii) that it occurred after S, was in mora 
We cannot hero discuss the conditions necessary to estab- 
lish morn. Siber (ZSS. 29, p. 47ff) has disposed of the 
view that a formal 'interpellatio' was regulatly required 
under the classical l:,w, 
ZSS.y 34, p.255 ff. 
83 4 13 c td 
(per Seium factum est quo minus Stichus e-t )0 Both 
these allegations nave equal value or none at all; if 
T. is entitled to plead 'culpa' on the part o2 S, as A 
ground of action against M,, he is likewise entitled 
to plead mora, and vice versa. The question we have 
to decide is, are these pleas relevant or i ~'~'e, ez° t? 
doey 'culpa' ar mora on the part of one correal debtor 
1-4.7 
infer liability to the other or dog- not? 
The attempt in the foregoing section to work out 
the exact meaning of the objective identification of two 
co-ordinate obligations led us to the result that mutual 
extensive responsibility was an essential element in such 
identification; hence a priori we must answer the last 
question in the affirmative. Another consideration seems 
to favout the same result. Suppose M. and So have maxxxx 
correally promised Stichus to T.'and S. through culpa 
kills the slave before delivery; To however sues 1VL, 
erroneously thinking that the slave was killed by the 
latter; in lure M. does not deny fault but simply joins 
issue. Under the classical law of process -consumption 
S. is freed and To .oses all recourse against him, though 
the evidence at the trial, contrary to TA''s expectations 
proves that he (S.) was the party really at faults" 
Hence if Me cannot be condemned on the ground of Sol 2xxl 
fault, To suffers a great hardship. Under these circus 
stances any impartial observer would, I venture to think, 
say that T,, as a setoff to the d. advantage imposed on 
him by the,,process- consumption rule, ought to have the 
advantage of being able to hold either debtor liable for 
the other's fault, 
Now let us glance at the s candpoint of the 
Justinianian law; 
(i )'C,fulpa', Process- consumption being now abolished, 
T, would in the case last figured be able to wring a 
!, 
74, 
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subsequent action against S. the party ao pally at fault. 
Hence the equitable argument in favour of extensive re- 
exists 
sponsibili ty no longer 3axi.gixxgxxt, and without any hard- 
ship each may be held liable for his own ' culpa' only® 
Culpa communis alone necessarily infers liability to both,' 
(ii) Nora. Under the Justinianian law, mora means fail- 
ure on the debtor's part to comply with a formal inter - 
pellatio; without such interpellatio max it can never 
arise. If then the creditor has addressed his interpellat- 
io to one of two correal debtors only, the natural infer- 
ence is that thts debtor only can be held kxa responsible 
for failure to comply with the demand. If the creditor 
wishes to hold both responsible, he should interpellate 
kathx both. 
A priori then we are quite prepared to find the 
doctrine of extensive responsibility rejected by the 
Justinianian law, Rxx What have the authorities to say 
on the matter? 
0 
In the first place, Levy has addressed a powerful 
argument in favour of extensive responsibility under the 
classical law in the case of tx co- tutors® He has proved 
that co- tutors jointly administering an undivided estate 
were correal debtors in the full sense and that the one 
was responsible for all loss caused through maladministr- 
ation on the part of the other. But on the other hand he 
has also proved that the compilors have consistently 
interpolated the classical texts with a view to eliminat- 
ing this extensive Ììx responsibility and making each 
each tutor liable for his own acts xfxm and omissions 
alone 
In the second place let us consider 
ZSS,37,p,14ff,; Monk,,p,220 ff, 
___---- 
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D.(45.2)18 Pomponius V ex Pla,ut. 
Ex duobus reis eiusdem Stichi promittendi factis 
a,l terius factum alteri quoque nocet. 
e 
understand 'factum' -y ( 
___,... 
of moms an act 
causing death or injury to Stichus, 
LAA- 
we have4a direct authority in favour of the view that 
correal debtors were extensively responsible, The only 
difficulty is why, assuming that under the Justinianian 
law a correal debtor was only responsible for his own 
c 
culpa, the compilors should have left this passage 
atanding. The explanation may be that they meant the word 
'factum' to signify an act which interrupted the running 
6 (lz,.,,... 
of prescription; as we -rev, Justinian by 0, (8,39 (40))4(5) 
of the year 531, provided that any act which interrupted 
prescription in favour of one correal creditor or against 
one correal debtor enured to the benefit or to the pre - 
judice of both.. 
In the third place we have to consider the two 
passages which, as they stand, affirm that each correal 
debtor was responsible for his own mora alone: 
i D.(22,1)32,4 Marcian. IV regul. 
Sed si duo rei promittendi sint, al terius mora alteri 
Cnóni noceto 
oat 
the close sequence 
of 'factis'Kx.aa± and 'factum' is not very elegaaht; 
quite likely the compilors have deleted something after 
'factis'o 
a) 
cp, Binder p.273 f. who even imagines that the compilors 
have interpolated Pomponius's words so as to make them 
apply to this case] íTíß.., tifi 
fib. r4-47 `, / c ...,/ 
c 
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T), ( 50.17 )1 7 3. 2. Paul. VI ad P l au t. 
Uniouique sua mora nocet, quod et in duobus reis 
promittendi observatur. 
Certainly neither of these passages inspires much 
faith in its own genuineness. 
As regards the first we note that the fragment 
D0'(2201)32 has been mNch interpolated and that its con- 
cluding paragraohs lack concinnity. There seems every 
likelihood that the compilors among other manipulations, 
inserted the 'non' in our present 4. 
As regards the second passage, obviously little 
reliance can be placed on an isolated statement of this 
kind torri by the compilors from its context. Doubtless 
thereg is a close connection between this passage and 
D.(45,1)88, which begins 'mora rei fideiussori quoque 
voce t' . But why does the mora of a principal debtor 
enure to the prejudice of a fideiussor? Simply because 
a fideiussor identifies his obligation with that of the 
principal debtor. Ue have already seen, however, that 
correality implies a. mutual identification of the two 
obligations. It is therefore logically impossible for a 
fideiussor to be held responsible for mora of his prin- 
cipal debtor, and yet for one principal correal debtor 
not to be held responsible for mora of the other,' 
Hence, whatever Paul did write in the passage now gigur- 
ing as D.(50217)173.2, .- and specu 1. Lion on this point 
seems in the present state of our knowledge futile, -it 
is almost a certainty that ne did not deny the extensive 
responsibility of correal debtors for mora, but rather 
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affirmed the same, 
We therefore feel justified in holding that in the case 
of a passive correal obligation 
r . . pesa . the classical law kÌxax treated 
each co- debtor as liable for the 'culpa' and mora of the 
other; that is to say, extensive responsibility was an 
essentl element in the passive principalcorreal relat- 
ion, 
Conversely it would appear that on principle all 
'culpa' or mora. which serves to perpetuate the obligation 
in favour of one of two correal creditors must do so in 
savour of the others also; but this case is of no pract- 
ical tip . mitmem importance, 
r 
In our treatise on Accessoriality we shall see that the 
principle of extensive responsibility does not apply in 
the case of accessory correalityo 
88 i 14 Constitutive Requisites of the Correal 
stipulation. 
The 'requisites' of a juridical act are the 
mÌe±x elements necessary to its full validity as 
such. They may be divided in to two classes (i) 
'constitutive' requisi 
a 1-.4-de 
which give /i.ac t its 
of aby one of which we 
tes, namely the elements 
a i osa eC 
existence ate. in the absrno 
. R 
have noAact at all, and (ii) 
'effective' requisites, namely, the elements which 
enable a' constituted act to accomplish its end and in 
A 9 
the abs &nce of any one of which thxxtx the act, 
though ex hypothesi Exxxtomi existent, is either 
altogether futile or endowed with an efficacy less 
than normal. 
In this section wtialugANXXxdilinxwM the cos- 
stitutive *demand= requisites of the correal stipula 
will be dealt with 
ation/ According to the strict civil law the con- 
stitutive requisites of the stipulation in general 
were entirely formal, but the mature classical juris- 
prudence added a material requisite, to wit, the 
fact of consensus. We shall consider separately 
I, the formal requisites of the correal stipulation, 
and II. its material requisite. For the purposes of 
the following exposition only the common form of cor- 
real stipulation with separate questions and, in the 
passive case, separate answers need be taken into 
account. The necessity of a connection between the 
two questions is assumed and will not further be 
referred to 
I. Formal constitutive requisites. 
The formal constitutive requisites of the correal 
stipulation fall under two heads: 
(A.) those which are mainly applications of the formal 
constitutive requisites of the stipulation in general,and 
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(B,) those which depend more particularly on the nature 
of the correal stipulation as a single joint act, 
(A4 ),The formal requisites of this class are as follows: 
(1) Praesentiao All the parties on both sides must 
be present together at one time and place. A subtle 
point suggests itself as to whether the proceedings may 
be commenced before one of the co- creditors or co-debt- 
ors arrives Thus suppose T. and M. are present togeth- 
er alone, and T. puts the question: Maevi, 21mmm decem 
dari spondes ?, Then S. comes on the scene, and T,, after 
explaining to him what has occurred, says: Sei, eadem 
A:am decem dari spondee?, after which both M. and S. 
reply, Are M. and S. duly constituted correal debtors? 
In the absence of atia.thority we may leave the learned 
reader to work out the results in this and similar 
cases according to his own appreciation of the position, 
it being always borne in mind that the mature classical 
jurisprudence may possible have modified the strict 
civil law consequences. 
(2) Oral Interchange, The creditor must put an oral 
question to each debtor and each debtor must give an 
affirmative oral answer, or each creditor must put an 
g oral question to the debtor and the debtor must give 
an affirmative oral answer covering both questions. If 
in the passive case only one of the debtors replies, or 
if in the active case the debtor replies to one creditor 
alone, mg e.g. Naevi, tibi (soli) dare spondeo, of course 
we have no joint act, but the mature classical jurtsprud 
ente held that a valid simplex obligation was constituted 
an analogous case is mentioned in connection with the 
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(3) Obligation. The interrogatory must be directed 
to the constitution of xx obligatory relations between 
the creditor and each debtor or between each creditor 
t 
and the debtor; it may contain conditions or terms 
rendering these relations meanwhile imperfect or immature 
the classical law permitted the questions of the gna±em 
interrogatory to differ modally as regards condition 
and term, mg e.g. T.'s question to M; may be 'pure', his 
question to S. may be subject to a condition and so forts, 
(4) Spondere. The verb spondere can only be employed 
by Roman citizens. This rule calls for no remark. 
(5) Correspondence; The response must 'correspond' to 
the interrogatory, or more precisely, if the response 
consist of two answers each of the latter must corresp- 
ond to its own antecedent question, if it consists of a 
single answer the latter must corresponds to both quest- 
ions. The requisite of correspondence consists of Um 
two I ±oE1x *k* rules which we call the rules of 'congru- 
ence' and 'acquiescence' respectively. 
(i) The rule of. Congruence means that the principal 
... 
the ze 40v... 4,4. 
verbs in the question and /answer must(agreeR . Thus a 
question 'spondee?' mus;, be followed by an answer 'spond 
so', a question 'dabis ? by an answer 'dabo' and so 
forth. Consider now thexItakkawingx his stipulation: 
:: T,: Maovi, decem dari spondee? 
Sei, ea,dem decem dabis? 
M.: spondeo 
S.: dabo, 
Is the rule of congruence here complied with? Yes, 
because each answer is congruent with its own antecedent 
question, though as we shall see presently, the use of 
an obligation connotes the rendering of a prestation in 
the future: dari spondee? d bis? facies? etc,; the use 
of the present; das? facie? etc, would render the stip- 
ulation inept. In xxx >.p ±ìxi acceptilation the position 
w ,e exactly the reverse; -t--..ea t eC,.;,4.1,e4 
91 14 otd 
different principal verbs in a joint interrogatory is 
not permissible and on this ground the proceedings are 
void, 
(ii) The rule ofc uiescence means that the answer 
must express an exact agreement with the terms of ìt 
the question without any addition, detraction or var - 
iation whatever. Consider now this stipulation: 
T.: ïviaevi, decem dari spondee? 
Sei, ex 2.k /cm eisdem decem quinque dari spondes? 
M.; spondeo 
S.: spondeo. 
So far as the rule of acquiescence is concerned, this 
stipulation is quite unexceptionable, for each answer 
expresses an exact agreement ix with the terms of its 
own antecedent question, though, as we shall see pres- 
objective 
ently, the /inequality between the two questions renders 
the whole proceedings void. The only complication 
arises where the two questions differ modally as regards 
condition or term, and a single answer is given, for 
example: 
M0: Titi, decem dari spondes? 
SG: Titi, eadem decem, si nervis venerit, dari 04444 
s 
spondes? 
T.: utrique vestrum dare spondeo. 
Can T.'s single answer serve as an acquiescance in both 
questions respectively in spite of their modal i.iiammn 
differn.nce? ? Probably yes; so far as it applies to k ik 
to be 
M.'s question it is /understood as pure, so far as it 
to be 
applies to Sors question it is /understood as conditional. 
In such a case, however, it might be better for T. to 
() 
cp. tut Inst. III.** l9o'5 iof. (z. -í. ). 
observance of 
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give separate answers: Maevi, spondeo - Sei, spondeo® 
(6) Continuus actus, All the questions and answers 
must comprise one continuous act. Originally, it 
would appear, the law was that the response must ßíÌX 
follow the interrogatory, and the different questions 
of the interrogatory and the different answers of the 
response must follow one another, forthwith. Under 
the mature classical jurisprudence, on the other nand, 
xxxxskattaxxxxxnxtäxiticzatx the sM -s 
la of this requisite depended zakam1yx solely on 
two rules,which we call those of (i)'oontinuous pres- 
ence' and (ii) 'abstention' respectivelyeasAyagc 
IdMAAmt4 Povided these rules were observed the elapse 
of an interval of any length between different stages 
1&427ttdid not matter, 
(i) The rule of Continuous Presence means that through- 
out the proceedings all the parties must remain con- 
stantly in one another's presence. If one of them 
'goes away' (discedere) in the middle of the proceedings, 
a break is caused in the continuity of act. In the case 
of a simplex stipulation the effect of such a bred 
offers no difficulty; the whole proceedings are render- 
ed void. Thus if T. stipulates from M., and the parties 
then separate, no matter for how short a period, the 
continuity of act is broken absolutely, and no answer 
given thereafter has any effect-; if it is desired to 
make a valid stipulation T. must repeat the question,' 
The only problem is when must a party be deemed to have 
'gone away'; in my opinion this point have been 
474 
regarded as one of fact 
(/ The application of this rule of continuous 
presence to the correal stipulation may give rise to 
a variety of problems. For example, suppose T. inter- 
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-rogues M. and S. correally, and before any response 
is given M goes away; even if M returns at once, 
no response given by him can have any effect, because 
ao far as he is concerned, the continuity of act is 
broken. But does M.'s departure break the continuity 
of act so far as S. is soneerned? The answer ̂ must 
it is thought, be ig the negative; la M.'s departure 
simply eliminates him from the proceedings, and it is 
still open to S. to gm give an answer which will con, 
stitute a valid simplex obligation between T. and him_ 
$1aÎ self, This case is comparatively stxmlaa plain, 
but consider the following: T. interrogates M and S.' 
correally; M. replies and then goes away Here a valid 
obligation is created between T. and M., but what effect 
has M.'s departure on S.'s position? Can S. still 
make a valid reply? if he can, does this reply, even 
though given in Mm's absence, render him a correal 
debtor with the latter? There is just a possibility 
that Venuleius may have dealt with some such point in 
the passage now figuring as D.(45.2)12 pr. 
(ii) The rule of abstention means that throughout the 
proceedings all the parties must abstain 2/comm from any 
other business. If one of the parties does turn to 
other business (ad aliud negotiun accedere), the effect 
is th same as if he had gone away. 
(B.) We now turn to the second class of requisites, 
which depend more particularly on the nature of the 
ci?rreal stipulation as a single jtint act. The two 
questions are but parts of a single interrogatory, and 
as parts they must be consistent with the whole and 
I ± l07, 
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with one another. 
('7) Though authority on the pt t point is lacking, 
we may lay it down as practically certain that each 
question must contain the same principal verb; in 
other words the questions must be congruent inter see 
Such a stipulation as 
T.: Naevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, e-tdem decem dable? 
1`ßi.: spondeo 
S.: dabo, 
would, ibn our opinion, be absolutely null and void; the 
difference in principal verb destroys the self -consist- 
ency of the interrogatory. 
(8) There must be equality of prestation-object 
between the two questions. Here we must distinguish 
the cases of (a) generic and (b) specific prestation- 
object. 
(a) Such a stipulation as 
5Extxxdamnambutixxporighuti 
Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, ex eisdem decem quinque dari spondes? etc 
would be wholly void; the same interrogatiry cannot at 
the same time relate to a sum of X and also tp a sum of 
V, even where the V mentioned in the second question 
are expressly stated to be part of the X mentioned in 
the first. Any suggestion that M. and S. are here 
s 
rendered correally liable quoad V, while M. i4 liable 
as sole debtor quoad another V, must be dismissed absol- 
utely. The cl.ss-i cal law does not admit anything like 
172) 
'pro tanto Amr correali ty' 
(b) In the case of stipulations fur determinate 
species, we cannot have equality of prestation- object 
without identity thereof.' Accordingly our present 
Naclatx axmaxxxx 
i) cp. Levy, Sponsio, p.126 n.1. 
ch -24-4. h-/. 0 
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requisite here meansthat each question must refer to 
one and the same determinate species. Obviously 
an interrogatory one question of which referred to a 
to another slave 
slave Stichus, the other /Xxx t;u Pamphilus, would 
lack inward consistency, and hence be void. The 
only point is whether a stipulation: 
2 T.: Naevi, Stichum servum dari spondes? 
Sei, eundem Pamphilun servum dari spondes? 
would be valid if the slave described as Stichus 
in the one question and as Pamphilus in the other 
be one and the same. In my opinion 
even this material identity would not ;mom cure the 
1) formal defect in the interrogatory 
(9) There must be equality of prestation- content 
between the two questions. Though authority on the 
point is lacking, I believe we must hold that the merit - 
ion of differ$en_t places of payment or delivery in the 
questions respectively, will render the proceedings 
void; for example 
2x T.: Maevi, decem Romae dari spondes? 
Sei, ea.dem decem Capuae dari spondes? 
i'. .i 
f-±,eyt 
ßt24 this same requisite excludes the po.e,sibility 
of the two questions prescribing different degrees of 
responsibility in case the obligation is not fulfilled. 
imm For example, such a stipulation as 
T.: Maevi, Stichum dari spondes? 
Sei, eundern Stichum dari spondes ita ut tantum 
dolus malus a te praestetur? 
where M. incurs ordinary legal liability for culpa, but 
Sols liability is expressly restricted to dolus, would 
__-.r---- / 
/!/(. G,k , .r.c c , 744.2, {. Ì ! C,/,cc4 
e-11/1-44 yc.- .C<.,,f- - d.-,.4rc4 r 441- zit 
" 
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in our opinion be void.' 
(10) Equality of prestation- object and prestation, 
content being assumed, the formula must not imm cont- 
ain any element which prevents the identification of 
the two prestations as one and the same. For example, 
such a stipulation as 
T.: Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, alfa decem dari spondes? 
would be void. Identification of the two generic prest- 
ationr.objects is here expressly excluded, the purport 
of the formula being to produce cumulation, but cumul- 
ation and joint stipulation are incompatible. Two 
questions relating to different sums, though of equal 
amount, cannot possibly be united as parts of the same 
interrogatory. 
Again such a stipulation as 
T.: Maevi, at Stichum dari spondes ita ut culpa 
tantum turn, non etiam Seii, a te 
praestetur? 
Sei,eundem Stichum dari spondes ita ut culpa 
za 
- -' tantum tua, non ettAm Maevii,a te 
pra,e s te tur? 
would in our opinion be void. Each of the tx quest- 
ions here figured, by virtue of the restriction of 
responsibility to culpa of the particular debtor, bears 
an individualistic quality which militates against 
the combination of both as parts of one and the same 
interrogatory, inasmuch as it deprives the latter of 
inward consistency. This agrees entirely with the 





This finished our mxgoEiii statement of the 
formal constitutive requisites of the correal stipulat- 
ion. A few supplementary points must now be noted. 
2 In the first place the rule which permits the 
two questions of the interrogatory to differ modally 
as regards condition and term, calls for a brief con- 
sideration. We ask, how is such a modal difference 
compatible with the unity of the interogatory? As a 
matter of fact, it seems quite possible that we have here 
a refinement of the classical jgxrisprudence which would 
not have commended itself to the conditores iuris 
antiqui. Apparently the matter was regarded in the 
introduction 
following light: By the ilagmr±iort of a condition or 
term an obligatory relation is rendered iaperfect or 
immature until the condition is fulfilled or the term 
arrives, but all this has no bearing on the actual 
prestation to be rendered or the manner of rendering 
it,-in other words, on the obligation -object. Hence 
two obligations may be objectively one and the same in 
spite of a modal difference of condition or term; sgrch 
a difference is not in the obligation- object, but mere- 
ly in the gm obligation- content. Having arrived at 
this result, the jurists were bound to give effect to 
the same by admitting the possibility of a corresponding 
ji 
modal difference in the two questions of a joint inttxxxx 
.interrogatory, though the nature of the latter would 
appear prima facie to exclude this possibility. 
Mn the second place we must remark on the 
rule that if T. interrogates M. and S. correally and 
M. alone replies, or if M. and S. correally interrogate 
T. and T. replies to M. alone, a valid simplex obligat- 
ion is thereby created. Here again we may doubt 
whether the result arrived at by the classical juris- 
,, ti :,``'"`4 ,vLdd . l_ t 3. 
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-Prudence would have gained the approval of the ancients. 
The latter might quite well have argued that a joint 
interrogatory contemplated the creation of two obligat- 
ions, and unless it 2akfgkÌad fully achieved this end 
it was altogether futile. Apd indeed Julian who 
states the rule in D.(45.2)6:9 gives a very guarded 
C.4.44 
decision (veriús puto) in the passive^ (pr. ), This 
hesitation was well justified, for if two parties agree 
to make a correal promise, the intention of each pre- 
sumably is that he shall be bound wì± together with the 
other or not at all. Yet the debtor who replies first, 
say M., has no guarantee that the other S. will also 
reply, and thus he runs the chance of being left as sole 
debtor. The same considerations do not arise in the 
active case, and accordingly Julian does not here 
evince any hesitation (2). 
In the third place, if our conjectures regarding 
3 
3 of the last quoted fragment be sound, the classical 
jurisprudence afforded the parties to a passive * *xx 
correal stipulation a simple means of excluding the 
possibility of one debtor being bound without the other. 
This means, we believe, consisted in the addition to 
each question of a clause fixing a period of time within 
which the answers must ooth be given, and providing that 
unless both debtors reply ( that is, of course, validly 
in the affirmative) within this period neither shall be 
bound, thus: 
T.: Maevi, decem dari spondes, ita ut ludo= intra 
duodecima.m partem unius horae to et Seius 
respondeatis et nisi intra hoc tempus 
utriusque responsum secutum erit, neuter 
teneatur? 
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IIe Material constitutive requisite$. 
Accorng to the old civil law, stipulation was zz a 
formal act in the stricyest sense, being devoid of any 
material constitutive rquisite, or perhaps we should 
rather say, having material constitutive requisites re- 
diced to a minimum! 
) 
If two parties r went through the 
a.ppropirate á verbal form under cúrcumstnaces which gave 
it the appearance of a genuine legal act, a stipulation 
was constituted, quite irrespective of the existence of 
a real consensus between the partiese The classical 
jurisprudence of the other hand pronounced the material 
fact of consensus to be an essential element in every 
nego tium, 
Applying this material requisite to the case of 
the correal stipulation, in the first place we observe 
that there must be a real consensus between the single 
party on the one side and each of the parties on the 
other. If for example T. stipulates from M. and S. cor- 
vs 
really, and there is a real consensus between him and N, 
but not between him and Se, the result calta only be that 
M. is bound as sole debtor, no juridical act having taken 
place so far as S. is concerned. In the second place 
we observe that there must be a real consensus between 
all the parties on the one side or the others Suppose T, 
stipulates Obrreally firm for Sticous from Vii, and b,, 
and m. reuns one, S. another, slave of this name, cor- 
reality is impossible, . and probably the whole act would 
be pronounced non -existent, The 'individuality/ of a 
specific prestation -object must be determined before a 
joint stipulat__onmcan be thought ofo 
see following note, 
Obviously if two persons went through the form of stip- 
ulation on the stage, no juridical act would be conclud- 
ed; hence we cannot eliminate all material conditions 
to the existence of a legal stipulatio; at any.rate the 
circumstances must be such as to give the t juridic: l 
complexion, 
it 4) PLC PI-C-tererlr/t,9, ` of/7.ta GIL g 4Z;, /) 4 
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100 15 Authorities 
t/TD. (45.2)7 Florentine VIII inst. 
Ex duobus reis promittendi aliusi)in diem vel sub 
condicione obligari potest: nec enim imperimento 
erit dies aut condieio quo minus ab ae eo qui pure 
obligatus est petatur. 
This passage, which is reproduced with two 
trivial alterations in Inst. III,16.2, constitutes the 
a- uthority for the rule that the two questions of a joint 
interrogatory may differ modally as regards condition 
or term. Florentine only mentions the case where the 
one questions is pure, the other conditional or txxxixxix 
termal. Clearly kmxxmaail however the same principle 
must apply where each question contains a different 
condition or a different term, pr the one a condition 
and the other a term. Moreover there seems no good 
ground for refusing to extend the principle to the active 
case. 
The motive given in the second part of the 
fragment (nec entm...) is not without significance; for, 
Florentine says, the term or condition to which the one 
obligation is subject does not prevent the pure obligat- 
ion being enforced forthwith. Nothing is here said as 
to the anomaly of a modal difference in the two quest- 
ions of one and the same interrogatory; by Florentine's 
time any difficulty on that score had apparently been 
overcome. The only point is whether two obligations 
correally related can be enforceable at different times; 
as thes( obligations are one and the same, does not the 
condition or term in the one affect the other likewisei, 
so that in result the attempt to establish a modal dif- 
ference between them fails? Florentine answers this 
question in the negative and accordingly holds the 
modal difference effective. 
l 
112ENFx ppure, alius ins. Inst. III.16.'2. 
1)( enim' del, Ins t. 
(l 
i 
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egl D0(45.2)6 Julian. LII digest. 
pr. K. Duos reos promittendi facturus si utrumque inter - 
rogavero sed alter dumtaxat responderit, verius 
puto eum qui responderit obligara: nequ.e enim sub 
condicione interrogatuo in utriusque persona fit, 
ut ita demum obligetur si alter quoque responderit; 
(. c + >+) 
<- >2) 
Y -9 
', duobus autem zintk reis ° constitutis, quin liberum 
sit stipulatori vel ab utroque vel ab altero dum- 
taxat fideiussorem accipere, non dubito. 
2 Tl, sed sit. duobus reis stipulandi interrogatus) 
respondisset uni se spondere, ei soli taxt teneturo 
( from l.) sed duo rei sine dubio ita interrogari imffxfxm 
possunt ut et temporis ratio habeatur intra quod 
uterque respondeatur et nisi intra tempus statutum 
utriusque responsum secutum fuerit, neuter teneatur.' 
9 (from L) In duobus reis promittendi constituendis si 
eadem stipulatione fideiussor quoque adhibeatur, non 
nisi pro utroque obligari potest, et post &Nza duos 
debet et interrogara et respondere: nam mi inter 
interrogationes ad duos reos factas si interrogatus 
fueri t vel inter duorum reorum responsa si responderit 
videtur impedire obligationem eius qui postea inter- 
rogatur vel agxpmxda responde t. 
iam 
SSi a duobus reis stipulaïidi interrogatus respondeat r--. 
'spondeo', utnique teneri constat: 
/r1A 
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,.[duo rei sine dubio ita constitui posaunt, ut et 
temporis ratio habeatur intra quod uterque respondeaj 
1: 
modicum tatuen intervallum temporis, item modicus 
ictus qui modo contrarius non sit, nihil impedit 
quo minus duo rei aunt :J 
17 
, 
1, fid$iussor quoque interrogatus inter duorum reorum 
responsa si responderit, potest videri non impedire 
obligationem reorum:J 
K, 
17 quia, nec longuet spatium interponitur nec is ictus 
qui contrarius sit obligationi. 
This fragment as it stands is perplexing in the 
highest degree, but if my suggestions as to its restor- 
ation are in any way well founded, it assumes the utmost 
impvtance for the proper understanding of the correal 
stipulation and likewise of certain points regarding 
the accession of a fideiussor. 
In the first place let us look t. period +i. 
So far as I am aware, no one has yet succeeded in giving 
this passage a rational interpretation. That it states 
is that 'duo rei doubtless can be so constituted that a 
period of time is fixed (lit, consideration is had of a 
time) within which both shall reply',' The term 'cons ti t- 
ui' is inappropriate, but if we substitute 'interrogan ', 
the idea at once suggests itself that Julian is here 
reproducing the framework of a, 
°ox formula, Now 
what can the purpose be of thus fixing a period of time 
xb within which both debtors must reply? Only this, 
I venture to think, namely, to ensure that the one debtor 
shall not be bound without the other. Hence I conjecture 
tamer 'respondent' Julian proceeded somewhat as 
1 - 15 ctd 
follows : e t nisi intra tempus s tatutum utriusque re sponsum 
secutum fuerit, neuter teneatur. Thus if kxxxxd T. inter 
rogates M. and S. correally, and M. replies within the 
time fixed, but S does not, M. is not bound as he other- 
wise would have been. In support of this conjecture it 
may be observed that the 'et' between 'ut' and 'temporis' 
is meaningless as the period stands, but if after fmaystex 
'respondeat' we add another 'et'- .clause also governed by 
'ut', and assume that the two *b'et's' mark two clauses is 
in a formula which is here outlined, the period acquires 
a perfect concinnity." Thus we arrive at the'.ßíl eal 
formula already given. This restoration, which in 
spite of its highly conjectural character makes, as 
every one must admit, uncommonly good sense, implies 
that period I. originally followet immediately after 
. 
o(, , and we accordingly transfer te to (3'. 
In the second place, I believe that period /, 
contains 
cthe 
remnants of a period". which originally 
preceded o Discussion of this Oconjecture I must re- 
serve for my future treatise on Accessoriality, as it 
depends on certain technicalities affecting the =mix 
relation of principaleand fideiussor. 
In the third place, the initial 'sed' in 3. 
suggests a preceding context which the compilors have 
deleted. I conjecture that the antithesis may have 
been between a simple reply 'spondeo' given to an 
active correal interrogatory, and a reply expressly 
given to ohe of the co.;creditors alone, e.g. Maevi, 
tibi dare spondeo' . 
In the fourth place periods d and K. are 
without doubt, to be attributed in their I entirety 
to the compilors; we shall deal with them in connect- 
ion with the Justinianian law. 
9 
/144, fr. fY 
9 22' 
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Meanwhile, assuming the substantial souddness of our 
reconsttzuctions, let us try and understm4d the procedure 
adopted by the compilors as regards this fragment. 
The pr. 1 andÇ2 represent three separate heads of 
discussion which frakax > dx presumably followed one anoth- 
ed in the same order in the fifty second book of Jul - 
ian's Digest. In the case of each the compilors kxux 
deleted part of the original decision a,s obsolete. 
None of the three heads of discussion had anything to 
do with the requisite of con_tinuus ictus, but the com- 
pilors thought this a suitable occasion to set forth 
the new theory devised by them regarding this requisite 
in its application to the correal stipulation, espec- 
ially as the deleted periods and ),. seemed capable of 
adaptation for this purpose. Accordingly they appended 
a new 3, made up partly of elements taken from and 
but entirely repugnant to the classical law;' 
1g5'á D. (45.2)12 pr. Venuleius II stip. ̀ - n'>9 2 
ol, Si ex duobus qui L romissuri 4 sint, ho dieJ < alter, 
3 4J 
alter bostera dij <"'9 responderit, Proculue+: non 
exile duos am= reos ac ne obligatum quidem intellegi 
0) 




3.) ex intervallo 
,I the MSS reading is 'prolutus', but the emendation 
'Proculus' is universally accepted; 'ait' must be under- 
s tood , 
,79 $St 105 ;#' 15 ctd 
2, 
actorl L, ad alia negotia "7discesser3.t vel 3, J 
promissor - licet peractis illis robus? <^->, 
responden t. 
By far the most troubbesome of the formal re- 
quisites of the stipulation is that of continuus actus. 
The general principle is stated in Venuleius D. (45,1) 
137 pr. which I have ventured to rettore thus: 
continuus ictus stipulantis et promittentis esse debet 
S 
C^] et <stricta iuris ratione> comminus respondert 
s tipulanti oportet. ceterum (hodle constat? im±aan 
si post interrogationem 4(uterque praesens manserit40 
nec alter adj aliud/ iccesserit»egotium> 17-3 
<p romi ttentem teeneri> quamvi s Ltuj <ex intervallo ,7 
spopondisset. 
9J 
The rule of continuous presence was, l believe; 
stated by Ulpian in D,'(45,1)1.1, which I have ventured 
to restore thus: 
Qui praesans interrogavit, 
eroLur disceessit, inutilem 
r 
uaq` mgvam kmox r-i reverso 
si antequam sibi respond- 
AL '401 efficit stipulatione'Rr 
responsum est 
r 
f, sed lio lure ui oat ali uem ab 
aliquo inter ogatum alter nec 
2 accesserit nec ab altero 
3) 
9 ex intervallo 
tenebi tur 
4 (ut tarnen aliquod momentum naturae intervenire possit) 
G, 
acceperi t Donell.: occeperit 
( nihil proderit 




sin vero praesens interrogavit r discessit et 
ìobligat: intervallum enim medium non vitiavit oblig- 
ationem. .------------ 
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The first point ow note in period 0<. of our present 
pr. is that the compilors have almost certaikly substit- 
utedtpromissuri t for 'interrogati t ; the reference to a, 
response (responderit) without a previous reference to 
an interrogatory would from the classical standpoint be 
altogether anomalous, for the interrogatory was the 
prodominating a iemen.t in every stipulatory formula. The 
fact of this substitution is important as affording a 
clue to the restoratihn of other texts. 
In the second place period AC, as it stands, inevit- 
ably founds an argumentum e contrario to the effect that 
in the case of a, passive correal stipulation the requis- 
ite of continuus actus is satisfied if both debtors 
reply before the expiration of the day when the question 
is put. But we may with the utmost confidence deny that 
the classical jurists ever laid down such a rule. It 
seems in the highest degree probable that Venuleius 
wrote 'comminus' and 'ex intervallo' respectively in 
the places now occupied by 'hodie' and 'postera igaxx 
die' (bis)o So restored, period c, contains a quotation 
from Proculus to the effect 'that both ..answers must follow 
immediately on the interrogatory; if either makes any 
appreciable delay in replying, he is not bound at all. 
According to my suggestion, Venuleius quoted 
Proculus merely to point out ±ate that the view of the 
latter was no longer generally accepted; the mature 
classical law held that the mere elapse of an interval 
between different steps in a stipulatory act was immat- 
erial provided both parties remained constantly present 
and neither turned to any other business, Period V 
as restored by me, sets forth this principle as applied 
to the ordinary case of a simplex stipulation. 
I next conjecture that Venuleius applied the 
same principle to the correal stipulation in a following 
107 15 ctd 
period 
f 
which the compilors have omitted., If T. in=ter - 
rogates N. and S. correally and M. replies at once, S,. 
after an interval, then, if T., M. and. S. remain con- 
stantly present and abstain from all other business 
until S. nas replied, a cor real obligation is duly estab- 
lished. So far the application of the principlb is simple 
but there is a possibility that Venuleius went on to dis- 
cuss cert.in more complicated riptavgmx questions which 
might arise in this connection. 
; 
For example, If M0', haviïg 
given his answer goes away before S. gives his, quid iuris? 






108 16 Effective Requisites of the Correal 
stipulation. 
The effective requisites of the stipulatio in general 
are dealt with kgxftag in Gal. & III, 97 -109, the method 
of treatment adopted here and in other juristic writings 
being to consider the various circums4ancee under which a 
stipulation is ' inutilis') For exampiw, (a) xp a party 
stipulates from a pupil or a woman without his @r her 
tutor's auctoritas; (b) a party stipulates for a prestat- 
ion to be rendered after his own or the promisor's death;. 
(c) a party stipulates for a thing which belongs to him- 
self, In each of these cases, assuming that all the 
constitutiveg requisites are fulfilled, it cannot be 
denied that a stipulatory act has been regularly accomp 
plashed, yet the substantive law holds the act ineffect- 
ive to produce an oblagationY Therefore we say that in 
each case an effective requisite of the stipulation has 
not been fulfilled. 
The question now arises, if a correal stipul- 
ation is materially effective to bind one of the co -debt- 
ors, or entitle one of the co- creditors, but is material- 
ly ineffective to bind or entitle the other, is a valid 
simplex obligation created? Whatever the old civil 
law might have had to say on such a point, there can be no 
doubt that the classical jurisprudence gave an affirmat- 
ive answer. 
Gaius (§ 102) includes in these the rule of acquiemcence 
which we have treated as a formal constitutive requisite, ! 
si) The term 'inutilis' is a perfectly general one and may 
connote the failure either of a constitutive or of an 
effective requisite. 
4) In the case of a stipulation from a pupil (or woman) 
/ without his tutor's auctoritas, there is antinomy on the 
question whether the pupil is bout naturally'; see 
Girard, p,654 n.31. its questionAaoes not concern 
us 
here; without doubt the stipulation is civilly ineffect- 
ive, 
; A ' -. , G O Z SS. 3 
/0 
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But further, the case of a correal stipulationmay give 
rise to the following delicate situation: Suppose a 
correal stipulation to be unimpeachable so far as its 
constitutive requisites are concerned; suppose also 
that, if either of the co- creditors or co- debtors be 
eliminated, it is effective to entitle or bind the other; 
but suppose that is is not effective to establish a 
correal obligation. This situation mayx kx arise irrx 
under two circumstances: (i) where there is a latent 
defect in the stipulation which renders the two obligat- 
ions materially unequal, and (ii) where the prestation 
ei r" 
r 
stipulated fs isA'individualised' by the person of the 
particular creditor or debtor, 
(i) The simplest example of the first case is where M. 
r 
and S. stipulate correally: 'decem x ±xil±g et et (aut) 
Stiohum dari, but Stichus belongs to one of them, say M. 
Here if we eliminate S., a valid simplex obligation 
cItte.4 . 
d.eom is in and if elim- 
inate M., a valid simplex obligation decem ;nit et (aut) 
Stichum dari is established in S.'s favour; but the 
inequality between these two obligations clearly excludes 
the possibility of their identification. We must there- 
fore lay down the rule that a correal stipulation in 
order to be effective for the fulfilment of its proper 
end, to wit, the establishment of two obligations cor- 
really related, must be free from any latent defect 
which renders these obligations materially unequal. 
(ii) As examples of the second case the following may 
be cited: 
M. and S. stipulate correally for the same usufruct. Now 
a usufruct is, as a rule at least, 'individualised' by 
the person of the particular usufructuary, so that a 
stutbxv[ usufruct constituted in favour of M. is incapable 
df identification with a usufruct constituted in favour 
,op,n£.rz 
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of S. Hence, though if we eliminate S., a valid alai 
simplex obligation is established in M.'s favour and 
vice versa, yet it is impossible that the correal stip -. 
ula.tiion can produce two obligations correally related. 
The fact of the prestation being 'individua.lised' by 
the person of the particular creditor excludes the poss- 
ibility of identification. 
(b)M, and S. stipulate correally for the same sum dotis 
nomine. As a dos is /individualised' by the put person 
of the particular husband, identification is excluded 
on the same ground as in the preceding case. 
(c) M. and S. promise correally the same services. Here 
the prestation, more especially if the services are of a 
expert t 1 
Wk 3kual nature, is individualised by the person of the 
particular debtor, for the quality of fork depends ̂on 
the intelligence and skill of the worrman. Accordingly 
on the same ground as before, identification is exclud- 
ed. 
We must therefore lay down the further rule that a 
correal stipulation, in order to be fully effective, 
must not contain a prestation which, being individual- 
ised by the person of the particular creditor or debtor, 
renders the two obligations materially non -identified. 
The question is, what result ensues if either of 
these effective requisites be not fulfilled,- if a cor- 
real stipulation does contain a latent defect or an 
individualised prestation, which induces material in- 
equality or non -identification? Tne old civil law, I 
believe, would have had no alternative but to pronounce 
the stipulatory act wholly 'inutilis', but as we shall 
see xklutx later, there are good grounds for holding 
111 1t ctd 
that the ma ;;re classical jurisprudence here introduced 
the doctrine of simple solidarity, 
tor 
We reserve all father discussion of these cases 
of material inequality and non -identification for out 
e )4,) 
chapter on Simple and Equitable Solidarity ex stipulatu. 
In the following section we shall merely consider two 
passages bearing on the case where one only of the two 
obligations which a r @gularly constituted correal stip- 
ulation purports to create, is valid. 
I7f$2tV 
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(1) D,'(45.2)12,1. Venuleius II stip. 
Si a Titio <- 7,Let pupillo< sine tutoris auctoritate 
3) 
Fel stipula,tus fuero eadem decem, a servo 
quasi duos reos promittendi constitui7 obligatum 
J.) 
JI 
Titium <^!/4 solun +% 1 Iulianus scribit, quamquam 
si servus <:-Aquitparldiumat spoponderit <---7' in 
actione de peculio eadem observari atom debent ac si 
liber fuisset. 
It does not take much critical $ßg42 insight to 
perceive that the compilors have here played havoc with 
Venuleius's §:$iginal text. As the notes indicate, I 
believe thisr paragraph originally referred to the 
relation of principal debtor and sponsor(or fidepromiss- 
or) and its detailed examination is therefore reserved 
for my future treatise on Accessoriality. Meanwhile we 
merely note the clause 'quasi duos reos promittendi 
c ons ti tui seem' o 
Suppose I stipulate correally thus: 
5rt Titi, post mortem meam 
C 
tuam) ) decem dari spondee? 
Maevi, dam eadem decem dari spondes? 
post meam eiusve mortem vel a muliere 
z) 
ve 
9 et a sponsore vel fidepromissore 
4, esse sponsorem vel fidepromissorem 
quasi duos reos promittendi constituiasem 
vel peregrinus 
yf quaeritur an pro eo sponsor vel fidepromissor obliget- 
ur: plane si ex justa causa alio verbo quam ' spondes' 
a servo stipuler 
i¡, 
_; 
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Here the stipulation from T. is in diem ( incertum), that± 
from M. is pure, but as we have seen the validity of 
the correal stipulation is not prejudiced by this 
modal discrepancy. The question to T.,xXxxxxa 
however, though formally unimpeachable, is ineffective R 
ortcount of the substantive rule which forbids 
Ixtaigxt ' ab heredis persona incipere obligationem'. 
But the elimination of T. does not prevent the creation 
of a valid simplex obligation between myself and M. 
Likewise if in place of T., we have a woman or pupil 
who promises without the auc Lori tas of her or his 
tutor, my stipulation from M. is valid. It need 
hardly be remarked that M.'s obligation in each case is 
for the full X; the dis .,ributive interrogatory excludes 
any possibility of partition. 
fk24 D. (45.1)128; Paul. X quaest. 
0Z. Si duo rei stipulandi ita extitissent ut alter 
utiliter,tgx alter inutiliter stipularetur, ei w 
qui non habet promissorem obligatum, non recta 
solvitur, quia non alterius laìx nomine ei solvitur, mar 
sed suce obligationis quae nulla est. 
q. eadém ratione qui Stichum aut Pamphilum stipulatur, 
si in unum xxx constiterit obligati°, quia k alter 
stipulatoris erat, etiamsi desierit eius esse, non 
recte solvitur, quia xxx utraque res ad obligationem 
ponitur, non ad solutionem. 
Z 
Period$ does not here concern us, except in 
so far as it indicates that in ,00C, Paul was thinking 
JGa3_.TII.' aka 100. 
ilatrt----ftecere infra p. 167. 
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not so much of the case where the stipulation of one of 
the creditors was formally void, as of the case where 
such stipulation was ineffective on material grounds. 
More particularly he seems to have been thinking of such 
a stipulatiorras: 
M.: Titi, Stichum dari spondee? 
S.: Titi, eundem Stichum dari spondes? 
I, 
where Stichus was, in point of fact, the próerty of 
say M. A valid simplex obligation is here created 
between S. and T., but M. is entirely eliminated, so 
that solutio cannot be made to him. 
The motive which Paul gives for his decision 
in (quia non...) is instructive. Apparently some 
were inclined to argue that since M. and S. were for- 
mally constituted correal creditors, M. was entitled to 
receive solutio xi in the name of S,, though his own 
obligatory right was materially void; But Paul rejects 
this argument. A correal creditor is entitled to 
solutio in nis own name, not in that of the other 
correal creditor; hence if his obligatory right is 
non -existent, solutio cannot validly be made to him. 
24( /1-ii` /1-t-t-tX 
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C. 
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Cl/vt.caftr arcu. -e-=#z"--W 
115 ? Eadem Ram Res and Civil Consumption. 
It id clearly ippossible for us toy attempt here 
any exhaustive exposition of tht Roman institute of 
process -consumption, and we must presume that the reader 
is generally acquainted with its principles. 
The fundamen ,al idea is stated by Gai. iii; 180-1; 
Iv; 106.79 passages w rich open up a wide field of spec- 
ulation. Confining ourselves to actions in personam, 
we note the rule that litiseohtestation in a iudicium 
legi tirm with an intentio iuris Givilis consumes the 
obligation absolutely, so that if any further action is 
brought on the same obligation (de eadem re, de eodem 
debi to = madam de eadem obligatione) the iudex is 
bound to absolve the defendant without the necessity of 
any exception,, tne obligatory relation being now extinct. 
On the other nand litiscontestation in any iudicium 
imperio continens or in a iudicium legitimum with an 
inten,io in factum does not consume the obligation, and 
hence if a further action be brought de eadem re, the 
iudex cannot absolve the defendant on the ground that 
by virtue of the previous litiscontestatio no obligat- 
ory relation now eätsts; if the previous litiscontest- 
ation is to operate as a bar to a second action de 
eadem re an excetio rei iudicatae vel in iudicium 
de duo tae Ais essential. 
Thus we leave two modes of process -consumption 
admitted by the later civil law: consumption ipso cure 
and consumption ope excentionis rei iud. vel in iud. 
called . 
ded., otherwise Axaxxklmax m 'direct' and 'indirect' 
7 
consumption. Another way of describing the position 
J It is altogether fallacious to describe 'indirect' 
consumption as 'praetorian', 'honorary' or equitable'; 
true ib owed its introduction to tree activity of the 
praetor, but long before the mature classical period it 
had been 'received' into the civil 
law. On the points 
neredealt with I would refer the 
reader to the title 
Grundzuge d. Process,onsumption in Levy, i_Cont., p.48 ff. 
The vexed question whether there was only a sihgle ex- 
ceptionrei. iud. vel in iud. ded., or two exceptions 
rei iud,and rei in iud,ded. respectively does not 
here concern us. 
F 
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ib to bay that in one case there is consumed the 
creditor' s obligatory -right itbblf so that his action - 
AGht, 
right necessarily disappears whereas in the other case 
the consumption merely covers his action- right, his 
obligatory -right being left intact. The distinction 
of a 
oetween these two modes of consumption was however/pure- 
ly technical nature, and did not mot need to be insisted 
on cohtinually in the course or juristic exposition.° 
Hence apparently for sale of convenience the exceptio 
rei iud. vel in iud, ded, was regularly ximakxx mentioned 
as the organ of process -consumption, even where there was 
of 
no suggestion /tRxt the first action being other than a 
iudicium legitimum with intentio iuris civilis, This -^ 
manner of expression is all the more a intelligible if 
we assume an exceptio rei iud. vel in iud, ded, to have 
been employed as a matter of common form ob maiorem 
cautelam even where it was strictly speaking tsupervacua;` 
Now the question whether or not the defendant in 
one 
art action can obtain absolution (whether m ipso iure or 
ope exceptionis rei iud, vel in iud. ded,) on the ground 
td 
of litiscontestation in a previous action, must be decidx 
according as the second action is or is not de eadem re 
with the first , The expression t eadern rest therefore 
must have a technical significance which demands invest- 
igation. This brings us to the somewhat remarkable 
fact that nowhere in the sources have we any definition 
of this expression as applied distinctly to actions in 1 
personam. All the definitions that mx we have refer to 
1-2.`41 £cL nK 
l 
actions in rem I cannot regard Levy's attempt to 
A 
/ See e.g. D,'(44,2)11.9; Levy, ',Conk., p. 61 ff. 
2) See e.g. Ulpian. i.(44.2)7.1,4; Paul, D. eod. 12, eod,14 
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discover in these definitions the principle applicable 
to actions in personam In point of 
i 
fact as Levy himself emphasises, personal and real 
actions must pursue different courses as regards con- 
sumption. In the case of real actions consumption had 
its basis in the old maxim, preserved to us by Quinctil.- 
3 ian,) 'bis de eadem re ne sit actio', which as Gradenwitz 
seems to have demonstrated, had no application to 
actions in personam; as regards the latter the fundament 
al principle was 'tollitur obligatio litis ¡mutt contest - 
atione' . 
The absence of any clear information regarding 
the technical significance of 'eadem res' as apblied to 
actions in personam, may, I think. be explained as 
follows: I 'Eadem res' is here precisely equivalent to 
'eadem obligatio' or 'idem debitum'. The question of 
'eadem res' or 'alia res' simply resolves itself into 
this,A ins the second action based on the same obligation 
(debt) as the first action or on a different obligation 
(debt) ?A, agi4 this question esul be separated from 
the details of the formulary system which the compilors 
naturally omitted as far as possible. 
We have indeed quite sufficient information to 
enable us to see how the position worked out in practico, 
1 ' 
xbaxix op. ci t. 21 p. 51 
J Ins t. Or. 7.6.4. 
9 Volkss.ruch u. Kunstregel bei d,Konsum.tion in Aus rom. 
u. b rg. Rec t, es sc ri t . :e er? 1907) p. Z85 ff. 
') It is now proved beyond doubt that the statement of 
Gaius D. (50.17) 57 !bona, fides non patitur ut bis idem ex- 
igatur, had nothing to do with civil consumption; Levy 
op ci t. p.49 n.1 
9 op. Gai.III 181, 'ut si...dobitum potion:), postes de 
agere nonApatiePe; IV. 107,`sí..', actum est...postea... 
de eadem re agi non po te s t.' 
1 
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Gai. III, 1310131a being particularly valuable in this 
connection. Oonsider the following case: M. sells a 
piece of land to T. and agrees to mancipate the property 
on the following day and to give vacant possession a =t 
month hence; he fails to mancipate and T. therefore 
sues him in an actio emptijthus : quod Titius de Maevio 
fundum quo de agitur emit, qua de re agitur quidquid 
ob earn rem Maevius Titio dare facere opertefex fide 
bona, eius, iudex, etc.) ffe assume that this action is 
brought before the expiration of the month allowed for 
the delivery of vacant possession, so that all T. can 
rw-c-trrrcrs._ 
is damages in respect of M.'s 
failure to mancipate. Then the month expires, and M. 
fails in his further duty to give vacant possession; in 
such case T. 's only remedy is to bring another actio 
empti. But this second action will have precisely the 
same formula as the first; its demonstratio will set 
forth the same contract of sale, and its intentio the 
same uncertain claim'quidquid Maevium Titio dare facere 
oportet ex fide bona'. Hence there can be no doubt 
that this second action is de eadem re with the first, 
and is therefore excluded by the process -consumption 
rule. In order however to restrict the operation of 
process- consumption, the classical jurisprudence devised 
the plan of inserting a praeseriptio 'ea res agatur de 
fundo mancipando' in the formula of the first action, 
so that the way was left open for a subsequent actio 
empti on the same sale, this second action being now 
technically de alia re from the first. 
Again consider Paul. 7)0(44.2)22 i.f.: et si actum 
sit cum herede de dolo defuncti, deinde de dolo heredis 
ageretur, exceptio rei iudicatae <vel in iudicium 





deductae >non nocebit, quia de alia re agitur. If 
T. deposits an article with M., and the latter dies 
leaving x S. as his heir, and T. alleging that M. has 
been guilty of dolus, brings an action thus: quod 
Titius spud. Maevium defunctum mensam argenteam depos- 
ui t, qua de re agitur, quidquid ob eam rem Seium, her - 
edem Maevii, dare fxx$ xx2max facer° oportet ex fide bona, 
eius, iudex, etc., then undoubtedly the entire obligati° 
depositi is con.sumed1and T. cannot bring xraratitxx a furth- 
er action on the ground of dolus on the part of S. himself 
In order to prevent this result a. praescrittio 'ea res 
agatur de dolo Maevii defuncti, must be inserted in the 
formula oflthe first action, so that the second action de 
II 
dolo Sell heredis becomes technically de alia re. Or, 
alternatively, the formula of the first action must be 
conceived in factum: si paret Titium apud Maevium 
defunctum mensam argelateam deposuisse eamque dolo malo 
Maevii defuncti redditam non esse etc.;C Here again this 
formula has no effect in excluding a subsequent action 
on the ground of S. 's dolus, the operation of the (indir - 
ect) process- consumption being expressly restricted. 
9 
Tne application of what has just been said to 
the correal obligation is now simplicity itself. Where 
two obligations are correally related, litiscontestation 
in an action on the one consumes the other, directly or 
indirectly, because both obligations are una atque oblig.- 
atio or res, -the object of each is unum atque idem 
debitum. The use of the term 'res' as equivalent to 
2 
' obligatio' is perfectly well authenticated, and the use 
see Levy, ?honk,, p. RE 95 n.4. 
`) see e.g. Ulpian. D,'(5.1)18,1 i.m.: si res non ex malefic- 
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of 'eadem rest as a technical term denoting thïam13mRitx the 
constructive uhity of two obligations for purposes of 
process -consumption is therefore quite natural. Hence 
when we have two obligations correally related, the 
actions which sanction the same are properly described 
as 'de eadem re', this description, as technically em_ 
ployed' being equivalent to a statement that the two 
actions stand ix to one another in a process -consumption 
relation. 
The expression'de eadem re' was no u however 
alw ays used in the technical sense just described,.' Thus 
p 
in Ulpian. D.(19.1)10: non est novum ut dune obligationes 
'I 
in eiusdem persona de eadem re concurrant, the words 'de 
eadem re' cab only means' concerning the same specific 
thing'. Accordingly 'dune obligationes de eadem re' are 
L 'two obligations having the same determinate species 
as their common prestation- object', nothing being here 
implied as tam to whether their reflation is correal or 
cumulative. 
Against one common practice of modern writers 
I must here enter a protest, the pax practice namely of 
employing the phrase 'obligations de eadem re' as a 
techhical description of two obligations correally relat- 
ed; according to this usage the 'rest signifies,not 
merely the prestation- object,but the prestation mrmIlktpcx 
or obligation- object itself, and the phrase quoted sig- 
nifies 'obligations with one and the same prestation as 
f 
their common (obligation- )object. So far as I am aware 
'; 
1 I must maintain the genuineness of as against 
Levy, Konk., p. 456 ff.' 
J Another unteçhnical use of 'de max eadem (ea) re' if is 
found in Ulp n.D.(44.2)5 which in its original form 
referred to vadimonium: here the phrase in question 
means 'on the same material ground of action'; (simply 
see Levy, Konk., p.101 ff. 
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there is no authority in the sources for this usage. 
It is only two actions that can properly be described 
as 'de eadem re' in the technical sense of the process- 
consumption rule. The phrase 'in utraquo obligatione 
una res vertitur' will be explained in our discussion 
of Inst.III. 16,1 in the next section. 
Thus we attain a full comprehension of correality 
as a relation founded on the entirely artificial and 
formal basis of process consumption. The very formality 
and artificiality of this basis proves it, we may simagat 
venture to say, with absolute certainly to have been the 
root out of which the whole institute of correality 
originally sprung. The correal stipulation must have 
been deliberately devised by the conditores iuris antiqui 
for the purpose of establishing a constructive unity of 
obligation which would allow process consumption to 
operate extensively. a Had the early Roman law been 
4SWExilfiTAF' NEW 
s tructing a correal relation in which litiscohte- altion 
had' n extensive consuming effect, the early uurfsts 
were boUild to attribute a like effect to acgptilatio 
which we ass)me to have been original, y'' indispensable to 
the discharge of \an obligatory rea"tion ex stipulau 
without action. The \when _,material fact of solutio 
became endowed per se wi AyAhe capacity of extinguishing 
such an obligatory re ,a' ion,ro'1the jurists were bound to 
attribute extens rj consuming effect, to it also. Thus 
in the class "'law law acceptilatio and''splutio stand 
side by : with litiscontest<atio as agents'i  22RMIt 
$ .mistiming a correal obligation,- each of themhacs an 
`power of effecting a civil consumption. But, as 
11 
able to devise an institute of solidarity based on 
solutio- consumption, the extensive consuming effect of 
litiscontestation would be an anomaly which could not 
be explained. If however we assume the institute of 
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correality as we find it portrayed in the writings of the 
classical jurists to have been evolved from a manipulation 
of the stipulatory formula made with the express design 
of employing the principle of process -consumption for 
solidary ends, the whop position becomes xtxxgx plaine 
Naturally after they had succeeded in con- 
structing a correal relation in which litiscontestation 
had an extensive consuming effect, thtear1y jurists 
were abound to attribute a like attta effect to acceptilat- 
been 
io which we assume to have /originally indispenaable to 
44 
the de charge of an obligatory re ktion ex stipulatu 
without action. Then when the material fact of solutio 
became endowed per se with the capacity of extinguishing 
a 
such xx relation, the jurists were bound to attribute 
extensive consuming effect to it also.' Thus in the 
classical law, acceptilatio and solutio stand side by 
side with litiscontestatio as agents in consuming a 
correal obligation).- each of them has an equal power of 
i 
effecting a civil consumption; But as Levy nag very 
clearly shown, in the writings of the classical jurists 
it is pm round process- condumption, not solutio- ( or 
acceptilatio -) consumption that the institute of correal- 
ity revolves. If two obligations as originally constit- 
uted, have different subjects on the one side or the 
other, and we ask whether or not they are correally 
related, the txxtx formal test is, does litiscontestation 
under the one consume the other or does it not? 
On the other viand, however, it cannot be denied 
that by the days of the mature classical jurisprudence 
extensive process -consumption nad long outlived its 
usefulness; as the institute of simple solidarity proves, 
the law was now perfectly capable of establishing solid - 
ary relations on the natural and material basis of 
Konk., p. 182 ff.; I must not however be held as con- 
curring with the whole of Levy's arguments. 
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solutio- consumption. Yet so deep had the idea of 
extensive process- con_sumpion its roots in the legal 
system 6f Rome, that it maintained itself in full 
vigour throughout the whole classical period. 
The obvious inconvenience of`process_consumpt- 
ion in the passive case,- in the active case it was 
practically harmless,- lay in the fact that if the 
debtor sued turned out to be insolvent, the creditor 
had no recourse against the other. It was therefore 
necessary for the creditor in his own interests to 
make careful enquiry into the solven)y of the debtors 
before bringing his action, and it might often be ad- 
visable for him to split up his ma claims ,--e' - 
But we ask, had the mature classical jurisprud- 
ence really failed to devise any means of protecting 
creditors against the hardship of extensive process - 
consumption? We at once think of the praetor's power 
(0) 
of granting restitutio in integro , but this remedy 
was of an extraordinary nature and we may be almost 
certain, was only applied where the max creditor was 
a minor or had been the victim of fraud or in certain 
other recognised cases of a special description. Then 
it was always possible for the creditor to avoid taking 
his co- debtors bound correally, and in lieu thereof 
to take one of them bound as sole debtor and the other 
241) 
as a mandator or independent guarantor. But leaving ( a44 
such devices aside was there no means of preserving 
the correal relation intact and yet enabling the cred- 
itor, after suing the one debtor, to have recourse 
14) cp. Pau1,D. (15.1)4703; 'rescisso superiore iudicio' ; 
Levy, Kónk., p, 261 ff, 
2 
4) vide infra p. f ls, /4 it 
34 vide infra p. 11111 1$"1 /, 174 
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against the other? If my conjectures regarding Papinian. 
D.'(45.2)11 pr. be well founded, the classical jurists 
had discovered such a means in the process of mutua 
fideiussio. After taking the co- debtors bound correally, 
the creditor could, by taking them bound in addition as 
fideiussors for one another, practically avoid ahy hard - 
the 
ship arising from /extensive p consuming effect of litis- 
contestationm 
One means of excluding extensive process -con- 
sumption mentioned by Justint,n in C.(8.40(41)28 cannot, 
in my opinion have been available in classical times, 
namely a special pact providing for such exclusion. 
Extensive process -consumption was a civil law consequence 
and I hold it quite in possible for this consequence to 
be avoided by a simple agreement of parties.' On this 
point we shall have more to say when we come to deal 
with the Justinianian law. 
The concluding point with which we shall deal in 
this chapter is the relation between process -consumption 
on the one hand and election and occupation on the other. 
The all impact ; ±xt important le fact is that the terms 
'eligere' abd 'occupare' have essentially a substantive, 
not a processual significance; the statements that the 
creditor'elects' one of his correal debtors, ex that one 
of the correal creditors 'occupies', have in themselves 
nothing to do with litiscontestatio or process- consumpt- 
ion. 'Election', as an accomplished Sact, properly 
=sax means nothing more than that the e editor has 
110.1 'mg 
I On this 
remarks 
.9* ¡i . 
matter I would refer the reader to the excellent 
of Levy, Konk., p, 48 ff, 377.' 
13q- 
'2Z,. 
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evinced an intention to proceed against a particular 
one of his correal debtors for the whole debt, and 
the others ; 'occupation', as an accom- 
p }shed fact, properly means nothing more than that one 
of the correal creditors has taken some step which 
Illttgitnixtixlxik&x ix$axaightxh aax mmum mx xghätgx 
stimmornattruati4xthammikergxhakagxtkamomaudatixxxxx 
gives him a preferential right to the whole debt and 
so excludes the others. The statement that the cred- 
itor in a passive correal obligation has an 'election' 
simply means that he has a power of proceeding against 
any one debtor for the whole debt at his free choice; 
the statement that any one creditor in an active correal 
obligation is in a position to 'occupy' simply means 
that he has the power of securing for himself a prefer- 
ential right to the whole debt. 
An election is however inchoate until it has 
been perfected by litiscontestation with the debtor elect- 
ed; the whole point of electing at all is the anticipat- 
ion of joining issue wxtI and once issue is joined the 
other debtors are freed. Hence we find passages in 
which the classical jurists use such terminology as 
'election of one debtor frees the other'; see for exampl9 
Paul .(9.4)24; 26 pr.: in quo casu electio est actoris 
cum quo velit agere.s,.electio vero alterum liberabit. 
In such cases, however, the context makes it clear that 
not election per se, but election perfected by kittimaxxx 
litiscontestation is the liberatory agent. 
On the other hand we must avoid the error of 
supposing that the classical jurists ever used thaxiarmx 
'electio' as a technical processual term e,ivalent to 
litiscontestation. Certnly in the example last 
quoted one might a, first sight be tempted to translate 
tiMet±o vero alterum liberabit' by 'but litiscontestation 
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will free the other'. This translation would however 
be inaccurate; the preceding clause shows 'electio' in 
its proper X4 4A S *4 sense of a substantive right on 
the creditor's part of electing which debtor he will sue, 
and 'electio' in the second clause lastquoted must still 
bear the same substantive meaning; only we must now 
understand that the right of election has been duly ex- 
ercised and perfected by litiscontestation. The bald 
place 
use of 'electio' in thmatamma of'litiscontestatio*'be-- 
longs lxmbutztay to the Justinianian law in which 
substantive 1 ideas and terms 
-Cot7t4 l 
.&.c 441.4 f , , y..4 c 
Likewise in the active case when it is said 
that one of two correal creditors has 'occupied', we 
naturally think of litiscontestation as the means by 
which this occupation has been achieved. There is, 
however, no necessary connection between occupation and 
litiscontestation. In the case of certain lam non-cor- 
real relations where there is a conflict of claims, the 
' occupant' is not the claimant who first joins issue, but 
he who fist obtains judgment, ̀ But even where it is 
stated that one of two creditors occupies by litiscontest_, 
a,tion, this statement does not necessarily imply the 
operation of extensive process -consumption. The law 
may quite well confer on the creditor who first joins 
issue, say M,, a preferential right to the prestation 
without thereby holding the obligatory right of the other, 
say S,, extinguished. In such a case, if M. joins t.ssue 
collusively or fails to prosecute the action duly, he may 
be deprived of his preference so that S. can now bring 
fis action. On the other hand where extensive process- 
consumption operates, the right of S. is absolutely 
extinguished in any °Vent. 
see Levy, Konk. , p. 4 ; th. S; ' fr `,. 227 fl 
z) 
cp. for example, Gaius D.(15.1)10 i. f.: 
pq 
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(1) Inst. III,16,1, 
oc Ex huiusmodi obligat.ionibus et stipulartyibus solidum 
singulis debetur promittentes singuli in solidum 
tenentur; 
Vin xaxol utraque tamen obligatione xx una res vertitur: 
dr' 
5. et vel alter debitum accipiendo vel alter solvendo 
Imx omnium peremit obligationem et omnes liberat. 
In the xxxyx pr. of this title, as we have already 
seen, the proper form for concluding a correal stipulation 
is given. In the present paragraph the matter is looked 
at from the opposite standpoint; a correal stipulation is 
deemed to be concluded in the form given and the effects 
of such stipulation are now laid down. In all probabil- 
ity the original of the entire title III,16 is Floventine 
Institutes, and we must Keep before us the elementary 
nature of the latter work in construing this paragraph. 
In period c, the term' obligationibus' is amp - ren-U -y 
's tipul ati onibus' and the t 
phrase 'ex huiusmodi obligationibus' theme means 'from the 
two stipulations "Maevi, decem dari spondes? spondeo" 
and "Sei, eadem decem dari spondes? spondeo" (and sim- 
ilarly in the active case)', which two stipulations are 
run together so as to form a single joint stipulation in 
distributive form. Period .<. therefore signifies that 
the joint stipulation by virtue of its distributivo form 
renders each co- creditor or co- debtor entitled or bound 
in respect of a full sum of X and not merely pro rata. 
Period 0 then goes on to say that though each 
of the two obligations (stipulations) has as its prestat- 
ion-object a full sum of t X, yet the two sums are one 
.N 
128 St? 04D ctd 
and the same. The phrase 'una res' seems to connmte Kt c 
simply the identification of the two prestation -objects, 
and the form of expression here adopted for the purpose of 
expounding the correal is perfectly justifiable, so long 
as we are not referring to the case of a stipulation for 
a determinato species. As we have seen, where two oblig- 
ations have roxal equal generic prestation- objects, mxgx and 
these prestation- objects are identified as one and the same, 
this identification (equality of prestation- content being 
assumed) produces identification of the two prestations, in 
other words it produces an objective identity between the 
two obligations. If however the common prestation- object 
of the two obligations were specific, e.g. the same slave 
* Stichus, the statement 'xxxxxxxx in utraque obligations 
una res vertitur' (where the 'una res' is Stichus) would 
not suffice to express the existence of a correal relation 
between the two obligations; for any number of quite inde- 
pendent obligations may have the same determinate species 
as their m prestation- object,- may be 'de eadem re' in the 
untechnical sense. 
The foregoing remarks proceed on the understand- 
ing of the 'res' in period Ç as merely the prestation -ob- 
jeet, not the prestation (obligation- object) itself, and 
this interpretation I believe to be in harmony with the 
terminological usage of the classical jurists. Period F 
must therefore be considered merely as an elementary indic- 
ation of the objective unity involved in the correal relat- 
ion, and not as a fundamental exposition Iltaxmfthereof; 
such an exposition would have to take into accouxtt the case 
where the prestation- object is a determinate species. 
/' t 
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Period S. sets forth the rule of solutio-consumption, 
and there is nothing to indicate that it is not substant- 
ially of good classical origin! On the other hand it is 
almost incredible that Florentine would have omitted all 
reference to processrconsumption, and we may therefore 
conjecture with fair certainty that the compilors have 
deleted a period dealing with this matter. In ptint 
ouL 
of fact wro- can hardly fail to perceive that the sequence 
of 0. and S. is defective:' The solutio-consumption rule 
is clearly meant to be t deduction from the 'una rest, and 
accordingly we miss some such word as 'ideo'; again 
change from 'una rest to 'debitum' is abrupt. If we 
e 
interpose a period , running somewhat as follows: et ideo 
AO_ 2 
si haec in iudicium deducta est, postea peti non potest, 
the 
and assume period to have commence 'et simili ter 
or the like, the abruptness is lessened and all serious 
difficult7 removed. 
The =mask correlation (Walter' and 'omnes (oMnium)1 
c.an_havdly, be treated as a serious objection. 
(Z) 
130 Va. ctd 
D. (45.2)301. Ulpian, XLVII ad Sabin. 
oc Ubi [duo rei facci 1<vsunt,(-/potest vel ab uno eorum 
solidum peti: 
Choc est enim duorum reorum] S^ ut unusquisque eon= ^ r1, --- 
in solidum sit obligatus Eossitque á ab alterutret ----,..__._. 
gt 
/, L et3<NJpartes autem a singulis [peti posse nequaquam s:) rtrrl--"L 
du.bium estJ<M?quemadmodum a [reo et fi deius ore 
'rI petere possumusJ<Nq <--> 
. <._ 
i eit } 
utique enim cum Duo= una sit obligatio una et 
J 
summa est <->1) 
a 
u t si [ve unus solvat es liberantur <^' > Luxe -----++--- 
solvatur ab altero liberatio contingat. 
plures sponsores vel fidepromissores in provincia 
a,ccepti 
J ipso iure 
3) cum enim lex oraria tantum in Italia locum habeat, ..._._ 
e veni t 
4, an 
S, petere, dummodo solvendo sint, ex epistula, divi itsdagm 
Hadriani sit compellendus creditor, toli, 
pluribus fideiussoribus 
41) compellimur gt,44t2 
s) cl,..Si.l`ezi.44... 




ito> quam sponsores vel fidepromissores debent 
12.4 Q 
Zito cum uno contestata omnibus 






The inconnity and triviality of this paragraphxr as it 
stands must be apparent to every one. In particular no 
one has yet succeeded, and I do not believe ever will 
succeed, in giving the words of period f a rational 
interpretation in their present context. Again the 
in j. 
reference /to solutio -consumption where a classical jurist 
would certainly have mentioned process- consumption, is 
without doubt due to the compilors. In my opinion, 
however, Ulpian in this paragraph dealt, not with the 
relation of duo rei at all, but with that of provincial 
sponsors or fidepromissors, the opening words 'ubi duo 
rei facti sunt' having been substituted for 'ubi dux 
plures sponsores vel fidepromissores in provinvia accepti 
Bunt'. On this view periods E. and J must mean that , 
since the different sponsory or fidepromissory obligations 
xxamsa cxxma , -24"..s 
are accessory to one and the same pri ncipa1h the ftffieb1,4q4..° 
due by the d sponsors or fidepromissors are one and the 
same' I conjecture that this argument served as a motive (t L 
c,...44.. cf..,,,.. ;, for a preceding decision that provincial sponsors or 
fidepromissors must have a beneficium divisionis whether 
they were taken bound together or separately. Ecfcamx 
fockftlimiitiumxdixiajoanksxamixhaxgrambadpagnxxxoemammyx 
sorrafaxxekmtXxaxmaxtxcxix xandxpxa The condition pre- 
cedent to a grant of beneficium divisionis is the existence 
2) 
of an accessory /correal relation, and periods ï. and 
assert the existence of the latter. Further discussion 
of the paragrapn must however be reserved for my study 
on Accessoriality. 
cp. Gai. II I.121, 121a. f f+ 
s444,(ax U 7r4 4 
c wC` 4-° 3 ° 
(3) 
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D.(45.2)16. Gaius III de verb. obligat. 
Ex duobus reis stipulandi si semel unus egerit, 
alteri promissori offerendo pecuniam nihil agit. 
At first sight this fragment a seems utterly trivial; 
if litiscontestation by one of the correal creditors, 
say M., has consumed the obligatory right of the other, 
S., how can the debtor possibly make an effective offer 
of payment to the other? Probably, however, the =Hex 
view which Gaius here refutes was ±xxthoxoffa± that, as 
M. and S. were originally constituted correal creditors, 
S. remains entitled to receive payment in the name of 
after 
M., even though his own obligatory right has own oblig- 
atory right has been extinguished through M.'s litis- 
contestation. Thus there is a close between 
Gaius's decision in this fragment and that of Paul in 
D.(45.1)128 (a). Both passages show us that the princ- 
iples governIng active solidarity were exposed to some 
doubt even in the mature classical period. The passage 
next to be considered places this doubt in a still 
stronger light. 
,2.iw7 05I. 
133 at :x 20 ctd 
D.(46.2)31,1. Veluleius III stip. 
of Si duo rei stipulandi sint, an alter ius novandi 
habeat, quaeritur, et quid iuris unusquisque sibi 
adquisierit. 
1 fere gutem mxx == convenit et uhi recto solvi et 
2 
unum iudiciumnpetentem totani rem in litem deducere, 
3 
item unius a.cceptilatione peremi utrisque obligationem : 
ur 
7 ex quibus colligitxx unumquemque perinde sibi adquisisse 
ac si solus stipulatus esset, excepto eo quod etiam 
facto eins cum quo commune ius stipula-ntis, t± amittere 
debitorem potent, 
'OW 
secundum quae si unus ab .l,ç stipuletur, novatione 
quoque Ellberare eum ab alterocum id specialiter agiti 
4,w >fJ eo magia cura eam stipulationem similem esse 
s oluti oni mxtxtgxx exi s timemus : 
F alioquin quid dicemus, si unus delegaverit creditori 
suo communem debitorem isque ab eo stipulatus fuerit? 
aut fundu, seri t doti (promi ttereJ^viro, vel 
) 





11-nam debitor ab utroque liberabiturJ 
........ 
i) I mu s t 
k k i gt maintain the genuineness of the clause 'et quid 
, . adquisieri t' as against Beseler, II, p. 56, whom Levy, 
Honk., p.380 follows. 
i) iudicio; Lenel, Paie, II. col, $ 1220. 
3) utriusque: Beseler, l.c. 
4) 
I must maintain the genuineness of period y as against 
4 ít/44 
` 
' Beseler, 1.0. 0 r;ti. A SJ (from) debitor ab utroque liberabitur. 
J'alb ,) read eundem (sc. communem debitorem); so Huschke, Lindes / 
Zeit schr,, new series, II. p.153 f.; ilichex Binder ' v 
/ dire 
"l read eidem (sc. communi debi tori) ; Huschke 
: debi tum, 
4 
(Ux dixerit. 
134 jlf ctd 
The special question raised in this paragraph, namely, 
whether one correal creditor has the power of excluding 
the other by means of a novation, must be reserved for 
a monograph on Novation. As regards periodsS and Ç.the 
seem to have 
compilors /have transferred the words tdebitor ab utroque 
l iberabi tur' to the end of the paragraph, andfsuhs ti tufted 
rrernftte of their own, In the conslusion of £, a ref- 
erence to dotis promissio has evidently been substituted 
for a reference to dotis dictio, and apparently as a 
result of this substitution the remaining text has become 
somewhat corrupted. 
In the present work however we are concerned sole- 
ly with the general observations in periods P. and y. Period) 
affords a striking confirmatioxfof our thesis as to the 
comparatively late development of active correality, A 
jurist writing about the age of Antoninus Pius can only 
say 'fore convenit' that solutio, litiscontestatio and 
acceptilatio have extensive consummng effect Does not 
this tend to prove that even in the mature classical per- 
iod there existed a school of jurists who denied the poss- 
ibility of active correality, holding that an active joint 
stipulation, even if framed distributively, could only 
produce partition? 
nt 
Period t is importaÑ* as giving an exposition of 
the precise relation of active correal creditors. Each of 
the latter occupies the position of a sole creditor, ex- 
cept that he is liable to be px deprived of his obligat- 
ory right by the act of his co- creditor. Here it is the 
substantial independence of the two obligations, rather 
than their formal unity, that receives emphasis, 
I, M- `r^ Z, ¡ f l, (32- 
it 
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D,(46,4)13,12, Ulpian, L ad Sabin, 
reis 
.0 Ex plm.ribus gaxi stipulandi si unus acceptum fecerit, 
liberatio contingit in solidum. 
Doeod. 16 pr, Idem VII disput, 
1. Si ex pluribus obligatis uni accept() feratur, non ipse aax 
Bolus liberator, seda et his qui secum obligantur: 
nam cum ex duobus pluribusque eiusdem obligationis 
parteLpibus uni accepto feratur, ceteri quoque liberantur, 
non quoniarn ipsis accepto latum est, sed quoniam velut 
solvisse videtur is, qui acceptilatione solutus est. 
A full discussion of the bearing of acceptilatio 
on the correal relation muse be reserved for a special treat -, 
ise on Acceptilatio, and it is not proposed to do more here 
than to quote the above passages as stating acceptilatio- 
consumption. In the passive case,it will be observed, 
Ulpian gives acceptilatio an extensive consuming effect on fk 
the express ground that it is deemed formally equivalent to 
solutio. This might be accurate enough for the practical 
purposes of the classical law, but it cannot be described 
as historically sound. Almost certainly acceptilatio pre- 
ceded solutio as a means of discharging obligations ex stip - j. 
-; 
ulatu without action, 
that periods 5 and Y 
are tautological, and on that account 
d' /G 
the -- axxexx pr, can hardly be attributed to Ulpian in its 
present form; probably the compilors have deleted something 
after . With the words teiusdem obligationis 
participibus t, Julian, D. (46;3 )34, 6; tparticeps et quasi 
socia obligationis t may be compatedg`, , 
 
(4` D.(46.1)5 
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Ulpian, XLVI ad Sabin. 
A. Generaliter Iulianus ait eum qui heres exstitit ei pro 
quo intervenerat, liberasi ex causa accessionis et solum- 
modo quasi heredero rei teneri, denique scripsit, si 
fideiussor heres exstiterit ei pro quo fideiussit, quasi 
reum esse obliga.tum, ex causa fideiussionis liberaci: 
reum vero reo succedentem ex duabus causis esse obligaturn 
ß. 
< + >2) 
yC nec enim,,,oduas obli_ga,tiones sustinetj 
5. item si reus xxxptÌattgax stipulandi exstiterit heres rei 
stipulandi duas species obligationis sustinebit: plane 
8 
si ex altera earum egerit, < -j utramque consumet. 
f Cvidelioet quia natura obligationum duarum quas haberet ea 
esset ut cum alter& earum in iudicium deduceretur, altera 
consumeretur, 
,4fpeita a sed si ex altera conventus fueri t, #1.x altera 
conveniri non posse,I/quia natura obligationum duarum 
cum initio in diversis reis constitissent ea, esset ut cum 
altera earum in iudicium ded4uceretur, altera consumeretur. 
2) / eadem ratione 
I) 
137 00' ctd 
This fragment deals with confusio and has lc 
the same basis as Venul C. D.'((45.2)13vd; here we can ob.ly 
4 -- it in so far as it bears on the subject of 
process- consumption. 
In my opinion the filial period has been trans- 
posed from its original position, namely a, where it 
referred to the passive not to the active, relation. In 
the first place, if we ignore the difficulty caused by 
the imperfect subjunctives 'esset'jand 'haberet', and 
give both the latter the force of present tenses, then 
takingj;and i. together we have the following glaring 
petitio principii: if the creditor sues/on one of the two 
obligations, he consumes both, because their nature is 
that an action on the one consumes the other. Eut in the 
second place, how are the two imperfect subjunctives to 
be justified? It may be said that 'esset' refers to the 
time of the original constitution of the obligations;- 
i 
the nature of the two obligations when they were originally 
constituted was such that... This interpretation gets over 
the petitio principii, but it is hardly possible on 
grammatical grounds; moreover, if such was Ulpian's mean- 
ing, why did he not express the same clearly? In any 
event, however, 'heiberet' seems impossible, the reference 
There is undoubtedly a close connection between this 
fragment and D.(19.1)10; see Levy, =honk., p.455 ff. with 
whose views however I cannot altogether agree; cp supra 
p,I2o n, f . In my opinion period y, is insiticious; how far 
consists of classical elements taken from another con- ' 
text cannot be discussed here; D.(45.2)13 contains part 
of this period in a somewhat debased form. 
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being to the present time. In the third place we note 
the inelegant change from Yd 'duae (duns) species oblig- 
ationis'in to'duae obligationes ¡dam= (öbligationum 
duarum)' in E . In the fourth place 'videlicet' is a, 
favourite word of the compilors, being frequently em- 
ployed by them to back on one passage to another., 
All difficulty disappears if my restoration of 
period is a,dop ed. The tenses are accounted for by 
the oratio obliqua and the passage makes excellent 
sense. The two obligations, as originally constituted 
4404.4 
between let us say T. and M. andAT. and S. were 
correally related, and they remain correally related tkint 
though by devolution they become united in the person of 
a single debtor. With our present fragment, as so manta 
2' 
restored, we may compare Julian. D.(44.7)18,' where the 
facts are as follows: M. is entitled to slave Stichus 
ex stipulatu, and S. is entitled to the same slave ex 
testamento, so that their rights are plainly cumulative; 
though M. succeeds as heir to S. (or vice versa) the same 
cumulative relation subsists, litiscontestation under the 
one obligation having no effect on the other. The motive 
is as follows: quia initio ita cohstiterint hae dune 
obligationes ut altera in iudicium deducta altera 
nihilominus integra remaneret. 
If my restoration be sound, the compilers nave =lap 
followed their not infrequent course of cutting out a 
passage from the middle of a text and transferring it, 
amended as required, to the end thereof. Their reason 
The classical jurists prefer 'scilicet "; Heumann.- Seekel, 
( p. 623 s,1v. videlicet. 
see as to this fragment Levy, Honk., p. 453 ff. 
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for here adopting this course is plain. In their time 
immaimixommumax extensive process- consumption had been 
abolished in the passive case, but was maintained, to 
i 
outward appearance at least, in the active case; hence 
they transferred Julian's motive (quia...) from the 
former case to the latter 44^ "'° 01 
4's44 44`4-4 'r4,4"."//n4-44 ' 644,.,a. i+. t..u:! ¿., a A/3 
hu a A 
Our present fragment, as restored and considered 
in conjunction with Julian D.(44.7)18 (cit.) is import- 
ant as showing how Julian considered the correal relat- 
ion. The two obligations are recognised as distinct, 
only they xxx stand related in a particular way,- they 
nave in their relation to one another a particular 
'natura's that is to say, litiscontestation under the 
one consumes the other. It does not of course follow 
that Julian rejected the idea of unity of obligation 
in D. (46.3)34.1, ne speaks of an ' obligatio communis,' 
and the recognition of the divergty 
connection 
the present /may be attributed to the 
viz., confusio. 
of obligation in 
nature of the subteet 
The inference is 
however plain that to his mind the unity of obligation was 
sithply a piece of juridical constructionp,..that 'eadem 
(una) obligatio' meant nothing more than 'dune obligationes 
quarum natura, est ut cum altera earum in iudicium deducatur 
altera consumatur'. Again/nothing is said of solutio- 
consumption; it is on process -consumption that the correal 
relation essentially depends. 
9 
vide infra p. 0 .2.2Srti 
139 'Iata- c td 
D.(45. 2 )11 pr. Papinian. XI respons. 




ct ireus [1f-],stipu1andi actionem suam divi1ere si velit 
(neque enim dividere oogendus est) poterit eundem ut 
principalem reum, item qui fideiussor pro altero 
exstitit, in partes convenire, non secus a. si duos 
promittendi reos divisis actionibus conveniret. 
í 
This is one of the texts of the Digest which 
merit the title oftfamous', and if one were to attempt to 
discuss aL length all the various opinions which have been 
expressed regarding it, a separate volume would almost be 
4) 
required. 
naze si alter ut is qui qm4 fideiussor pro altero rxstitit 
condemnatus erit, alterum qui a reo stipulandi liberatus 
est ma.nd.-,ti actione obliga.tun habebit; itaque si iudicatum 
non f ,ciat, hanc altdixo.actionem cedere reo stipulandi 
per praetorem compelletur, vel actio utilis dabitur 
y autem -- 
1 
3) read et ut eum d Y; Savigny, Obligationenr., I. p.268 n(a) 
suggestsfitem tamquam eum.' 
4Die curious reader may consult the following:Savigny, 
Obligationenrq I, p. 268 ff.; Brinz, T; .l,tt., iV,i, 36 fe 
Vangerow, Pando,Ill,p.83 ff (§ 573 4 Mitteis, Individua.lis- 
ierung d. Obligat,, p.69 ff., Reichsr. u, Volksr, p.183; 
Binder, p.3,01 ff,; Bortolucci, RIDR,17.p.309 ff,; 
Collinet, Etudes Hist. sur le Dr8?it de Justinien,I. p.131 
ff. 
140 I9118 c td 
To begin with, nothing will persuade me that 
Papinian was here dealing with any case other than that 
where tx two parties were first taken bound as principal 
correal debtors and then as fideiussors for one another, 
this : 
T.: riaevi, decem dari spondes? 
Sei, eadem decem dari spondes? 
M.: spondeo 
S.: spondeo 
T.: Maevi, eadem decem pro Seio fide tua esse Tubes? 
M.: fide mea, esse iubefb 
T.: Sei, eadem decem ciseau. pro Maevio fide tua esse 
Tubes? 
S.': fide mea esse iubeo. 
the 
Any suggestion that we have here to do wi th /a Greek 
institute ofwAAi/ lry or that there is any connection 
between Papinian's vice mutua fideiussores and theK.0 ( wV 
c / r 
U 7Lv uv'or of Novel 99, ) must in my opinion be absol- 
utely rejected. 
Now in , Papinian says'it is agreed that 
the taking of correal debtors bound as mutual fideiussors 
is xietwgtk not without its utility'. Wherein consisted 
the utility of this practice? So far as I can see, the 
one answer is reasonabll possible, namely, that the 
T 
creditor thereby escaped the perils of extensive process - 
consumption. How this was accomplished is easy to 
understand. The creditor T. sues one of the co- debtors, 
say M., not as principal but as surety for the other S.; 
M. being condemned in the name of S., has an actio mandati 
2 
against the latter; 
% 
if M. satisfies the judgment, good 
and well; if he does not, the praetor can put pressure 
on him to assign his actio mandati to T., who can then 
sue S. for the unrecovered balance; or again, if M. 
"vide infra p. 325Ií 
2) The circumstances of the mutua fideiussio clearly imply 
that each has given the other a mandate to become fide - 
iussor for him. 
/9 
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contumaciously refuses to make the assignment or absconds, 
the praetor will clearly be justified in granting T. an 
actio mandati utilis based on the fiction that the assign- 
ment has actually been made. 
But how does all this agree with period-. 2 Y 
This period reads as follows: Therefore if the creditor 
wishes to divide his action (for he jut cannot be compelled 
to atom do so), he will be able to sue the same debtor 
(say M.) partly as principal and partly as fidetussor for 
the other (S,), just as if he were to sue the two co- 
debtors separatly each for a share of the debt. Apart 
from the introductory 'itaque', this period makes perfect 
i 
sense. The debt being,say,X, T. may, if he pleases, sue 
M. for, say, VI as principal debtor, and for the remaining 
IV as fideiussor on S,'s behalf, in which case the posit- 
ion will be the same as if he were to sue M.' for VI and 
S. for IV separately. The pareiáthetical maxim clause 
'neque enim dividere cogendus est' has caused difficulty 
to some but it is capable of a perfectly reasohable 
interpretation. M. and B. are sureties for one and the 
same debt; are they not therefore entitled to a benefic- 
ium divisionis? No; the beneficium divisionis only 
applies to co- sureties for a third party, nojv to correal 
debtors who become sureties for one another. Again the 
words 'duos promittendi maxim reos' as contrasted with 
the 'reos promittendi' in d have proved a stumbling - 
block. All difficulty is however removed if we observe 
that 'duos' here means 'the two', 'both'. Throughout 
the response Fapinian uses 'reos promittendi' without 
any prefix 'duos', 'an plures','duos pluresve', in the 
sense of 'correal debtors, the facts of the case doubt- 
less making it plain that none other than a correal rel- 
ation is intended. 
reos promittendi', 




r Moreover in 
D 
: he does not say k duos 
which is the invariable sequence when 
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i'. 
'duos' is a technical prefix connoting en correality, 
xndxitxmxxxìmxtkxdxlas but 'duos prom ttendi reos' and it 
may be that he chose this latter sequence deliberately 
to avoid the possibility of 'duos' being construed as a 
technical prefix. 
On the other hand however it seems impossible that 
the compilors have preserved the whole of Papinian's ar- 
gument. Period y, putports to be a deduction from otxi; 
the special advantage which the creditor obtains by the 
mutua fideiussio appears to be that he can divide his 
action by suing one of the co- debtors partly as principal, 
and partly as fideiuseor for the other. But if the fore" 
exposition be sound, the creditor's power of dividing his 
action is a matter of small significance; the substantial 
benefit which he ol4ains by the mutua fideiussio is a 
power of suing either co- debtor * fort the whole as sure- 
ty for the other, Hence I am driven to the conclusion 
that in Papinian's original text, period 
0 
did ndt follow '' 
immediately on K. . This view is slightly supported by 
two considerations: 
(a) 'itaque' standing second in its clause, though by no 
9 
means impossible inAlegal Latin, is somewhat suspicious; 
moreover if period followed wax immediately ono, an 
explanatory particle such as 'name wouldnbekmore appro- 
priate; 
(b) in .(.the verb 'convehire' is used in the sense of 
'to be agreed', while in V. it is used (bis) in the sense 
of 'to sue'; but it is hardly likely that Papinian would 
N 
employ the same verb in two differept senses in such close 
proximity. 
Accordingly I have ventured to insert a period , and 
Beseler, III. p.105 ff. 
fig 
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to substitute ' autem' for kxx' i taque' in y. . If 
Papinian wrote such a passage as the compilors 
would naturally delete the same owing to the reference 
to process -consumption.; under the Justinian law, the 
creditor was able to sue both correal creditors one 
after the other, so that the substantial benefit formerly 
every 
arising from mutua fideiussio was now afforded in mg 
case. Moreover with the deletion off. the ' auteur' 
( Ì/4 
introducing J-. lost its force, and it was quite natural 
that the compilors should substitute another particle; 
perhaps they took the 'itaque' from the concluding 
sentence of 
But now a further point arises; why should the 
creditor wish to divide his action when it was more to his 
advantage to sue one of the co- debtors for the whole as 
surety for the other? If T. sued M. for VI as principal 
and for IV as fideiussor on S's behalf, mom as regards 
the VI he loses all faculty of regress against S. should 
M. fail to pay. It may be suggested that Papinian was 
here dealing frith a point of more or less academic inter- 
est, but such an explanation is hardly satisfactory. 
Perhaps there may be something in Mitteis'suggestion ths 
that in the concrete case submitted for decision T was 
z) 
endeavouring to evade the exceptio litis dividuae. Sup- 
pose T. and M. are resident x±xRxmm in the same place, 
but S. is resident elsewhere; T. at present only wishes 
to exact VI of the X due, and he therefore sues M., whose 
solvency is beyond doubt, for this sum as principal 
0 
Individualisierung p,' 69 ff.; Reichsr. u. Volksr. p. 1f33 
contra Binder,p. 101 ff.,. 
/T 
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debtor; subsequentlyIbut intra eiusdem praeturam) he wishes 
to sue for the remainign IV; the exceptio litis dividuae 
does not prevent him from itt±a suing S., but this course is 
inconvenient,S. being resident in another place; but if he 
sues M. as fideiussor for S,, does the exception lie? 
No, becamse when T. sues sues M. pro parte as principal 
as principal debtor and pro parte as fideiussor for S., 
the position is the same as if he were to sue M. and S. 
elt 
each in a separate pro parte action. This expnianation 
may be accepted until something better is suggested. 
P 
unus a duobus dumtaxat eandem rem atque ex x eadem causa 
petet, aut duo ab uno, aut plures a pluribus. 
The case of a single joint action in solidum 
a$mxxi several 
raises xxxxxxxxx2 questions: 
(a) Smppose in the passive case that the common cred- 
itor T,, makes a 'simple joint' litiscontestation with 
obligation 
145 5-212 Actions on a correal PL ptaxUUN. 
We conclude our study of correali ex stipula.tu under 
the classical law with a brief note regarding the mode 
of suing on a correal obligation. No attempt can lalaweller 
be made to deal xith exhaustively with the subject xbt, 
as the rules here to be applied depend on technicalities 
of the formulary system which have evoked considerable 
controversy. 
Certainly the common creditor may sue any one 
correal debtor alone, any one correal creditor maymmax 
alone may sue the common debtor, in solidum. Like ÿwise 
the common d creditor malt bring a separate pro rata 
action against each correal debtor, each correal creditor 
may bring a separate pro rata action against the common 
debtor. But we ask, can the common creditor bring a 
single joint action in solidum against the various correal'' 
debtors together, can the various correal creditors hringx 
together bring a single joint action in solidum against 
the Common debtor? There seems little doubt that such 
a course is possiblex; here we seem to have the causa 
coniuncta, mentioned by Quinctilian, Inst. Or. 3.10.2 e, 
l 
the correal debtors, M. and S., no that the formula 
runs: si paret haevium et Seium Titio decem dare oportere 
iudex, Iaevium et Seium Titio decem condemnato etc. 
Such .I formuliu can only result in a ' simple joint' 
condemnation against M) and S. But can T., having ob- 
tained such a condemnation, proceed to execute the same 
g- 
see Levy, Konk., p. 197 n. 6 
, 
, 
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against either M. or S. in solidum, or must he split up 
his judgment claim and proceed against each for V only? 
The late classical jurists decided in favour of tie second 
alternative. 
D.(Ait 49.1)10.3 Ulpian VIII disput. 
Quotiens auteur plures in unam summam condemnantur, 
u trum una sententia est Let quasi plures in unam 
summam rei lint promittendij ,ut unusquisque eorum in 
solidum teneatur, an vero scinditur in personas sent - 
c 
wntia, quaeritur. et Papinianus reepondit, scindi 
sententia,m in personas atque ideo eos qui condemnati 
sunt viriles partes debere. 
Apparently in Ulpian's view, if the joint sententia 
is construed as a single undivided whole, the result 
necessarily is that that such sententia can be executed 
in solidum against any one of the parties condemned; if t 
it can only be executed against each !mop pro rata, we 
must consider it merely as the sum of a number of part- 
icular sententiae. This view is entirely sound; a 
passive joint condemnation, like a passive joint contract, 
naturally leads to correality, not partition. Papinian's 
however 
decision in favour of partition of the judgment is kouna 
accepted; just as a passive simple joint stipulation 
leads to partition, not correality, so with a passive 
simple joint condemnation. 
D.(42.1)43 Paula XVI respons. 
Paulus reepondit eos qui una sehtentia in unam 
i) 
From the fact that the question is not mentioned in 
earlier writings we may perhaps infer that joint 
actions only came into use at a comparatively late date. 
apparently a gloss. 
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quantitatem condemnati cunt, pro portione virili ex í causa iudicati 
D.(17.1)59.3 Paul. IV respons. 
ki± Paulus respondit unum ex mandatoribus in solidum 
eligi posse, etiamsi non sit concessum in mandato: post 
condemnationem autem in duorum personam collatam 
u 
necessario ex causa igdicati singulos pro parte dimidia 
v t 
coneniri a posse 0,t debere. 
C.ß(7. 55) 2 Imp. Gordian. (a. 242) 
Quotiens a tutoribus singulis procuratoribus datis 
insequitur in maziam omnium persona condemnatio, 
e 
periculum sententiae videri esse ditisum. Ì ideoque 
quod ab uno servari non potuerit, a ceteris exigi non 
r 
posse explorati iut.is est. 
(b) But, we ask, could a passive joint 4ondemnation ever 
be made in distributive form so as to render the defend- 
ants liable xxigka singuli in solidum in the judgment 
obligation, in other words was a correal joint condemnat- 
io over competent? Such a condemnatio seems clearly 
referred to in the following text: 
D.149.14)39.1 Papinian. XVI respons. 
Eum qui periculum commuf_is condemnationis dividi 
postulavit, quod participes iudicati solvendo essent 
o 
revocatis alienatiAnibus quas fraudulenter fecerant, 
non xm videri oausam pecunias fisco nuntiasse respondi. 
The damand for a beneficium divisionis here mentioned 
necessarily implies the existence of a s3- relation. 
The remainder of this fragment is apparently a gloss; 
so Gradenwitz, 7, p.65. 
2) vi4 c, p. 30r. 
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Compare also 
C.(7;55)1. Imp. Alexander (a.229) 
Si non singuli in solidum, sed generaliter tu et 
collega taus una et certa quantitate condemnati estis, 
nec addi tum ut quod ab altero servari non posai tK alter 
suppleret, effectua sehtentiae virilibus potionibus 
212- 
discretusA ideoque parens pro tua portione sententiae 
ob cessationem alterius ex causa iudicati conveniri 
non potes. 
But under what circumstances was a correal 
joint condemnation competent? In the case of a stricti 
iuris iudicium such a condemnation necessarily implies 
a correal joint litiscontestatio and a correal joim.t 
formula: si paret Maevium et Seium singulos in solidum 
Titio decem dare Elm oportere, iudex, Maevium et 2x[ 
Seium singulos in solidum Titio decem condemnato etc. 
The question in what cases it was competent for the 
praetor to admit a correal joint litiscontestation and 
grant a correal joint formula xx cannot be discussed 
here. Nor can we consider whether in a bonae fidel 
iudicium the iudex could ever pronounce a correal 
joint condemnation, where the litiscontestation and 
formula were simple joint merely. 
(o) As regards the active case a simple joint con- 
demnation will plainly infer pro rata judgement rights 
merely, and we can hardly suppose a condemnation was 
ever framed so as to confer correal judgment rights. 
Finally there was no reason why the common 
creditor should not sue the various correal debtors 
each pro rata together and conversely in the active 
case. Here however separate pro rata litiscontestat- 
xkh 
ionesA ould appear to necessary, though all 
these 
formulae would be sent to the same iudex and 
the 
different processes disposed of together. 
l 
r 
149 Appendix.. Correa,lity from Nexum, 
Moot Littoral Contract and Testament. 
Whether correality could be produced by nexum 
is a gmestion of purely antiquarian interest, which we 
must leave to those who have made a special study of this 
contract. 
The opinion frequently expressed that correality 
could not be created by littoral contract is altogether 
without . Certainly there was no technical 
objection to a manipulation of ledger entries for the 
purpose of creating an active or a passive correal 
relation, and that such manipu] tions were actually 
resorted, particularly in the case of banking transact- 
ions, id highly probable. 
Levy quotes two passages which seem to contain 
a reference to an active correal obligation created in 
favour of bankers. 
i$ D.(2.14)9. pr. Paul. LX ad edict. 
Si pkroix plures sint qui eaidem actionem habent, 
unius loco habentur#ej ut puta plures suit rei stip- 
ulandi vol plures argentarii quorum nomina simul 
facta sunt: unius loco numerantur quia unum debitum 
est,,,,. 
D.(4.8)34 pr. Paul. XIII ad edict. 
Si duo rei sunt taut] credendi aut debendii1 et unus 
compromiserit isque vetitus sit potere Laut ne ab eo 
si alius petat,Lvel ab e turf # vtdendum est an, 
celio petatur j poena commi ttatur: idem in duobus 
argentariis quorum nomina simul eunt...... 
Correality ex testamento is free from all 
difficulty. In the passive case if a legacy is granted 
thus: Titius et Maevius heredes mei decem Seio danto, 
Levy, Monk., p, 382 ff. 
l1.0. 
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without doubt T. and M. are lois liable merely pro rata. 
If correality is to be created a distributive form must 
be employed, ad as the following pass age shows, xmÏx 
an alternative mode of condemnation suffuced for this 
purposed: 
D. (30)8.1. Pomponius II ad Sabin. 
Si its scriptum sit:'Lu,cius Titius m heres meus aut 
i aevius heres mama meus decem Seis date', cum 
utro velit Seius aget, ut si cum uno actum sit ïxx1taxx 
2 
iikmmmtm et solutum7, alter liberetur, quasi duo rei 
promittendi in solidum obligati fuissent. Cquid ergo 
si ab altero partem petierit? liberum cui erit ab 




xic$ xampxadxxt hmxxxtxxmxmxmaxxxkugma.yxgma mtmdx 
Doubtless howerver any other distributive form of bequest 
would equally suffice for the creation of correality, for 
example; Titius heres meus decem, Mia.evius heres meus eadem 
decam,Seio dato (or danto). 
As regards the active case a legacy granted 
thus: heres meus decem Titio et Iiaevio dato', will render 
T. and M. entitled merely pro rata. Correality can however 
always be created by the use of a distributive form: 
D.(31)16. Celsus XVI digest. 
Si Titio aut Seio, taxtztalma utri heres vellet, legatum 
relictum est, heres alteri dando ab utroque liberatur: 
9 
a. 
by a common slave; D.(45.3)9.1; 10;21. 
I agree with Levy, Konk. , p.194 n.3 that beyond 
ion of these words no further restoration is here 
Krúger, Dig., following Donellus,deletes 'cum utro. 
3)v.1. ei; 
T mode, coul not be used in the case of a stipulation I 
Mommsen: utique. 
4l 







si neutri dat, uterque perinde intere potest atque si 
ipsi soli legatum foret: nam ut stipulando duo rei con- 
stitui possunt, ita et testamento potest id Íicamaiä fieri.' 
152 Chapter III Simple and Equitably Solidarity., 
ex stipulatu. 
21 Principles of Simple Solidarity. 
The most novel feature of the present work is the 
theory of simple or non -correal solidarity which it 
sets forth. Simple solidarity, as here conceived, is 
merely an improper sapcies tut of correality admitted by 
the classical jurisprudence where a joint contract was 
incapable of producing correality proper on account of 
some material 'inequality' or 'non -identification'. 
This institute of simple solidarity I believe 
to have taken its rise within the sphere of real and 
consensual contracts. As we have seen, any. formal 
inequality or non -identification in a correal stipulation 
rendered the act entirely void, and probably under the 
old civil law material inequality or non -identification 
c 
had the same effect. On the othr hand in the cese of a 
joint real or consensual contract there can be no such 
thing as formal inequalijy or non -identification, ani to 
hold such a contract void on the ground or material 
inequality or non -identification would, as we shall ex- 
plain later,'have been highly inconvenient. Hence to 
meet this latter case I conjecture that jurisprudence 
invented a, new solidary relation based, not on process - 
consumption, but on solutio -- consumption, and that event- 
ually this new institute gained a footing within the 
realm of obligations ex stipulatu. When all the constit- 
utive requisites of a correal stipulation were fulfilled, 
but correality was excluded 14 reason of some material 
inequality or non-identification, the jutists of the 
mature classical period or even earlier, instead of 
pronouncing the act nw.11 and void, treated it as product- 
ive of a simple solidary relation. 
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The cardinal principles of sinple solidarity are as 
follows: 
(i) There is no constructive identification of the two 
obligations,_ no 'eadem res'; Papinian we believe states 
the position by the words 'ín cuiusque persona propria 
singulorum consistit obligatio', 
I) 
(ii) As there is no 'eadem res', litiscontestation has no 
extensive consuming effect, 
(iii) As there is no 'eadem res' there can be no extensive 
responsibility. 
(iv)In spite of the absence of'eadem res' solutio has, at 
z law and not merely in equity, extensive consuming effect. 
Simple solidarity, as well as correality, thus 
stands opposed to cumulation, but in a different sense. 
According to the old civil law, correality and cumulation 
exhausted the whole field of possible relations. If 
litiscontestation had extensive consuming effect, the 
result, was correality; if it had not the result was 
cumulation. Under the classical jurisprudence, on the 
other hand, we have a new relation which stands opposed 
to cululation because of the extensive consúming effect 
of stlutio, not of litiscontestatio. When, applying the 
principles of the old civil law,maxy we say that a correal 
stipulation cannot result in cumulation, we mean that it 
cannot produce obligations which do not stand to one 
another in a process consumption relation; if it be 
incapable of producing atakxgtx obligations so related, 
47¡'°'- 
:j4S.21 q_2 "'4.,L14-4- h. 274 
2/ Whether acceptilatio had an extensive consuming effect as 
between simple solidary obligations is altogether doubt- 
ful. On the one hand if we attach predominating importance 
to its property as a formal receipt of payment, we must 
accord it the same consumptive force as payment itself. 
On the other hand if we take into account the fact that in, 
classical times,iax,44apte was normally employed as a 
means of discharging obligations with out payment then we 
may deny it extensive consuming effect. The pobabilities 
are however, I think, in favour of the first view, 






it is null and void. But on an applicationz of the 
principles of the classical jurisprudence, the statement 
that a cotrea,l stipulation cannot result in cumulation 
means that the obligations which it produces must at any 
rate stand in a solutio- consumption relation, whether 
or not they also stand in a process- consumption relation. 
The antithesis simple solidarity v. partition 
requires a word of remark. If we adhere stricjLly to the 
prin1ciple that partition implies an ideal correal obligat- 
ion" ,we must, where the possibility of two 
co- creditors or co- debtors being correally related is 
excluded, likewise exclude the possibility of tb Ìxxttoxm 
their being entitled or bound pro rata. Nevertheless in 
certain cases where the possibility of correality is 
excluded merely through the'individualised' nature of the 
prestation- object, but the latter is capable of division, 
it would be unreasonable to deny the possibility of part- 
ition as an alternative to simple solidarity mama on the 
technical ground aforesaid alone. 
As in correality, so also in simple solidarity 
the principle of. 'subjective alternativity', which is the 
predominating element in all solidarity, must have free 
scope. The common creditor must have the power of 'elect - i 
ins' any ()mot' his simple solidary debtors; any one simple j 
must 
solidary crrditor maxxi have the power of 'occup7ing'; 
any element which impedes the free exercise of these 
powers is anti- solidary. 
But further, we must, I believe, regard 'substan_t 
i ;ki ial equality of prestation' as another indispenaltible 
element in the classical simple solidarity. Thus we ax 
cannot conceive of an obligation lx dari and an obligation 
we omit reference to the case where it produces a valid 
simplex obligation. 
21 14.4 "' 1° S 0 
z 
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fieri sj,andinpr in a simple solidary relation, Moreover 
I do not think we can ever have simple solidarity without 
equality of prestation- object, though this requirement 
has a different significance here than in the case of 
correality. Ina correality the equality must be in toto, 
that is to say, the one full prestation -object must be 
equal to the $JaÌi other full prestation- object. Thus 
consider two obligations (a) decem dari and (b) sex dari. 
For purposes of correaltty it is not permissible to 
analyse obligation (a) into two obligations (c) sex dari 
IL (d) quattuor dari, and then to say that obligations (c) 
and (b) may be correa,lly related and obligation (d) left 
outstanding. Taken each as 'a whole obligations (a) and (b) 
are unequal, and for purposes of correality no pro tanto 
equality between them can be recognised: 
) On the other 
hand for purposes of simple solidarity the aforesaid 
analysis seems to be legitimate. A simple solidary relat- 
ion mqy exist between obligations (c) and (b), with oblig- 
ation left outstanding. Likewise if we have two obligat- 
ions (a) decem et Stichum dasx dari and (b) decem dari, 
it seems permissible to analyse obligation (a) into two 
obligations (c) decem dari and (d) Stichum dari, and tp 
proceed in the same way as before. 
The crucial case, however, is that where 
obligation (a) has a compound prestation- object in the 
alternative e.g. Oecem aut Stichum dari, and obligation (b) 
has a simple prestation- object consisting of one of the 
same alternative elements e.g. decem dari. Is it possible 
for these two obligations to stand in a simple solidary 
relation? Yes, we think, but only in one way, namely by 
interpreting obligation (a) as an obligation decem dari 
subject to the modality of an alternative prestation- 
Ma - ..- .. .410 - 
Mk: . ,-, a . . .. . 
h 
tx: =Aunt : o - 
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object The significance of this interpretation lies 
in the fact that the modality 'aut Stichum' only affects 
obligation (a), and hence the giving of Stichus cannot 
at law xxi±a extinguish obligation (b). 
The whole matter may be summed up by saying 
that though in xixxxialt simple solidarity the classical 
jurisprudence had managed to dispense with the idea of 
unity of obligation, it was, we think, far from attaining 
the conception of pure subjective alternativity as a legal 
relation. Substantial equality of prestation was still 
required in order to establish a relation in xtxx which 
solutio- consumption would at law operate extensively. 
In our Introductory chapter we stated our adhery 
ence to the view that in simple solidarity there is a plug 
ality of obligations directed to one and the same artdx 
w 
juristic end;) this view not requires examination,' 
Stipulation is essentially an abstract negotium from which 
cuw2 ( 
the elemeritof juristic eni, material economic interest, 
is formally eliminated. How then can the law take into 
consideration the identity of end of two obligations ex 
stipulatu, not constructively identified, so as to Induct 
place the latter in a. simple solidarily relation? The 
answer is that the identity of end which we find in 
simple solidarity ex stipulatu is merely the reflex of an 
identity of originating cause. The exclusion of cumul- 
ation which unity of cause carries with it implies an 
unity of end even as between two purely abstract obligat- 
ions; unity of juristic end here is merely the unity of 
originating cause axixadd expressed materially and teleo- 
logically instead of formally and ontologically. Well, if 
this be so, we must conclude that simple solidarity, 
like correality, ex stipulatu is impossible without 
u 
ynity of cause. Whether this conclusion must be modified 
044-- h. / D, 
744,;.4. 
(-24.- ,3), Q. 't4 6-k 
/-1-1- 49--t-A 
a,ti 4.#4.44 , , `` - 
L 
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so as to admit the establishment of simple solidarity 
ex diversis causis indirectly by means of reciprocal 
conditiond will be considered in a later section, and 
a negative result arrived at. Solidarity without unity 
z of cause can only be-attained through the aid of equity. 
This brings us to what we venture to lay down tea 
with full confidence as a leading principle in this branch 
of the law, namely, that ix anything in the nature of 
solidarity^ without unity oiivçause was abhorrent to the 
civil law. Within the realm of obligations ex stipulatu 
this abhorrence is I think, evidenced by the relation of 
principal debtor and independent guarantor by stipulation. 
Suppose T. stipulates from M: decem d ari spondes ?, 
and that ne subsequently stipulates from S.: ex eis decem 
quae Maevius mihi dare spopondit, quanto minus ab illo 
consecutus sim, dari spondes?, we call S. an independent P , P 
or 
guarantmv by stipulation on M's behalf. As a result of 
the second stipulation, S. becomes liable for the full 
X already promised by M., 
This case, 
as we shall see, was a source of considerable trouble to 
the jurists, the reason undoubtedly being that it did not 
fit in very easily with civil law principles. The result 
which Paul, and we may assume the late classical jurists 
generally, arrived at was to deny any liability on the 
part of S. until T. had been discussed and a deficiency 
in nis resources disclosed. Accordingly T. was degprived 
excluded. of his power of election a solidarity 
For the purposes of our present discussion, 
or consequi possim, exigissem; see the passages quoted 
--, inf rag 17 7 e 
Zelt 
7/4 
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2.. 
158 2 c td 
nowever, we shall assume that T. has a power of election, 
and we ask, is the relation of M. and S. one of simple 
solidarity? The practical significance of this question 
lies in the fact that if M. and S. stand in a relation of 
simple solidarity, payment by S. frees M. and vice versa. 
There seems no doubt, however, that the question must be 
answered in the negative. The actual result which the 
late classical jurisprudence must certainly have arrived 
at is that on the one hand payment by S. leaves T.'s right 
against M. legally intact and so capable of assig.ment to 
S., and that on the other hand payment by M. does not free 
S. but renders his obligation non -existent (in whole or in 
part) ab initio. 
Here we seem to see the reaction of the civil 
law against anything in the nature of solidarity without 
unity of cause. All difficulty would have been removed, 
had jurisprudence felt itself entitled to lay down that 
solutio by either the debtor or the guarantor freed the 
other. The exclusion of solidarity may indeed be explain-, 
ed in another way as follows: Formally S. does not pro- 
mise X, but an uncertain sum not exceeding X; hence we 
have an inequality of prestation- object which is incon- 
sistent with a solidary relation. But this inequality of 1 
prestation- object is immediately connected with the 
diversity of cause, Had S. formally promised the same X 
as L, the result would inevitable have been novation4 
only by making S. 's promise formally unequal to that of 
M. is an independent guarantee by stipulation possible 
au all. 
The same reaction of the civil law against anything 
in the nature of xx solidarity without unity of cause 
Supp e q -= tion , were 
quan of`i u 1110 mi; s,,veri..., 
requi e T. to di - . - s Ni. e ,f,.o`re proc 
framed_ 
ouldAhe j 
ing agai - S.. 
tibi 
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also shows itself in the relations of principal debtor and 
mandator, constituens, argentarius recipiens. None of 
these relations, of course, belonged to the old civil law, 
but yet the principles of the latter made their influence 
a 
everywhere felt. 4e shall see a still more striking ex- 
ample of the same reaction when we come to consider the 
case time z independent mandate-- th aa,., r ___ l 
04,14-0( % . 
Simple solidarity ex stipuLatu, then, arises solely 
from a correal stipulation Rhilkx2REItsimxImutxRimmatxxx 
where there id present some element rendering the two 
obligations materially unequal or, though equal, incapable 
Q (A. - 
of identification. T,° m^a+ ^1 ,zT; ^ a example of such X 
correally 
material inequality is where two parties stipulate for, 
say, decem et (aut) Stichus, but Stichus happens to belong 
to one of ahem. MQ--gle.s-t---erit'fi-euns example of the exclusion 
of identification between two equal obligations is where 
two parties promiseR maxxa $ correally services which 
are 'individualised' by the person of him wh@ renders 
them. Examples of the gp.ggt identification ̂in the active 
case are where two parties stipulate for the same usufruct 
or for the same sum dotis nomine, a usufruct or dos being 
individualised by the person of him to whom it is granted 
k 
Mere however partition will generally offer itself as a 
solution, 
3 
In the following section( 5 24) we shall 
discuss the two fragments, Gaius D.(45.2)15 and Julian. 
eod. 5, where these mmm examples are given. No doubt our 
results depend entirely on conjectural restorations of 
the fragments quoted, but nevertheless they seem eminently 
reasonable and in accordance with the spirit of the class_ 
1) 
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of the Justinianian reforms was to eliminate the elass- 
i cal distinction between correality and simple solidarity, 
whcich fact amply explains the scantiness of our authorit- 
ies regarding this distinction. 
The question may be asked whether parties had it 
in their power to reduce, by special agreement, a correal 
ta. 
re,alotion to one of simple solidarity? To this question 
a daximatm decided negative answer must be given. Provided 
the p two prestations are materially equal and there is 
nothing in their nature to prevent their identification, 
correality is the civil law result, and any attempt to 
.modify the stipulatory formula so as to exclude this result 
will nullify the whale act, Nor, in our opinion, can 
the effect of a correal stipulation be in any way modified 
by independent pacts; this point it will however be more 
convenient to discuss when we are de tiling with solidarity 
from real and consensual contracts. A correal xíÌì relat- 
ion can only be reduced to one of simple solidarity, as it 
were through accidental circumstances which under the 
strict civil law would render the whole act null and void. 
Finally, let us consider the form: 
Tot Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
M.: spondeo 5a 
T.: Sei, eadem decem dari spondes? 
S,; spondeo. 
Here a valid obligation is in any event created between 
T. and M., but if any break in the continuity of act, as 
already explained )occurs between Tr.'s reply and the quest- 
ion to S,, the latter's promise must, I believe, be pro- 
nounced void on the ground that 'eadem' is thereby dxpxixml 
formally deprived of an antecedent, and the question to S. 
accordingly becomes meaningless 
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net result of the act? In the first mac% place, does S. 's 
promise novate the already constituted obligation of MA? 
This I believe, to be impossibly. Diversity of cause is 
essential to novation, but here the stipulations from M. d 
and. S. form a continuous act, the two parts of which are 
connected by 'eadem' without any further express identifi- 
cation of the two prestations. If novation be intended 
the words ' quae Maevius dare spopondi t' or the like, must 
be inserted in the question to S., in which case the two 
stipulations, even though they follow the one immediately 
on the other, are shown to be formally distinct, and the 
lat /ernhas thiga2 novatory effect. In the second place 
we ask, can the result be cumulation? Again a negative 
answer must be given; the term 'eadem' identifies the two 
sums of X as one and the same, and hence excludes zx sammx 
mastic= a cumulative relation. In the third place we ask, 
can the result be simple solidarity? Again we believe, 
the answer must be in the negative. Even though the pro- 
ceedings form a continuous act, yet we have here two sep- 
arate stipulations, not a single joint one, and hence 
simple solidarity, equally with correality, is excluded. 
Under the xmax civil law then I venture to think, 
Sets promise must be pronounced incapable of producing any 
result and hence null and void. In my treatise on 
tacessoriality however I shall show grounds for belieiaing 
that the jurisprudence of the Empire utilised this form 
for the purpose of taking bound a principal debtor and 
sponsor (or fidepromissor). 
The disposition of the remaining sections 
of this chapter is as follows: 
3 
In C29t as already stated, we shall examine the two 
directly 
fragments which bear ¡on xfficka simple solidarity ex stip- 
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ulatu. 
4 
In 2 we shall examine the authorities on the relation 
of principal debtor and independent guarantor by stipulat- 
ion, and also the relations of principal debtor and 
mandator, constituons and arrgentarius recipiens. Here 
shall see in practical operation the reaction of civil 
law principles against anything in the nature of solid- 
arity without unity of cause. 
r G 
t 20 and 2t will be dedicated to mumairdaRkty equitable 
7 
solidarity, and finally in 4 21 we shall discuss the 
problematical case of Imam' solidarity b4 reciprocal 
conditions. 
(r J 
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D.(45.2)15. Gaius II de verb, obligat, 
Si id quod ego et Titius stipulamurr in singulis 
personis proprium intelle¡,atur, non poterimus duo rei 
stipulandi constitui, voluti cum usum fructum aut dotis 
nomine dari stipulemur: idque et Iulianus scribit, 
idem ait et si Titius et Seius decem aut Stichum qui 
11 
Titii site stipulati fuerint, non videri eos duos reos 
stipulandi, cum Titio decem tantum, Selo Stichus aut abaram 
&Nam decem debeantur: 
y quae sententi,a, eo pertinet ut, quamvis [re1 huic vet illi 
0 
decem solvent el Seio Stichumti>ñihilo minus alteri 
obligatus Eman0fr0d [dicendum est uta si decem 
alteri solveri t, ab altero l ibere tur. 
iudioium cum altero promissor acciperet 
mane re t 
3 
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We shall consider periods, and , of this fragment first. 
Suppose a correal stipulation to be made as follows: 
Maevi, decem dari spondes? 
S. Maevi, eadern decem aut Stichum dari spondes ?, 
we have no hesitation in pronouncing the act wholly void 
on account of the formal inequality of prestation. But 
the case contemplated by Gaius is that of a formally 
valid correal stipulation: 
Maevi, decem aut Stichum dari spondes? 
r 
S,: Maevi, eadem decem aut eundem Stichum dari spondes ?, 
where the constitution of a correal obligation is prevent- 
ed merely by the fact that Stichs happens to belong to 
T. The rule that no one can validly stipulate for what 
belongs to hiiself causes a material inequality of prest - 
ation which excludes the possibility of identification 
and hence of process- consumption. 
Now xxkxx ±x what is the result of such a stip- 
ulation? The ancients, I venture to 'think, would have 
pronounced the whole act nrkll and void, buts as period 
shows this was not the view adopted by the mature class- 
/ 
ical jurisprudence. 
Period y, however shows evident marks of the 
compilors' hands, 0 Its substmhtial faults are the omission 
of any reference to process -consumption which was the 
all important matter from the classical standpoint, and 
also the contradiction between the first statement that 
solutio of X to either creditor ( or of Sticks to S.) 
The omission of 'eundem' would in my opinion be quite 
regular, the preceding 'eadem' being sufficient to connect 
the two questions as parts of the same interrogatory. So 
also if Stichus had been mentioned first, the eadem' 
preceding 'decem' might, I consider, have been omitted on 
the same ground; cp. supra P. 624, 
3 
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leaves the debtor bound to the other, and the second 
statement that solutio of X to either frees fxxx him from 
the other. The text also bristles with formal defects; 
The verbs (with the exception of 'pertinet' have no subject 
r ' Uti.indic. (manet) if not absolutely impossible, is at 
any ±xx rate highly suspicious. The passage 'vel 
Stichum' is inelegant as regards both the use of 'vel' 
(different particles should have been used to connect 
'huic' and 'illi' and to connect the two branches of the 
clause) and the alternation of pronoun (huic, iili) and 
noun (Seio). Dicere f ut is at any rate highly suspicious. 
So far as I am aware, no one has yet hit on 
a satisfactory restoration oft. but I venture to suggest 
the following: Delete the defective 'vel huic . Stichum' 
passage; change 'manet' to ' mane re t' ; and delete iftima 
'dicendum est ut'. 
By means of these comparativiay simple, and, 
it seems to me, highly probable, restorations, we get a 
relation of simple solidarity; although litiscontestation 
by one of the creditors would not extinguish the right of 
the other, yet solutio of X to one of them does so. This 
was, I believe, the only result that the classical juris- 
prudence could reach as an alternative to holding the 
entire act null and void. In particular I must reject 
Levy's suggestion, that the result here was legal cumulat- 
ion reduced in equity to solidarity. A correal stipulation 
) cp. Xalb, Wegweiser, p. 101 
Levy, Kok., p.' 305; cp. VIR. II. col. 220 D. 
3) Korak.' p.506; this learned writer regards 'judicial 
consumption by means of exceptio doli' as the most likely 
mode of excluding cumulation and refers to Gaius D.(45.1) 






could never produce cumulation; 
in fact ulpder the civil law it could never produce other 
than a process -consumption relation based on eadem res, 
and all that the classical jurisprudence does is to allow 
it to produce a, solutio -consumption relation independent 
of eadem res. 
Assuming the soundness of our restorations, the 
wxwm4mApl 
r compilors'Q present no difficulty. In the ÎÌt 
first place they substituted a reference to solutio -con- 
sumption for the original reference to process -consumption, 
and in so doing inadvertently dropped the subject ±gxoxz 
'promissor'. In the second place they changed 'manere,t' to 
'minet', the force of the 'irrealis' being now lost. In 
the third place they inserted 'dicendum est ut' in order 
to soften the contradiction between the two parts of the 
period. 
One paint in connection with y deserves special 
attention. Gaius does not say that solutio of Stichus to 
44 o " 
S. frees Wm from T,, and this omission has been a frequent 
source of trouble to commentators. Levy,, indeed, summar- 
ily dismisses the point by observibig that Stichus belongs 
to T.; this being so, the debtor could notAgive him to S; 
In my opinion, however, the difficulty cannot be got over 
in this simple manner. We must ask ourselves whether the 
debtor, if he procured a transfer of the property in 
Stïuhus from T. and then assigned the same to S,, was 
thereby freed from T.? 
The laxatgt correct answer to this last question 
is thought to be that the debtor was not freed from T. at 
law, but was Ote freed in equity. In the case before us 
Konk., p.1305 n. 13 
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one of the obligations a compound prestation -object 
in the alternative Seio decem aut Stichum x4 da 
while the other_has a simple prestation.- object consisting 
of one of the same alternative elements 
In order then to establish equality of prestation -object 
for the pruposes of sithple solidarity, we must, I believe, 
interpret the first obligation as decem dari subject to the 
modality of an alternative prestation -object (aut Stichum),' 
But under this interpretation Stichus must be left out of 
account so far as the simple solidary relation is concerned, 
for the modality affects the first obligation merely, not 
both. If then the common debtor, having acquired the pro- 
perty in Stichus, assimgs the same to S,, he is certainly 
under no further liability to the latter, but such sèlutio 
cannot at law prejudice the right of T. to claim X On the 
other hand, however, it would be quite inequitable to allow 
To to exercise tthis legal right, If the latent defect 
in the correal stipulation had not existed and correality 
had therefore been established, solutio of Stichus to S. 
would of course have freed the debtor from T04; but 
ktaxxlumptxxrixtx- 3-totto:r rs-;,position cannot in equity 
be rendered better as a consequence of the said defect. 
and contrary to the evidentì intentions. of parties. 
We therefore reach the result that solutio of 
X to either T. or S. operates a full legal release of the 
common debtor, whereas solutio of Stichus to S.J,Immx does 
not free the common debtor from T. at law, but does so in 
free him in equity. In fact I think it well within the 
bounds of probability that Gaius after continued somewhat 
as .follows: sed si Stichus desierit Titii esse eumque 
J It is to be observed that if Stichus belonged to T. at the 
time of the stipulation, then even though he subsequently 
ceases to belong to T., the common debtor cannot give him 
to T. in fulfilment of the obligation; see D.(45.1)128 M 




promisaor Seio dederit, an a Titio liberetur, quaeritur0' 
et Iuliano placet lure non liberari sed ma ex_ceptione 
doll adiuvari. 
We now turn to p ?. a. A The pmrport of this 
period is that two parties cannot with effect stipulate correally 
for a prestation which is 'individualised' by the person 
of the particular creditor, for the obvious reason that 
identification of the two prestation- objects is here 
impossible. Two app^riate examples are quoted, namely, an 
obligation usu fructum dari and an obligation (aliquid) 
dotis nomine dari.11 
It is important to observe the exact á _icanoe 
of Gaius's decision. He does not deny that I and Titius 
can stipulate for the sane usufruct or for the same thing 
dotis nomine; all he says is that we cannot be cohstitued 
correal creditors. Thus leaving aside the obvious case of 
separate stipulations leading to cumulativiH. rights, it 
would, I consider, be possible for us to stipulate jointly 
for the same usufruct so as to render ourselves entitled 
I 
We cannot here enter acxg into any detailed discussion of 
the various elements which caused a usufruct and ma a dos 
to be 'individualised' by the person of the usufructuary 
or husband. As vaxgxx regards usufruct we may rematk 
that this right was always considered as of a peculiarly 
personal nature; cp. e.g. Paul. D.(45.3)* 26: ususfructus 
sine persona esse non potest et ideo servus hereditarius 
inutiliter usum fructum stipuii ur. Moreover a usufruct 
was, generally speaking, limited by the life of the usu- 
fructuary, so that it might -vary in point of duration 
according as it was granted to this party or that. 
As regards dos it may be remarked that a dos was essent -. 
ially designed to enable a particular husband to bear the 
burdens of a particular matrimonial relation; cp: "-Paul. 
D.(23.3)56.1: ibi dos esse debet ubi onera matrimonii cunt. 
Moreover the matter of recovery of the dos was intimately 
connected with the duration of the husband's life and his 
matrimonial conduct, so hat the position might turn out 
quite differently accordingly as the dos were granted to 
this husband or that. 
3 
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pro rata, ix i.e. each to a pro indiviso share of the 
usufruct Again, assuming us both to be actual or pros- - 
I! 
pctive husbands, it would, I consider, be possible for us 
to stipulate in like manner dotis nomine. ittt.Xx2uxxr 
gi xxxxidxxxxmxxgaitxxxxximixxiÿxtx .xxmxx.ixxx.tix tixäxxxs 
pxXxxi xxixxxenteugxxxdxTiTiaxxxxxxatxti xxixturvx mdxxxxy 
p xxtatic Cxthixxxx xxth eaxxtuzixxxxxxikxixaxixxxxxxxthin g 
lat The thee rélical obj -e tion th, in both the cases 
the ex 2sion oorreality ' «plies the elusion 
pa itionkeorise must ot, it is ght be 
But further, it would seem quite competent 
for me to stipulate as principal creditor and T. as 
adstipulator, and pi= very probably this was the case that 
Gaius was here thinking of; When two stipulators are 
described as 'ego et Biti x Titius', as a rule Lego' is 
sole principal creditor, while 'Titius' occupies some sort . 
of subsidiary position. So here Gaius's meaning may be 
that, though I and T.' may perfectly well stipulate for a 
usufruct or dotis nomine as principal creditor and adstip- 
ulator respectively, we cannot so stipulate as principal 
correal creditors. Further discussion of the case where 
I and T. are principal creditor and adstipulator must be 
reserved for our treatise on Accessoriality. 
Meanwhile we ask, suppose I and T. do stipulate 
correally for a usufruct or, being both actual or pros- 
pective husbands, dotis xi nomine, whn.t is the legal 
} 
result? Three alternatives seem to be open: (i) to hold 
the whole act void; (ii) to hold us 
entitled each pro rata; 
(iii) to hold our relation te be one of simple 
solidarity, 
Personally I think the second is the most 
likely solution, 
assuming the nature of the prestation 
-object to admit of 
the same. I have already ventured the 
conjecture that 
4hhis assumption is necessary, for if either of us is not 
an actual or prospective husband he cannot be entitled at 
all; cp. D.(45.3)8. 
3 
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in the mature classical peridd there were still some who 
held. every actite joint stipulation, even if distributively. 
framed, productive of partition merely, and if this be so, 
a distributive interrogatory and partition cannot, in the 
active case, have been deemed irreconcilable. Under these 
circumstances partition was the obvious solution in the 
case before us where correality was excluded, the validity 
of the act being thus preserved without any resort to 
simple solidarity,' If however a case should arise e-rt 
where the nature of the prestat- 
ion- object excluded the possibility of partition, xxxxekk 
then, ii 
simple solidarity would seem the natural result, 
1). With regard to periodos Levy's opinion (Konk, p.504 n,1) is 
that the act must be declared inutilis, unless the tifiiling 
inner relation or other circumstances show that one of the 
stipulators (ego) is materially entitled alone, while the 
other (Titius) is 'at the highest' solutionis causa 
adiectus. But how one oftbtxxiaxxiduaxxima active parties 
to a joint stipulation could ever be 1 mere solutionis 
causa adiectus, I have difficulty in seeing, and in any 
event it seems impossible that the leftfaxstixibtfaxMaxx 
efficacy of the act should be dependent on the material 
conditions mentioned. Levy also suggests that Gaius may 
added some remarks in the form of a divisio' after 
'stipulemur' or 'scribit'; this suggestion is not'improbabfle 
but we have no means of verifying it. 





(2) D. (45,2)5. Julian, XXII digest. 
.< Nemo est nesciat CaionasJ operas promitti posse et 




XX et ideo<-;>nihil prohibet Ama duos reos stipulandi 
consti tui L vel promittendi sicuti] si ab eodem fabro 
[duo rei stipulandi] easdem operas stipulantur, 
4 Ji 5, 
L 
et,» ? ex contrario duo fabri <'7 usdem peritine ~i 
easdem operas promittere intelleguntur Let70 duo rei 
Y 
promittendi fieri, 
sed sine consensu stipulatoris solvers eum non. posses*: 
operas enim in persona eius qui promittit propriae 








Tne restoration given by Beseler, III,.p.142, to which we 
sçall have occasion to refer,is as follows: 
Nemo est qui nesciat alienas operas promitti (non> posse 
Cat7 <nec> fideiussoradhiberi in ea obligationet, et ideo 
pi hil rohibetj < neg> duos reos xx stipulandi constitui 
e Aromi tendi sicuti) si ab eodem fabro duo L./rei. 
stipulandi easdem operas stipulantur: et ex contrario 
dub fabri teiusdem peritine easdem operas inutilter> 
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cc 
We shall consider periods,. and d, in the first place. 
That Julian wrote these periods in their present 
form is quite impossible. In y we at once remark the 
awkward tacking on of 'vet promittendi' to 'duos reos 
stipulandi constituí', theexpression .'sicuti si' which 
isA7W5 AE f ñ the sense of 'for example if', though well 
authenticated in the sense of 'in like manner as if', 
the inelegant repetition of 'duos rei stipulandi'. We 
therefore delete the words 'vel promittendi sicuti' 
and 'duo rei stipulandi'; there can be little doubt 
-ers+yc 
that 'vel promittendi' added by the compilors for 
the purpose of generalisation (and, as we shall presently 
.ut, 
see meson to believe, in contradiction of the classical 
law), and that 'sicuti' and 'duo rei stipulandi' were 
further added by them in view of this generalisation. 
'4(c, urn-4 
Beseler also takes exception ton'nihil prohibet' 
( =00ó ¿v xwAv£1) as betraying the Greek hand. But, while 
admitting the force of his argument, I cannot regatd it 
3) 
as impossible that Julian did actually use theSC ee words. 
In period 7,, as it stands, the emphasis seems 
to be on.the words 'eiusdem peritiae'; th.etst whether 
two smiths can or cannot bind themselves correally &NI= 
is whether or not they are of the same skill. But 
assuredly no classical jurist would ever have set up a 
test of such a vague and altogether subjective nature. 
Beseler proposes to delete 'eiusdem peritiae', but it is 
o VIa./ V. col. 529, 539. 
9t duo' is unnecessarily retained by Beseler. 
' nihil prohibot' seems perfectly genuine in Papinian. 
D.(46.3)41 (not cited by Beseler); 'nihil vetat' in 
Gaius D.(44.2)15 (Beseler, II.p.146) seems likewise 
genuine. 
S 3 
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kxxxxNax much more probable that these words were found in 
Julian's text, 
Now as to the restoration of Julian's argument. 
In the first place we observe that the compilors by their 
introduction of 'vel promittendi' in(. have made the 
same principle apply to both the active and the passive 
case, and this fact renders it highly probable that 
originally the two decisions were different; the words 
' ex contrario' in ; also render a slight support to this 
view, In the second place we observe that on principle 
there seems no reasmn why two parties sould not be correal- 
ly entitled to the same operae, for services in general 
are certainly not individualised by the person of him 
to whom they are rendered. In the third place, however, 
we observe that services, at any rate if they are to any 
appreciable degree skilled, are eesent, illy individualised 
I, 
by the person of him who renders them, and the.move highly 
skilled they are, the more pronounced the individualisat- 
ion becomes. Hence the law may., with good reason.r refuse 
to admit that (skilled) services to be rendered by one 
individual can ever be identified with (skilled) services 
to be rendered by another individual, for the purpose of 
constituting a passive correal obligation. 
If we assume the foregoing observations to 
represent the substance of Julian's argument, then what 
the compilors have done is to invert the decision so, as to 
make the passive case agree with the active, a quite 
impracticable condition as to equality of skill being 
The question how far 'operae officiales' were individual- 
ised by the luctxmx person of the patron to whom they were 
due, does not seem to arise here. 
3 
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however imp_ osed in the passive mama case. That such an 
-4-d 
inversion of Julian's decision eli.4 actually mite- piltee 
is rendered highly probable by Ulpian. D.(46.3)31: 
Inter artifices longa differentia est et ingenii et 
naturae et doctrinae et institutionis. ideo si navem 
a se fabricandam quis promi ;erit L1_insulam aedif- 
i 
icandam fossamve faciendamj Let hoc specialiter actum 
est ut suis operis id perficiatJ , fideiussor ipse 
i 
aedificans Evel fossam f6.diens 
3 
non consentiente 
stipulators,, non liberab&t reum. . . 
No one at the present day can have any doubt that the 
passage 'et hoc...perficiat' is due to the compile 
°°- - 
Ulp a.nia,ni arguing from the fact that artisans differ immense 
in respect of skill, natural education and 
training, lays down the rule that, without the creditor's 
consent, a fideiussor cannot validly perform a piece of 
work which his principal has undertaken; the fideiussor 
merely guarantees that the principal will perform and has 
no duty or right to perform himself. The compilors, on the, 
other hand, only admit this rule where it has been spec- 
ially agreed that the principal shall carry out the work 
by his personal efforts. In othe words theydecline to 
recognise that operae are individualised by 
the person of him who renders them; in a concrete case 
indded they may be so individualised, in particular, 
where it is agreed that a certain ̂shall render them 
personally. 
2) 
9 'vel insilam...fodiens' and 'vel fossam fodiens' 
seem to be glosses. 
9Øe shall see later (p. 2 33 ) that the compilors, even if 
they had adhered to the rule regarding the passive indiv- 
41"lisation juactxxtotalakmatire 
of services, would have been perfectly just- 
ified, from 'the standpoint of the Justinianian law, in 
inverting Julian's decision. 
î 
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If the foregoing argument be sound, then the sub - 
sta,r_tial point in the restoration of S, is fixed, namely, 
that Julian denied the possibility of two smiths binding 
themselves correally to perform a piece of handicraft. 
As regards the details of restoration, I prose to sub- 
stitute 'tamen' for the initial 'et', to insert 'quamvis' 
before 'eiusdem peritiae', to insert 'nee' before 'easdem; 
and change the 'et' before 'duo rei4promittendi' into 
meaning expert) 
'nee'. The mammiaggthen is thaptkx services rendered by 
two smiths, even where the latter are of the same skill, 
are never deemed to be the same, and accordingly even 
though two smiths make a formally unimpeachable correal 
such 
promise to render services, they are ri,Itlyied to be 
correal debtors. The ; -_ 'neat before 'easdem' 
seems much preferable to Beseler's ort 
'inutiliter'; the point is that the services are ma7^t- 
!/ ti. ,. n,t.,a -. 4. iiect... 
` 
ctt,4ci., 
erially incapable of Finally we have only, 
to insert 'quamquam' or the like before 'nihil prohibet' 
in y, and our restoration of the two periods is complete, 
p We now turn to period '< Any attempt to give 
'alienae operae' another meaning than 'operae to be 
rendered by a third party' seems out of the question, so 
that we have here an unmistakable antinomy with the 
classical law; cp. for example, Ulpian.D.(45.1)30 pr.: Kffa; 
r 
nemo autem alienum factum promittendo obligator, and 
r 
Hermogenian.D.'(46.l)65: factum alienum inutiliter 
promitti tur' Numerous attempts atx restoration have been 
made, but none of these can in my opinion be pronounced 
successful. It will be sufficient to note Mommsen's 
,,¡which Beseler follows, 
proposal/Ato insert 'non' before 'posses' and change 'et' 
1 see Binder , p.24 n,'59. 
3 
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to 'nee'. In the first place we observe that the words 
valid 
'in ea obligations' assume the existence of a /principal 
obligation, and in the second placetxxxamicTxwklubmiammA 
ifaxixtariximatafixlaaxextlatinaglatxitxxxxxximpcxtraxalmayxilaatxx 
valid we ask 
if there was no /principal obligation, /what m classical 
jurist would nave thought it necessary to deny that a 
fideiussor could accede thereto? 
My own suggestions as to period o, are as 
follows: In the first place I observe that in Inst4IIIe 
e 
19,21, the compilors adhered to the classical rule: qui 
alium facturum promisit, videtur in ea esse causa ut non 
teneatur, nisi poenam ipse promiserit. I accordingly 
conjecture that in our lexxE present perioda, the word 
'alienas' represents rather a corruption of Julian's 
text due to inadvertence on the compilors' part than a 
deliberate interpolation designed to alter the classical 
law regarding promises of facta aliena. In the second 
place I observe that the preliminary remarks of Julian 
ineK.were to all appearance intended to lay a foundation 
for a decision that operae could not be promised by two 
parties correally. In the third place, founding on 
D.(46.3)31 (cit. ), I conjecture that Julian deduced the 
such ,Gi " 
impossibility of /a correal promise ̂from the incapacity 
of a fideiussor validly to perform himself the operae 
promised by his principal without the creditors consent 
I therefore reach the conclusion that the compil- 
ors must have deleted a passage which formed the sequel 
too( ; this conclusion is somewhat supported by the fact 
that, as the fragment stands, we should have expected 
periodnto terminate with a verb instead of with tze4 
phraseA'in ea obligatione'. In the notes I have ventured 
a suggestion as to how this deleted period may have run; 
if it contained the word 'alienas' there is no inherent 
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unlikelihood that the latter may, through carelessness 
have gcbt incorporated into oC in the process of interpol- 
ation. 
To the question whether Julian wrote anything, 
and if so what, in the place now occupied by 'alienas', 
s 
no certain answer can be given, 'Aliquaal', 'alicuius 
artificii', 'alii (sc, quam patrono) east, may be mention- 
ed as possible conjectures, but all discussion on this 
e 
point must be reserved for a study on # Operas libertorum 
3! 
to which context our present fragment doubtless belonged. 
The substaÏtial soundness of our restotaaions 
being assumed, we now ask, what was the actual effect of 
a passive correal stipulation for operae2 Consider 
such a stipulation must as: 
irlaevi, statuam aeneam Apollinis facere spondes? 
Sei, eaíhdem statuam aeneam Apollinis facere spondes! 
Ex hypothesi this stipulation cannot create correality, 
and on a stricj, application of civil law principles it 
must, we believe, be pronounced wholly null and voids 
But the language employed by Julian in period (as 
restored) seems to imply that such an act was not invalid.' 
Well, if this be so, aspartition is out of the question, 
¡¡ 
S 
only one result is possible, namely Dimple solidarity, 
and on principle we believe that this was the precise 
result which the classical jurisprudence must arrive at. 
Quite likely Julian after proceeded to explain this 
result, just as Gaius did in D.(45.2)15. 
The only remaining aptgkia question is whether 
the classical law excluded the possibility of correality 
in the case of all obligations for the rendering of 
y ryó S 
3 
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services, or only where the services were of such 
a skilled nature thst the personality of the workman 
made an appreciable f difference. To this question 
no cer n answer is possible in the absence of author- 
ity. We may point out, however, that it would be hard to 
draw the line between 'individualised' and 'non- individ 
ulaised' services, and the probabilities are therefore 
not in favour of such a distinction being admitted by the 
classical jurisprudence. Accordingly we deem it safer 
to lay down one general rule that operas of any descrip- 
ion are individualised by the person of him who performs 
them and cannot therefore be the prestation- object of a 
passive correal obligation. 
The case of a passive correal stipulation 
containigg a latent defect which induces material inequal- 
ity of prestation is not max mentioned in the sources. 
If such a case were to arise, no doubt the result would 
be simple solidarity likewise. 
17 9 -- Cß . 9 (4 Et a4 - w 
D.(46.2)6 pr. Ulpian. XLVI ad Sabine w `f 2 
Si Ettamaxtxitxxztaxatzy ita fuero stipulatus: 'quanto 
minus a Titio debitore exigatur, tantum 
non fit novation, (quia non hoc agitur ut nove turf 
D.(45.1)116 Papinianx. IV querest. 
BgK Decem stipulatus a Titio, posteti quanto minus ab eo 
consegui posses si a Maevio stipularis, sine dubio kaevius 
s z) 
universi periculum potest subire: 4ed et si decem patter 
petieris a Titio, Maevius non erit solutus, nisi iudicat- 
um Titius feceri t. J 
Paulus no tat : non enim sunt duo rei Maevius et Titius 
eiusdem obligationis, sed Maevius sub conditions debet 
si a Titio exigi non poterït: 
igitur [nec Titio convento Maevius liberatur (qui an 
lialit debiturus sit, incertum est) et soiveíbte Titio 1- 
nwliberatur Maevius (qui nec tenebatur, cum conditio 
stipulationis deficit), nec kaevius pendente stipulation- 
is condicione recta potest conveniri) 
a Maevio LenimI ante Titium excussum non tette petetur. 
fide tun promittis . This seems a more likely restor- 
ation than spo ndes, for if Ulpian 
nad used the latter 
word the compilors would probably not have interfered 
with it. Fgaffp. Fide promittere is of course here used 
in the principal not the accessory, sense; see Levy, ,Spor_s 
io, p.7 ff. ' 
Eisele,ZSS.30, p.143, deletes 'et' by way of emendation- 
; 
in my opinion wrongly. 
l3) Eisele 1. c.n attributes 'hisi iudicatum Titius fecerit' 
') to the compilers, but I cannot by any means concur in 
this view. 
s- 
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D.(46.3)21 Paul,X ad Sabin. 
Si decem stipulatus a Titio, deinde stipuleris a Na, e vio 
quanto minus ab illo consecutus sis, etsi decem petieris 
a 
a Titio, non t(pmen absolvitur Ivîaevius : quid enim si 
condena,tus Titius nihil facere potest 2 ro 
sed et si cum Ivia,evio prius egeris, Titius in nullam partem 
, oitAZwuw 
liberatur: incertum quippe est an omnino Maevius 
*pers sit. 
i 
B denique si totum Titius solveri t, nec debitor fuisse 
videbitur Uaevius )Lquia condicio eins deficit 
I, D,(12.1)42 Celsus VI digest. 
Si ego decem stipulatus a Titio, deinceps stipuler a 
i 
I`+'a,evio quanto minus a Titio consequi possim, si decem 
, 
petiero a, Titio, non liberatur Ia.aevius,J alioquin nequic- 
quam mihi cavetur: at si iudicatum fecerit Titius, nihil 
ultra haevius> tenebi tur. 
K. 2 sed si cum Maevio >egero quantumque est quo minus a 
Titio exigere potuero eo tempore quo iudicium inter me 
et Maevium acceptum est, tanto minus a Titio posten, 
petere possum. 
P aul and Cel sus tagexRftzxxximxIalmaxofxixiimaximitAm.ixix 
e 1 
kmanxaxserxed call the guarantor Seius, but I have 
preserved the name Maevius throughout. 
(:L 2 aOu Ly Q y67,, t, d4T " . = 
e;.014:, / 9nz/ 
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These passages present to us the relation which we 
call that of principal debtor and independent guarantor 
by stipulation. As already indicated,1) the discussion 
which this relation caused seems undoubtedly due to the 
fact that it did not easily fi u in with the principles 
of the civil law. 
In the first place we note that Ulpian in period.( 
thinks it necessary to deny novatory effect to the 
second 
gxxxxxtea stipulation. The argument in favour of novat- 
ion was specious. As. Papinian says in ß. :Maevius mnixun 
universi periculum potest subire; is the position not 
then substantially that M. I promises the same X as T. 
has already promised? The classical jurisprudence 
however rejected this argument,which if accepted would 
have rendered independent guarantee by stipulation inaltusa 
obligation 
impossible. The second Ktigadiatim pre -supposes the 
continued xxgxt subsistence of the first; moreover its 
prestation- object is an uncertain sum not exceeding X, 
while that of the first is a fixed sum of X. 
In the second place, novation being thus disposed 
of, the question arises whether the relation of the two 
obligations is not necessarily one of formal accessori.- 
i ty. If this question be answered in the affirmative, 
S. is in the same position as a fideiussor7and litis- 
contestation has extensive consuming effect. Such a 
result would however destroy the utility of the guarantee 
altogether. The mm creditor must be able to sue T. 
without losing his right of recourse against M. fe.-ifoliA4aw 
e he fail4 to recoverAfrom the former. Otherwise, as 
Celsüs says I. in , tnequicquam mihi cavetur', the same 
idea i-e apparent in Paul's question inJ ' quid enim 
si condemnatus Titius nihil facere potest?' Accordingly 
we are bound to treat the relation of T. and M. as governs 
ed by other principles than the relation of principal 




debtor and fideiussor. It is clearly the existence of an 
accessorial relation that Paul intdenies eith the words 
'non enim sunt duo rei M. et T.'eiusdem obligationis'. 
In the absence of unity of cause no one would suggest 
that M. and T. were correal debtors. 
In the third place then we ask what precisely 
are the principles by which the relation in fn..,.estion is 
governed? If we could regard T. and M. as standing in a 
relation of simple solidarity, the position would be 
plain, but this result never seems to have been suggested. 
The reaction of the civil law against anything in the 
nature of solidarity without unity' of cause is such that 
jurisprudence must abandon any attempt to fix the basis 
of the relation on extensive solutio- consumption. Two 
methods of solving the problem are given by Celsus and 
Paul respectively, 
The 14.a of the older jurist Celsus is as follows 
The creditor can sue either T. 
If he sues T., M. is not freed by 
but if T. satisfies the judgment, 
or M. in the first instance 
process -consumption, 
M. is under no further 
liability, - 'nihil ultra tenebitur', (period 
it will be observed, does not say that M. is 
he would be if extensive process -consumption 
operate; the words q mean that nothing 
, ). Celsus, 
'freed', as 
were to 
is now due 
under M.'s obligation at all, - in fact the position is tla 
the same as if this obligation had never existed; this 
result, as we shall see presently, is brought out with 
greater disttn.ctness by Paul. Naturally the same result 
T w 
will take place if 4. makes a voluktary solutio without 
being sued. On the other hand, if the creditor decides 
to proceed against M. in the first instance, *ìÿt11 *rRxON 
T.'s resources must be evaluated as at the time of 
litiscontestation in this action. Suppose it is 
 ....,- .,...... 
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J 
ascertained that T. is able to pay VI of the Xxd sum 
of X due; the creditor's right against M. is then limit- 
ed to the remaining IV, and c;ì quoad this Ìiß his right 
against T. is consumed. Such ty at any rate is my 
z 
interpretation of the difficult period K , IkexEsmaxx 
Paul agrees with Celsus in holding that li ti s- 
contestation with T. does not. free M. (period 3.), and 
he brings out with greater clearness the result that if 
T. makes stlutio, M.'s .obligation is rendered null and zok 
rt .` Le-,e.., e d,6, 
void ab initio... 
&X' C-« ( uzl 14') e 
But he unies Coleus's doctrine as to the position where 
4.) 
the creditor sues M. in the first instance. Litiscontest 
ation in this action, he holds, does not free T. to any 
extent, because it is not yet certain whether M. will 
owe anything (period 
7. 
). In other words M. cannot be 
condemned until T. has been discussed, so that if the 
creditor sues M. in the first instance, the procdedings 
must be hung up, until the discussion of T. id accomplish 
ed; if the creditor presses for judgment before the 
latter event, N. must be absolved. Hence Paul, in 
effect, deprives the creditor of his right of 'electing' 
T. or M. in the first instnace, and so does away with 
any suggestion as to their relation being solidary. 
We have a very succinct statement of Paul's 
view in his note to Papinian D.(45.1)116 (periodsr - 
-d. ( a. a 2t'> 
if we eliminate the allatefily gloss with which this note 
has been encumberedY According to my restoration, what 
Paul says is : T. and M. do not stand in an (accessorial) 
eadem res relation, but on the contrary T. only incurs 
(principal) liability if the full amoutt cannot be exact- 
ed frob,T.; therefore M. cannot effectively (recta) be 
4 Beseler, III.p.63,110, deletes the whole of periods , 
4 and e but this is too drastic. 
According to my restoration, it will be observed, 'igitur' 
comes first in its clause. In this position it is gener- 
ally speaking, suspicious, but by no means impossible; 
e.g. in Paul.' D. (46 1)71 pr. i. m. the genuineness of the (`I> 
e 
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sued before T. has been discussed. 
It will be observed that nothing is anywhere said 
of the effect of solutio by M. on the obligation of T., 
but we have no difficulty in holding that Jim this effect 
is nil. T. remains under the same liability as before, 
et e..v.c4. 44, 
and M. ,an making paymentA is clearly entitled to an 
assignment of whatever rights the creditor may have against 
him. 
We may assume that the late classical jurists gen- 
erally adopted the same view as Paul regarding the xalciR 
relation of principal debtor and independent guarantor 
by stipulation; that is to say, by t depriving, in effect 
the creditor of nie right of election, they excluded this 
relation from the sphere of solidarity altogether. Let 
us, however, suppose that this view had not been adopj,ed, 
but on the contr i,ry that the creditor's right of election 
had been preserved intact. Let us further ignore the 
doctrine of Celsus that, if the creditor sues N_. in the 
first instance, liability is partitioned according to the 
state of T.'s resources as at the date of litiscontest- 
ation in this action, and asume that the creditor can 
obtain judgment for the full amoutt from M. Is the 
relation of T. and Y. thus established on a solidary 
basis? This question, I believe, must be answered in the 
negative. Even if the classical jurists had taken up the 
view here suggested, they would, it is thought, nave been 
bound to deny the existence of extensive solutio- consumpt 
ka 
ion. Solutio by M. would still have no effect in freeing 
T. and solutio by T. would mat still not free. M. , but luld 
would render his obligation null and void ab initio. 
(ctd from last page ) words. ' igi tur alterum reum eiusdem 
pecuniae non liberar i' is beyond dispute a4, 44 
"41 42 ` ̀" .. ,, c 1-1t,'.ß 
,4,44,v1,44 C%ttAn.utL ' /4: A 2k z ) 4o ,.,., 
J 606. (4 3 ) f S, lo 
r=d,rai- 
' 
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D.(46,1)13 
r 
Juliana XIV digesto 
el Si mandatu meo Titio decem credideris et mecum mandati 
egeris, non liberabitur Titius: sed ego tibi non aliter 
condemnari debebo quam si actiones quas adversus Titium 
habes mihi praestiteris." item si cum Titiò egeris, ego 
non liberabor, sed in id dúmtaxat tak tibi obligatus 
ero quad a Titio servire non potueris. 
D.(46.3)95.10. Papinian. XXVIII quaest. 
Si mandatu meo Titio pecuniam credidisses, eiusmodi 
contractus similis est tutori et debitori pupilli: et 
ideo mandl.tope convento et damnato, quamquam pecunias 
soluti sit, non liberasi debitorem ratio suadet, sed et 
e 
praestare debet creditor actionos mandatori_ adversus 
debitorem, ut ei satisfiat. et hoc pertinet tutoris 
et pupilli debi toris nos fecisse comparationem: nari 
cum tutor pupillo tenetur mal ob i$ quod debitorem eius 
non convenit, neque iudici_o cum altero accepto liberator 
alter nece si damnatus tutor solverit, ea res proderit 
debitorio O O O 
i 
as to remainder of this paragraph seo Partsch, Negotinrum i 
Gestio, I. p.62 44 P=4, 4 7P 
cf. 2 4i. s' 
Until Justinian altered the law by Novel 4 of the 
year 535, a creditor had a right of election as between 
9 a principal debtor and a mandator. J Yet, as the above 
passages show, he relation of principal debtor and 
mandator was not thereby established on a solidary hat 
2 " 
basis. Solutio by the mandator does not free the prin- 
cipal debtor but entitles the former to an assignment 
of the creditor's rights against the latter, and it is 
further to be inferred that xi solutio by the principal 
debtor does not free the mandator but renders his oblig- 
ation non -existent ab initio. Though the relation of 
principal debtor and mandator was of course unknown to 
the old civil law, yet here again we see the principles 
of the latter making their influence felt by way of 
reaction against solidarity without unity of cause. f 
cfr. 7444,,, D.( -1 1 ) s y 
) SG /t^ íT,L.f a &., .."-Zyb 
/ Ct a d.( ^ u 
ev-cz.t oak' etc"....( Ct,t CVicr + ) ̂ r7t4 
tia/M.aji 1/t4":41"a a"/ 1 jt414, c 
/ / 
ft<- wv&-c-j í2Z-a(.+` ¡l 44:Ing 
/7t4/.- f 
(3) 
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D. (13.5 )18.3. Ulpian. XXVII ad edict. 
Vetos fuit dubi tatio E}n qui hutxxxiatim 4-> hac actione 
L 
egitJ }sortie obligationem consumat. et tutius est 
dicere fEsolutioneJ4,->,potius [ex hac actione factaj <,-) 
liberationem contingere [non litas ontest .tione1, 




3) per excoptionem doli 
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In this celebrated paragraph Ulpian is no doubt deal- 
ing primarily with ax}x the case where the debtor himself 
is the 'constituens', but this case and that where the 
txnititxamm Cons ti tuons is a third party are governed by 
fundamentally the earn principles. If we ta$e the para- 
graph mx as it stands and apply its words to the case 
last mentioned, we seem to have, according to inclItmailitxx 
ANsitax ±xtux xxx what is stated to be the 'safer' view, 
an instance of simple solidarity without unity of cause. 
The principal and the ' cons ti to tort'' obligations of course 
originate from different facts, yet apparently extensive 
consuming effect is attributed to solutio though to denied 
ti o 
to litiscontestaaiuo.' 
It may however be regarded as perferetly certain 
that Ulpian did not write this paragraph in its present 
form, though so far as I am aware no one has yet sgeceeded 
in proposing a tenable restoration. In the first place 
Seckel has drawn attention to the fact that the perfect 
'fait' at the commencement of the paragraph does not 
agree leery mmmk well with the present 'tutius est dicere', 
and he suggests that it WAS the compilors who relegated 
the controversy to the past. The point is however of 
small impottance, and I am prepared to let 'fuit' stand. 
In the second place, as the actio de pecunia constituta 
was a p rp tori an action in factum, it is inaccurate to 
speak of this action consuming, not merely the creditor's 
principal action- right, but the principal obligation 
z) 
itself. In the third place, it is impossible to believe 
that Ulpian used the harsh phra :e 'solutione ex hac 
s) 
accione facta' ; moreover the ( rd tins' is super- - 
fluons and indeed false. In the Z place, we note the 
i) Haftung de peculio in Aus rim. u. butg. Recht (Festschrift 
f. Bekker, 1907) p.347 n.4. 
ZI Levy, ?honk., p. 64w; cp. supra p. ¡r í 
3) 
Seckel, l.c deletes 'ex hac actione facia'. 
Z4- 
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awkward tacking on of 'non litis contestatione' to 'lib - 
erationem.contingere', which is quite in accordance with 
the methods of the compilors. In the fifth place, the 
concluding motive 'since solutio enure to the benefit 
of each obligation' apparently implies an antithesis to 
litiscontestatio, but such an antithesis is false from 
the classical standpoint, for litiscontestatio may equally 
enure to the benefit of each obligation, and in any event 
the argument involves a petitio 
Now with a view to attempting a restoration of 
Ulpian's original text, let us auticxxxxxlaxffs as a start 
ask ourselves if it is at all likely that a 'vetus 
dubitatio' existed on the question whether litiscontesta4 
ation in an actio de pecunia# constituta consumed, dir- 
ectly or indirectly, the principal obligation. In my 
opinion it is highly unlikely that any serious doubt 
existed on this point at all. Process- consumption 
could only operate extensively if the constitutory oblig- 
ation were treated as formally accessory to the principal 
obligation, in other words, assuming tbuct the constituens 
to be 
;UM different parties, if the 
to be in the same position as 
a constituens had been deemed 
and principal debtor 
stituens were deemed 




in this position, the classical law could hardly have 
excluded the beneficium divisionis as betwenn xmxffxax± 
several constituents, but Justinian's constitution 
a0(4.18)3 shows that the latter were not accorded this 
benefit till the year 531. But quite apart from this 
special argument, I can laaxd3cy have little doubt that 
the classical law did not regrtrd a constitutory obligat- 
ion as accessory in the formal sense. This obligation 
a 
derived its force entirely from the pretorian law, and to 
treat it as standing in an eadem res relation with a 
principal civil law obligation would be quite anomalous. 
jl 
24 
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c Hence i reach the conclusion that as between -6101.44two 
obligations process -consumption could never operate ex- 
tensively either ipso iure or per exceptionem rei lud, 
vel in iud. ded. True if the g reditor once sued on the 
principal obligation, the praetor might on equitable 
grounds refuse him a further action de pecunia constitute 
(or only grant the same subject to an xxx ±gxxxxkixkkxx 
xxx.1:xxxii doll of in factum which would render it useless],,, 
!I 
of 
and vice versa, but this has nothing to do with civil r" 
D, 
consumption, 
Let us then dismiss the idea that our present 
paragraph as written by Ulpian dealt with the question 
whether litiscontestation in an actio de pece constit. 
consumed the principal obligation. The main clue to 
what Ulpian actually did write seems to be found in the 
words 'solutione...ex hac actions facta'. If we atixxx 
eliminate the following reference to littscontestation 
(non litis contestatione), we at once perceive the poss- 
ibility that the question raised may have been did 
solutio under the constitutory obligation consume the 
principal obligation, so that if the creditor subsequently 
sued on the latter the iudex was bound to absolve without 
the aid of any exceptio? I have little hesitation in 
nolding that this Wl,s the actual point on which the 
ancient doubt existed, and I therefore substitute i 'qui 
ex hac actions solvit' for 'qui hac actions egít',' 
Confining ourselves meanwhile to the case where 
the principal debtor and constituens were one and the 
same party, we see the point. at issue to be as follows: 
Common sense seemed to favour the view that solutio made 
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Ar.14t J) 
or after action was on principle immaterial,- ìNxxo ipso 
lure consumed the principal obligation likewise, though 
rac t Gc.sc 
litiscontestation n.ad no such effect but 4,'; e + , , 
66.( 
"7'-it. 
G ft4", - ri a44-4c ,a-C4-4-4 ñ 4.4t04 
to - f 
In the converse case where payment was made under th 
principal obligation the difficulty could be got over by 
holding that the constitutory obligation was not indeed 
consumed, but rendered non -existent ab initio, Payment ?Íi 
under the constitutory obligation, however, clearly could ül 
not so affect the principal obligation. 
How then did Ulpian solve the problem? Here the 
cluse seems to lie in the word ' potius', which is quite 
impossible as it stands, but which, by the very reason 
found 
of its impossibility, was in all likelihood tzkam by the 
compilors in the original texte íi3cpixx Suppose Ulpian 
to have written 'tutius est dicere per exceptionem doll 
potius quam ipso lure liberationem contingere', and the 
i 
whole position becomes plaine Ulpian admits the force of 
the common sense arguments batxxxxamthzkamx in favour of 
solutio- consumption, but nevertheless does not recommend 
any derogation from strict civil law principles. Indeed 
no such derogation was at all necessary, for an equitable 
exceptio doli would give the debtor ample protection. Tp 
complete our restoration we have only to substitute 
'quamquam' for 'quoniam' and insert ' sortisi' after 
'solutio'. The decision then runs as follows: Solutio 
under the constitutory obligation is best regarded as 
endowed with merely an equitable consuming effect on the 
principal obligation, though solutio of the principal 
debt (legally) enures to the benefit of each obligation.. 
Ulpian, according to our restoration, only mentions the 
case where solutio was made after action brought (qui ex 
hac actions solvit), because ,the principal debtor and the 
constituens being the same, a voluntary payment would 
naturally be attributed to the sors. 
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As already indicatedr payment under the principal oblig- 
ation may quite reasonably be held to render the constit- 
utory obligation non -existent ab initio, and Ulpian's 
avoidance in the final clause of any reference to consumpt- 
ion. 
amore? -3- justifies the conjecture that he thus construed the 
- °"4'A salt of solutio sortis. 
cxtit The substantial soundness of our restorations 
being assumed, the compilors' manipulations of the para- 
graph need not cause any serious difficulty, familiar as 
we now are at the present day with their extraordinary 
modes of operation. The whole question whether solutio 
under the constitutory obligation consumed the principal 
obligation must have seemed to them trivial; of course 
'solutio ad utramque obligationem proficit', they must 
nave thought. But, assuming always that the principal 
debtor and constituons are one and the same, does litis- 
contestation under the one obligation consume the other? 
This question still remained open for Justinian's abol- 
ition of extensive process -consumption could'ònly 
apply where there were different parties on the debtor 
side. Now very probably Ulpian in a preceding context 
which the compilors deleted, raised the question whether 
litiscontestation had extensive consuming operation in 
the case before us, and he must have given a negative x 
answer. The compilors therefore conceived the brilliant 
deal 
idea of m -a ring the present paragraph gaix with this 
question and interpolated it accordingly. 
Let us now glance at the case where the constituens 
and the principal debtor are different parties. If sol- 
utio were granted extensive consuming effect, then wed 
should have a simple solidary relation without unity of 
cause. But by adhering, in accordance with Ulpian's 







result. Solutio by the principal debtor renders the con - 
stitutory obligation non- existent ab initio, while 
solutio by the constituens leaves the marmilwaxokiigAtion 
creditor's right against the principal debtor ixtx legally 
intact and capable of assignment to the constituens,' Yet 
the creditor had the right. of electing either the principal 
debtor or the constituens under the classical law, for the 
2 
constituens (a/vTlcrwrì jS ) ) was expressly granted a 
beneficium excussionis, along with the fideiussor and the 
mandator, by Novel 4. In all this we can again trace the 
influence of the civil law antagonism to solidarity With- 
out unity of cause, though of course the muck relation of 
principal debtor and xxxxpttxmxx constituens was unknown 
to Jhe civil law. 
The foregoing criticism and exegesis remove, I 
believe' for the first time, all difficulty from our 
present paragraph. The result attained ought to be 
2 
specially acceptable to Levy, for it eliminates one of the 
19 
most serious obstacles to his theory of process- consumptin 
r 
wrtngly translated 'sponsor' in the Collectio. 
see Monk., p.64. 
(4) 
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D. (17s 1)28. Ulpian. XIV ad edict. 
Papinianus libro tertio quaestionum ait (mandatorem 
debitorisJ^solveiitem ipso iure reum non liberare 
(pripter ExxmCmandatum,enim suum solvit et suo nomine ) 
I 
4 
tdeoqueCmandator,A, ctiones putat adversus reum cedi 
deberes 
This fragment comes from a context dealing with 
the actio reci pticia, and I believe it must priginally 
have referred to the receptu91 argenta ,.iorumo 'Mandatorem 
debitorist is hardly possibleimore particularly as the 
debtor is immediately thereafter described as 'reus's 
If my restor .tion be sourd; then we have the ralation 
of principal debtor and aput argentarius recipiens 
governed by precisely the same principles as the two 
relations last discussed. The creditor undoubtedly has 
a power of electing the debtor or the recipiens, but 
solutio-consumption does noie operate; on the contrary ao 
M ) solutio by the recipiens does not free the debtor and 
solutio by the debtor renders the receptum obligation 
=t x aax= non- existent ab initio. Here again we are 
rt 
entigled to tracd1 the influence of the civil law reaction 
against solidarity without unity of cause. The par- - 
rd 
enthetical clause 'propters nomine' is apparently intend 
to refute any suggestion that the recipiens is formally 
an accessory debtor; if he were so, then solutioAmust 




q see Lenel, Pals, U.4,001.492; ism ZSS,) 2, p.66 f. .--,.. 
s) At Ays-4 4,;.vm' ( aat t /61La-4r1/4 
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194 #20 Equitable Zuitatax$ Solidarity, 
Equitable solidarity is the result produced where 
two obligations stand at law in a cumulative relation, 
but equity prevents the recovery of more than the full 
prestation due under either of them. For the Elm sake 
of simplicity we shall confine our exposition to the 
passive case, 
Legal cumulation being a condition precedent to 1 
equitable solidarity, the two obligations must originate 
from different causes, for unity of cause and cumulation 
are mutually inconsistent, Accordingly we have here a 
relation converse to simple solidarity; the lester is a 
xiagacÌ legal, not an equitable,relation ; and the Nxzmaii' 
principles of the civil law strongly oppose its existence 
1i 
without unity of cause. 
The ground on which equity reduces a legal cum- 
ulative relation to one of solidarity is that both oblig- 
ations are based on the same material cause, are directed 
tomthe same juristic end, are designed to fulfil the 
same economic interest. Whether in a particular case 
equitable relief will be granted on this ground, depends 
on the general principles of the ius honorarium, and,we 
should probably add, to some degree on the 'conscience' 
of the individual praetor. 
The most important question which arises is 
whether equity, in reducing a legal cumulative relation 
to one of solidarity, will treat =IN solutio, or its 
equivalent, as the sole consuming agent, or will 
attribute extensive consuming effect to litiscontestation 
also; in other words, is equitable solidarity modelled 
after a simple solidary or a correal pattern? Accord - 
ing to the principle t equi ty follows the law', we are 
probably justified in saying that as a general rule 
equitable solidarity admits the extensive consuming miiem 
effect of litiscontestation, though it would be rash to 
J 7e et-culvt14Z; ."+ iS'; 4, z 
t.) f-1-i, A- 
s 
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affirm tha;, the praetor's hands were tied in this respect 
so as to prevent him doing substantial justice according 
to the circumstances of each concrete case. 
The normal sanction of equitable solidarity lies 
in the praetor's power of refusing actions and granting 
exceptions. The simplest mode of reducing a legal 
cumulative relation to equitable solidarity is for the 
praetor to refue a creditor who has received payment 
from, or sued, one debtor any further action against the 
other. But it will often be Ï more convenient for the 
praetor, instead of himself deciding whether a further 
action should be granted, to grant the action subject to 
an 
an exception, the question whether or not /equitable 
consumption should be recognised being thus left immed- 
iately to the iudex. If equitable solutio- consumption 
is pleaded, an exceptio doli would seem in all cases to 
be sufficient for this purpose; if equitable process - 
consumption is pleaded, an exceptio in factum modelled 
after the exceptio rei iud. vel in iud. ded. would seem 
more xxgxtga appropriate In the case of bonne fidei 
iudicia, however, we must always bear in mind the iudex's 
power of considering all points of sCaad faith without 
any exception, and also of refusing to pronounce a 
condemnation in xx the action unless the gm plaintiff 
relinquishes another action- right. Buu into these 
details we cannot enter here. 
The praetorAs power of gxxxtiogg refusing 
actions and granting exceptions would enable him to give 
effect to the pure idea of 'subjective alternativity', 
For example, two obligations decem a Miaevio dare., and 
domum a Seio aedificari both in favour of Titius, might 
in equity be treated xxx as alternative in the sense that 
T. can claim fulfilment, of either, but solutio or 
5 
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litiscontestatio under the one extinguishes the other matt 
entirely, though no 'substantial equality of prestation' 
is here present. We may however conjecture that in such 
`n cases the praetorian law cl as far as possible to the 
idea that solatio- and process- consumption can only oper- 
ate as between prestations which are Aixa]txxxxixxxxtxtxxta 
ifkkkg equal. In the illustration given, probably the J 
prestation domum aedificari would be valued in money, say 
]J 
at XV or X + V ; an equitable solidary obligation would then 
be deemed to exist between the two obligations decem dari, 
xxxxlsdagxtiox a simplex obligation quinque dari being left 
outstanding. Therefore RxIcxxf xxAxxingxxxx ixxlixXxfxx x, 
Ixxx*Vdtxxxtiakuatxtxxxmaxaxxicxlmiqcxxxxxxkxgxlaxeximmaxxxxxtx 
Xxxftxxxxtucanx, if the house be not duly built, T,, after 
having recovered X from M., is still entitled to sue S. 
but in this latter action the condemnation must be . limited 
to V. Again if T., has merely joined issue with M., and 
extensive process -consumption operates, the condemnation 
gx against S. must be similarly limited. The rules govern - . t 
ing equitable process- consumptionare of a 
fl exit e nature. At law, the consuming effect of litis- 
contestation is absolute; if the two obligations decem 
d 
a, Maevio dari and omum a Seio aedificari stood in a legal 
process-consumption relation, litiscontestation with M. in 
respect of the full X, must consume T,'s right against S. 
in its entirety. Equity on the other hand ^. rr^+ 1; c A 
4e admit the possibility of a process- consumption relation 
between one obligation and a part of another, the remainder 
of the latter having an independent existence. 
The foregoin g principles will to some extent be 
illustrated in the following section by reference 
to 
D.(46.2)28. Meanwhile, however, let us consider a 
simple 
case of equitable solidarity: M. asks T. 
for a loan of X; 
T. agreed to make the loan but on one condition only, 
namely, 







of the other to pay him X. The foll=ing stipulations are 
^G Bg entered into: 
T. : í' +ia,evi, decem dari spondes? 
M.: spondeo 
T.: Sei, decem daro spondes? 
S,: spondeo, 
As a result of these stipulations M. and S. are of course 
cumulatively liable at law, but ,as ex hypothesis, only a singl 
sum of X is lent, it would be contrary to good faith for T. 
i) 
to exact more than a single sum of X; the material cause, 
is 
the juristic end, the economic interest, xxx one and the same 
both obligations. Accordingly if,ss-y M.,pays 
the full X due, and T. then attempts to sue S,, the praetor 
will either refuse this latter action altogether or render it 
nugatory by means of an exceptio doli. But further, it would 
appear that in the ordinary case, if T. merely joins issue 
with M. in respect of the full X., he is precluded from 
thereafter sing S,; any subsequent action against the latter 
will either be refused or be rendered nugatory by means of an 
exception in factum. in the nature of an exceptio xi rei iud, 
vel in iud, dedo, 
The question of interest is here ignored, 
4 
G 
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D. (46.2)28. Papinian. II Oefinit. 
oi. Fundum Cornelianum stipulatug, quanti fundus est postea 
stipulor: Esi non novandi animo secunda stipula.tio facta 
est cessat novatio: ...,, 
secunda vero stipulatio tenet ex qua non fundus sed pecunia 
debe tur. 
1 itaque si reus promittondi fundum solvat, secunda stipulatio 
0 iure non tollitur, nec si litem actor ex prima contestetur; 
. denique meliore [vel deteriore] facto /sine culpa debitoris 
posten, fundo lpraesens aestimatio ismickt fundo petito recte 
consìderetur, in altera vero] <79 ea aestimatio venit quere 
secundae stipulationis tempore fuit. 
i 
in deductionem 
199 r ctd. 
immediately 
In this fragment Papinian deals laaimmakkg with the case 
whe re the two stipulations are from the same party, but the 
case where they are from different parties is governed by 
fundamentally the same principles. In the meanwhile let us 
confine our attention to the first case. 
Titius stipulates from Maevius: fundum Cornélianum 
dari spondes ?, and subsequezá,tly he stipulates from the same 
M0; quanti fundus Cornelianus 'est Ku quern mihi dare spopondit, 
dari spondes? Papinian denies that the second stipulation 
66%,400 prestations 
novates the first,A obviously because the twohttiquaixtionam are 
1 
juristically distinct though economically they may coincide, 
yet he thinks it necessary to uphold expressly the validity of Clß 1i 
the second stipulation Then he draws the inference that 
neither solutio nor litiscontestatio under the first stip- 
ulation legally consumes the second,( Ì) 
gx x 
iftxka All this is lai akx highly instructive. 
It is evidently assumed that the material cause, the juristic 
end, the economic interest, is one and the same in the case 
of both obligations; perhaps the parties intended to achieve 
novation or else to give T. a choice of claiming either the 
estate itself or its present value, but they failed to take 
the proper means for carrying their intentions into effect. 
What is the result? 
on a ing 
em in any way, formally 
Novation exclud- 
ed the only alternatives t are to 
hold the second stipulation void or else to treat the two 
obligations as co- existing cumulatively at law, And Papinian 
soundly decides in favour of the latter alternative. But 
equity is bound to prevent T. from exacting both the fundus 
and its value. The question is, how does equity operate? 
£, 
Clearly period r cannot have been written by Papinian 
makpcxuldstatarIKAmmatextigarfitiiatiolltdfiltittliEWRRiiiixIcRiRR 
cp. Ulpian.D. (45.1)82 pr. where the res and its pretium are 
also distinguished; 
it is unnecessary now to argue that the passage 'si non 




as it stands. We pote the following formal defects: 'Sine 
culpa debitoris' cah only refer to 'deteriore', while gram- 
matically iL should refer to 'meliore' also; 'postea' is in a 
false position and the point of time to which it refers is not 
h stated; ibuidak 'fundo petito' following so close olb 'facto.. 
fundo' is inelega.ht; the present subjunctive 'consider. etur'. 
could not have been written by a, classical jurist; there is 
nothing with which 'j.ltera' can agree. We further note the 
triviality of the decision. The action on the second stipul- 
ation is an actio ex stipulatu in which, by vartue of the word 
of the stipulatory formula 'quanti fundus est', the value of 
the fundus obviously must be taken as at the date of this 
stipulation. The action on the first stipulation is a. 
condictio certae rei and the value of the fundus for purposes 
of condemnation must of course be taken as at the date of kiti 
litiscontestation in this action, unless indeed the fundus 
has deteriorated through culpa or after mora of the debtor. 
The clue to the restoration of period $flies, I 
think, in the phrase 'ea aestimatio venit, which seems to call 
for 'i eductionem'. If then from the preceding part of the 
period we eliminate everything but 'denique meliore facto 
fundo', we seem to have the case where the fundus has increased 
in value since the date of the second stipulation, and T., in 
xxia suing for it under the first stipulation, can, it is held, 
only recover its present value less the value as at the date 
of the second stipulation. But such deduction of the value 2 
of the fundus as at the date of the second stipulationáx is 
intelligible on one assumption only, namely, that T. has 
already joined issue under the second stipulation. If T. had 
recovered under the second stipulation without action, V i - 
deduction would only extend to the amount actka.a,lly 
paid. Thus we get the position that T. first of all sues on 
True 'venire in deductionem' does 
te-Kt* but in Javolen. D.(16.2)14, sbstituted ?compensationem' for 
miumiiznpensationem non veniunt'; 
not occur in any recorded 
apparently the compilors have 
'deductionem' in the phrase 
'venire in compensationem'a& 
occurs in Ulpian. D. eód.6, and_ in Gai.IV.66, 67 we have 'in 
compensationem voearz, in deductionem vocari', 
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the second stipulation, then finding that the 21,1 fundus has 
increased in value since the date of the latter, he sues on 
the first stipulation fxxxtxxxilxmatux. Under such circumstances 
the decision is that T. whether or not he has realised any- 
thing by his original action, can in this fresh action only 
recover the present value of the fundus less its value as 
the date of the second stipulation. 
Here we see equity operating by means of extensive 
process -consumption to prevent cumulation. At law T., though 
he has already joined issue under the second stipulation, is 
still exktx entitled to recover the full present value of the 
fundus under the first stipulation, but equity restricts his 
right as aforesaid.' Ï T. must submit to a limitation of the 
condemnatio in the formula of the sus- actions otherwise th®s 
lattor will be refused or rendered nugatory by means of an 
gxap ±xmm exception. 
Now it will be observed that period amt : ~. :;rca_ and 
(a d r 
periodf deal with xK situations, and that x we have 
no decision as to the equitable result in the two cases xxxtxx 
indicated in 
1. 
tha (i) where Rxxlxotxt - ±imixi xiandxr 
M. h:as made a voluntary sclut o of the fundus and (ii) where 
T. has joined issue under the first stipulation; nor again 
have we any d e.c..an-i-: the case where M. has made a voluntary 
payment under the second stipulation. It would appear then 
that only a fragment of Papinian's original decision has been 
preserved, and that of this decision period £, as indicated 
by the particle 'denique' formed the conclusion. Accordirigly 
we have little hesitation in holding that something has been 
. deleted between ) and I. . 
The substance of this deleted passage (periodá) 
we can restore with practical certainty. Papinian must have 
laid down: (i) if M. makes voluntary solutio of the fundus, 






and T subsequently sues on the second stipulation, he IT.) 
can, in equity, recover only the amount, if any, by which the 
value of the fundus as at the date of the second stipulation 
exceeds its present value, though at law, he would be entitled 
:xm recover its full value as at the date of the second stip- 
ulation; (ii) if T. has joined issue under the first stipul- 
ation (it is quite immaterial whether he has or has not real- 
iced anything by this action), and he now sues on the second 
stipulation, he can in equity recover only the amount, if any, 
by which the value of the fundus as at the date of-the second 
stipulation exceeds its value as- at the date of the previous 
litiscontestation under the first stipulation, though at law it 
ne would be entitled as aforesaid; ibut clearly in neither 
of these two cases could T. recover under the second stipulat- 
ion, if the depreciation of the fundus after the date of the 
second stipulation were due to his culpa 3 (iii) if M. has 
a Arf,4.,6 
made eeil5L payment under the second stipulation, and T. then sues 
k 
on the first, he (T.) c<a}y, in equity, recover only the amount 
if any, by which the present value of the fundus exceeds the 
sum so paid, though attlaw he would be entitled to recóver 
h 4, 
its full present value. Then followed period E,0,3,1 
Of course all this distinction between law and 
equity was antiquated from the Justinianian standpoint, and we 
have tlxxxffx2m therefore no difficulty in understanding the 
compilors' action in elit.inating Papinian's argument, and ginri 
giving us merely a banal statement as to the different bases 
of valuation in the two actions. Fortunately however they 
just left sufficientof the original text sto enable us to see 
what Papinian was aiming at. 
If we now assume that the two stipulations were 
from different parties,- that T. first stipulates from ì,_.: 
fundum Cornelianum dari spondes? and then from S.': quanti 
s oondit tant 
203 ' g c td 
i amatxxxsauxxxikxxxxxux t 
fondus Cornelianus est ruem'Maevius mihi dare spopondit, 
dari 
tantumjair* spondes? -the same principles are applicable as Ì 
before. At law, the result is cumulation, but equity will 
in the manner explained prevent T. from exacting more than 
the full amount due under the more pxx2klixxxx profitable 
stipulation. Here then we have equitable solidarity between 
the less profitable obligation and an equal part of the more 
profitable one. But further the equitable solidarity thus 
established is based on a correal pattern, for an extensive 
consuming effect is miixichgtati attributed to litiscontestaticm 
as well as to solutio Even in equity the formal and artif- 
icial conceptions of the civil law make their influence felt. 
Solutio- consumption without process -consumption, i xffi er 
)1/ mixxximphaxmaidxmity remains a singular result only to be 




204 1 Solidarity by Reciprocal Conditions? 
e have now to consider the highly problematical point 
whether the classical jurisprudence admitted the possibility 
of solidarity being indirectly established by means of 
separate stipulations containing reciprocal conditions. This 
point is suggested by the following fragment: 
D.(45.1)9. Pomponius II ad Sabina 
Si Titius et Seius separatim i tg . stipulati essent:'fundum 
ilium si illi non dederis, mihi dare spondee ?', finem dandi 
alteri fore quoad iudiciuu acciperetur, et ideo occupantis 
fore ac ti onem. 
fr,W1 a4 f 
di..dt a I t is plainly assumed ___ ____ ._ that the debtor, 
by making solutio of the fundus to either T. or S., escapes 
all further liability to the other; moreover either is 




in the abs 
,, to our the 
if this xxx were a case of active correality. But 
ence of x unity of cause, correality is, according 
ory, excluded, and.'we thus seem to be involved in 
a hopeless dilemma. 
With a view to explicating the situation, we shall 
fibst assume that the power which either creditor has of 
occupying by litiscontestation is legal and not merely 
equitable. How can we hold that correality is here excluded 
have we not an exact parallel to our presnt fragment in 
Gaius D.'(45.2)16, where the creditors are described as duo 
rei stipulandi? The answer is that the fact of two creditors 
having each a legal right of 'occupation' does nol, in itself a 
render them correal creditors; for occupation may depend 
on a concurrence of material rights as 
3) 
ence of actions. In D.(45.2)16 (cit.) 
frta a 
144-72-0- 
well as on a concurr- 
-5, 
undoubtedly / 
G.. 't( /,.G-t,c,u 
(/ 
as e 've 
The party who has not joined issue, say 
S,, is deprived f his obligatory right by the litiscontest- ;ti 
ation of the other^ -.', and no one in classical times would 
J Aitd ?4r. ir. s-y H." 
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have imagined any other result to be possible. But it 
may have been suggested that/S. though no longer a 
creditor, was, by virtue of his original position as a correus 
of T., still entitled to receive payment on the latter's 
behalf, and apparently it is this suggestion that Gaius here 
contradicts. On the other hand where we have merely a con - 
currence of material rights, litiscontestation by T. has no 
extensive consuming effect; S. still remains a creditor and 
of action 
all the law can do is to hold his right /meanwhile suspended. 
In other words T. by 2x first joining issue has acquired a 
prior claim to the prestation, and neither can the debtor 
defeat this claim by rendering the prestation to S., nor can 
S. do so by xí suing the debtor, even though he should obtain 
condemnation before Try' But the protection thus gxx granted 
to T. will naturally be conditional on his acting in good 
faith and with due diligence in the matter. Should it become 
apparent that T. joined issue collusivly merely in order to 
exclude f S., or that he has no intention of prosecuting his 
action seriously, S.'s right may be held to revive. 
Now if, as we for the present assume, the power 
of 'occupation' accorded to either creditor in this fragment 
is legal and not merely equitable, we must, I believe, 
regard the concurrence as of material rights only and not of 
-, - ., 
lase where the debtor make 
but for the fact that Paul 
constitutum as equivalent 
ion, so that the debtor is 
., - t- 
e; might compare the 
s a consti um in favout' of T. alone, 
.D.'(13.5)10 apparently 'regards a 
to solatio for purposes of consumpt- 
actually freed from S. 
'1 
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actions. T. by first joining issue acquires a prior claim 
to the prestation, but S. still remains a creditor; S,'s 
right is only extinguished when T. aotu .11v recovers the 
fundus. -ß-77e seem NMP to have a case of simple solidar- 
ity based on solutio- consumption alone, though bearing a 
certain resemblance to a process -consumption relation by 
reason of the occupatory force attributed to litiscontestat- q 4 
ions If this a so, then aAsolidary relationAAbe constit- 
uted indirectly by means of separate stipulations containigg 
reciprocal conditions, 
/I - - - y 
one of legal solidarity? In m . _ on this question must be 
answered in the - lye; the solidarity here established must 
If we ask what is the 
7t1..( acjual legal effect of the two stipulations under considerat- 
(w- ion, the correct answer seems to be as follows: If, before 
any action is brought the debtor renders the fundus to 
If.JAIa- either T. ot S., both obligations are simultaneously extin- 
guished. On the other hand, before the fundus is rendered 
to either, both T. and S. are entitled to bring separate 
actions and this being done, no subsequent rendering of the 
fundus to the one can prejudice the other's right to judgment 
and execution; hence in this case the actual legal result is 
cumulation. Therefore, if in point of fact li Liscontestation 
by the one operates as a bar to a further action by the other, 
we must htld this to be the result of equitable intervention. 
The ground of such intervention presents no difficulty. The 
prestation- object in both stipulations is one and the same 
determinate species which obviously cannot be rendered to 
both stipulators cumulatively. Hence by virtue of the recip- 
rocal conditions, equity is entitled to infer that both oblig- 
ations are designed to fulfil the same juristic end,' 
But having reached this result can we now say that 




on a legal concurrence of material rights? I thic think not. 
What we have here is an equitable action concurrence deter- 
s 
mined in the sense of process -consumption. Litisconte4,tation 
by T. excludes S. in equity, just as does KS solutio to T., 
though we must not go so far as to say that the praetor was 
debarred under all circumstances from granting a subsequent 
action to S. In short the case figured by Pomponius is 
simple one of equitable solidarity presenting certain 
singular features. 
If the reader will attempt to a work out the 
position in the case of Iaixa stipulations from different 
parties for the same determinate species and containing 
reciprocal conditions, he will, I think, have little difficult 
46, 
in reaching the result that solidarity can_ only be 
established through the aid of equity. Furthermore in the 
active or the passive case alike, where the prestation- object 
is generic, a fortiori any attempt to establish a legal 
solidary relation ex diversis by means of reciprocal 
conditions must fail," 
208 
2 Chapter IV. Solidarity ex skit stipulatu under the 
r 
l2p Justinianian solidarity, joint and several. 
Justinianian law. 
In passing frorr: the classical to the Justinian - 
ian law we feel ourselves ehtering .,tin- c- ntip.ely new world. 
The expositions of the great Roman jutists supplemented by 
authoritative decisions of the Roman emperors, still form the 
basis of the legal system, but the x ±mpx atmosphere of the 
living law is entirely fresh, the doctrines and rules of the 
classical jurisprudence being now largely modified through 
the influence of Helltnic ideas and customs. 
The contrast between the classical and the 
Justinianian systems is nowhere more marked than in the 
!> 
realm of stipulation. 
In the first place dtipulation was no longer a 
formal act. Leo's constitution of 472, Saz*a x 0(8.37(38))1ç 
enacting that all stipulations might validly be concluded 
'non soljemnibus vel directis sed quibuscumque verbis pro 
r 
consensu contrahentium, endowed any agreement made between 
two parties present together (inter praesentes) with the 
force of a stipulation. This degeneration of the stipulatio 
is of the highest significance. Previously the primary 
element in every stipulatory act was-the interrogatory which 
must formally set forth the whole terms of the prospective 
contract. Now no interrogatory at all was required; mxayx 
oral 
mxEry any expression of consent constituted a binding agree- 
ment. Accordingly all references in the Corpus iuris to a 
formal interrogatory and response must, from the .standpoint 
of the Justinianian law, be regarded in the light of j4purely 
theoretical analyses. Just as we are accustomed to analyse 
contracts however concluded g ±al into an offer and acceptance 
, 
9 4/v ft4 4a, 
zi<1d4/4",u,, 0, *(az z./ 
Q4444;t.tetiti-o ̀ "' ?LS, 35'. io .2-i 4 4.3 . 2 G L 
r 4 2,014 f_, 
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so m we may assume the Justin_iania.n lawyers made use of 
the analysis into interogatory and response after the model 
of the classical stipulation , Cases can however be quoted 
where the compilors of the Digest seems to have deleted 
references to the now obsolete interrogatory., 
In the second Tlx place Justinian by his constitution 
of 531, 0.(8.37(38))14, gave almost every written contract 
the forte of a stipulatio by means of a presumption that an 
oral agreement inter praesentes had been concluded. This 
constitution is somewhat difficult to follow, owing it would 
appear to the revisors of the Code having touched it up in 
rather a clumsy manner. its actual provisions seem to be: 
(i) If a written contract purports to have been made by a 
slave of the creditor with the debtor, an absolute presumpt- 
ion is raised that the slave mentioned ka1amgaxto belonged 
to the creditor and did actually stipulate from tht debtor; 
(ii) if a written contract purports to nave been made by the 
creditor kimma t2 personally with the debtor, a presumption 
is raised that a stipulation was concluded, but this pte- 
sumption can be rebutted by proof that during the whole day 
when the written contract was executed either the creditor 
or the debtor was absent from the town where it was executed; 
no other rebuttal was however allowed. Thus we see that by 
inserng the name of a,' slave as stipulator, any risk of a 
written contract being declared invalid on the ground of 
'absentia' was avoided,' 
In this way the Justinianian stipulation 
'absorbed' the litteral contract of the Eastern provincial 
customs This abbprption was not however quite complete 
iz.0 .P.(4s Z) 13 h /by,. fr 2-23 
1) see Riccobono, ZSS,1 43.p,306, 326 ff.' 
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The Justinianian law, as set forth in Inst. III, 21, aalptxaax 
recognised a proper litteral contract where a written acknow- 
r 
ledgment of a loan was made cessante á°;' -t, verborum obligat- 
1 
Tone. Litteral contracts proper were not of course subject to 
the provisions of O.(8.37(38))14 ; but, we venture to think, 
a document which purported to record a stipulatio could never 
be construed as an obligatio litterarum withink the meaning of 
Tnat.III, 2l. 
Under the Justinianian law, therefore, a stipulation 
might be either an oral or a written act and, having regard 
tom the universal employment of writing for legal pg[rposes in 
the East we may locaa ±x consider an unwritten stipulatio as 
of rare occurrence, Nevertheless the compilors in their 
treat 
manipulations of certain classical texts continued to tagat 
the stipulatio as theoretically oral. 
When a stipulatio was concluded in writing, none 
I) 
of the formal requisites above described had any application, 
except in so far as the presence of the parties in the same 
town can be regarded as a formal requisite; when it was conclud- 
ed orally, the requisite of 'praesentia' alone held good in real- 
ity, Yet the compilors did not eliminate the other requisites?) 
but sought rather to adapt them to the spi ±it and principles of 
the new law. In particular we must observe now they dealt with 
the requisite of continuus actus. 
In our opinion, the requisite of continuus actus, as 
laid down by the mature classical jurisprudence, was made up of 
two rules, viz.,'continuous presence'and'abstention'; provided 
these two rules were observed, the elapse of an interval between 
the different stages of the act did not matter fl Now obviously 
this requisite could have no possible application to the case 
except that relating to the use of 'sl'ondere', which had been 
obsolete from the time when Roman citizenship ceased to lam 
have any significance. 
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of a written stipulatio, and we must therefore assume that 
the compilors in dealing therewith had before their eyes 
a stipulatio concluded orally. Their mode of manipulating 
the requisite in question was as follows: The rule of 
o 
continuos presence they modified so as to allow a 'modicum 
i) 
intervallum' during which the parties might separate. to 
rule 
come between different stages of the act, and the zetam of 
abstention they modified so as to allow either party to 
perform between different stges of the act a 'modicus 
ictus non contrariusobligationi'. The vague nature of 
these provisions clearly betrays their utter unpracticab- 
ility; who is to define a 'moderate intervalle' or a 
'moderate act noy contrary to the obligation'? On the 
other hand, however, the compilors, by way of set -off to 
their attrition of the classical rules of continuus pres- 
ence and abst &ntion, introduced a Etaw new rule, not found 
in the classical jurisprudence, namely, that the answer(s) 
must be given on the same day as the question is put. 
Under the mature classical jurisprudence, provided the 
parties did not separate and each abstained from all other 
business, there was in our opinion no theoretical objection 
to the answer being given a week aster the question xxx 
had been put, though of course any such case was entirely 
unpractical. There is little difficulty in conjecturing 
where the compilors goi, the idea of their 'idem dies' rule, 
C, 
namely, in the lax words of 0.(8.37(38))14.2: si tarnen in 
eadem civitate utraque persona in eo die commanet, in quo 
huiusmodi instrumentum scriptum xe est. Here the stipul- 
atory act is presumed to have been commenced and ended 
within the limit of a single day, to wit, the day on which 
the written instrumentum was drawn up. 
t) it was not the admission of an intervallum per se, but the 
admission of an intervallum in which the parties might 
separate/that in our opinion constituted the derogation 
from the classical law. 
21 t/ 7 d £t 2 5 5 , 3 S; fr 2-5-2 1L2 ;t S4- 
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iaxxx One of the most important innovations made 
by Justinian on the classical ius stipulationis was in the 
matter of novation. By a constitution of 530, C.(8.41(42)) 
8, 
22x xxxxxxxixxx this Emperor rovided that novation was 
no longer to take effect by force of law, but only where 
the parties made an express declaration in that behalf. 
If a promise were made which in ancient times would have 
had ipso iure novatory effect, the obligation created by 
prior 
such promise and the prinanxtitilag obligation were henceforth 
to co -exist side by side, unless the parties expressly 
declared that the 1--t-t4r obligation was to be remitted, 
and the to take its place: (pr.) sancimus,..nihil 
penitus priori x cautelae innovari, sed anteriora xixix 
stare et posteriors incrementum illis accedere, nisi 
ipsi specialiter remiserint quidem priorem obligationem 
et hoc expresserint quod secundam magic pro anterioribus 
elegerint. 
It is to be observed, however, that to all 
appearance the classical law of novation had undergone a 
considerable degeri °ration before Justinian's time. In i 
of the same constitution x the Emperor says: et generaliter 
defini mus voluntate solum esse, non lege, novandum oputi 
etsi non verbis exprimatur ut sine novatione, quod solito 
vocabuloc(voßgrsurwsdicignt, causa procedat. These words 
seem clearly to infer that before 530 parties could always 
exclude novation by an express agreement to this effect, 
and all Justinian therefore did was to reverse the rule in 
the sense that novation should not now takexxftxxigixxx 
place unless expressly provided for. But in my opinion 
under the classical law, novation could not be excluded by 
u.L 
agreement merely, exceit in certi n special and well defined 
Cases,) Moreover the representation of the pre -existing 
iÌ notably where it was desired to take a sponsor or fideprom- 
issor bound separately from the principal debtor, which 
case will be discussed in my treatise on Accessoriality; 
cp. supra p. s ! 
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state of the law in Inat, III, 29, 3a cannot be altogether 
reconciled with the rules of the classical jurisprudence on 
he subject and seems to amply a post- classical development. 
We now km turn to the mode of oohstituting solidary 
relations under the Justinianian law. Needless to say, 
such a thing as a classical correal stipulation was quite 
unknown in Justinianimn practice, though fortmnatel.y the 
compilors of the Institutes thought it worth their while to 
set forth the ancient form for the benefit of students. 
As stipulation now depend 4 for its force essenttally on 
the consensus contrahentiujn, the constitution of a solidary 
v eic s 
relation ex stipulatu mgt lac based on t4.4 material fact 
of consent ' An important point must however here 
be noted. As a result of Justinian's constitution 
0.(8.41(42))8, if for example, M. owes X to T. and S. gmeia x 
promises T. the same X as M. owes but nothing is said as to 
novation, $, becomes a solidary debtor with iii,, even where 
latter does not know or does not approve of S.'s promise. 
The case last mentioned suggests a distinction 
between two forms of Justinianian solidarity: 
(i) where the solidary relation is constituted with the 
xmocommon consent of all the parties on the one xxside or 
C 
the other; this we shall call Justinianian mffikgat$x$tyxxx 
joint solidarity or Justininnian correality. The jointness 
of the relation here depends on the communis consensus 
enirely; ii is of no consequence whether the tffigxtky 
different obligations are created by one act or several, 
or whether all are created simultaneously or one after the 
other, provided always each creditor or debtor consents to 
the accession of the others. Obviously, active solidarity 
can only be joint in the present sense, because one creditor 
Affpgitaffailgxisitgxeatedczutetaixickxkotistkxist3A§ttitx1RR*21MxRiixickxtlit2XXtifii 
apparently the same result took placevbefore 530 if novation 
were expressly excluded.tf..k 
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cannot have another solidary creditor added to him without 
his consent; 
(ii) where one debtor being already bound, another solidary 
creditor is added without his 101101 (the first debtor's) 
knowledge or consent; gtdcxxclixidatztimmxlmatwatummtxx 
C 
this we shall call Justinianian several solidarity. 
This distinction between joint and several 
solidarity may be utilised by the law for a number of 
purposes; for example, a beneficium divisionis, or isitx 
mutual rights of regress independent of any inner relation 
or of cessio actionum, may be admitted as between joint, 
as 
but not between several, selidary debtors. Justinian's 
constitution C.(8.39(40))4(5), which permitted an inter - 
occurring 
ruption of prescription /in favour of, or .against, One xi 
s o_lid ary creditor, or debtor, to enure to the benefit, 
or prejudice , of all, deserves attention in this connect- 
ion, for the language here employed is applicable only to 
the case of joint solidarity: ( 
i 
1) 'in uno eodemque 
3 
contrac tu' ; ( § Ii) 'cum ex una stirpe unoque fonte unus 
e ffluxi t con trac tus vel debiti causa ex eadem ac ti one 
apparuit'. Likewise we believe the provisions of Novel 
99 to be applicable only to joint solidarity. 
It is with Justinianian joint solidarity , or 
Justinianian correality, that we are mainly concerned, 
sevef°al solidarity presenting no difficulty. 
If a Justinianian correal relation is to be 
constituted by written act, the normal course will be for 
a single document to be drawn up embodying the whole 
transaction. The only point that requires attention here 
is the possibility of the contract being declared wholly 
or partially void on the ground of 'absentia' as defined 
by 0.(8.37(38))14. Suppose the document attests a correal 
ipulation_ made by the creditor T. with personally with 
vide infra p. 2551 
Y 
215 f 4 ctd 
the co- debtors M. and S., and it is proved that either T. 
or both M. and S. were absent from the town where the 
document was drawn up during the whole day am which it was 
drawn up, the contract will be wholly void. If it is 
proved that one of the debtors, say M., was so absent, the 
contract will be void so far as he is concerned, but a 
valid simplex 'obligation will be created between T. and S. 
On the other hand, however, there was nothing 
to prevent a correal relation being established by xmyxxx 
means Mg separate documents forming part of the same 
transaction. Here then we have the possibility of T. 
resident, say, at Constantinople stipulating correally 
from M. resident, say, at Rome and S. resident,' say, at 
Carthage, purely by means of written documents. As we 
have seen, if a slave of the creditor were inscribed as 
stipulator, the presumption in favour of the due conclusion 
of a stipulation was absolute. All that T. then has to do 
in order to take M. and S. bound correally is to get M. 
to send him a document stating 'Sticho Titii servo stipul- 
anti Maevius promisit, ita ut is et Seius duo rei promitt- 
endi essent', and to get S. to send him a corresponding 
document. Here the intentions of parties to create 
(correality are manifest, and as no proof is admissible 
that the stipulations were not actually made, we must hold 
a correal relation to be duly established. In such a case 
it is perfectly natural to say that T. has taken M. and S. 
bound as correali debtors tex diversis locis', i.e. 'fromt 
Rome and Carthage, the precise form of expression which 
we find in D.(45.2)9.2 (itpd). 
In the next place let us immgir[m suppose that 
a correal relation is to be created orally. Here it is 
necessary for the single party on the one side (T.) to meet 
with each of the parties on the other side (M. and S.), 
9 vide infra p. 22-4, lyse 
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but on principle there does not seem any necessity that 
M. and §. should themselves meet, provided each intends tp 
bind himself correally with the other. The compilors, 
however, for the purposes of their expositions proceed on 
the basis that all three parties meet to conclude a single 
joint act. Here the interesting point is ttxmx the manner 
r 
in which they deal with the classical requisite of contin- 
r 
uus actus, namely, by allowing a modicum intervallum in 
r 
which the parties may separate and a modicus actus non 
r 
contrariuy obligationi to be interposed between any two 
stages of the proceedings, in particular between the two 
hypothetical answers, but on the other hand by insisting 
that both answers shall be gi velt, on the sa me day as the 
hypothetical question is put. 
Finally we must observe that until Justinian 
altered the law by Novd1 99 of the year 539, the rues tion 
whether two joint debtors were liable singuli in solidum 
or pro rata depended solely on the intentions of parties. 
Even where a document attested a simple joint stipulation, 
e.g. 'Titio stipulanti Maevius et Sekus promiserunt', it 
was open to the creditor to prove that the creation of 
solidarity had actually been intended. This rule is per- 
fectly intelligible. Under the classical law, if a cautio 
stipulatoria were in the above form and hence, according 
to Papinian.. D.(45.2)11.2, was evidence of pro rata liabil- 
ity merely, the creditor was quite entitled to prove by 
.other evidence that a distributive form of joint stipulation 
had actually been employed and solidarity therefore estab- 
lished. L'Ihewise under the Justinianian law, ,where the 
intentions of parties had taken the palce of stipulatory 
forms, similar proof was admissible. Presumably the same 
principles applied in the case of an active joint contract 
also. 
îr 
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The remainder of this kmeg chapter is distributed 
as follows: 
27 
In the next section ( 3'e) we shall illustrate the 
foregoing observations fro. certain interpolated texts. 
Then (4 3D and 3i) we shall deal with and illustrate 
Justinian abolition of extensive process,- consumption. 
z 
Finally ( 37) we shall consider Novel 99. 
.7? . 
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(1) Ulpian. D.(45.2)8. supra p. 
We have now to interpret this fragment as an exposition 
of Justinianian law. 
In the first place we observe that the document con- 
tains a clausula stipulatoria,which fact excludes the idea 
of a littoral contract proper; hence the provisions of 
C. (8437 (38) )14 must apply. 
In the second place it is essential to assume that 
' you the s tipul ans' are the actual creditor ana not a slave 
acting on his behalf. Had the clausula stipulatoria run: 
'stipulanti tibi Sticho Titii servo...', the validity of the 
contract could not, in my opinion, have been challenged on 
any ground of 'absentia'. 
In the third place it is essential to assume, not 
not present 
merely that one of the debtors, say K., wa,s /xkx:. st when the 
document, but that he can be proved to have been absent 
from the town where, during the whole day when, it was made. 
On the other hand, it must equally be assumed that M., in 
spite of his absence on this occasion xxxxxiaxxxis had actually 
consented to the transaction, otherwise of course there 
could be no question of hiss being bound at all. 
In the fourth place we note that the question 
whether the debtors, M. and S., are, assuming the contract 
to be formally valid, rendered liable singuli in solidum 
or merely pro rata, depends entirely on the intentions of 
parties (quid inter contrahentes actum sit). The terms 
of the clausula stipulatoria indeed serve merely to estab- 
lish a simple joint contract leading to partition, but the 
creditor is entitlerirstamt., to prove if he can, an 
intention to create correality. 
Under these circumstances the decision is perfectly 
intelligible: If the intentions of parties were to con- 
stitute M. and S. correal debtors, then S. ±x remains 
liable in solidum though M. is eliminated; if their 
intentions were to constitute M. and S. pro rata debtors 
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the elimination of M. cannot increase 8. 's pro rata liability 
(2) Pomponius D.(45.2)4. supra p. et-.% 
The representation given in this fragment of 
a stipulation as consisting of t formal interrogatory 
and response has of course no practical place in the Just - 
i nianinn law. If my previous conjecture that the compilors 
have deleted references to the necessity of a distributive 
form of interrogatory in a correal stipulation, be sound, 
then the significance of the pxx fragment from the Justin- 
ianian standpoint must be that, where a joint agreement is 
made orally, no special form of words is required to 
create correality, as opposed to partition, provided an 
intention in that behalf is evident. 
(3) Javolen. D.(45.2)2. supra p., 4'f 
Here ag Li_n we note the absence of all reference 
to the necessity of a distributive form of interrogatory 
in a correal stipulation; everything depends on the intent- 
ions of parties. 
(4) Ulpi<an. D.(45.2)3 pr. supra p. S3 
In this pr. the compilors set froth the new law 
of correality without unity of cause, for which purpose 
they have, as I believe, adapted a text of Ulpian's deal- 
ing with sponsors or fidepromissors taken bound apart 
from the principal debtor. Justinian's constitution 
a.(8.41(42))8 had removed all fear that the second of the 
two promises would novate the first, unless the parties 
expressly declared that it should do so.// Perio4 is not 
happily framed, for at first sight it seems to xxÍotgx refer 
to i,he case where T. interrogates Y. and 3. correally, and 
(3) 
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a certain interval elapses between their respective 
answers, Such an interpretation would, however, certain, 
ly be erroneous. The inelegant words 'licet ante prior 
responderit, posterior etsi ex intervallo accipiatur' 
sithply mean that first Of all the one debtor is taken 
bound alone, and then after an interval the other is 
taken bound alone, so that we have two separate acts, 
oral or written. The words 'pristinam obligationem 
durare ratim gainftaiNExxedmrmx et sequentem accedere' 
are an obvious adaptation of the 'anteriora stare et 
posteriori, incrementum illis accedere' of G.'(8,41(42))8; 
c . Inst.III,29.3a 'manero et pristinam obligationem et 
secundan ei accedere'. 
Period Y.is a very clumsy adaptation of Ulpi<an's 
original text, but its import is perfectly clear; Provided 
the debtors M. and S. intend to be constituted correal 
debtors, it is immaterial whether they are taken bound 
together or separately; for novation cannot take place 
without an express declaration to that effect. 
Pomponius D.(46.1)43. supra p. S'S' 
Here the second principal stipulation is not 
declared to be made novandi animo; hence novation does 
not operate, as it must have done under the classical law. 
The actual decision as to the two fideiussors not be 
e 
co-fi dßiussors for the purposes ofx the beneficium divis- 
ionis does not here concern us. 
(6) Ulpian. D. (46.2)8.5. supra p. S4' k 3 
Period e of this fragment shows us the new law of 
novation t /4.c 442-o /-r/ cS 
(4 C. a) 3t. 1. K 133. 
sq 
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(7) supra p. 101, 
now 
We have only to consider 3 (periods'f,-K ) of this 
fragment. 
Period as it stands is devoid of any real 
significance and seems to serve merely as an introduction 
to the remainder of the paragraph. Apparently it means 
that in constituting two parties correal debtors there 
may be fixed a period of time within which the answers 
of both must be given,- within which the agreement with 
each must be concluded 
) 
But as to the purpose which the 
fixing of a period of time has to serve, or what will 
happen if the agreemeal wi th each is not concluded within 
the time fixed, there is never a word. Moreover the 
inappriateness of the construction 'ita cons titui. 
nabeatur' (lit. 'may be so constituted that a period of 
time is fixed') is obvious. I have already suggested 
that Julian wrote ' interrogari' in the place }how occupied 
by ' cons ti tui' and then gave the putline of a formula.' 
Naturally the compilors deleted the formula, and they then, 
I conjecture, sought to give the period a fresh complexion 
by substituting i ' cons ti tui' for the reference to the 
obsolete interrogatory ( interrogari ). The results of these 
manipulations are, however, anything but satisfactory. 
The connection between periods and seems to 
be thus: Though a definite period of time within which 
shall 
both answers maxi be given may be fixed, Tx*xuxureixwhemaxmix 
Inaziaxpegxsadxixx2kxgdTxtAxxxixixxxo$xxxmkutaxxtextxáxxxxkxg2x 
an alternative suggestion would be that the compilors meant 
the phrase 'intra quad uterque respondent' to bear the 
grammatically impossible meaning of 'inter duorum reorum 
responsa'. 
zq 
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in which case if both answers are given within the time 
fixedr a correal obligation is validly constituted even 
though there is a break between them, yet,even where no such 
period is fixed the elapse of a moderate interval of time, 
or the performance by any of the parties of a inamdtxmxxx 
moderate act not contrary to the obligation, between the 
giving of the two answers, will not prevent the constitut- 
ion of a correal relation, 
i, 
In the first place we note that these provis- 
ions have no application where the stipulation is concluded 
by means of written acts, one or more, but only where it is 
concluded orally. In the second place we note that tkax 
during the moderate interval of j,ime the parties may 
separate as appears from the interpolations in D.(45.1)1.1, 
and this possibility of separation though not here mention- 
ed is the really vital pointy !he classical jurisprudence 
we believe did not exclude the possibility of an interval 
of time elapsing between different stages of a stipulatory 
act, but insisted on the parties remaining continuously 
n1..türL 
present throughout the interval; the coffloilors kittImPrAwd 
cd-a d this rule of continuous presence by allowing the parties 
La 
to separate. In the third pxlce we note that, as alrady 
remarked,} the ideas of 'modicum. intervailum' and 'modlc s 
actus non contrari us. obligationi' are too indefinite for 
practical use, so that they can only respresent a piece of 
doctrinaire attenuation by the conpi lore of the classical 
law. 
Period 1. admits the possibility of a fideiussor 
being taken bound between the principal debtors. From the 
standpoint of the Justinianian law this is altogether 
trivial, and we are therefore safe in conjecturing that 
we have here simply an adaptation of Julian's text, which 
point will be discussed in our treatise on Accessoriality. 
IrKtfr i,. 
note quominus -}- indic. , which if not absolutely impossible 
in classical law Latin, is at any rate in the highest 
degree suspicious 
4) note also the non- committal expression may =;I: 4a1.4m ept.tir 
(8 ) 
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In the inelegant period K the same ideas of 'modicum 
intervallum' and 'actus non contrarius obligationi' Inot 
even qualified as 'modicus') reappear. 
Memakeimm Venuleius D.(45.2)13 pr. supra, isms p 
I consider it in the hï?j..est degree probable that 
the compilors have substituted 'promissuri' for 'inter - 
rogati' in periodoc., formal interrogatories being now 
obsolete, but yet in order to save the period from 
being simple non -sense, we must assume :that the co- debtors, 
M. and S. have been jointly intero ?v gated. If there are 
here two separate stipulations, that is to say, if M. 
X r 
promises today and S. promises tomorrow eadem decem quae 
M. promisit, the statement that S. is not bound is obviously 
falsee Assuming, however, the existence of a joint inter- 
rogatory, then the purport of period oC. is that both answers 
must be given on the same day as the hypothetical inter- 
rogatory is put, and that any answer given thereafter is 
invalid. All this represents the application of the 
compilers' 'idem dies' rule to the case of the correal 
stipulation; the utter impracticability of the whole 
situation needs no further remark. 
Period&., as it stands, seems capable of two 
r wac A 
explanations: (i) the stipulator or the (second) pro- 
misor has meanwhile departed to other business, although... 
or (ii)(since the stipulator of the (second) promisor will 
have gone away meanwhile to other business, although,... 
Ii, the first interpretation be adopted, the inference is 
that even if the second answer be not given till the 
following day, it will be valid, provided no other business 
has meanwhile intervened. If the second interpretation 
be adopted, we seem to have an attempt at justification 
of the 'idem dies' rule; it must be inferred that if 
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the interval is extended overnight, other )mats business will 
be attended to of such a nature as to break the continuity 
of act. The second interpretation seems preferable, but 
the whole matter $s entirely without iraluct importance; the 
compilors' manipulations of the classical requisite of 
continuus actus are too devoid of all max reality to 
deserve serious attention. 
i, 
(9) Papinian, 1), (45.2)9.2. infra p, 2f/ 
271, 
6 
It is certain that the passage 'cum duos ma reos.... 
habebiturt (period 1. ) was not written by Papinian. The 
a 
expression'duos reos promittendi f4cere ex diversis lotis' 
can only mean that the creditor gets two parties to send 
him correally related promises from different places, an 
idea absurd from the 4 classical standpoint, but, as already 
shown,Z)perfectly intelligible under the Justinianian law, 
This being so, we see that the verb 'stipulati' does not 
here connote an oral interrogatory, but has thé same 
untochni calk, s our 'stipulate' _ 'to provide for in the 
contract.' 
P) As to the interpolations in period cp. Eisele, ZSS,; 13, 
p,149, and Riccobono, ZSS., 35, kiQRx p.253. 
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225 30 The Abolition of Extensive Proeess- 
Consumption. 
Tue insti aut,e of proues6. conoumption is only 
intelligible under what we may call an 'organic action 
system' that is to say, a system in which an action is 
regarded as a 'processual- i_ndividuum')x having a nature 
and life of its own, passing through different stages of 
existence and capable of exercising an influence mxtay both 
on other actions and on substantive rights. This idea of 
the organic action was perfectly realised in the processes 
of the logis actio and formulary systems. The opposite is 
the conception of an action as a mere lifeless framework 
or mechanism for submitting substantive claims to adjudicat- 
ion; such were the processes of the extraordinary cognition 
3) 
system, Hence when the formulary system was abolished 
probably towardd the end of the third century, the whole 
doctrine of process -consumption ought to habae been abolished 
likewise. Naturally enough however it retained its position 
through force of inertia. But as there was now no such 
thing as litiscontestation in the old sense, the attribut- 
ion of consum efficacy to a certain stage in the 
proceedings, deemed to correspond to the old litiscontest- 
atio, was purely arbitrary. 
Under these circumstances the Idgmao doctrine 
of process- consumption, established as it now was on an 
entirely arbitrary basis, was bound to undergo a severe 
attenuation in th, post -classical period. Not only was 
there introduced a regular system of 'after-actions', grant-, 
4 
od in despite of process -consumption,, under the classical 
Jthis expression is taken from Levy, Xonk., p.162. 
Z-) also in the forms of action of the English common law. 
3J and of modern systems generally. 
V) see references in Levy, TKonk., index sub voce'Nxexftxa ,p; 
' Nachforderungskl age' 
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law the grant of such an action depended entirely on 
equity,- but,as Justinian expressly informs us in 
C,(8,40(41))28,extensive process -consumption could be ex- 
cluded by simple agreement between the parties. That 
extensive process- consumption could be so excluded in 
classical times, I believe to be quite impossible; for the 
same was a civil law result which, if the necessary con- 
ditions were fulfilled, must take effect whatever the 
parties intended. The faculty of excluding extensive 
process -consumption by pact must therefore be attributed 
to the post -classical law. 
Justinian by C.(8.40(41))28 of the year 531 
abolished extensive process -consumption in the case both 
PI-4# 
of accessoriality and of correality, f2 of this constitut- 
ion relates particularly to the latter: 
Idemque in duobus reis promittendi constituimus, ex unius 
rei elections praeiudicium creditori adversus alium 
fieri non concedentes, sed remanere et ipsi creditori 
actiones integras et personales et hypothecarias, donee 
per omnia ei satisfiat. 
It seems nighly probable that this abolition of extensive 
profess- consumption as between correal debtors was origin- 
ally accomplished by means of a separate, constitution 
which the revisors of the Code in 534, for the sake of 
brevity, combined with the similar constitution re3.lting 
to fideiussors. 
The words 'ex unius electionet in the 
above quoted f 2 and the 
similar words in 1 are worthy 
e 
of attention. The pr. of th*a constitution indeed shows 
plainly enough that process- consumption id referred to, 
and as already remarked,) the classical jurists themselves 
sometimes employed 'electio' in the sense of 'election 
r ) 
vi-de 2Ninra p. /zb- 
227 , 30 c td 
perfected by litiscontestation'. Yet- we are probably just- 
ified in inferring from Justinian's use of the term 'electio' 
here and elsewhere: as well as from our general knowledge 
extensive 
of the principles of the Justinianian system, that/process- 
consumption had now come to assume in large' measure a 
material complexion , In other words to the mind of a 
Justinianian lawyer litiscontestation prior to -531 had 
extensive consuming effect, not Ï merely as a processual 
fact, but because it was deemed to indicate a material 
intention on the part of the creditor to exact the amount 
due from the one debtor and to let the other go scot-free. 
Here plainly we have a complete degeneration of the ortginal 
extensive 
conception of /process -consumption, which de eneration Pi9444.10- 
-- x maim xmpArxttmlitxm2x e latter, 
Actually a creditor by joining issue with one of two correal 
debtors had no wish to let the other in go scot -free if he 
failed to extract the full amount of the debt from the one 
sued; moreover it was now held that the extensive consuming 
operation of litiscontestation could be excluded by a previ- 
ous agreement to this effect. In point of fact, from the 
first moment when extensive process- consumption could be 
excluded by pact, its ddom was sealed, and the only crit- 
icism we can make on Justinian's reform is that the same 
was long belated, 
0.4 8.40(41).)28.2 only applied in terms to 
passive solidary relations and here it had the importance 
of destroying the foundation of the classical distinction 
between correality and simple solidarity; in fact we may 
say that the Justinianian correality corresponds to the 
classical simple solidarity. This innovation obviously 
necessitated a- Bhmagmxafxtkoxaxxkaaxil changes in those 
classical texts which denied the existence of a correal 
relation on the ground of V'inequ ality'or 'non -identification' 
, ¿ z.o ( 40.) 23 (4l0 r 4+ f . 319. ; : 04.3) yo (4\ 
'J h. 2s3, -.; ((4. -z) 22, 
9 .991 
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while admitting the existence of a simple solidary relation. 
The compilors were bound, if they discharged their duty 
efficiently, to give the phrase 'duo rei (promittendi)' an 
enlarged significance covering every passive joint solidary 
relation, whether correal or simple according to the class- 
ical me...5=-1, and hence to affirm that co- debtors were duo 
rei in cases where the classical texts denied this. As was 
only to be expected, however, the compilors failed to carry 
out the rimak work of interpolation in a proper manner. 
Wien it became possible td) exclude 
extensive process -consumption by padt we may conjecture 
that the practice also grew up of excluding 'extensive 
i 
responsibility by pact, for as already shown, extensive 
responsibility was in a sense the counterpart of extensive 
process -consumption. Accordingly, when Justinian excluded 
be 
the latter by force of law, it would KM= a reasonable 
inference that the former was excluded by force of law 
likewise. Thus we may take it as a general principle m2 
that each Justinianian correal creditor was liable in respect 
r 2 
of his own culpa and mora only. 
The question has been much canvassed whether Just - 
inian's abolition of extensive process -consumption in the 
passive case should be applied by analogy to the active case 
3 
also. The j oti ty of writers are against such an applic- 
ation, and in fact it is perfectly clear that litiscontest- 
ation still had an 'occupatory' force under the Justinianian 
law. For example in D.(45.2)2 we read 'ideoque petitione 
.,.unius tota solvitur obligatio', which words can only 
apply to the active relation, though the compilors by their 
preceding interpolations have carelessly made them seem to 
apply to the passive case also. Likewise in D.(46,2)31.1 
ñBinder, p.423 ff. 
Igva;e' supra p.k3 -)k 44/1,- 4/4,,,.. h Y! ----° 
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we read 'fere autem convenìt.., unum iudicio petentem totam 
rem in litem deducere'. Again in D.(46.1)5 i,f, we read 
r 
P. ane si xktaxxxxxxxktxxxx ex altera earum (sc. sp e ci e rum 
obiigationis ), utramque consumet, videlicet quia natura 
dxxxxx obligationum duarum quas haberet ea esseL ut cum 
altera earum in iudicium deduceretur, altera consumeretur.' 
The question however arises whether this possibility 
of one correal creditor occupying by litiscontestation can 
properly be regarded as process -consumption in the classical 
sense. In my opinion it is more likely that the Justinianian 
lawyers nere treated occupation is a material, rather than 
a processual, Íxxt result, The creditor who first joins 
issue excludes the other, not so mush on the ground that 
thereby 
the right of the other is /extinguished, as because the cred- 
itor who first joins issue thereby acquires a prior claim 
to the prestation. If it were shown that issue had been 
joined with no serious intention of exacting the prestation, 
I venture to doubt whether the Justinianian lawyers would 
have refused the other creditor an action. Again special 
cases are recorded where the rendering of satisfaction by 
the debtor to one party who sued first was deemed to free 
e) 
him from another party, though, in oppaQition to the class- 
law, mere litiscontestation was deemed to have no such 
effect. Such passageOare D.(39.3)11.1: 
si uunus.egerit, 
gxxxxxxxxxtx Let restitutio operis litisque aestimratio 
faacta sitj ceterorum actionem evanescere, 
and D.(47.12)6: 
quo cessante si alius ogerit, quamvis rei pliblicae causa 
o 
afuerit dominus, non debebit ex integri, [adversus eum 
qui litis aestimationem sustuleritj dari. 
If the view here suggested be sound, we have 
9 see as to these passages Levy, K.onk., p.379 n.1; 387 f; 398 f 
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in the cas4Justinianian active.correality x rather a 
concurrence of material rights than of actions, wilathis 
result seems in complete harmony with the spirit Of the 
Justinianian law. Hence from the standpoint of the com- 
pilers, such passages as D.(45.2)16 must have had a somewhat 
different significance than that wgx m which they bore 
under the classical system. The question here raised become£ 
of practical importance in the case where the classical 
active 
law, while excluding /correality on the ground of 'inequality 
or 'non -identification', admitted a relation of active 
simple solidarity , If the occupatory force of litiseontest. 
ation now depends, not on process -consumption, but simply 
on a material preference accorded to the creditor who ±xkxxx 
:thx <anti c,pate s the other in taking the first step towards 
exaction of the amount due, this preference should be ac- 
corded in the case of any active solidary relation, whether 
correal or simple according to the classical sy_p tern, But 
here again we seem to find a failure on the compilors' part 
to carry out the work of interpolation consistently; indeed 
in D.(45.2)15 i.f. they seem to have deliberately evaded 
the question of occupation altogether. 
We thus reach the result that, though 0. (8440 (4 
28,2 only applied to passive solidary relations, extensive 
process-consumption in the classical. sense probably had, 
under the Justinianian system, no real place in xx active, 
any more than it had in passive, solidarity, Solutio, or 
something which the law regarded as equivalent thereto, xTgT 
X2Rxrtxi ixx was the sole consuming factor in both cases, 
only in the active case the law still attributed an occupa.t- 
ory force to litiscontestation, 
231 ' 31 Authorities. 
(1) Ulpian. D.(46.2)8.5. supra p. ° 22O. 
Period of this paragraph besides showing the new 
law of novation, also 
w_n_t e.f solutio-consumption t 
M.ia.i.;... 
(2) Ulpian.D. (45.2)301, supra p. 00. 0,
Period J, affords an example of solutio -.consumption 
introduced by the compilors in both the active and the 
passive cases, where Ulpian, I believe, dealt only with 
the passive case and mentioned process7oonsumption. 
(3) U1pia.n.D, (4601)5. supra p. / 3.6 
The compilorst action in transferring the motive 
t quia. natura... consumere tur t from the passive case 
(period to the active case (period f, ) is specially 
instructive. 
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(4) Gaius n0 (45° 2 )15, supra phi /O. 
According to my previous conjecture, Gaius, after 
TwatIng quoting in 4. Julian to the effect that T. and S. 
were not corre al debtors proceeded in 
t. 
to explain what 
their actual relation was, namely, simple solidarity quoad 
the prestation of X. The change which the compilors 
should here have made was to admit that T. and S. were duo 
rei stipulandi, that is, Jutsinianian correal creditors, 
and to allow either the power of occupying by litiscontest- 
ation. The course actually adopted by them is interesting 
and instructive as affording an insight into their methods. 
They allowed the denial of correality in (to stand, -ó 
in the first part of 
-. 
they lambrx changed the denial of 
process -consumption to a denial of soltb,tio- consumption. 
Thus we get_the extraordinary result: Solutio of X to 
either T. or S,, or solutio of Stichus to S,, leaves the 
debtor still bound to the other, but solutio of X to either 
frees him from the other; The inner contradiction of 
these statement the compilors have sought, in an altogether 
futile manner, to tone down by the insertion of 'dicendum 
est ut'. 
Let us now endeavour to find the correct 
decision in the case before us from the Justinianian 
standpoint. Solutio of X to either T. or S. frees the 
debtor from the other; so much is clear. But assuming 
that the debtor succeeds in obtaining from T. a transfer 
of the property in Stichus, and makes the same over to S. 
is he Lhereby freed from T.? The answer depends on how far 
the law has got towards realising the pure idea of 'subject- 
ive alternativity', independent of 'substantial equality 
of prestation'. Is it willing to recognise the possibility 
of two obligations Titio decem dari and Selo Stichum dari 
standing in such a relation that fulfilment of the one 
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extinguishes the other, or does it still cling to the idea 
that such a relation can only exist where the two prestat- 
ions are substantially equal. I see no good reason why 
the Justinianian law should not have ilelatmaxibutx2exmerx 
x$xxxx admitted pure subjective alternativity here. 
Again, litiscontestatio should have been 
accorded an occupatory force. If T. joins issue in respect 
of decem or Se in respect of decem aut Stichus, the right 
of the other should meanwhile be suspended 
i 
and will finally 
expire when the creditor suing actually receives satisfact- 
ion; if howver the action is not duly prosecuted, the 
right of the other creditor may be held to revive. 
(5) Julian. D0(4502)5. supra p07/. 
If our previous conjectures regarding this fragment 
be sound, Julian,in the case where two smiths correally 
promise cartain operae, on the one hand denied jihe possibil- 
ity of a corre relation being established because operae 
are individualised by the person of him who renders them, 
but on the other hand he allowed such a promise to produce 
a relation of simple solidarity. 
This being so, if the compilors' interpolations 
could be attributed to a desire of substituting Justinianian 
correality for the classical simple solidarity, they would ma 
merit our entire approval. But as we have seen, there are 
cogent raisons for thinking that the compilers were here 
actuated mainly by an intention of obliterating the rule 
that services are essentially individualised by the person 
of him who renders them. The retention of the words 
'eiusdem peritiae',which as they stand subject the estab- 
lishment of correality to a quite impracticable condition, 
is in favour of the latter view; by requiring the smiths 
to be of the same shill, the compilors sought to tone down 
their elimination of the individualisation re rule. 
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(6) Papinian. D.(45.2)9.1. infra p 259,,, Z74r-. 
As will be shown in the next chapter there is 
every reason to believe that Papinian, while denying in 
period that .max co- depositaries, a quibus inpar suscepta 
0 
est obligati° were correal debtors, held their relation 
to be one of simple solidarity. The compilors therefore 
should have altered the text so as to affirm the existence 
of Justinianian correality, and the fact of their having 
failed to do so bears eloquent testimony to the defective- 
ness of their methods. If the co- depositaries in the case 
mentioned are not duo rei, we immediately ask, what then 
is their relation and to this question no answer is 
forthcoming. 
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Justinian's famous Novel 99 of the year 529, entitled 
7itP I ñ/lA yA in-uwY enacts as follows: 
i (i) if two or more parties are taken bound as 'A'1 } FT°ws 
( fA 
VI ?fU0`(/VOI ,but without any express provision that any 
G / 
one of them is liable for the whole prestation(VS e/logfilP° 
in such case the liability shall be borne by all in equal 
shares; 
(ii) if it is expressly provided that any one of them 
is liable for the whole prestation, a beneficium divisionis 
shall be granted; 
(iii) if any proceedings are taken on the contract, the 
judge shall summon before him all the parties who are 
resident in the same locality and dispose of the case 
against all at the same time. 
The first question we naturally ask is regarding 
i 
the significance of the terms aA A'/Aw ceA/I JI Crrv" 
dA/11i1c f-rvWs viì uOuvuc,Thts point is much disputed, but the view ' 
which most commends itself to me is as follows: The 
Greeks in the period of their'naive legal- consciousness' 
reached the conception of contractual solidarity through 
that of mutual suretyship, the same process being traceable 
in Germanic law where solidary debtors bound themselves 
2) / 
'one for all and all for one'. nililql 91-11 i s therefore 
3) 
Greek solidarity, , The oldest Greek documents which 
we possess indeed generally contain both an obligation 
2 21 of the debtors as,;(A ,1wv Enuau (its fi(-r/ r(r)and also a clause 
expressly conferring on the creditor a right of exacting 
the full debt from one and each whichever he may elect: 
Binder, p.306. 
9 Binder, 1. c, 
3) Collinet, Etudes Historiques sur le Droit de Justinien, 
I. p.139, 
> 
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This latter clause however gradually becomes rarer and 
by the Byzantine age it had disappeared altogether. 
The second question we ask is, in what relation 
f 
do the Greek 0/1 yAw Wu" stand to the Roman duo 
rei promittendi? My answer is as follows: Beyond the fact 
that both were solidary debtors, there was originally no 
relation between them whatever. Roman correality was 
evolved from, and always had its chief root in, the oral 
correal stipulation; Greek coM 9 A £rrv% was created by a 
written act. The whole process of reaching solidarity 
through mutual suretyship implies a certain indefiniteness 
and fluidity of legal forms and ideas, and must be pronounc- 
ed impossible under a rigid formalistic system like the 
ius civile. Ahy suggestion that two reciprocal fideiussory 
stipulations could ever per se constitute solidarity 
must sI believe, be excluded absolutely, If N. and S. were 
to kk]: attempt to bind themselves as mutui fideiussores 
without also binding themselves as principal debtors, such 
a proceeding would be absolutely futile. If they were to 
bind themselves as pro rata principal debtors and then 
each were to bind himself as fideiussor for the other, the 
result would not be solidarity at all, but two cumulative 
principal pro rata obligations each wx with an accessory 
obligation of its own. Under these circumstances I must 
z 
entirely reject Collinet's view that Papinian in D.(45.2) 
$$x 11 pr. admitted the validity of a process of mutua 
7 
fideiussio modelled after the Greek AAA A £d-tv7 ; my own 
.i 
Mitteis, Grundzuge, I. p.113 f, 
op. ci t, p.131 ff, 
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suggestions as to tbuttxilxxmgREIK this pr. have ä already 
been given. 
On the other hand, btxaxtax however, it was 
i 
inevitable that correality and .0AA,ALAr/7 should be brought 
±xtxx into relation with one another after the constitutio 
Antonina of the year 212^ extended Roman citizenship and 
with it Roman law to the whole empire. After that sixtx 
> 'I 
event the legal position of the ..e/1/11/1 4/t/ irr oxxxxonnuax 
Atiatolut as solidary debtors depended on their assimilation 
to the duo rei promittendi and their subjugation to the 
rules governing the latter. In the Eastern provinces the 
mere execution of a document in which two parties made a 
) )/ 
joint promise as .'A,1 ,lwv E j-rvui no longer sufficed to 
create a legal correal obligation or any legal obligation 
at x.11; on the contrary a correal stipulation was now 
required for this purpose, though no doubt in practice 
the legally indispensable oral act was frequenlit omitted. 
The Greek idea of á0 //y/1 trry ry survived &, , 
ands, as no oral stip- 
ulation was now required, the mere execution of a document 
containing a joint promise by two parties as oe /1/17Á4/1/ £pr"' 
sufficed in itself to create a Justinianian correal obligat- 
1 )/ 1l % I 
Iñwr 9rvot ion. Hence e,Hkr a /( must now be regarded simply as 
Greek equivalent of duo rei promittendi. The rubric of 
Novel its& 9977c/9/ 
% 
c04 /l eot-`- wr is trahslated in the Authenti cU m 
'de $ reis promittendi' ('rei promittendi' obviously mean- 
ing correal debtors), and this translation is literally 
correct. 
The third question which we ask is, what 
can have induced Justinian to make 'A4yAwv f --voi liable 
only pro rata unless expressly declared to be liable 
singuli in solidum? This is a perplexing point, but T 
X illa$a$m 
9 44"-- h 13q61" / ,/ 
z ifiLt-t/K tL 4--`-` '' r` "i` /Lcc /v(. `-T,Ptrt,1-4;tt, t f 
C. (e. 57(7S-0/4 41 
7,4-4 
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venture to suggest the following solution: Under the law 
of the Digest the question whether two or more parties 
were liable singuli in solidum or pro rata depended essent- 
ially on the intentions of parties. This state of the law 
may well have given rise to disputes as to what were the 
ca 
real intentions of parties in particular mcses, and Justin- 
ian therefore f deemed it advisable to lay down an objective 
)/ tip. rule. In deciding that the words .6444/1' Viol should hence- 
forward constitute merely pro rata liability unless solid- 
arity were provided for in express terms, the Emperor may 
have thought he was carrying out the opinion of Papinian 
in D.(45.2)11.2: partes viriles deberi, quia non fuerat 
adiectum singulos in solidum spopondisse its, ut duo rei 
promittendi fierent. 
The fourth question we ask is, what induced Justin- 
ian to confer a beneficium divisionis on co- debtors express- 
ly taken bound singuli in solidum. This question need nolL 
cause any difficulty. The classical law stricgly confined 
this benefit to parties who were bound_ in an accessory 
2 
capacity, but x.atax in Justinian's time there was a strong 
movement which can be seen in interpolated passages of the 
3 
Digest to extend this benefit to co- principal d:ïbtors 
likewise, In Novel 99 Justinian carried out this movement 
to its logical result. 
,vide supraa210 
Z) vide supra /34 
3) 
e.g. D.(26.7)38, see Levy, 24,SS,37.r.69 ff.; D.(19.2)47 infra 
p. 214 g. 
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Chapter V. Solidarity from Real and donseneual 
Contracts. 
Application 
33. ix *xxxImt of Solidarity to Formless Negòstia, 
The extension of the institute of correality from 
the domain of obligations verbis to that of obligations re 
and consensu we may assume to taken place somewhere in the 
middle classical period, that is roughly the period from 
lalchotx Labeo to Julian. Prior to this extension a real or 
F 
consensual obligation would for purposes of correalisation 
have to be transformed inpo a verbal obligation. 
The mode in which this extension was achieved is 
easy to understand. There was now mimic admitted the poss- 
ibility of a formless negotia having two or more parties 
on the one side or the other and endowed with a joint nature 
by the fact of all these parties acting communi consensu. 
The material community of intention is here allowed to 
take the place of x the f xpax formal unity of stipulation; 
hence where such community is presentwe have unity of 
cause just as if he different obligations had arisen from 
one and the same xt joint stipulation. 
The first question that arises is concerning the 
antithesis solidarity v. partition. Here I believe, we 
must apply the principles that an active joint contract 
leads naturally to partition, a passive joint contract to 
solidarity. The natural tendency of a passive joint con- 
tract to produce solidarity appears from +hg Ni nom; 
V 
th-c '9P rt ^pp1- the phrase t 
sque 
fidem in solidum 
s e cu tu s' or the liked Thzxx0xxxxiaxx nnatxx;cxiAtfaxxxiZx x 
xxx±x. ±ex, ±zxnx to the creditor in a passive correa.l obligat- 
ion. This phrase connotes, inter alias an intention to 
exclude partition,- to look to any one of the debtors for 
the rendering of the entire prestationr- and its special A 
significanceAis that, unless the terms of the contract 
otherwise provide, the creditor is entitled to make such 
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an intention effective. All this amounts to saying that 
solidarity pertains to the 'naturalia' of a passive joint 
contract, for obviously a creditor will always assert xxz 
an intention in favour of solidarity, in preference to 
partition, if he can. 
A passive joint contract might, however, be so 
framed as to vpoduce partition, though we can hardly regard 
this case as of very frequent occurrence; if partition be 
intended the more natural course generally is to conclude 
separate contracts. Like wise there is nothing to prevent 
an active joint contract being so framed. as to produce 
solidarity, but here it seems more likely that a cow 
stipulation would be employed in practice. 
In this connection we have to draw attentbon 
to the fact that real and xxxelttime consensual contracts, 
with the exception of matte mutuum, are synallagmatic or 
bilateral, that is to say, they 4oduce reciprocal oblig- 
ations, the creditor in the one being debtor in the other. 
Certain of these contracts are imperfectlyybilateral, that 
is sto say, originally they produce only a single perfect 
obligation, for example that of a depositary ummummudzturyx 
to restore the article deposited mxxÌamt, though eventually 
there may arise a 'contrary' obligation, for example, that 
of a depositor to reimburse the p depositary for all loss 
z 
and expense incurred ihxxxx as a result of the contract. 
Hence a joint real or consensual, with the exception above 
mentioned, is both active and passive at the same time; for 
sake of convenience, however, we describe it as active or 
passive, according as we deal with it as the cause of oblig-. 
ations between two or more creditors and a single debtor, or 
as the cause of obligations between a single creditor and gu 
two or more debtors, 
9 The nature of the 'contraria iudicia' by which such eventual 
obligations are sanctioned cannot be discussed here. 
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Ittbi x Other of these contracts, for example, sale and hire 
ot are perfectly bilateral in respect that they Ileiginally 
two perfect reciprocal obligations,which latter are inter- 
dependent in the sense that fulfilment of the one cannot 
- discharged 
be exacted unless the party entitled has already ittaftled, 
discharge 
or offers to #xkiick, his own liability under the other. 
The point we haveïspecially to emphasise is that 
a joint real or consensual contract may +rte ^m t;m* 
yaxlxo[ produce partition on the active, side and solidarity 
on the passive side. For example, if T. deposits an 
article with M. and S. jointly, no express provision being 
made for partition, M. and S. are liable singuli in solidum 
in the obligatio depositi directa, whereas in the obligatio 
contraria each is entitled to recover only tklaxxxtuxtx 
x xpxxxxxxx xklamkxi txxxrxt xkyklaimxxl2xxicixmaxxxiarm --t om 
2u-0,( 
of the total loss or expense which has been incdrred 
by himself akomac individually. Again suppose T. sells ar 
article to M. and S. jointly, no express provision being 
made for partition ; M and S. are bound singuli in 
solidum to pay the price (obligatio vanditi), but neither 
is entitled Itx alone to claim more than a pxz pro rata 
share of the article (obligatio empti ). As we shall, the 
compilors obliterated this unsymmetrical case of active 
partition concurring with passive solidarity, and sought 
to reduce the various situations which might arise to a 
scheme in which partition on the one side always concurred 
with partition on the other, and ïi ewiee with solidarity. 
nie a?2tz ;c.h : _ _ _ solidarity 7. novio :: dies not 
here :ri - tF.- : ôvse ro"" - =cn can only be e _ _ _ _ _ _ , ZhatIrr' 
a for=- =_ - =!Irds the Í=- -_ -es_z, solidarity 
or 
V. a joint real/xx± 
contr . ., ca.f never proï'Ve cumulation any more th :n can a 
joint stipulation. 
The constitutive requisites of a joint re ,-1 r 
1 
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consensual contract xx, over and 'above that of communis 
consensus, are siitply the requisites of the particular 
contract under consideration xixxpterixamxxa, adapted as 
necessary,, and they therefore call for no remark. 
In this connection it is however^ t be noted 
that ali/agreements made at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract are elements in the contract itself. Here 
we observe the distiction between formal and form*i negotiae 
in the Oa&e of a stipulation, all the terms of the contract 
must be set forth in the interrogatory otherwise they 
R4not__ pxsanx_>5t*Mgxy 
cannot, on a strict application of civil law principles, 
be said to be part of the negotium, though the late class- 
9 ical jurisprudence did not adhere rigidly to this xxm rule. 
On the other hand a formless negotium is composed essentiallry, 
of the entire expressed agreements of the parties at the 
time. 
If a passive joint real or consensual contract 
be concluded in a manner which does not introduce any 
'inequality' or 'non -identification' between the two 
obligations, there can be no doubt that the result is 
a process- consumption relation, i.e. correality, just as 
if the cause of obligation had been a correal stipulation. 
»e have here to observe that the phrase 'utriasque fidem 
irsolidunt secutus' or the like, apparently connotes not 
of the creditor's 
merely an intention /to exclude partition, but also,hee 
an intention 
to hold each debtor responsible for the'culpa 'and mora 
of the other as well as for that of himself,. Unless this 
'extensive responsibility' is expressly excluded, it will 
be held to exist by virtue of an intention on the creditor's 
part to this effect, for naturally a creditor will always 
assert such an intention if he can. But extensive respons- 
bility necessarily implies constructive unity of obligatio. 
J ¿244D 
A te-d., 4,4zLl. ce45.6., - 
4, ,cula: 
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t we a.re, enti tied to say tit that, equality of prest- 
ax, 
ation being assumed, this unity will result unless some 
element exclusive of identification is expressly introduc- 
ed. . 
The importatt quetion now arises, ¡that will happen 
if, by the terms of a passive joint contract, an inequality 
of prestation is introduced, or, assuming there to be no 
inequality, there is introduced some element exclusive of 
identification. We have seen that if any formal inequal- 
ity or non -identification be introduced in the interrogatory 
of correal stipulation, the whole act is rendered null 
and void. But in the case of a formless negotium, of 
course there can be no such thing as nullity of formal 
grounds. What then is the result to be? is the joint 
real or consensual contract to be pronounced null and void 
on material- grounds? We have ventured the conjecture that 
under the old civil law a correal stipulation would be 
rendered void on the ground of a latent defect in a correal 
stipulation inducing material inequality of prestation, or 
m2 on the ground of the prestation being materially 
t individualised; so that identification of the two oblig- 
44 
ations wfra excluded. But can this principle be applied 
here? Consider for example the case of a deposit made to 
two parties jointly. T. has deposited a certn article 
with. I. and S. subject to the proviso that .'h. shall be 
liable for culpa in addition to his leg=al liability for 
dolus, while S. remains liable for dolus merely. Here 
we have an inequality of prestation which excludes the 
possibility of correality. But can we pronounce the 
whole deposit null and voidi, that is to say, are we to 
refuse T. an actio depositi and leave him simp ry with a 
vindic<atio or condictio for the purpose of recovering his 
property? Such a result would be altogether anomalous. 
The article has actually been handed over depositionis 
xm[xmxtaxkxxmmdx2, 
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causa to kzxxxatxitz both. M. and S,, and T. must have an 
ac ti o depositi against each. But the fact of the deposit 
being joint excludes the idea of cumul ûtionx, and we are 
then faced with the urgent quetion, in what legal cop, ty 
do M. an0 . actually stand? 
Her I venture to think, we get at the origin 
of the institute of simple solidarity. M. and S. are not 
correal debtors xatx and accordingly litiscontestation can 
have-no extensive consuming effect, nor, we think, do the 
co- debtors incur extensive responsibility; yet the law 
/r uar 
must nel their obligations as designed to fulfil one 
and the same juristic end, so/that solutio by the one 
frees the other. As already explained, I conjecture 
that the institute of simple solidarity, after having been 
.developed within the sphere of real and consensual contracts 
eventually gained a footing within the sphere of verbal 
contract, with the result that material inequality or 
non -identification was no longer held to render a correal 
stipulation null and void, but merely mis the same product- 
ive of obligations standing int a simple solidary, instead 
of a correal, relation. 
It is convenient to consider in this place 
the result where a correal stipulation, perfectly capable 
in itself of producing a correal obligation, is conCluddd, 
but at the same time one or more pacts are added which, 
Of they had been incorporated in the stipulatory formula, 
would have rendered a correal relation impossible. This 
point is suggested by the famous fragment Lecta est, 
Paul, D, (12, 1)40, particularly by the clause 'quia pacta 
in continenti facts, stipulationt finesse cred_untur'. We 
see from this fragment that the late classical juri sprdd- 
ence had ceased to draw a rigid line betweeh tge formal act 
of stipulation itself and informal agreements ancillary 
thereto. We therefore ask, in the case figured, do the 
245 
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pacts have the effect of excluding correality? In my 
opinion this question must be ,answered in the negative. If 
a correal stipulation, is in itself both formally and mat- 
erially capable of producing a correal relation, no agree- 
ment extrinsec to the stipulatory act can prevent this 
result. 
Consider thefollowing example: T. stipulates 
corroally from M. and S. for slave Stichus, but at the same 
time makes a pact with M. that the latter is to be liable 
merely for dolus5; *xxrammildousxxxlemxkkxxxxkixxxyxIagmicxxx 
no such pact is however made with S. who remains under his 
ordinary legal liability for culpa. Obviously if this 
pact had been incorporated in the stipulatory formula, the 
negotium would, according to our theory, have been rendered 
null and void, but certainly this result cannot take place 
in the Cade figured; the only alternatives here are to 
hold the correal relation formally uni_Lcai -red or else 
reduced to one of simple solidarity. The old civil law 
would no doubt have treated the pact as of no effect what- 
ever, and in any event it could not have decided in favour 
of simple solidarity, for it knew of no such relation. 
the civil law result therefore is maintenance of the correal 
relation, and in my opinion the classical jurisprudence, 
even though it regarded the pact as effective and recog- 
nised the possibility of simple solidarity ex stipulatu, 
was bound to adhere to this result. The position then 
is as follows: The correal stipulation per se produces 
two equal and identified obli gations4i the pact modifies 
one of these obligations soit that T. cannnly obtain a 
condamnation against M. on the ground of doles, while he 
can obtain a condemnation ,against S. on the ground of culpa; 
nevertheless the xx extensive consuming effect of litis- 
,,,,-.-,.C 
1) a ,4 f 
0614, , 4f- /4_ 4/wok 1.4.-.6-" 4-e.--04 1 
1 u.trt.- as Wet,' ,- 
44,14,&r. .4,7%.&-a.1. 
xf:r { /1`'lt Gl.-ewlLL á C'1/1.c..J 
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contestation remains unimpaired, and within the limits 
allowed by the pact, so does the extensive responsibility 
of the co- debtors. 
If the foregoing argument be sound, we have the 
result that in the case of obligations ex stipulatu a 
correal relation can only be reduced to one of simple 
solidarity through some inequality or non-identification 
intrinsec in the stipulation but not formally inconsistent 
with the joint nature of the act. This result excludes 
the possibility of a correal relation ex stipulatu being 
reduced. to one of simple solidarity by virtue of a special 
agreement between the parties inducing inequality or 
non -identification; such an agreement in tarder to have 
any effect at all on the correal relation would have to be 
incorporated in the interrogatory and then it would render 
the stipulatory act formally null and void. Hence, if 
we wish to illustte the reduction of correality to 
uaf 
simple solidarity by a special agreemtn inducing inequality 
or non -identification, we must turn to the case of formless 
negotia where every agreement concluded at the time of the 
contract is part of the contract itself. The effect of 
a pact concluded subsequentlpa to the conclusion of the 
9 
contract will be considered in our exegesis of D.(45,2)9. 
- The next quetion we ask iss this: In the case 
Le 4w 
of form. negttia, the parties can induce inequality or 
non -identification, and so reduce the resulting relation 
from correality to simple solidarity; can they by special 
agreement Exakmtx directly exclude the extensive operation 
of process -consumption by special agreement? In my opinion 
this quesion must fie answered in the negative. Process - 
consumption is a civil law result which cannot be excluded 
merely through the parties agreeing that it shall; such 
exclusion ncn only be effected indirectly through the 
presence of some rocment which prevents identification 
f the two obligations, 
,.2.. (1, QV 
0 
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In corder to produce a correal relation between 
two real or consensual contracts, tinily of originating 
cause is as essential as in the case of obligations 
ex stipulatu, only the unity of originating cause here 
consists solely in the Material fact of all parties 
acting with a common intention in the matter. The 
question, however, arises, particularly in the case 
of mandate, whether the law ever admitted the possib- 
ility that two separate xxntxxxtx real or consensual 
contracts might produce obligations standing in 'a 
simple solidary relation. In my opinion, this 
question must be answered in the negative. We have 
already seen the reaction of the civil law against 
anything in the natúre of solidarity without unity 
ofAcausell and the same principle cox must make its 
influence felt here also. Two obligations 
arising from different real or consensual contracts 
can onl y stand jnxmxxakitaxpxxxixtxaaxxictaxiax amtat 
mixagatifit in an equitable solidary relation. Further 
details regarding this matter may be postponed for 
z) 
our special discussion of the contract of mandateZ, 
infra p. 30y66. 
J /7. 0r7 11 
. 
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Justinian's abolition of extensive process-consumpt- 
ion as between correal debtors by stipulation was naturally 
extended to the case of correal debtors by real and consens- 
lax ual contracts. This reform, as in the case of obligat- 
ions ex stipulatu, broke down the classical distinction 
loam between correaltty and simple solidarity, and placed 
all solidary obligations arising from joint real or con- 
sansual contracts on a single basis of solutio- consumption; 
,as before,) 
this new form of the institute we call/Justinianian joint 
solidarity or Justinianian cor. realibty, Accordingly the 
compilors, if they carried out tkeir work of interpolation 
properly, should have given the expression duo rei an ex- 
tended significance so as to cover classical simple solid, - 
ary, as well as correal, relations, in which case they 
must have affirmed that co- debtors were duo rei in certain 
cases where the classical jurists. But here as in the case 
of obligations ex stipúlatu, the work of interpolation 
was imperfectly accomplished. 
The compilors seem also , in the case of 
mandate, to have obliterated the classical principle 
that a legal solidary relation could not be constituted 
by separate contracts. Apparently the Justinianian law 
c as 
here admitted a relation of several solidarity contested 
with the joint solidari tywhich resu7Ìed where unity of 
cause was present. 'i 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall 
illustrate the foregoing exposition by considering iri the 
first place certain passages which deal with the/contracts 
9 
of deposit AT - . _ _ commodate ( 34), 
S 
and the contracts of sale and hire ( 3 ; the contract 
Ç of mandate requires a apecial exposition ( f 31) which 
1 
will be followed by certain illustrations ( 5 3W). 
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(note from previous page ctd) ma to bear in mind that this 
contract though formless was essentially unilateral and 
was sanctioned by a strici iuris iudicium. The probabilit 1 
ies are that a loan made to two parties jointly per se 
rendered each liable pro rata verely; but could a pact be 
added which would render theF, liable singuli in solidum? 
The opening words of Paul,D,(46.1)71:.,. pxm Iulio Pollione 
et Iuli o Rufo pecuniam :nu team accipientibus ita ut duo 
rei siusdem debiti fuerint, are indecisive, for a correal 
stipulation may be be implied; cp. Paul. D.(12,1.)x 2.5: 
verbis quòque credimus.,.veluti stipulatione. In 
Diocleti ant C.(4..2)12, the words 'nec re' are regarded as 
interpolated by Perozzi (nruger, Cod.) and Riccobono 
w.. u 44. 'Ccn. 
- 0 (.,35,p.262), Nor can much . - 
Ulpian, D. (12, 1)7, ̂  The matter is of little conse- 
quence, for if it were intended to bind the co:debtors 
singuli in solidum, a correal stipulation milli& would no 
doubt invariably be employed in practice. Likewise if 
toro parties jointly made a loan, Ex each was 
par se entitled merely pro rata, and if it were desired to 
constitute active solidarity, a correal stipulation would 
be resorted too 
I c sems undesirable to complicate our present 
exposition with references to fiducia and pignus, and the 
bearing of the institute of solidarity on these contracts 
is therefore reserved for future studies. 
250 k 34 Authorities (Deposit). 
(1) D,(16.3)1031, Ulpian. XXX ad edict. 
Si taaduorum servus sit qui deposuit, unicuique 
dominorum in partem competit depositi, 
íj 
From this decision the conclusion is justified 
that if the masters made a joint deposit personally 
á.taxd they would like rise be entitled merely pro 
rat,', in the absence of a special agreement in favour of 
solidarity, 
(2) D. (16.3 )17. Florentin, VII ins t. 
Eiet deponere tam plures quam unus possunt, attamen} 
apud sequestrern non nisi plures deponere possunt: nard 
turd id fit cum cliqua res in controversiam deducitur, 
q/4-t- 
itavi hoc casu in solidum unusquiseue videtur deposuisse: 
pr 
quod aliter est cum rem communem plures deponunt. 
1, Rei depositae proprietors apud deponentem manetV, sed et 
possessi o nisi apud sequestrem deposita est: nam turd 
demum sequester possidet: id enim agitur ea depositione 
ut neutrius po:sessioni id tempus procedat. 
The banal introduction ,¡ 
z) 
e licet, .. a.ttament, cannot be genuine, but,I a,ssumeAthe 
a 
authenticity of the remainder Florentine's argument 20 
44,4-6r7tc,644,4u0,414,1aa seems to be as follows: In the case where two or 
more co- owners of a thing j ontly deposit the same, each 
remains legal owner and possessor of his own loaffixind mimmx 
share, and can reclaim this share but it alone, unless, 
we may add, a special . agreement has been made entitling 
either to reciim the whole. In the case of sequestre, 
on the other hand each ddpoxk ±axy party surrenders to 
the sequester the legal right of possession which he 
z, '47, lZek-X. 
i h 3 n . B4441-vz ii fr ref, `otC(cz.4.4-enti7 




asserts over the entire thing; the sequester now becomes 
legal possessor of the thing, but, by virtue of the condo- - 
ion of the contract, he is bound to restore it to that 
parties 
one of the IRXR4tii2XX who shall have succeeded in estab- 
lishing the best title thereto, and if he fails so to 
restoreit, the successful party, but he alone, can sue 
him (the sequester) in solidum, 
joint 
The contrast between ordinarj /deposit and sequestre 
has a deeper significance than the contrast between 
partition add solidarity. Suppose in the case of an 
ordinary joint deposit, it is agreed that either. depositor 
may reclaim the whole. Here we have a case of active 
correality; the action of the one depositor 'concurs' 
with the action of the other , and the concurrence is 
determined in the sense of process -consumption; if the 
one depositor joins issue in solidum with the depositary, 
the other's right is extinguished. On the other hand in 
the case of sequestre, there is no action-concurrence at 
all; among the several :1.epositors, only the successful 
party is mxtÌÌmt entitled to sue the sequester; if an 
unsuccessful party attempts to do so, his action has no 
effect in consuming the right of the successful party* 
Here we see the fundamental necessity of distinguishing 
sequestre from ordinary joint deposit. If several 
disputants regarding the property in thing were to make 
an ordinary joint deposit thereof 'in solidum' pending the 
settlement of the dispute, an unsuccessful party by join- 
t.. A 
ing issue with the depositaryAwould extinguish the right 
of the successful party, and the whole end cif the deposit 
would be defeated. v +r_ , G t-- 
0 We assume the contract contains no element of inequality 
or non -identification which reduces the relation to one 
of simple solidarity. 
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9 see Lev;;, honk,, p,386 f. Lenel, Edict,, p,281 f, 
thinks that the formulal, sequestraria was conceived in 
factum. 
253 34 ctd. 
(3) D.(16.3)1.43,44. 
43 oC, Si apucl atra duos sit deposita res, a.dversus unumquemque 
r eorum agi potent, /Floc/ libera,bi tur alter si 
cum altero agatur Lnon enim electione sed solutione 
liberantur,, 
proaéinde si ambo dolo fecerunt et alter [ quod interest 




L quod si alter vel nihil vel minus facere possit, ad 
0 
alium pervenietur J. 
3 
idemque et si alter C-- > dolo non fecerit, L- 
idoirco sit absolutus: nam a.d ilium pervenieturj<^'í, 
44 sed si duo deposuerint et ambo agant, L ̂si quidem sic 
deposuorunt t vel unus tollat totem, potenit in solid- 
um a,gere: sin vero pro parte pro qua. eorum interest, 




conventus sit, alter qui dolo fecit liberabitur: nam 
is qui convenitur alterius nomine condemnari potest.. 
S) alteri qui prior ad sententiam pervenerit res tradenda 
est ita, ut caveat reum adversus alteram defensu iri. 
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Îkkaxpl These paragraphs, perplexing though they 
be at first sight, cause comparatively little trouble 
nowadays, because the interpolations are generally 
admitted. 
In period oC it is assumed that the deposit 
is joint,- in fact it is almost Onconceivable for a depos- 
it with two parties to be made otherwise than jointly, - 
and it is further assumed that there is no element of 
inequality or non -identification in the contract which 
would exclude correality. The first point decided is 
that the co- depositaries are liable singuli in solidum 
(adversus unumquemque eorum agi po teri t) h The following 
denial of process -consumption and assertion of solutio- 
consumption are certainly due to the compilors. The 
'sed' proposed by Levy0in place of 'nec', is an almost 
certain restoration and much preferable to the 'et' 
2 
proposed by Eisele.' The 'non enim...liberantur' clause 
gives the Justinianian watchword tnon electione sed 
s oluti one, the 
the processual 
substantive 'electio' taking the place of 
3 
'litiscontestatio' J again 'liber.<antur' 
has no proper subject. 
The result of oC. , as restored, is that 
joint depositaries are correal debtors in the full sense, 
unless of course correality is prevented by the terms 
of the contract, and Ulpian now proceeds to give 
deductions (proinde) from their correal relation. 
In period the reference to solutio (quod 
interest praestiterit) has certainly been substitu6dd 
by the compilors for a reference to litiscontestatïo 
vide supra p. 124, . 226/. 
p.210. 
Z) Archiv f.d. Civil. Prax.,77.p.449. 
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i 
Ifuerit conventus, or the like). The significance of 
the decision in this period is then as follows: Dolus 
in itself is a delict and as such it points to cumulation, 
not solidarity; if two persons have been guilty of a 
joint deliet, then according to the fundamental principles 
of the old civil law, whichtwmax however were greatly 
modified in later times, each might be sued for the full 
penal due)and neither litiscontestatlo with, nor 
solutio by, the one had any effect on the liability of 
2 
the other. But this rule does not apply to dolus regard- 
ed merely as a broach of contract or 'quasi- contract'. 
Where the dolus 'ex contractu reique persecutions 
3 
descendit', it cannot have the effect of rendering correal 
debtors liable cumulatively. I do not, however, feel 
inclined to adopt Levy's suggestion that Ulpian wrote 
'et' between 'proinde' and 'si', -4 'hence even if',- as 
if periods 0(. andp. represented a soft of climax. It is 
to the decision which, as we suppose, was originally 
contained in period g. that the 'et' is really appropri- 
ate. The words 'exemplo duorum tutorum' are highly 
significant, for they show that co-tutors jointly .admin- 
istering an undivided estate were correal debtors in the 
full sense; this point doe. of however concern us here. 
That period A is wholly due to the compilors 
may be pronounced certain. The decision is diametrically 
opposed to the classical probess-consumption and mammexx 
assumes that solutio alone has extensive consuming effect; 
see Levy, Privatstrafe u. Schadenersatz,(passim). 
3) these words are taken from Ulpian. D.(16.3)7.1 and are 
pregnant with meaning; see .T,evy, op, ci t. p.22; Konk. 
!x p. 93 ff. 
honk. , fr. 210. 
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the phrase 'ad (aliquem) pervenirit, as here used, and 
the change from'alter' to 'alius(alium)' are at any rate 
highly suspicious. 
^ 
The whole period ". after 'idemque' is generally 
attributed to the compilors, but this view seems too 
radical; À The interpolation of the final words 'n.am 
ad -Ilium pervenietur' may be regarded as certain,lumblxx 
and our attention must be concentrated on the preceding 
clause 'et idcirco sit absolutus'. Obviously this 
clause proceeds on the theory that correal depositaries 
are liable each for his own culpa alone, and this we 
believe to be contrary to the classical law; hence in 
our opinion the clause in question must be interpolated. 
I must, however, add a warning against employing the 
present passage as an authority for the doctrine that the 
classical law upheld, while the Justinianian law rejected, 
the extensive responsibility of correal debtors. Such 
an argument involves a petitio principii; it is only 
because we have seen good cause for maintaining this 
doctrine on the ground of other passages and likewise on 
that of general principle, that we are entitled with any 
certainty to pronounce the present clause 'et idcirco 
sit absolutus' interpolated. 
As regards the restoration of period S. I 
propose the following: Insert 'quit between 'alter' and 
'dolo', and after 'fecerit' add ' conventos est, alter 
qui dolo f_ecit liberabitur: nam is qui ammo= convenitur 
see Levy, ZSS.,37.p. 58 n.5. 
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alterius nomine .condemnari potent' or the like. This 
extensive 
restoration shows the connection between/process-consumpt- 
ion and extensive responsibility. Suppose of two correal - 
depositaries M. and S,, M. alone has been guilty of dolus, 
but the depositor sues According to the principle laid 
down. in S. (as restored), li. is rr1 freedA but 
this fact involves no hardship to the depositor, for 
S. dòes not gain a right to absolution merely by establish. 
ing his own innocence; on the contrary he is liable to 
be condemned on the ground of Mots dolus (alterius 
nomine) 
We now turn to the active case mentioned in ÿ 44 
(period f. ). It is- unnecessary at-this time of day to 
spend time arguing in favour of the interpolation of 
the passage 'si quidem,,.faeiendam'; its contentsi 00m. 
utterly banal, its form in the highest degree inelegant 
and it bears &n its forefront every mark of Byzantine 
origin, As to the substance. of Ulpian's original argu- 
ment we can make a shrewd guess. iiiítkxu ±xkiv When two 
parties made a joint deposit without a special agreement 
ir_ favour of solidarity, each was entitled pro rata 
merely, the basis of division being the ratio of the 
shares in the article held by each, Now almost certain- 
ly the words 'ambo agant' do not mean that both co-depos- 
itors bring a single joint action, but that each sues 
separatel*Â But as presumably the object of the deposit 
is a determinate species which cannot be divided physically 
without destroying its nature, the limpxxix ±xxx defendant, 
if he wishes to make specific restitution, cannot do mtkmm 
otherwise than deliver the whole to one of the p1-71444 , 
0) 
piccobono, Çommunio in Essa rs in Le al Histor , 1913, 
(ed. Vinogradoff ), p. 107 note 2 a to p.106 . The 
readeras ouldxñ.axeefxlllvanox e 
the other interpolated 
passages bearing on deposit cited in this work p.103 ff. 
il 
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Which of the latter is entitled to such delivery and on 
what terms? Founding on Ulpian. -$ulian. De (16.3 )1, 37, 
Uipian.Dg(32)11021 and Ulpia.n.D, (9.4)14 pr., 1 have vent- 
ured a restoration which answers this quesion. 
Tne interpolation in §-44 is instructive inasmuch 
as it enables us to see that the compilors, following 
perhpps in the footsteps of previous commentators, 
sought to schematise the various situations. Quite 
probably Ulpian in the sequel to this paragraph pointed 
out that a special agreement entitling each of the co-de - 
positors in solidum was perfectly competent, and this 
suggested the scheme: active joint deposit in solidum 
xlKiaincox ij txciaptamitxymaxEl x (si quidem sic deposuurunt 
ut vel unus tollat totum) - active joint deposit pro 
rata (sin vero pro parte pro qua eorum interest). 
We shall see a more pronounced example of $chemat- 
isation on'the compilors' part when we come to deal 
with the case of joint sale 
9 cp. Riccobono, op ,cit., p.105 f. 
2) vide nfra p.14 296y# 
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D. ( 45e 2) 9. Papbni an. XXVII gmxpatx quaest. 
PÇ Eandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidGm 
in solidum secutus, vel eandem rem duobus sim_iliter 
comrr.odavi : fiunt duo rei promittendi, 
quia non tantum verbis stipulationis Lsed et ceteris 
contractibus, veluti emptione venditione, locatione` 
conductione, deposito, commodato, testamento ut puta 
si pluribud heredibus institutis testator dixit: 
' Ti tius et Maevius Sempronio decem. dato' ( <n-' >. 
Sed si quis in deponendo pones duos paciscatur ut ab 
altero culpa quoque praestaretur, verbis est non esse 






non idem probandum est (cum duo quoque culpam promis. 
,.. 3 
issent si alteri poster, pacto culpa remissa sitri; 
quia posterior conventio quae in alterius persona 
intercessit statum et naturam obligationis quae duos 
initio reos fecit, mutare non pia potest: 
<-". >4) 
rquarej ñ i socii sint Let communi s culpa intercessi tJ "> 
etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum bproderit) < Y 
a 
9 si conclusum sit quad 
-- 
ti 
agatur, ita fieri possunt. 
J ? N4.--( ) nft--,4 t-ti" / 
, 
3) si ex intervallo sit `- 1+11- --A- 
9 
e si cum altero actum f.eri alter li. axat quocum en um es u o 
11)ossit 
.9 sed 
6> contrario iudicio 
% nocebit 
erat cuamvis 
ne con enari 
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¡ L Cum duos reos promittendi facerem ex diversis lotis, 
Capuae pecuni am dari stipulatus sim, ex persona cuiusque 
ratio pr opr. i i temporis habebitur 
i 
nard et si maxime parem causam suscipiunt, nihilo minus 
in cuiusque persona propria singulorum consistit obligatio. 
sed et si in continenti pactus fuerit ut ab utroque 
40. 
praestetur culpa propria ix ipsius non eti.m alterius, 
puto duos reos non esse, 
3) 
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This fragment is one of the greatest difficulty 
but also of the greatest importance for the proper 
understanding of our subject. 
In period ': the mention of commodatum (vela a 
commodavi) is generally now regarded as interpolated, 
but it does not seem to me by any means impossible and 
I am therefore prepared to let it stand. Levy questions 
the genuiness of the statement that co- depositaries 
(co- commentaries) become duo rei promittendi, and suspect 
that the compilors have either suppressed a 'quodammodo' 
or 'quasi', or titxtx*promkttmmdjJximmalmmxtmxthmmxx have 
inserted the 'promittendi'. He admits however the 
possibility of the expression 'duo rei promittendi' 
having been used by Papinian in a wide sense to cover 
correal debtors in general and this, I think is the 
sounder view. Correality from real and consensual 
contracts was undoubtedly modelled after stipulatory 
correality, and the extended application of the terms 
'duo xxmk rei prom,' and 'duo rei stipa' is perfectly 
intelligible.0 
I do not like the smggestion that Papinian wrote 
'quodammodo' or 'quasi', because either of t-1á s might 
be taken to imply that the co- depositaries (co- commodat- 
ari es)were not correal debtors in the full sense; cp. 
Faul.D0 (26.`7)45: `sed haec in magistratibus trattavi 
quasi duo rei eiusdem debiti essent omnimodo; quod non 
ita est! But co- depositaries(co -cam.) were correal debto 
a e full sense, - o _ - - _ - o - o taken bound by 
verbal contract. "evy, op.cit. p.206 n.2 refers to 
D. (130 6) 5a 15:'quare duo quodammodo rei habebuntgr ' but 
these words I believe to be interpolated (infra ); 
to D.(13.5)16 pr.:'si duo quasi duo rei constituerimus' 
but he word t,,,,. si duo rei r if genuine^ 
simply mean 'as correal debtors'; to D.064 (21.1531.10: 
'si quasi plures rei fuerunt venditores', but this passage. 
(4 7117 
`tA" interpolated (infra .30 .); to D. (30)8.1:' quasi si i s   ( P 4G q 
f a ry -) duo Txm>i ;Í :xdÌ rei promittendi in solidum obligati 
fuissent', but 'quasi' here means 'just as' (r3upra 
Levy, Konk. p. 20 5 xxgxx thinks the interpolation 'as 
good as certain'; see also the Italian. authorities 
cited by him (n.1). 
2) ec 
744- i'li'r"'*7 F-W6'1/) "kj 6d"-° /1.,,:-rc. `ti&c ' /Gttict( 
/tit, /2"--44-2( C-151/1"--11 r -cA.k,( : P a.. 
Ta--e-1)3.3J4LF,¡ a., ì} (iz.G)7-0, Q ...ia, , ,`, 
262 
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The ;,hree elements in the statement of facts are 
(i) eandem rem spud duos deposui (commodavi); (ii) pariter; 
and (iii) utriusque fidem in solidum secutuse kxklt These 
require separate attention, 
(i) It is plainly inferred that the deposit,- we may omit 
further reference to commodate, - was joint, in other words 
that the article was delivered to both parties together 
by way of i. single contract of deposit; any other hypoth- 
esis would be far- fetched and need not be considered. 
(ii) 'Pari ter' though frequently synonymous with 'simul', 
must as the 'inpa.r' in )/. and the 'parem' in fi show, here 
connote 'equality of pr estation.', 'objective equality of 
obligation', in particular equality of liability where 
the article is not restored at all or is restored in a 
defective state. In other words, both must be liablee 
for dolus,- this is the measure of liability which the 
law itself will impose on a depositary in the absence of 
special agreement; or both must be liable for culpa also, 
or both for casus fortuitus also, and so forth. 
(iii) The phrase 'utriusque fidem in solidum secutus', 
as we understand it, has two connotations. In the first 
place it implies an intention of the creditor tc exclude 
pxrt ± ±tx : ±xtx partition, but this is of small import; 
the object of the deposit is aÁ species (eandem rem) and 
any idea thaileach of the co- depositaries is to be bound 
to restore merely a part of the same may be discarded 
altogether. moreover, xpxr± quite apart from. the nature 
of the thing, deposited, a passive joint contract naturally 
leads to p solidarity, not partition, and this tendency, 
in the absence, of any formal considerations, is bound to 
assert itself. In the second place, however, -and this 
is the important point, - the phrase in question seems to 
Jcp. Levy, ihonk. p.207. 
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imply an intention on time creditor's part to hold the 
co- depositaries 'extensively4'responsible' for all loss 
of, or damage to, the article; if the latter is not 
restored at all, or is not restored ii proper state, the 
depositor, unless the loss or damage shall have arisen 
through a cause for which the depositaries are not xxxlIx 
responsible, looks to each for recovery of his full 
interesse, no matter whichAhas ac wally been at fault. 
We must entirely dismiss the idea, current in 
former rimes, that the phrase'utriusque fidem in solidum 
secutus' implies an express agreement to create solidarity 
in general or correality in particular, for actually its 
Z. -c z` 
implication is just the reverse, gnat Papini.an\ says is 
that, assuming a joint contract and equality of prestation, 
the creditors intention to hold each co- depositary liable 
for restoring the entire article and for making good any 
loss caused by the doles (culpa etc.) of the other as well 
as of himself, is decisive in rendering them correal 
debtors. Such an intention will be implied in the absence 
of any contrary term in the agreement, so that the posit- 
ion may be summed up by saying that correality belongs to 
the'naturalia' of an 'equal' pxÏx± passive joint contract 
of deposit/ These results are perfectly unexceptionable, 
and offer no antinomy with those arrived at in the case of 
correality ex 
xxÌktxxx ±xxxx stipulatu . The only difference is that we 
are now dealing with negotia where the intenions of part - 
ies take the place of form. When we leave periodoc.however 
cp. Levy, 'monk. p. 208, and the following passages quoted 
by him (noté) in illustration of the phrase 'utriusque 
fidem in solidum secutus': D.(12.1)1.1:'xÌkx alienam fidem 
secuti'; D.(17.1)21:'alienum (utriusque) mandatum intuit-. 
u s' ; eod. 53 : ' al terutriusxxx mandatum secutus'; D.(19.2)47: 
t singulorum in solidum intuitum personam' (infra p. 3a2 
6, ) ; 
D.(42. 5)24, 2:'fidem publicam secuti' . 
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our troubles begin. 
That period ig in its present form cannot h be genuine 
is certain. The absence of a principal verb and the 
reference to 'ceteri contractus' (which,include 
testamentum, 
1 
) are in themselves sure signs of Interpol- 
' 
ation. Riccobono restores the text by inserting 'duo 
rei fieri possunt' after 'verbis stipulation_is' and 
2.) 
deleting the passage 'sed et. . conductione' . Levy, on 
the other hand, deletes period r, altogether. I venture 
to suggest that while Levy's proposal is too drasticr_ 
the initial words 'quits. stipulationis' may perfectly 
well be genuine,- that of Riccobono is not drastic 
enough. In the first place there lurks in the words 
'deposito, commodato' at any r z,te the .suspicion of a 
petitio principii:- co- depositaries and co- commodataries 
become correal debtors, because correality can be created 
by deposit and commodate. In the second place, the 'et' 
T 
in the final 'titius et maevius. , . dato' clause is false 
a, Y. 
from the classical stiZá.dpoint and must be emended to 
taut', while from the Justinianian standpoint it causes 
3 
no surprise in view of C,(6.38)4 (particularlyy la). In 
the third place the example tut puta si.,,' is altogether 
inelegant; having first stated that 'plures (more than 
two) heredes' had been instituted, the writer abruptly 
11 
introduces two persons T. and M. as these heirs. Again 
it was quite mummommammy unnecessary to digress from the 
main argument in order to give an example of correality 
ex testamento. 
For these reasons I propose to delete the 
Dal diritto rom, class, al djritto mod. in Annali del 
min r T de R.Universi Na di Palermo Tea. III -IV. 
p.691. 
Konk.. 204 ff. 
Levy, i-e-e.. 
9) C x 
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whole of period( after ' stipulati onis' , As to what 
Papin i an may actually have written, I venture to refer to 
the clause 'tametsi quod inter eos ageretur verbis quoque 
stipulationis conclusum non fuissetz ' of Pepinian. 
7.(19,5)8, and to suggest 'si conclusum sit quod agatur 
ita fi eri possunt t. Rxxtlxix According to this restora- 
tion period signifies that, in order for co- depositaries 
2 (co -com.) to be taken bound correally, a stipulation 
is not now required as it ]ux doubtless had been at some 
earlier date. 
The difficultieP which the pr. of the fragment 
present are buimaxxx trivial as compared with those which 
now meet us in ) 1. In periode. one of the co- deposit- 
aries undertakes by pact liability for culpa over and 
_ above his legal liability for Bolus, and in period f. 
it stands, both co -depositaries do this but the additional liabil- 
ity of one of them is subsequently remitted. This 
introduces the vexed questions regarding pacta adiecta 
in general and pacta depositioni adiecta in particular. 
I make the following mkxxxxxtkam preliminary observations: 
(a) I believe that the classical law fully permitted a 
depositary to assume by pact additional liability for 
culpa, though it did not permit him to be relieved from 
3) 
liability for Aik Bolus; (b) I believe that the basis 
°IN is genuine inasmuch as Papinian did here actually 
deal with the case of a pactum de culpa praestanda 
depositioni adiectum; (c) It is certain that the ,original 
text has been fundamentally interpolated by the compilors; 
in particular periods E and O. cannot have been written_ 
4,c-a 
which hoF.ever Beseler, II,p. 163 tat treats as inte-rpolat- 
ed. 
) See Siber, ZSS.42.p.80 ff, where references to the lead- 
ing modern authorities will be found. 
9 2. .(/4_ 3) I. G, 7; ~ Pa.4, 17_(i3. G) `7/4-. 
P.7.77er, 
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by Papinian in their present form. 
Let us consider period F in the first place. 
The clause 'cum duo quoque culpam promisissent' is 
et 
impossible. 'Culpam promittere' is # .7Te.5 ATo/+E Vof- and 
i 
crude ̂'quoque' should come after, not before, ' culpam' 
.. 4 . 
however admit that the 'cum'- clause may simply be deleted 
; 
:: . ._..,.. I cannot 
the fact of both parties having originally assumed addit- 
tonal liability for culpa being thins left tD implications 
On the contrary, if we pronounce this clause interpolated 
we must, I believe, further attribute entirely to the 
compilors the position of fact complicated in period E. 
namely that both depositaries origilly assumed addit- 
ional liability for culpa, and that one of them, but not 





In the second place as regards period g , the 
line of argument seems to be as follows: In , and S. 
it is laid down that if both the co- depositaries, say 
M. and Se originally assume additional liability for 
culpa, so thatbtheir obligations being 'equal *, they 
are duly constituted correal debtors, in such case a 
subsequent pact (hereinafter referred to as the pact?), 







y y an 
Then in /9. the 
deduction is drawn (quare), that if M. and S. are 
i In D.(47.8)2.23 4f9 'si in re deposita, custodiam 
culpam quoque repomisi','culpam' is interpolated; - 
Schultz, ZSS. 32, p, 36 ; Levy, Konk, p'.205 n.7. 
2> 
This is apparently the view of Levy, 1.0., who holds 
the 'cum'- clause 'superfluous'. 
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partners and S. is sued on the ground of culpa communis, 
kAit i1 he (S.) can r: ' _ . _ - - - - for the 
obvious reason that , if condemned, will nave regress 
against M. and the pact will thus be rendered illusory. 
Thus the decision in B is inextricably bound 
up with the position of fact set fxm forth in and must 
stand or fall with the latter. But we have three further 
grounds, the first purely formal, the second and third 
subs$antial, for refusing to attribute ® ±m in its 
present form to Papinian: 
(i) Is it likely we ask, that a classical jurist would 
have used the same verb 'intercessit' with two different 
connotations (conventio intercessit - culpa intercessit) 
in the same context? The inevitable negative answer at mare 
once renders the clause 'et communis culpa intercessit' 
suspicious, for ±1 tbmm the genuineness of period_ is 
beyond dispute,) Moreover the cons Úction 'sint*(pres. 
subj.) - 4intercessit(perf. indic.) governed by the same 
'sit is at any rate remarkable. 
(ii) We ask, on what legal principm can S., when sued 
on the ground of culpa, be heard to plead as follows: 
Yes, admittedly I have been guilty of culpa, but MO tx 
who is my partner has been guilty of the same culpa, and 
I, if condemned, shall have regress against him in a. 
by the pact 
iudicium societatis; but you have /remitted M.'s liability 1. 
for culpa, and my claim for regress will render the pact 
illusory; ergo,I must be absolved. The plaintiff's 
answer is immediate: I am not concerned with any inner 
v 
relation between you and M. ; I am sling you in respect 
J Be shall presently see cause to believe that a period 
originally intervened between ;f. and d but this period 
would have to be of considerable length in order to 
remove the inelegance in question. 
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of culpa which is your own and liability for which has 
never beon _remitted,Hence we must regard as bad law. 
(iii) The mention of culpa communie seems-clearly to tintt 
infer that it was only in the case of such culpa that S. 
requirdpermission to plead the pact in order to 
prevent it from being rendered illal sory. W Certainly where 
S. is the sole culpable partyx, the pact is net rendered 
ke 
illusory through his not being allowed to plead it; fo 
CS°,/ 
if condemned on the ground of his own culpa alone, cannot 
claim regress against M. even where they are partners, 2-) 
But consider the converse case where Y. id the sole culpab1Q11 
3) 
party. If M. and S. are partners and S. is condemned on 
the ground of M.'s fault, he will naturally have regress 
against M in a iudicium societatis. Hence if S. is 
liable to be so condemned, the pact will be rendered illus- 
ory unless he can plead it, though no culpa communis has 
occurred. 
The whole question then comes to be, can Sß` 
be condemned on the ground of M. 's culpa? Under the 
classical law, we believe, an affirmative answer must be 
given. Ex hypothesi, M. and S. are correal debtors, and. 
as we have seen good grounds for thinking, extensive 
responsibility was an essential element in the passive 
correal relation uhder the classical law Now S,(together 
with M.) has undertaken additional liability for culpa, 
and on classical principles this additional liability 
must be deemed to cover M.'s liability as well as his own 
0 Quaere, if the lAxìrtil±f2x depositor had made the pact in 
full knowledge of the inner relation between M.and S. and 
the mkg of the regress -rights which this relation carried 
with it, would equity intervene to prevent him from suing 
S. on the ground of culpa communie? 
3-) Levy, Konk. note 5(b) to p.210 (at foot of p.211) omi t 
to consider this case; hence though his criti cism of Binder` 
is sound so far as it goes, his own views regarding $ki x 
period_} must in our opinion be rejected. 
-=:7,A A 1-,,-..d-zrr -74 .. 
444:al - 
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otherwise, according to our theory, correality would be 
excluded®' True M.'s liability for culpa has been remitted, 
but there is nothing to suggest that the pact in any way 
affected S.'s liability for M.'s culpa, Hence it was not 
only in the case of culpa communis that S. required per- 
mission to plead the pact in order to prevent it being 
rendered illusory; such permission was equally necessary 
in the case where M. alone had been guilty of culpaA In 
point of fact, then, period d. only becomes intelligible 
if we assume that liability for culpa was 'intensive' 
merely, so that S. could be condemned where the culpa was 
on the part of himself alone, or on the part of himself 
and ii., but not where it was on the part of M. alone. 
This, as we have seems good grounds for believing, w Ls 
actually the rule under the H Justinianian law. 
Now we have to ask ourselves what may have been 
the orisinal purport of Papinian's argument? As at pres- 
ent advised, I can see only one answer to tiiis qu.stion, 
namely, there were here contrasted a pact de culpa gExamx 
prae. Ganda made with one of the co- depositaries at the 
time of the original contract and a similar pact made ex 
intervallo. I do tk not think it is in any way necessary 
2) 
to interfere with the words 'in deponendo penes duos' in 
but I would make raad !non idem ma probandum est 0 
ex intervallo ita pactus sit'. 
With th rase restoration$ 4'* 1 (apart from 
which will be consideredApresertily) becomes perfectly 
J whether the remission coùers liability for the culpa of 
both M. and S., or for the culpa of Y. only o ̂  S. only, 
depends or course on she uerms of the pact. 
2> 
contra., Levy, ronk., p.205; cp. Heumann_- Sectel, 
'penes'. In my opinion it is hypercritical to 
'penes' as coming in place of 'apud'. 
It may be observed that the sequenc 
-..pra.esta.retur' does not afford 
Kalb, Wegweiser} p.76. 
g 
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intelligible. In period Y: the pact being made at the 
time of the original contract is part of the latter. 
Hence obviously an inequality of prestation is introduced 
which excludes the possibility of cor. reality. Now if IY:,: 
p.nd S. are not correal_ debtors, what are they? In our 
opinion only one answer is possible, namely they 




Oa mxtma kxdtx nulamxxïamtxmmrX r G , 
In periods E (as restored) and", on the other 
hand, nothing was originally t additional 
liability, and M. and S.' were duly constituted correal 
debtors; by a subsequent pact However, Iv.^undertakear 
additional liability for culpa. The decision here is 
that this pact cannot disturb the correal relation 
originally established. 
But, we at once ask, what is the effect of the 
st' 
subsequent pact? A Jutztinianian lawyer would no doubt 
answer that it is invalid for purposes of action but 
9 valid for purposes of defence. Under the classical law, 
however , it would appear that in the case of contracts 
sanctioned by a bonae fidei iudiclum, a subsequent pact 
pro :Lctore ( otherwise dasmstkdadx described as a, pact 
ad augendam obligationem) was valid for purposes of 
action; that is to say, if the creditor sued on the 
i1 Soc the interpolations in Papinian. D, (1S. ]. )72 pr.: 
Pacta conventa (quae postea facta detrahunt 
-I.-7 J 
emptioni conteneriCcontractuil videntur: [ cluae vero 
adi,ciunt, credimus non messe J. quod locum habet in hip quae rL r:inicula Runt emptionis, veluti no cautio 
duplae prmostetur aut ut cum fideìssore cautio duplae 
praestetur. Coed quo casu agente emptore non valet 
p ctum, idem vires habeM t lure esce ti nis agente zdmdàtal 
venditore ; roe Siber, ZSS 42 ' p, 86 . 
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original contract the iudex was entitled and bound t 
take into consideration iany subsequent pact by which the 
defendant's liability was increased. And in point of 
fact period 1, as we understand it, implies that the 
subsequent pact was valid for purposes of action, other- 
wise there could be no question of it disturbing the. 
original correal relation If all this be sound, then in 
the case figured in (as restored) and ,we have a 
correal relation subsistirr; in spite of an inequality 
of prestation introduced ex post facto; M. and S. are 
still mutually liable for dolus and litiscontestation.. 
with the one frees the other. The only difference now 
is that if the depositor sues S,', ne can only recover on 
of either party, 
the ground of dolus/ whereas if he sues M.he can recover 
not merely on the ground-of dolus of either party, but 
also on the ground of ' culpa, -whether the culpa of kmEkX 
either party or of M. alone or S, alone, depends on the 
terms of the pact.` These results, i t seems to me, are 
perfectly reasonable and in accordance with the spirit 
of the classical law. A correal relation once establish - 
ed. is a kxxxtAxett de[$ ddx always established, and ho 
e iodifi cation of the liability of mictxmx one. party -. 
°l`/1 ..0 
_ . ; : _ detract therefoom. Iv VI 
The foregoing restoration of F leaves 
meaningless; how could We undertaking of additional 
liability for culpa ever 'benefit' S0? It would however 
be contrary to sound methods of textual criticism to 
A . 
assume that Skis period is wholly itxx due to the compilors ; 
on the contrary we must proceed on the supposition that 
Papinia,n said something as to the effect of tint k' 
subsequent pact on S.'s position and that the compilors 
adapted his words to suit their previous interpolations. 
ne Nos t obvious experiment is to substitute 'nocebi t' ar 
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for 'proderit'. Taking the remainder of the period as 
it stands, the meaning would then be that, where M. 
and S, are partners and the c poeitor sues S., the latter; 
in the event of culpa, communie being established may be 
condemned by virtue of the pact; the argument in favour 
of thin & -en bet-mg that S. will have regrese against 
km in a iudicium societatis. Any such d:e-e-i-moR must 
however be rejected absolutely; S. being en el-r 
stranger to the pact, can never be condemned by virtue 
thereof. 
The only way in which we can fit in 62 with our 
other restorations apparently in to regard it am referring 
to the contrariUm iudicium, the substitution of 'nocebit' 
for 'proderit' being retained. S. claims for axiammxx 
incurred 
expenses etc. /in connection with the deposit; can the 
tiump depositor set -off/ oounter- .claim for loss through 
Ï.xfmaxliaikk culpa for which M, is responsible under the 
pact? If M. and S, are partners, it seems highly 
equitable that such a set-off should be allowed,' If the 
same be not allowed, the pact will be rendered illusory, 
because M., as S.'s partner, will share in the amount 
recovered by S. from the depositor, without any deduction 
on the ground of culpa for which he (M.) has assumed 
liability. S.'s claim against the depositor 
must, it is thought, be reduced by the amount of the 
depositor's claim against k. under ákkxlaamt the pact, 
S. having regress against M. in a iudicium societatie. 
This interpretation of, involves the deletion of 
the 'et communie culpa intercessit' clause which we have 
seem to be questionable on other grounds. It also 
(period 1. ) 
implies that Papinian wrote something /between 3. and 
S., I believe, could only recover the amount which he 
himself had expended (etc.), not also that which M. had. 
expended (vide supra p.241 ) We must, however, assume 
that S.'s expenses were a partnership debit, 
ev(--(4 
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The following restoration of periods and %. may 
be suggested: quare, si cum altero actum fuerit alter 
Á#1 libera.tur, guamvis is dumtazat quocum conventum est 
culpa.e nomine condemnari osait; sed si socii sînt, 
9212.2.11.1f2 etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum 
nocebit. 
Another, though comparatively unimportant point 
of restoration is suggested by the words 'si alteri 
postea pacto culpa remissa sit' in , . These words 
may perfectly well be genuine and possibly they mrtatmzì r 
refereed taathammaaxulaacra in Papinian's text to the case 
where M. mrÌg± zuì (but not S,) originally undertook 
additional liability for sap culpa, but this additional 
liability was subsequently remitted. It may be that 
a 
Papinian mentioned this case incidentally in is deleted 
period g", and we ask how was the same likely to have 
been decided? On the one hand it may be argued e contrar- 
io from 3', , that if correality were originally excluded 
by inequality, it could never be induced ex post facto. 
If this view be adopted, Papinian may have proceeded: 
eoque lure utimur etiam si alteri postea pacto culpa 
remiss, sit, or the like. But, on the other hand we have 
to remember the rule, laid down with special reference 
to the pactum de non potendo, that one pact could be 
'elided' by another.q If this doctrine be here applied, 
Papinian may have written: si auteur alteri postes pacto 
culpa remissa sit, prius pactum per posterius elidetur, 
ita ut duo rei initio cons ti tuti videantur.? 
Assuming the substantial soundness of the 
s.- .- . -..- 
(note at foot of previous page ctd) 
and that the sum recovered by him was a partnership 
credit. 
see Gai. IV.126; Paul. Sent,, I,1.2; Consul tatio' IV, 4; 
Paul, D.(2.14)27.2; Siber, ZSS,,42, 10.74. 
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foregoing restorations, we must now consider the compilons 
mode of dealing with 1. 
4 n 7/ In the first place we revert to the fact that the compilors 
should have changed Papinian's denial of a duo rei relation 
in po an affirmation thereof, the classical distinction 
between correality and simply solidarity being now non® 
existent.' Actually the whole contrast in periods and 
E. is, from the Justinianian standpoint meaningless; 
for in both cases alike the relation must be one of 
Justinianian correality. 
V1, /f In the second place with regard to the manipulations of 
periods , ®61, we make the follweing observations: 
°9l,i' ,'According to the principles of the Justinianian law a 
depositioni 
pactum pro actore/ x intervallo adiectum was invalid for 
purposes of action, so that obviously it could not disturb 
a correal relation originally established. But Papinian, 
as we suppose, treated such a pact as valid for purposes 
of action and based its incapacity for disturbing the 
correal relation originally established on the special 
ground set forth in J . Hence a revision of his decision 
seemed necessary. 
In what manner then did the compilers carry out 
their revision? As we shall presebtly see grounds for 
thinking, Papinian in 2 (period f, ) dealt with the case 
where both M. and S. had originally assumed additional 
liability for culpa, though each for his own culpa alone. 
The ttauamt mention of this case the compilors Matadi 
tilts deleted, but here they got a cue for a suitable 
interploation of 1. Why not introduce the case where 
M. and S. both originally undertook additional liabiltty 
for culpa, but M. subsequently had this additional 
liability remitted, This course would be all the more 
readily suggested if, as we suppose, Papinian had already 
) M J ""40-. z4Sr 
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previously, in the dakta deleted period Y , mentioned the 
case where an original undertaking of additional liabil- 
ity had subsequently been remitted. And so, I conjecture 
the compilore utilised period las the motive for lip a 
perfectly new decision; we shall presently see cause 
for thinking that in 4' 2 they utilised period /T in a 
precisely similar manner. If all this be sound, the 
omission of period T. ,and the adaptation of period ß, 
and in accordance 
to suit the previous interpolations maadmastxammaxamyx 
with 
1ïifïaz ±tpxxzS the new rule that the responsibility of 
correal debtors was purely'intensive' need not oause 
any difficulty, 
ea 
It is interesting to specua .te how Papinian 
would have decided the case where both M. and S. origin- 
ally undertook additional liability for culpa but M. 
subsequently had this additional liability remitted. 
Would the inequality induced ex post facto have disturbed 
the correal relation originally established? We think 
nett so that, a if this answer be sound, the compilers' 
decision in f, is perfectly good classical law. 
We now im turn to §' 2 which at first sight 
presents just as great difficulties as 41, though I 
the 
believe I have found =alma key to their solution. 
That period I, was not written by Papinian in its 
present form, may be pronounced certain. In the first 
plate we note the abrupt change from aarrazkif solidarity 
ex deposito to solidarity ex stipulatu. In the second 
place the construction 'oua'4- inperfect subjunctive - 
perfect subjunctive is impossible) and the combination 
z 
of 'duos reos fifcere' and 'stipulari' (the latter being 
and unclassical 
used in the untechnical /sense of 'provide') is harsh in 
941-014'711-4-14A- /Z-"--(14 7W4A41a.tu,7 3 0,--1 /c ir,- 
Tl- a 
áh `i 'w) r I Z- . % C 4 t=yt 
`t4 -.r.".5 .(47.z) 4.As,,ZcG,. 
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the extreme. In the third placo the words of the period 
can only refer to the case where, for example, T, at 
Constantinople by means of written acts takes y. and 
S. correally bound 'from' Rome and Carthage respectively, 
the place of payment being Capuae; different suspensive 
evu 
terms being tho implied in favour of the respective 
]ea debtors. Such a 'math position was abstblutely incon- 
ceivable under the classical law, but quite practicable 
under the Justinia.nian law, as we nave already seen. ° 
But what did Papinian here write? To answer 
this question let us turn to period K. which has every 
appearance of being genuine. Obviuely this period is 
meant to serve as a motive for the preceding decision 
that the obligations of M. and So are subject to differ - 
ent implied suspensive 6erss. So regarded it must be 
construed thus:' for though M. and S. are correal debtors, 
each is the subject of a separate obligatory relation', 
the inference being that the two relations must, if cir- 
cumstances so require, be qualified differently. This 
construction, however, seems quite impossible What 
Papinia,m actually says is :' for though M. and S. under- 
take precisely equal liability, yet each is the subject 
of an obligation peculiar to himself', and to these 
words only one meaning can , I believe, be attached, 
namely, that the two obligations, though equal, are not 
constructively one and the same, are not correally 
r$ar related. 
P) 
Here, itt it is thought, we get the key to 
the restoration of , In the pr. of the fragment 
supra p. 21Y, 224. 
2) cp. Papinian. D, 4(4583)18.3:' singulorum annorum initio 
cuiusque anni pecunia fructuario q .t a ami v ,1.' 
Moen s reads 's ti ul a tus sum' fpr 
's, eim', an Kruge , Dig. delete ' 'sim' but al*lsuch 
else dations re hop less. 
r) 
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the conditions necessary in order that a joint contract 
of deposit (or oonmodate) may produce oorreality are 
contained in the words 'pariter' and 'utriusque fidem 
Papinian 
in solidum secutus'. In 1 /mentions the case where 
correality is excluded. on the ground of 'inequality': 
non esse duos reos a quibus inpar suscep +arc est obligation 
What then would be more natural that in f 2 ne should 
proceed to deal with the case where oorreali ty is excluded 
because the depositor cannot z be described as 'utriusque 
fides in solidum secutus'? Now there are two opposites 
to 'utriusque fidem in solidum seoutue', azie namely, (cx) 
C ) 
partition and4solidarity without unity of obligation and 
hence without extensive responsibility, in other words, 
simple solidarity. We 114# leave partition out of account 
conclude 
for the reasons stated abobe, and we therefore /that period 
1. as written by Papinian dealt with the case where Me. 
laxigimaitz 
and S, /undertook equal liability with regard to the whole 
'res', but a, special agreement was made Which excluded 
identification of the two obligations, 
'hat then may this special agreement have been? 
"Lou. 
I venture to suggest it as highly probable that both M 
and S. ! originally undertook additional liability for 
culpa, so that the two obligations were rendered precisely 
equal,^ but that the additional liability of each was 
expressly restricted to his own culpa and did not cover 
that of the other, so that the extensive responsibility 
essential to a correal relation was absente Here we 
have literally the situation contem ated in A', and I 
et 
theref ore venture to restore I. thus: Sed /si in continenti 
pattus fuerit ut ab utroque praestetur culpa propria 
ipsius,non etam alterius, puto duos reos non esse. 
When such an agreement as is here contemplated had been 
we meAIM cs41.. rs-.r= se oc memoa.o-Mess -a_qc->.Q..- 
Utz supra p. 
War 
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made, the depositor could not be described as 'utriusque 
fidem in solidum secutus' within the meaning of the 
classical law, and hence the relation of the co- depositar 
ies is reduced to one of simple solidarity. 
Two special merits are claimed for this conjecture: 
(i) it gives the fragment as a whole a 
in allirespects worthy of Papinian, and 
where the compilors got the idea of an 
additional liability for culpa by both 
which idea they nave utilised in their 
period E 
If our restorations are in any way well founded, 
it is undeniable that our present fragment provides a 
most valuable contribution to our knowledge of the 
perfect concinnity 




classical conseptions of correality and simple solidar- 
ity. The inscription of the fragment is significant. 
The twenty seventh book of Papinian's Qua.estiones dealt 
largely with obligations ex stipulatu, and Lené seems 
quite justified in giving the fragment the rubric 'de 
duobus reis constituendia'. In all probability the 
context Zpom-1144.-1.4-La-tam raised certain fundamental 
questions regarding correality and simple solidarity, 
and the case of äaga;ttmm* real contracts, in particular 
of deposit, was introduced because of the facility with 
which they lent themselves to illustrate 'inequality' 
and 'nonce- identification' in a joint contract. The formal 
considerations which played an all ipportan_t part in 
solidarity ex s uipulatu did not arise nere, and every 
thing depended on what the parties nad actually agreed. 
Again legally a depositary was liable for dolus only, 
but might by pact undertake additional liability, and 
Pal.Iacol.869. 
rar:.R..rs. l+'srbt-s s 
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pacts of this description could easily be framed so as 
to produce 'inequality' or 'non ®identification'. 
If we assume Papinian to nave written period I. 
substantially as I have nave restored it, the compilors 
could not properly leave the decision standing, because 
extensive liability was not an incident of the correal 
reaction under the Justinianian law, We must then in 
conclusion consider the question where they got their 
idea for the interpolation of this period. The answer to 
this question is, I venture to think, to be found in 
D.(46.1)49.2, also taken from the 27th book of Papinian's 
Quaestiones. In this latter paragraph Papinian discusses 
the following highly technical problem: 
M. promises at Capua to pa4 T. a certain sum at ï Capua; 
S. promises at Rome to pay the same sum at Capua as 
fideiussor for M, The debt being immediately due and M, 
being at Capua, T. is entitled to bring an action against 
M. at Capua immediately, But suppose T. prefers to 
sue S. who is at Rome by means of an 'actin arbitraria'. 
We ask, (i) is T. entitled to bring this action against 
S. at Rome immediately, or (ii) must he wait until 
sufficient tile has elapsed to enable S. to proceed to 
Capua, the place of payment, should he (S.) desire to 
do so? Papinian decides in favour of the second alternat_ 
ive, If M. were at Rome, he (M.) could not be sued there 
in an actio arbitraria until sufficient time had elapsed 
to enable him to proceed to Capua, =g should he desire 
so to do, and a similar suspensive term must be implied 
in S's favour. The motive is expressed thus: nam e 
contrario quoque si quis responderit, quoniam debitor 
Capuae sit, fideiussorem confestim teneri non kkx habita 
ratione taciti propril temporis, eventurum ut eo casu 
fideiussor conveniatur quo dstti =a debitor ipse, si 
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Roma, fui s se t, non conveni re tur. Founding on this 
decision the compilors formulate the general rule thus: 
itaque nobis placet fideiussoriaaa obliga.tionem condic- 
ionem taciti temporis ex utriusque persona reciperare 
tam rei promittendi qua.ffi ïpeita dead ovine . ' 
Now there is a striking^between the language 
of D,* (46.1)49,2 and that of period i of our frag- 
ment which must be obvious to any readers and the view 
which I venture to submit is that in täß - tt;r the 
compilors deliberately utilised the decisions in to 
former as the basis of an analogous decision concerning 
the relation of duo rei promittendi. Under the class- 
ical law, indeed, no analogy was posetble between the 
two oases, because a fideiussor could bind himself at 
a different time and place from the principal debtor, 
principal 
whereas the constitution of a /correaal relation damzmàmoï 
Y 
tkaximmummaaxgfxanxImettasm xtkaxzaimaxitaxita by ilbrbal 
contract demanded the presence of all parties at the same 
time and place. On the other hand under the Justinianian 
law, which permitted the creation of correality by separ= 
acts 
ate zmmtzaatm, the analogy between the case where a 
principal debtor and fideiussor bind themselves at differ= 
ent places and that where two có eal debtors do so, is 
obvious at once. It is gowever equally obvious that 
these two cases, though analogous, Are not exactly 
parallel, A fideiussor, by virtue of his accessory posit- 
ion, is entitled to the benefit, not merely of any sus- 
pensive term implied in nis own favour, but also to the 
benefit of any such term implied in favour of the prim, 
cipal debtor, though a principal debtor is not entitled 
i) That this passage is due to the compilors seems certain; 
so also Pampaloni, Archivio giuridico, 55,1.512; Krger, 
Dig. App. IVs o o` . African, D, "(13,'4)8 should 
be compared ¿ritt J. (4 6. r )4(1.2-. 
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to the benefit of any suspensive term implied in a 
fideiussor's favour. On the other hand, as two correal 
debtors stand on a co- ordinate /rooting, each can only be 
entitled to the benefit of a, suspensi re term implied in 
hts own favour, and never tox the benefit of such a term 
implied in favour of the other. Hence from the Tustiniar* 
i an standpoint, the decision in I, as it stands is perfeoti 
ly unexceptionable. 
To sum up, the compilors, finding that they 
had to delete Papinian's original decision in 1., conceiv- 
ed the brilliant idea of substituting therefor a dimstimmx 
decision in the case where two correal debtors had 
bound themselves 'from' different places. The motive 
set forth in k, seemed to them quite capable of support- 
ing this latter decisionywhion;attwr could then go forth 
to ,.he world bearing the iirprimatur of the great Papinian. 
If my conjectures be sound, this fraud, which so far as 
I am aware has hitherto escaped detection, is laid bare 
at last. 
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Romae fui s se t, non conveni re tur. Founding on this 
decision the compilors formulate the general rule thus: 
itaque nobis placet fideiussoriam obli ga.tionem condic- 
ionem taciti temporis ex utriusque persona reoiperare 
tam rei romïttendi p P quaxa i eius fideiuseoris....' 
aIL 1 K 
Now there is a striking between the language 
of D. *A (46,1)49, 2 and that of period I. of our frag- 
ment,which gust be obvious to any readers and the view 
i 
which I venture to submit is that in t e -) -cter the 
-12(?'&.1)(tg..Z compilors deliberately utilised the decision m in taw.- 
farmer as the basis of an analogous decision concerning 
the relation of duo rei prornittendi. Under Ube class- 
ical law, indeed, no analogy was possible between the 
two cases, because a fideiussor could bind hiiiself at 
a different time and place from the principal debtor, 
principal 
whereas the constitution of a /correal relation äa<msaanta d 
Y 
tbriximaximmaxafxzkixparttaimaxtkammaxitaxtia by wbrbal 
contract demanded the presence of all parties at the same 
time and place. On the other hand under the Justinianian 
law, which permitted the creation of correali ty by separ- 
acts 
ate zmmtramta, the analogy between the case where a 
principal debtor and fideiussor bind themselves at differ. 
exit places and that where twá có eal debtors do so, is 
obvious at once. It is gowever equally obvious that 
these two oases, though analogous, are not exactly 
parallel. A fideiussor, by virtue of his accessory posit- 
ion, is entitled to the benefit, not merely of any sus- 
pensive term implied in nis own favour, but also to the 
benefit of any such term implied in favour of the prin- 
cipal debtor, though a principal debtor is not entitled 
RR+HOSOCliRf.Q!^*!iipAlO^MO4. 
That this passage is due to the compilors seems certain; 
so also Pampaloni, Archivio giuridico, 55,D.512; Krger, 
Dig. App. IV. . 4 . African.D0. (13.'4)8 should 
be compared w--t a(46. r )0%2-, 
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et ait Celsus si alter conveniatur qui furti non egit 
et para.tus sit < 7 > periculo euo conveniri alteram qui 
furti agendó lucrum sensit ex re commodats, debere eum 
audiri 
L;t absolvij ; 
1 
7, 
Sed si [?Legis Aquiliae adversus socium eius na.buit 
oommodator actionemi 
z) 
videndum erit ne <- 7 
cedere debeat 
A C si torte damnurn dedi t`a.1 ter quod hio qui xcçtt c onveni tur 
oommodati actione sarc(ire compellitur: 
r nam et si adversus ipsum habuit Aquiliaso aotionem 




nisi torte quis dixeri t agendo eum e lege Aquilia hoc 
miriue consecuturum quam ex oausa oommodati conseoutus 
3> 
est: quod videtur habere rationem: 
()avere 
çulpa alterius res- oommodata deterior fasta, eritL el 
alter eo nomine condennatus est 
al teri_ condemnato ác,i,.ánem quam adversus alterum nabuit 
commodator, rescisso suerîor ïudicio 
2 
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If by a single joint contract T. lends an article 
to M. and S, 'pariter' and 'utriusque fidem in solidum 
secutus', then without doubt M. and S. are liable ammm 
correaJ.ly just as in the case of deposit. Tile question 
raised in period pc. of our presebt fragment must relate 
to a special case which seems to be4as follows: Suppose 
M. and S. wish to proceed 7say' rrom one part of Rome to 
another and T. lets them use his carriage for this pur =- 
pose. Is it reasonable in such a, case to regard mm T. 
as 'utriusque ridem in solidum secutust? Snould we not 
rather say that each of the mmmmatzriÌ commodataries has 
been granted the use merely of a proportionate share of 
the carriage and is responsible for such share alone? 
There can be little doubt that this question arose mainly 
in connection with the commodataries' responsibility for 
' cus todia a , A commodatary wasp 
and if it were 
stolen, except under circumstances against wciich no 
human foresight could prevail. 
/9 
he was liable. Suppose 
now in the case figured the carriage was stolen, should 
not M. and S. be held liable each for half the loss 
merely? :is appears to be the problem set forth ine , 
The introduction of the case of locatio (vel locatum) 
seems to be a gloss or interpolation, but I see no 
reason to interfere with 'simul', 
i) 
Period (3 is without doubt largely made up of 
glosses and interpolations, and any attempt at restorat. 
is little more than guess-work. 
ion/sagmmetsfalang. Possibly Ulpain may have written: 
et alt duorum quidem in solidum dominium vel possessionem 
esse non posse, usum autem uniuscuiusque in solidum esse 
quamvis non omnia loca vehiculi teneat: ideóque esse 
c44-'4*" 
versus ait singulosnoustodiam in totum praestare debere, 
.,.-_.a.em-,,r-e-.PO...-ree..a....r.r.s-....-..s.e. w..e..,e.,mm-re-...coe®eo. 
see .[iúbler in FaRI&Qe f. Gierke, p, k 257 n.2 (separate 
impression, p.21 n.2); Levy, konx,,p,213; Hmann, ZSS. 
40o$i&î1 , p.219. 
l . 1 D.(4 Y. 2. ) l 4. 7: (1.* c44-6 
3AMMMultx naymann, 1.0. marks 'in to tum a with a point " , ..> 
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In any event i is clear that Celsue decided in 
*'avoua of solidarity as opposed to partition, and period.. 
purports to give Ulpian's deductions from this result. 0 
Tue parks text, nowever, shows obvious signs of the 
compilors' hands. In the first place the reference to 
solutio- consumption cannot be genuine, but the deletion 
of 'si' and 'praestiterit' at once restores the classical 
s al tta process -.consumption. In the second place, however 
I do not believe that this restoration cures the entire 
defects of trie passage, The clause tapbtadmemsdax 'duo 
quodammodo rei habebuntur' im is in my opinion very quest- 
ionable, and the introduction of the case of theft is 
(ambobus competit furti actio) is decidly abrupt.' 
As regards the 'duo quodammodo rei habebuntur' 
d 
clause, we must, if its kuthentioity is to be upheld, 
supply 'promittendi' and understand aux z1sggxztigxwtikx 
'quodammodo' as connoting an analogy with correal debtors 
by verbal contract,` But it is very doubtful whether a. 
classical jurist would have employed such terminology; 
the word 'quodammodo' is certainly capable of teint, con- 
strued in the sense that co- commodataries were no 6 full 
correal debtors, buú such a construction would clearly 
2 
be zalse. 
laza az isandaaxxta a better 
c-6,4444,. fjk4. C'. 
course 
41-41 
1y is to treat* as an interpolation. 
To remove tue abruptness of the introduction 
of the actio furti, I suggest that in the place now 
occupied úy the 'duo q. r.iztx haLebuntur' clause, 
Ulpian drew tue inference that, if the article were 
stolen, trie co-commodat&ries were liable singuli in 
(c td from last page) of exclamation (! ), but I do not see 
any real objection to these words; opo jj(47,2)14.7:'in 
t o tum' . Waxszprgattaaxmaaikxmmctaarstatstdx i$ac x Neuma nn® 
Seckel, p.117, s.v.'custodia' aa) understand 'vehiculum' 
with 'totum'. .7- 
0 'praestiterit' has no object, and as solutio- consumption 
is referred to , conventus is superfluous. 
2) vide supra p.: n.. 
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solidum for breach of fcustodia', even where neither 
of them was actually at fault. I therefore propose 
the following restoration oft: quare si turtum fit, 
quamvìs mm sine alterutriusque culpa i n osolidum 
/4 
teneéxtur, sed alter conventus lioerabit alterum, et 
ambobus compatit furti action It cannot be aenied 
that the concinnity of the period is much improved by 
this restoration. The compilors may i.ave deleted the 
words in italics, because in their view There could be 
no breach of custodia without a certain measure of 
fault (culpa levis),) 
The next question we naturally ai[ätzq 
ask is whether the co-commodataries are entitled singuli 
in solidum or pro rata against the Lhief. WiLether Ulpian 
here discussed this question it is impossible to say, 
but/It any rate the decision was in favour of solidarity, 
As the co- commodataries were liable singuli in solidum 
actione commodati, they must also be entitled singuli in 
solidum actions furti. Ulpian did not find it necessary 
to state expressly the determination of the concurrence 
of the two actiones furti, but in fr.6 (period ) the 
compilers have introduced a quotation from Pomponius gtzt 
giving a determination in the sense of process -consumption, 
By so doing they evihce their adherence to the principle 
s 
that litiscontestatio had. an occupatory effect in the 
case of active correality. 
In period ¿ the question is raised whether, 
if one of the co- commodataries, say M., rias sued the 
thief for the full two -fold or four -fold penalty, the 
actio commodati must be directed against him (M.) alone, 
and not against the other (S.). The answer to this 
question is given in a quotation from Celsus which doubt, 
less belongs to the same context as We have no 
2) The ins c p ó - 0. crip ption of fr 6 has been the source of some 
trouble, see Levy, Hank., p.394 but with this point 





.c. ..( i 
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difficulty in seeing Celsus's view to nave been as follows: 
At strict law the fact of M. having sued the thief cannot 
Axamaxtzxftaxx the commodator, T,, from suing S. if he 
so pleases. If however T. sues S. and , when the pro- 
ceedings are in lure, the latter makes a request that T,' 
1,eqvi...rrft-te sue M. instead, at the same time offering 
( T.)a promise of indemnity (with sureties if necessary) 
in ma case he (T.) should fail to recover in full from 
M., in such an event, Celsue axa a, the praetor is 
bound to take this request into consideration; that is 
to say, if T.nunreasonably rejects S.'s adieux request 
L 
and offer, the prae-ter must either refuse T. an action 
against S. altogether, or else grant the same subject to 
an exceptio doll or in factum which will render it 
nugatory. 
Now this decision, eminently sound as it is, 
obviously proceeds on the basis that litiscontestation 
S 
with M, frees S. If T, , after suing M. ,had recourse 
against S, in another actio commodati for what he failed 
to recover from M., the promise of indemnity becomes 
altogether useless; the whole end of this promise is 
that I T,', though by joining issue with M.0 he loses all 
further right of action commodati against S., may still 
be able to sue 2 S;' (or his sureties) in an actio ex 
etipul.a,tu. Hence under the Justinianian law, extensive 
process -consumption being abolished inx ±xn$na, the 
decision loses it point The compilors therefore 
endeavoured to adapt the same decision to the new law by 
two manipulations: 
(i)It seems fairly clear that they deleted some such 
word as 'cayere' between 'pa,ratus sit' and ' pericolo'. 
By means of this manipulation, which, so far as I am 
aware, has not previously been observed, the compilors 
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eliminated the necessity of any formal promise of indemn- 
ity (with sureties if necessary) by So; all the latter 
had to do was to say to T,, 'sue ma at my my risk', ! 
(ii) We may affirm with practical oertainty that the 
final words of period ' 'et absolvi' were added by the 
compilors. These words are quite inconsistent with the 
classical law; under the latter, S, cannot obtain an ab- 
solutory judgment unless issue has first been joined Ind* 
between T. and himself, and by virtue of such joinder of 
issue I, a would[ be freed altogether,' Without a doubt 
Celsus had regard solely to proceedings in cure and to 
the praetor's power of refusing actions and granting 
3 
exceptions,. The words 'et absolvi' only become intell- 
igible under the extraordinary cognition system where 
emu., 
there was no distinction bag-two-a ius and iudi cium, and 
where the judge might rite naturally give effect to 
S. 's request by pronouncing an absolutory plagamma judge- 
ment in his favour. Such a judgment having been pronounc- 
ed, T. is compelled to seek his remedy against M. ; but 
ae tne action against M. is at S.'s risk, T. must be 
granted regress against S., should he fail to recover 
the full amount from M, even though S. has already been 
absolved, 
Thus the compilors, with considerable ingenuity 
it must be admitted, succeeded in making Celsus's decision 
outwardly conformable to the new law. Still no careful 
enquirer could fail to perceive that the decision, even as 
amended, was somewhat anomalous from the Jus tins anian 
standpoint, and actually it gave considerable trouble to 
2) These is nothing corresponding to these words in Bas. 
(Reild7 Tr 
eoh.4 /, ?/6 
) d V'w 7 f w K /V KrVl (Tov' KdTd Too c Fi v} std To(l T U 
c, t 844. )7,7% . s, fi Of -r-ÿy 
^ 7 
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_0 the Byzantine commentator Stephanos. 
We 
be accepted 
now turn to 1 of fr.7. if period t, could 
as genuine, 
p-reseritiy. the question submitted by Ulpian would be 
as follows: 
the article 
One of the comcommodataries, M, has injured 
lent so that the comnodator,T., has an actio 
legis Aquiliae against him, but T. brings an actio com= 
modatî against the other co- commodatary ,S., in respect 
of this injury. It is thus inferred that S. is liable 
for M.'s wrongful act and the actio commmdati against 
him (S.) is well founded. The question is whether S., 
if condemned, can claim an assig Tent of T.'s actio legis 
Aquiliae against M., with a view to working out relief?? 
be 
The answer of the clasìical law to this question tom---/ - ,,2', ,),A Gc 
laxi tx; that S. can claim such assigment if he is 
entirely free from blame himself, but not otherwise. 2> 
From the compilors' standpoint, however, 
there ari ses a, difficulty which is implied in period d : 
'if perchance the other party (M.) has caused an injury 
which the party who is sued (S,) can be compelled to 
make good in an actio commodati' 8 That this period, which, 
reproduces exactly the language and style of the compilors 
is interpolated, no one at the present day will dispute. 
It ill implies that ordinatily one correal debtor ver not 
liable for the wrongful acts and neglects of another, but 
s. 
.mom ,,,X- !-.. -( 
tt.titasi.n order to render v,, intelligible, 
4. 
owing to some exceptional circumstance, > to.ay S.' A --berm 
ati f x in respect of 
. . . c .. s n. + 
liable in an actio commod- 
. act. If then we accept 
period as of classical origin, we have, as Levy points 
out, a most cogent argument in favour of the view that 
4 4)Konko, p.212, note 5(c) to p.210. 
!) S0h070v7-0 ¡of. to Ba,s.XIII.1s 5 (Heimb.IS.p.l3(33)1? 
Levy, Konk., p.216. 
Z 
" 
/.292 .',.2, -4,, 
. . 
3) l s. `.` ̀ . Y,....,- f . 1'H-. t . r < r x.,.- /124 --wi -.-c 
eta- , ci' ± fr 2 g a I. 
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under the classical law correal debtors were extensively 
rammoutikiattyx responsible for wrongful acts and neglects, 
whereas under the Justinianian± law this extensive respons- 
ibility had been done away with. But whether we can 
actually regard period 7. as genuine is quite another 
matter which we shall consider presently. 
The question raised in 7. is not answered directly, 
but period ll. suggests an affirmailve answer.' for if it 
were against S. nimseif that T. had an actio legis 
Aquiliae, it is most equitable that in suing S. commodati 
he remit this actio Oigis Aquiliae'. Substantially this 
decision is sound from the classical standpoint. There 
is no civil consumption relation between the delictal 
and penal actio legis Aquiliae and the contractual and 
reipersecutory actio commodati, but clearly it would be 
inequitable that T . sóuld recover damages twice over. 
The actual authenticity of period I. is nowever quite 
another matter. 
Period k. will be admitted by every one nowadays 
to be entirely the work of the compilors. In a manner 
Vila= thoroughly characteristic of the latter and in 
flat contradiction to the view which has just been pro- 
nounced most equitable in t,, this period suggests and 
approves the doctrine that T., if he sues commodati 
does not lose his actio legis Aquiliae; all that happens 
is that if he subsequently brings the latter action, the 
sum which he has already recovered must be taken into 
account. 
Now we must approach the question as to the 
genuineness of periods 7. and f. . 
Period //. presents a, number of anomalies. In the 
first plage we note the long separation of 'legis 
Aquiliae' and 'actionem'. It certainly looks as if the 
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writer had originally intended to use the genitive 'legis 
Aquiliae' alone, but inserted 'actionem' as an after- 
thought in view of the subsequent ' cedere'. Classical 
jurists, however, do not indulge in such mpaorattg slovenly 
constructions. In the second place we note the phrase 
'adversus socium eius', wick can only mean 'against 
socius 
the ;main= of him who is sued in the actio commodati', 
i.ee against M. But the omission of 'qui actione 
commodati convenitur' after 'eius' is here quite unjust- 
ifiable; hothing has previously been said as to M. and So' 
being partners,- apparently 'socius' is used in a loose 
,a 
sense of ; the whole position is difficuly to 
grasp at first sight, whereas perfect perspicuity tßxìxx 
is the first watchword of every legal writer worthy of 
the names In the third( place, the perfect 'habuit' 4 -' 
quite unintelligible as the period stands, the present 
' habet' being obviously required°' 
For these reasons I have little difficulty in 
Wading that period ry, cannot have been written by Ulpian 
in its present form. The key to the restoration seems to 
lie in the perfect 'habuit', Let us eliminate the refer- 
ence to the actio legis Aquiliae, and assume that Ulpian 
was dealing solely with two actions commodati against the 
co-commodataries, f4 and $,', respectively; let us 
further assume that the commodator T° nas joined issue 
with S., and the question then is raised as to the right 
of the latter to a cession of T °'s actio commodati 
against M.; under these circumstances, the perfect 
'n.abuit' becomes perfectly intelligible, The litis- 
contestation with S. has extinguished T,'s right of 
action against M,, so that this latter action is now 
properly described as 'quam commodator habuit'gxtzudu 
In order that the cession in question may be effected 
292 34 otd 
the acíiion against M, must fix first be revived by a 
praetorian gt grant of restitutio in integrum annulling 
i 
the process-consumption. 
Now what may nave been the purport of period 
as written by Ulpian? I suggest the following: sed si 
culpa a,lterius res commodata, deterior faota erit, et 
alter eo nomine condemnatus est videndun est ne alteri 
condemnato actionem quam ardversus al terum habui t se=IT X 
commodator, rescisso superiore iudicio, cedere debea,t. 
That Uipian did actually write something like this seems 
to me extraordinarily probable. S. can be condemned 
in respect of a wrongful act or neglect of M., and the 
question is whether in such case S. can claim an a.saign- 
ment of T. 's actio commodati against M. The answer to 
this question must, it is thought be, that S. is entitled 
to such xsxkgxsxXxzxxigpagat assignment if, but only if, 
he is free from all blame in the matter. 
Assuming then the substantial soundness of our 
restorations, let us consider in what light the case 
would appear to the compilors. krigansum Extensive 
process- consumption being abolished, it would seem t, 
S. 
anomalous to condemn, /in respect of M.'s wrongful act or 
neglect and grant him (Só) an assignment of T.'s actio 
commodati against M, ; if S. on being sued proves that 
the injury complained of is attributable to M. alone, he 
ought to be absolved, and T. left to bring a, fresh actin 
commodati against M.4.6xtensive process -consumption 
and extensive responsibility go hand in nand, and with 
the abrogation of the former, the latter loses its 
raisons d'être. f 
But consider the following case from the 
Justinianian standpoint: M. eras been guilty of a wrong- 
...... . ....- -.mm -. 
op, the acute observations of Levy, ? nke , p.222 ff. with regardto the cessio actionum in the case ofco- tu+oabs, 
2) 7L14,- 44 474 a, 1 47.6 f 
/ ,/ / at ,t 
u 
[.11....ar -22LCCf 
lJ, -Clw., aL v ____-- zq 
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ful act rendering him liable $ in an actio legis 
Aquilia,e, and S. has been guilty of negligence in per- 
mitting such an act to take pla.cek ; if T. sues S. in an 
actio commodati, thet latter oy reason of his negligence 
cannot escape condemnation, but can he claim an assign- 
ment of T,'s actio legis Aquilia.e against i. who is the 
party Atka culpable in the first degree? This seems 
precisely the case which the compilors nave substituted 
in place of that figured by Ulpian and which is discussed 
¡ 
p 
1 as it stands. The same question might indeed have 
arisen under the classical law, though here it would 
apparently have caused no difficulty; if S. has contrib- 
uted in any way to the wrong he has no claim to an 
sum assignments The Justinian_ian law,hoRever, did not 
exclude on principle the possibility of an assignment 
except where the party seeking the same had been guilty 
of actual dolus, so that in the concrete case figured the 
aga.ins t `. 
question whether T,'s aotio legia Aquiliae should be 
assigned to S. might appear sx.t somewhat delicate. 
If our views regarding period 7. be accepted, 
it is impossible to hold period! genuine, this latter 
period being obviously connected with the former. The 
compilors in characteristic fashion do not answer the 
r. 
question raised/ but merely suggestAa parallel case 
the decision in which seems to have some bearing on the 
said question. Moreover the passage 'si adversus ipsum 
Lee 
commodator' is clearly founded on the 'si legis 7 o L 
A 
Aquiliae..,'actionem' passage in 
/. 
; the same 'habuit', 
impossible in its present context, reappearing here also; 
'ipsum' in the sense of 
convenitur' is obscure; 
'eum ipsum qui actione eommodati 
cp. Levy, Konk,, p.230 ff. 




ungrammatical and De77.9 A V-67`"/" /" r ; the clause 'ut 
commodati agendo remittat actionem' is vague and slovenly 
does it mean that T. can only ob4ain a condemnation in 
his actio commodati if he promises (with sureties) not 
to exercise his actio logis Aquiliae, or that T., if he 
sues commodati is thereby deemed to have abandoned his 
actio legis Aquiliae so that any subsequent request for 
the latter action must be refused, or what precisely 
does it mea,n7; the fina,l'actionem ' without Ix anything 
definite to indicate that the actio legis Aquiliae is 
intended,is harsh 
little 
We nave thereforexXIttel hesitation in pronounc- 
ing the whole of 1 after period ,interpolated,' 
VIR./ I,' col,' 296. 
Z) cp. Ulpian. D,(6,1)13 i.f.: uncle quaeritur an non alias 
iudex a.estimare damnum debeat quam si remitta.tur a,ctio 
legis Aquila.a,e. et Labeo putat cavere petitorem lege 
Aquilia, non actutum: qua.e sententia vera im est. r 
295 35 Authorities (Sale and Hire). 
D.(19,2)13,9. I Ulpian, XXXII ad edict, 
Duo rei locationis in solidum esse posaunt. 
This is an example of a, class of text on 
which no reliance whaever can be placed. It is totally 
irrelevant both to its preceding and to its sucoedding 
context, and more likely than not it is insitioioue. 
Moreover its significance is quite uncertain. Does it 
refer to joint letters or joint hirers? If to the former 
does it mean that the joint letters may be solidarily 
bound to hand over the article or may be solidarily 
entitled to claim the rent? If to the latter, does it 
mean that the joint hirers may be solidarily bound to 
pay the rent or may be solidarily entitled to claim 
delivery of the article? Hence we may dismiss this 
paragraph altogether, 
296 35 ctd. 
(2) D,(19,2)47. Marcellus VI digest. 
f r, 47 0<. Cum apparebit [emptorem conductoremveJ pluribus 




i ta. demum ad praestationem partis rsinguli sua sunt 
compellendij 3) si constabit resse omnes solven.do 
1-, quamquam ¿fortas3e iustius sit etaim si, solvendo omnes 
x erunt Lelectionem conveniendi quern velit non auferendam 
actorij/ i] <ti> s) actiones suas adversus ceteros 
praestare non recuset. 
c 
De (21,1)31,7,6,10. Ulpian. I ad edict. aedo cur. 
;. Marcellus quoque scribit,si servus eommunis servum emerit 
et sit in causa, redhibitionis, unum ex dominis pro parte 
sua redhibere servum non posse: non magi s, inqui t, quam 
cum emptori plures heredes exstiterunt nec omnes ad 
redhibendum consentiunt, 
Idem Marcellus ait non posse a,lterum ex dominis consequi 
G 
actione ex empto ut sibi proparte venditor [tradatj<-'-> 
si pro portions pretium debits 
emtoribus dcGr-wc (tl 7 
1 k 
vendidisse `- 




l------ GJ ma,ncipio servum det 
1,, \, 4 /7 d cZdt tik.,vc - / Z - ha``- __ 
kl-atttt-ot- t /tet`` 
._, 
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3 et hoc in emptoribus serva,ri oportare ait: 
7, nam venditor pignons loco quod vendidit mmptmr retinet, 
K) 
quoad emptor C-. sa,tisfa,cia,t, 
lo 8 Si venditori plures heredes exstiterunt, singulis pro 
portions hereditaria poterit servos redhiberi 
t. et rsi servos plurium venierit, idem erit dicendum: 
3, 
K, a pluribus vel plures ab uno vel piura 
mancípia, ab uno emantur,) verius,icere} 
maxapcmaxisikm 
rsi quasi plures rei fuerunt vendi tores, singulis in 
solidum redhibendum: 
si tarnen partes emptae sint a singulis 
j 
recta dicetur 
alteri quidem posse redhiberi, cum altero autem agi 
quanto minoris, 
Y. item si plures singuli partes ab uno amant, tuno pro 
parte quisque eorum experietur: 
17 
f 
. sed si in solidum emantunusquisque in solidum redhibebit 
lJ pluribus quorum singulorum in solidum venditor 
intuitus sit personam 
.9 sC® ornat 
4J sc, ornant 




/ u, ccvnU 
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That the quotations in D.(21,1)31.7,8 come, like 
D.(19,2)47/ from the sixth book of Marcellus's Digest, may 
be regarded as practically certain, Let us see whether 
by the aid of a comparison we can do something to ex- 
plicate the latter fragment, 
We shall consider D,(21,1)31,7,8 (periods -I. ) 
first. Period, only concerns us in so far as it shows 
the context of the following periods, In 6. we must, I 
think, substitute 'mancipio servum dot' for 'tradat'. 
Aimmxkis Assuming the object of the sale to be, as in 
a slave, pro parto tradition is of course out of the 
question, but a mancipation may cover merely a pro 
indiviso share of the object, Moreover ttradatt without 
a direct object is harsh, and we may assume ' servum' to 
have been omitted through inadvertence in the process 
z 
of interpolation, 
Period, is hardly possible in its present 
form, and Krúger proposes to read 'in emptoris heredibus 
which emendation agrees very well with Labeo -Javolen. 




/ri íI/I/Iwv o7- and this interpretation 
should I think, be adopted. My conjecture is that 
period 
S. originally summarised Marcellus's decision 
in the passage now figuring as D,119,2)47 (poriodsc< -61 , ), 
and that the compilors have deleted after 'emptoribus' 
^the -gorda 'pluribus quorum singulorum in solidum venditor 
A 
intuí tus sit® or the like, 
A L.., .24A-4,4 w n-`4 ao 
= I also sus ec t that -. '
have been omitted/ilaem period y, 9 ,A(14:444.4 
A u, , n LC . c 1,4?a ., e., s. 
/ 1Wé now turn to D,(19,2)47. In perio d the 
aasazgsrpataaamx 
' see Lenel, Pal., I. col. 2@fl 60v. 
9with D,(21,1)31.8 Paul, eod, 57 pr. 
3l =o'i0. 27 (ffeimb. II, p,308). 
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passage 'emptorezn.. ,locantem' is obviously impossible 
/and 
Riny attempts to correct it by way of emendation 
l) 
/ 
Z venture to 
suggest that Ma.resama have written m 
apparebit emptoribgaspluribus vendidisse ̂a,liquem 
Bingulorum in solidam lane-[ intuitum personam. It seems 
thinking of 
not unlikely that he was here tzktagxattk the contrast 
oetween the two cases (a) wnere the intentions of the 
Cw -) 
parties were that each of the co- purchasers, should be 
vnx- 
liable to pay a proportionate share only of the priceLA), 
and (ii) (the case actually dealt with here) where the 
intentions ,of the parties were- that each la of the co- 
pnrehasers, should be liable to pay the full price ,(4 - - 
As period , now stands, obviously i, refer - 
a. 
ence ism to the beneficium divisionis, but the z) 
manner in which this reference is expressed is imposs- 
ible. In the first place we note that 'partie' should 
strictly speakingbe'partium' in order to agree with 
the following 'singuli aunt compellendi'; this point 
must not, nowever, be pressed, for the classical jur- 
lets were not over particular in their use of the 
singular and plural in such connections.2 In the 
second place, the fact that two or k more parties are 
granted a beneficium divisionis is not correctly stated 
by saying that 'each is to be compelled to render a 
part of the prestation'o Such a mode of expression 
we 
obliterates the idea, of a ,'benefit' ; what ma should say 
0 
Mommsen prop,ses to change 'emptorem conductoremve' to 
m 'emptoribus venditoribusve' and Lenel (Pal. Io' col. 
600 n.4) to 'emptorum conductorumve'. 
3) cp. e. g. Papinian. D,`(45, 2)lls 1 t 'virilem partem singuli 
s tipulati videbantur' . 
a #." '"",ql, c .. ct. e- o - ,vck eLo-14 ( -111ruw) ec-3 /¡." .L° 
24'4,4 nru /.c iJ-d ( cr.Gá) , -v-v`'"r` 
i.(.5'177) -7" '(T/4-`4.-4-41'421/54 zt- 
,),1,.-; 4,1(z-A )1/. 301. 
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is that 'none is to be compèlled to render more than a 
part of the prestation'Y Ìxxtbuixtkixdx1duc ax But further, 
the grant of a benefi_cium divisionis to co- principal 
debtors Azzx belongs to the Justinianian, not to the 
classical, law, Esikmxinag What then may Marcellus have 
here written? Following up the conjecture that period 
summarises the present decision and that periodexpla.ins 
it, I venturo to restore ß. thus: ïta demum ad praesta.tion- 
em partis est compellendus (sc.venditor,;) si constabit 
A.661 .c, haec A2af ti,7,w2-, 
ernptore Aqui petit ut /pars sibi mansIvetar in totum 
3 
pretium satisfacere paratum esse, of the Iaa like. 
In period y the compilors in thoroughly 
characteristic fashion proceed to question the soundness 
of their preceding decision by suggesting it as more 
equitable that t]ss mgaraksimu xaakamidman itxkimpuextmat 
gtaa :tt ; a beneficïum divisionis should not be granted 
but that the plaintiff should be entitled to sue any one 
debtor for the whole provided he assigns to such party 
his rights of action against the others. No argument is 
required that this passage could not have been written in 
its present form by kw Marcellus, and the only question 
is what did the latter write7 I venture to think that 
his orOginal text zany may have contained the words 
'quamquam solvendo erupt', which words gave the compilors 
____a._®e-®oree 
vide titis= supra p.34,a3f., Collinet, Etudes Historiques 
sur le Droit de Juetinien,I,p,141 n,3 also holds the 
present reference to the beneficium divisionis interpolat- 
ed, though his restoration of the fragment as a whole is, 
in my opinion, quite impossible. 
14 as to'fortasse' see Beseler, III0p,83 ff.; with 'iustius 
sit ; -Liv )A ap tly compares the concluding words of 
Justinian.C, (7,72)Ì3t 10:'quid eniin iustius est..,' 
) -44, c 5 .# . ,.. ... " -r,-N.(G wc r f . r/t,._; 
4/1.:7 dl ti, 4 6,-,"/ 
a 
/ 
c-w,-. u-v Lk.eiLC- ) qo 
k4454.44i(rvt-7 
:- 7% Q. 2, 4 
4.41-4.td 4,17174,", 
f"'":14 
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the cue to introduce the oeneficium divisionis. 




zisdttmx has no reason to fear a. failure to recover 
priceA yet as 
they are liable singuli in solidum, any one must pay the 
full price if he wishes to claim his proportionate 
a 4C h (/4). 
a mre of the tag- soldf Furthermore, I venture to 
think that Marcellus may have added 'dummodo actiones 
any 
As tka one 
from each his proportionate share of the 
suas adversus ceteros praestare non recuset'. 
purchaser by paying the whole prioenfulfils the liab- 
ility of the rest as well, he is reasonable entitled to 
a cessio actionum. 
Assuming the substantial soundness of the 
foregoing restorations, we now proceed to examine closely 
the use of a sale to two persons jointly. The seller 
we shall call S. and the purchasers Pl.and P2; the 
prestation-oh jest we shall imagine to be a slave. 
As regards the obligatio empti (i.e. the relation 
between the purchasers are creditors and the cedar as 
debtor), Pl. and P2. are ipso iure entitled merely pro 
rata, for as we have frequently had occasion to remark 
an active joint contract naturally leads to partition, 
not solidarity. As a pro rata creditor either of them, 
say Pl,,can claim mancipation of a pro indiviso shire 
only of the z slave. But if he makes this claim, is it 
sufficient for him to tender a corresponding part of the 
price or must he tender the whole? Paz The answer to 
this question dmpzzdz depends on whether the obligatio 
venditi (i.e. the rzzkz relation between the vendor as 
creditor and the purchasers as debtors) is partitioned 
or solidary. If each purchaser is bound merely to pay 
a proportionate part of them price , then clearly Pl. 
on tendering his part is entitled to mancipa4ion of his 
}armxtzdtikmmxzhzra 
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share in the slave. Here the passive joint obligatio 
venditi is partitioned as well as the active joint 
obligatio empti; in other words the joint contract 
may be analysed into two separate contracts, in each 
of which the thing sold z is a separate pro indiviso 
share in the slave and the price is a separate part of 
the total values But on the other hand, ifs the 
purchasers are bound singuli in solidum for the price, 
then, though P1, can as before claim only a pro indiv- 
is() ZK share in the slave, he must as a, condition of 
so doing tender the full price. A little reflection 
will show how eminently sound this result is. S. is 
entitled to sue Pl, for the full price, but in so doing 
he need only tender a, pro indiviso share in the slave; 
zzzz conversely, Pl. is entitled to sue S. for a pro 
indiviso share in the slave and that alone, but in so 
doing he must tender the full price. Here we have 
partition on the active side concurring with solidarity 
ori the passive side, and 
/ x (4 ¿ . . R ti er 
With regard to the obligatio venditi, we now 
ask, when is the liability of the co-purchasers to pay 
the price solidary and when is it partitioned? In our 
opinion, if the terms of the sale contain no express 
provision on this point, the decision must be in favour 
of solidarity. A passive joint contract leads naturally 
to solidarity, and any doubt on the matter would seem to 
be settled by the words 'singulorum in solidum Ìzàtmázmx 
intuitum personam' in ®C . These words which correspond 
exactly to Papinian's 'utriusque fidem in solidum secut- 
us' in D.(45,2)9 pr., indicate that the implicit intent- 




determinating factor in the situation, and of course 
his intention will always be to hold the purchasers 
liable solidarily if he can. Accordingly the purchas- 
ers, if they wish to be held liable merely pro rata, 
must make a special pact with the k vendor to this effect. 
Again, with regard to the obligatio empti, we ask 
can P1. and P2. be constituted solidary creditors so that 
wither transfer 
azak can claim dakizazy of the entire property in the 
slave? There seems no reason why such active solidarity 
should not be created by special pact,, but we can hardly 
regard this case as of frequent occurrence; if kcf P1,' 
and P2. wish to acquire solidary rights, they doubtless 
p 
a 
6"`.d d4 4 _ _ _ would as a, rule sti ulate correl7_ from SI, 
Now let us consider the converse case where two 
parties, S1. and S2. jointly sell a slave to a single 
party P. Here Si, and S2. are only entitled pro rata in 
the obligatio venditi, unless by special pact active 
solidarity is created. Such a pact cannot however have 
been frequent, a correal stipulation beY 3 g no doubt 
preferred in practice. The case of the obligatio empti 
is more difficult, Though the contract is here passive- 
ly joint, can P. claim from either of the za vendors 
more than his (the particular vendor's) share in the 
slave* unless solidarity be expressly provided for by 
pact? Probably not, we think; here the common property 
relation of the vendors seems to counteract the natural 
tendency of the passive joint contract to produce !zzakza 
effectively 
solidarity, for obviously a, co- owner cannot /dispose of 
more than his own share in the property. Moreover even 




Ni t a will be to employ a correal stipulation. The sounder ` by 
view therefore seems to be that a sale ± two parties 
1 
304 f35 ctd 
S 
jointly producen per se partition onx the passive as 
well as on the active side. 
We thus attain the result that the passive joint 
obligatio venditi in a, sale by one party to several 
was the only instance where a joint contract of sale/44- 
produced a solidarity relation. In other cases solidar- 
ity, active or passive, might be induced by pact, but 
here a correal stipulation would be preferred. The 
special question dealt with .,y Marcellus in D.(19.2)470- 
and the same question appears under another form in 
D,(21,1)31,8 (period ),- arises out of the interdepend - 
1 oKc t / e 
ance, in the,,case ils of the aaÌ#uxryx passive 
solidary obligatio venditi (liability of the co- purchas- 
ac tive 
ers to pay the price) and the /partitioned obligatio empti 
(right of the co- purchasers to claim the slave) which 
corresponds thereto. 
The question whether the solidarity arising, 
either ipso iure or by aid of special pacts, fromz a, 
joint sale, !aaaamtaxum is or is not of a, correal nature 
presents no difficulty. Assuming that no 'inequality' 
or tnon- identification' is introduced, the joint contract 
is fully effective to produce the constructive unity of 
obligation implied in correality. If on the other hand 
any inequality br non -identification is introduced, only 
simply solidarity can result, 
We must now consider the problem regarding the 
compilors manipulations of D,(19,2)47. Considerable 
light is thrown on this problem by the interpolations in 
lßä a= D.(21.1)31,10 (periods-, ), I do not propose 
to subject this paragraph to ani detailed art critical 
examination which would lead us too far afield into the 
realm of the aedilician remedies. I merely submit, -and 
I do so with some confidence,, that the passages 
305 4' 35 ctde 
'si servus (1, )...a, singulis(/- )t and titem ( V ).0 ".' 
rodhibebit 
( )' are entirely due to the compilors. 
Assuming then the soundness of this submission, let us 
examine the scheme of the paragraph. All that Ulpian 
says is that,( 9.) if a single vendor dies leaving 
co- heirs, a separate actio rednibitoria may be brought 
against each in proportion to his share in the inheritance, 
and that ( FL ) an actio redhibitoria may be brought 
against one co-heir and an actio quanto minors s against 
the other. The compilors on the other hand, take the 
opportunity of introducing the matter of a joint sale,(K); 
(i) where the plurality of parties is on the vendor side,: 
and (ii) where it is on the purchaser side,^ and then they 
attempt to work out the various results in each of the 
foregoing cases according as the joint sale is (a) 
(A) ( fA.ziat v7 
s olidary^ or (b) parti tioneden This attempt may indeed 
be considered quite unpractical and inept, yet the fact 
of its 'laving been made is highly significant; for we 
nere see that the compilors, and perhaps certain oriental 
law professors before them, had been applying their minds 
to the question of joint bilateral contracte and had 
been seeking to á.chematise the various situations which 
might occur. 
Vow for our preent purposes the important 
point is that, so far as we can judge, the compilors 
disregarded the possibility of a joint contract of sale 
( or a joint bilateral contract in general) producing 
solidarity on the one side and partition on the other. In 
À. the vendors are 'quasi plures rei' which apparently 
means both that they are entitled in solidum to claim 
the price and that they are bound singuli in solidum 
to deliver the thing sold. In ha. 'proportionate parts 
of the thing have been bought from the sellers respective- 
306 f 35 ctd. 
ly' which apparently means both Is that each vendor is 
entitled to claim merely a proportionate part of the }a 
price and that each is bound to as deliver merely a 
proportionate share of the thing sold. Likewise 
apparently/ in V, the co- purchasers are both entitled 
and bound pro parts, and in they are both entitled 
and bound in solidum. No reference at all is made to 
the case where a, thing is sold by one party to several 
under circumstances which render the x co- purchasers 
liable singuli in solidum to pay the price, though 
each is entitled to claim merely a share of the thing 
sold. From this omission, we are lead to infer that 
the Justinianian lawyers had drawn up a scheme of 
possibilities, each case being symmetrical in the sense 
that the active and the passive relations harmonised 
as regards solidarity v. partition, and no room was 
left for the unsymmetrical case 4 where passive 
solidarity concurred with active partition, 
If these observations be justified, the inter- 
polations in D, (19e2)í 47 cease to present any serious 
difficulty. Marcellus, we believe, was dealing with 
the case where several co_purchasers^ were enti tied 
merely pro rata but were bound singult in stblidum, 
and the compilors felt themselves bound to recast the 
fragment ks this case did not fit in with their 
scheme. Now we come to their extraordinary modus 
&44e124, c,kdc,cZ-e2Griwc 
operandi. 




and our attention:-must-bue--fixed 
What do 
wee words signify? In my opinion what the compilors 
cr,te&Zezi-vve 
meant to say can only have been 'emptorem^a pluribus 
vel pluribus vendentemñ,, ' a purchaser from several 
307 35 c td. /616, Il 
or a vendor 
Ato several', a, but the mx words ' pluribus 
veil were inadvertently omitted, perhaps through the 
stupidity of some scribe who failed to understand the 
compilors' instructions. Tne meaning of period 
as it stands, now becomes plain. The words 'singulorum 
in solidum intuiturn personam' indicate the constitution 
of a solidary relation,both active and passive, so that 
two cases are here considered (i) that/of the 'emptor a 
pluribus' where the co-- vendors are solidarily related 
both actively and passively,- this is the same case as 
is figured in period, and (ii) that of a 'vendens ( 
pluribus' where the co- purchasers are solidarily related, 
both actively and passively,- this is the same case as 
id figured in period *S. ,
Having now given period ,.< an entirely fresh 
graatx 
significance, the compilors proceed in 3 to admtixta 
admit 
paxaxktyxaf a benefid.ium divisionis to the co- vendors 
and co- purchasers alike, ad and then in 
'. 
they question 
the propriety of this admission and evince an inclination 
to grant a 'beneficium cedendarum actionum' tauttamdax 
merely. All this is high *y important for the study of 
these two beneficia under the Justinianian law, but does 
not further concern us here. 
Let us now return to paskad D,(2101)31.$ 8. If 
my con .ecture be sound that after 'emptoribus' in . 
Ulpian wrote 'pluribus quorum singulorum in solidum 
venditor intuitus sit personam', so that we have here a 
7 , ,( summary of Marcellus's decision in ix D.(19.2)47 zx (as 
restored), all serious difficulty is removed. In the 
joint 
preceding period which deals not with a paxaxaa sale 
to two parties, but with a simplex sale to a slave owned 
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neither of the co- owners of the purchaser- slave can 
claim pro parte mancipation merely by tendering a part 
of the price, This decision the compilore left un- 
touched, except for the alteration of mancipation to 
tradition; the sale is here sithplex, not joint, in form, 
is raised 
and no question k x xxximax as to the solidary or pro 
for the price., 
rata liability of the co- owners (quod iussu etc, )I the 
then on principle 
seller is /0 * entitled /to retain the slave 
until he receives the full price, just as if the purchas-. 
er had been a single freeman; cp. Ulpian, D.(19.1)13.8. 
In periods, on the other hand, Ulpian , still 
quoting from Ma roellus, turns to the case of a joint sale 
to several purchasers, and here the mak vendor is not 
entitled to demand the full price in return for a pro 
at rata mancipation, except where the purchasers are 
liable for the prise singuli in solidum. ^k .re -- -we 
have the case of active partition concurring with passive 
solidarity, for which there was no room in the compilers' 
scheme. Under these circumstances the step which the 
latter took is illustrative of their methods in general. 
In periods 
J. 
and 7. they simply deleted all reference to 
the solidarity of the co-purchasers liability and its 
mymmiseg concurrence with the partition of their right. 
Thus period7.was reduced to a state of complete vagueness 
and the special point of period J'. as a motive fora and. 
explanation of1periodt), was eliminated, 
309 36 Mandate. 
For purposes of exposition we must consider separate- 
ly the cases of i A. a plurality of mandataries, and 
B. a plutality of maandators. 
A. Plurality of Mandataries. 
tx 1, oûiigatio directa. If a single mandate is im- 
parted by xxx the mandator T. to two mandataries, M. and 
s., jointly, then as a passive joint contract leads 
naturally to solidarity, not partition, M and S. will 
be liable singuli in solidum unless pxxtÌ ±gist pro rata 
liability is g expressly provided for. The solidarity 
will be correal if there is no inequality or non-identifi- 
cation between the two obligations, otherwise it will be 
simple. The joinrness of a mandate depends on the 
material fact of M. and S. having each undertaken to act 
in conjunction with ïhe other; their must be communis 
consensus on the part of the mandataries. Suppose for 
example that a mandate is given by T. to M. alone, and 
subsequently it is desired to associate S. with M.; in 
order that M. and S. may be joint mandataries, each must 
agree to act with the other, so that the original sitplex 
contract of T. with Me is in effect superseded by a 
fresh joint contract with M. and S. 
Under certain circumstances, however, it is 
quite possible for independent mandates having one and 
the same end to be given to different parties. For 
example, T. may give M. and S. each a separate mandate 
to purchase for him the same fundus Cornelianus. Wnat 
relation is here created between M. and S.? The lack 
of communie consensus between M. and S.,- in other words 
the absence tzx of unity of originating cause, - plainly 
excludes the idea of correality. But it is equälly plain 
that if either M. or S. effectOs the purchase, T. can have 
no further claim against the other. The question then 
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arises, have we here a, real case of simple solidarity. 
Suppose neither M. nor S. fulfils the mandate, then if 
one of the mandataries pays the mandatorts full interesse, 
is the other ipso sure freed? If so, the relation is 
one of imicia simple solidarity; if not, then it is one of 
legal cumulation and sanity the aid of equity must be 
invoked in order to prevent 2xx2 the mandator from 
exacting double damages. In my opinion, the decision 
must be in favour of legal cumulation; even in the case 
of the formless negotia the reaction of the civil law 
against solidarity without unity of cause must makes its 
influence . The fact that specific fulfilment mf 
tkimmaxnezzliztzx by the one mandatary frees the other 
may easily be accounted for on the ground that the two 
mandates by their nature cannot both be fulfilled. It is 
only in the event of non-fulfilment of either mandate that 
the legal cumulation can operate. 
The position may be summed tip by sating that 
only in equity is the identity of juristic end recognised; 
the law itself refuses to take this identity into account 
where unity of originating 
n 
is lacking. It is, however, 
to be observed that the resort to equity in order to 
prevent the mandator from exacting double damages does 
not iffiply any necessity of the praetor's intervention, 
for the iudex in a bonne fides iudicium can give effect 
to equitable defences without the aid of an exception. 
The question above raised becomes practical but 
when we consider the matter of z cessio actionum. If 
M. and S. be solidary debtors, then solutio by one, say 
attpI iff gpt; *ifr i gIëatExx /44xtMtxtigxäí Btt44í 4äAlgX 
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M., frees the other, S., a. solutely, so that no subse- 
quent cession to M. of T.'s right of action. against S. 
is legally possible. A cession in return for a payment 
is therefore only possible on the fiction of a sale, the 
cession being agreed upon beZo.ago the payment is actually, 
All this is explained in a passage which, though it 
refers immediately to the correal relation of co- tutors, 
z1ikm extensive 
is equally relevant here, for /solutio- consumption 
operates alike both in correality and in simple solidar- 
ity; 
D.(46:3)76. Modes tines respondit, si post solutum 
sine ullo pacto omne *uod ex causa tutelae debeatur, 
actiones post aliquod intervallum cessae slut, nihil 
ea cessione actum cum nulla actio superfuerit: quoc 
ante solutionem hoc factum est vel] cum? conven- 
isset ut mandarentur actiones, tune solutio farta 
esset L-tum subsecutum mkg est] kk salvers esse 
mandatas actiones, cum Cnovissimo quoquej <hoc> casu 
pretium Emagisa mandatarum aag actionum solutum 
-quam actio quae fuit peremptaj videatur. 
On the other hand if simple solidarity is excluded 
payment kft by M. does not free S., so that cession to 
M. of T. 's right of action against S. remains fully 
competent and can be claimed in order to aìko[ enable 
M. to work out proportionate regress against S. 
E quity, however, will prevent T., after he has recover- 
ed in full from, or nxkmmUtax probably Imam after he 
nas merely joined issue with, M. from bringing a further 
action himself against S. 
2, Obligatio contraria. The right of M. and S. toxxaa ..t 
recover all expenses loss eske. incurred through the 
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execution of the mandate causes no difficulty, Whether 
a single mandate be imparted to M. and S, jointly, or 
separate mandates be imparted to them severally, each 
can only claim payment of the expenses, . 
Ìhich he himself has incurred, unless in the case of 
a joint mandate active solidarity be expressly created 
by pact. In the latter event however a correal stip- 
ulation would be the more natural course. 
L. Plurality of Mandators. 
tqc 1. Obligatio directes. Two parties 1Ví. and Se may give 
a single joint mandate to T. , or they may give separate 
mandates directed to one and the same end, But in both 
cases alike, the claim of either M. or S. against T. 
can only cover his (the particular mandator's)interesse* 
unless z in the case of a joint mandate solidarity be 
expressly created by pact, In the latter event however 
the parties would naturally have resort to a correal 
stipulation. 
2, Obligatio contraria. If ix a single joint mandate 
be given by M. and S. to T., then as a passive joint 
contract naturally leads to solidarity not partition, 
singuli in solidum 
M. and S. will be liable /zzazaaiiy to reimburse T. for 
all expenses 1,etc. incurred through execution of 
the mandate, unless pzxiáiizx pro rata liability be 
expressly provided for. As usual, solidarity will be 
correal where there is no inequality or non.- identificatior 
between the two obligations, otherwise it will be simple. 
Where separate mandates directed to one and the same 
end are given by M. and S. to T., the question again 
arises whether the relation of M. and S. is one of 
,Urau, 4`_6,Zc,t,, u 
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siffiple solidarity or of legal cumulation mmdmmmdxkla 
magmityxmaxmixxtaxmmktdxxityxx which only by aid of 
equity is reduced to solidarity. As in the case of a 
plurality of mandataries, I take the xx latter view, 
If T,, having obtained his full interesse from, say,M,, 
or even Having joined issue with M. fag, subsequently 
sues S,, the bonne fides officium of the iudex will 
indeed suffice to ixxxmmx protect S. without the aid of 
any exception, but L, ifxkmxzkmx even after having made 
payment, is entitled to demand a m cession of Tets 
right of action against S. in order to work out proport- 
ionate relief. 
As is well known mandate was extensively 
employed in later classical times for purposes of 
suretyship, and this aspect of the contract will be 
discussed fully in our future study on Accessoriality0' 
A 
Justinian in his constitution C, (8,40(41))28 pr, 
of 531, expressly mentions the abolition of extensive 
process -consumption as between co- mandatores, though 
whether a separate enactment to this effect had been 
made prior to fft 531 remains uncertain, Naturally the 
abolition of extensive prooese- consumption must be 
applied to all cases of passive correality ex mandato. 
The Justinianian lawyers seem further to have 
obliterated all distinction between a joint mandate 
and several mandates directed to the same end, solutio- 
consumption being allowed to operate extensively in the 
case of the latter as well as in that of the former, 





D ®(17°1)60 ®20 Scaevola, I respons. 
Duobus quis mandavit negotiorum administrationem: 
quaesitum est an unusquieque mandati iudicio in 
solidum teneatur. tespondi unumquemque pro solido 
conveniri (debere,_dwnmodoab__utroque non amplios 
debito exigaturj 
As the facts are here stated, we cannot but 
assume that a joint mandate is referred to, the case 
where the zotaixixtxxttamam administration of the same 
negotia is entrusted to two parties severally being 
hardly possible. Moreoüer the gtmes tion raised deals 
with the antithesis solidarity v, partition, and this 
antithesis only presents itself 
where we have unity of causes) Yet the decision as it 
stands , is to the effect that each mandatary should 
(must? ought to ?) be sued for/the whole, provided not 
more than the amouit due is exactly from both together. 
Here it is plainly inferred that litiscontestation 
with the one does not free the other, yet under the 
classical law the two obligations, arising as they 
ex hypothesi do from a single cause, must be correally 
related, assuming of course that no inequality or 
non -identification has been introduced® 
The final clause 'dummodo,.0exigatur' is 
however very suspicious,-'from both together' is not 
happily expressed by 'ab utroque' (_'from each'), 
'amplius debito exigere' nas a thoroughly Triboninaian 
ring,- and we have littbb hesitation in attributing -4- 
to the compilers) The preceding 'debere' must also 
3) 
be interpolated. If it means 'must', it is false; for 
a 
see Levy, monk ®, pe 203. 
3)1 
Levy, 1. c. 
f) 4/7:4 / si 2. 
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there was no reason why the mandator should not 
divide his action. 
" 
If it means 'ought to', then we 
observe that in the preceding question Scaevola is 
asked to state the legal right of the mandator not 
to advise him on his most profitable line of action. 
The paragraph this purged from interpolations, 
simply states that the cod, mandataries are liable 
singuli in solidum, and not merely pro rata. But it 
is hardly possible that we have here the full purport 
of Scaevola's original response. The words 'unumm 
quemque pro solido conveniri' standing alone are 
abrupt, and it is not a legitimate mode of restoration 
to add 'posse', for if the compilors had found this 
word in the text, it is unlikely that they would have 
changed the same to 'debere'. Moreover, if Scaevola 
had merely meant to give an affirmative answer to 
the question 'an unusquisque mandati iudicio in 
solidum teneatur', he need only have said 'tenori' 
Hence we seem justified in concluding that only a 
fragment of Scaevila's response has been preserved by 
the compilors. Probably the case he dealt with was 
7) 
considerably more complicated than that here presented.' 
e e e e c e p e ? e e e e C e e e e e e 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 e N f O o e e 
4 A formal comparison with Paul. D. (42.1)43 - upr4 91 ) 
is perhaps not altogether without value. Gradenwitz, 
ZSS,7.p.65 f., has on good grounds pronounced the 
remainder of the fragment after 'conveniri' to be inter., 
polated. Here as in our present fragment, we have a 
somewhat abrupt 'conveniri' followed by an interpolat 
i on. 
L7?1: 
41 - t) NNt 4,'vkC 
,tu.o e ea ce a v "" `c. . ^ 
/1°14 <,. ( t afi- / . 
c-i-v1+-4-.1 tej d _Ymy lt)a-4. r t I It( L. - 
(2) 
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D.(11.6)3 pr. Ulpian. XXIV ad edict. 
Si duobus mandavero et ambo dolose fecerint, adversus 
singulos in solidum agi Nitta poterit, sed altero 
convento rsi satisfeceri t in alterum actionern 
denegasi oportebit. 
In thins pr. ° mandavero' is used in an untechnical 
sense, and refers not to the essentililly gratuitous 
contract of mandate but to the employment of a mensor 
agrorum who naturally would be paid for his services. 
The case here dealt with is Pzery instructive , though 
stirictly speaking it falls without the scope of this 
treatise. 
) 
If mensor made a false return (si Íakamm 
mensor falsum modum dixerit), he was liable in a praetor- 
ian action in factum which was delictal (dolose fecerint) 
and penal ir1i is nature, though the amoutt of the cordemia - 
a.tion was fixed at the plaintiff's interesse, > Hence 
where two mama mensores were employed jointly, they would 
on a strict application of civil law principles be 
liable cumulatively, each in the plaintiff's full inter- 
ease, the end of the obligation and action being theor- 
elically the punishment of wrongdoing. 
It was however impossible for the class- 
ical jurisprudence to accept the foregoing result. Though 
penal in its nature, this action in factum fulfilled 
essentailly a reipersecutory function, being to all 
intents and purposes designed to afford the plaintiff 
,z) 
Levy, Privatstrafe, 1%55 
Level, Edict., p.212. 
n. 5. 
k 
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Compensation for loss sustained xk through the mensorts 
misconduct, Hence Ulpian considers it the duty of the 
praetor, after litiscontestation has taken place with 
one of the co-mensors, to refuse a further action against 
the other. Thus we have a, case of praetorian consumption 
corresponding to the civil consumption which would have 
taken effect had the parties been liable singuli in 
solidum in an actio mandati and issue had been joined 
with one of them. 
That the words tsi satisfeceritt °rrse.et= 
are due to the compilers, mat/now 
be accepted as beyond the possibility of doubt. 
Ilx*IaxäikkxaXxxxx&m3cxxikxx 
(3) D.(15,4)51, Paul. IV ad Plaut. 
(,C, Si unus ex servi dominie iussit contrahi cum at eo, is 
Bolus tenebitur: 
sed si duo iusserunt, cum quovis in solidum agi potest , 
quia mix:VE$a similes Bunt duobus mandantibus. 
k. 
The only question decided in period <.is that 
if both masters have authorised a negotium into which 
the slave enters with a third party, each is liable 
in solidum, and not merely pro rata, to the latter in 
an action paid quod iussu, and this decision is 
justified by a reference to a corresponding rule in 
the case of two mandators. The ottax determination 
of the concurrence between the two actions quad iussu 
is not mentioned, but beyond doubt this determination 
was in the sense of process consumption. 
It is however worth while observing that 
in this matter of the determination of the concurrence 
a distinction must be drawn between duo domini iu.tentee 
i 
(4) 
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ipdxatmexman and duo mandantes. In the case of the 
former, as the originating cause of obligation and 
action is the slaves negotium with the third party, 
extensive 
we have unity of cause and therefore /process- consumption 
even though the two iussa have been given independently; 
in the case of the latter, on. the other hand, we 
cannot have unity of cause and process -consumption 
i 
unless tlsaxtx a single joint mandate be imparted. 
D.117.1)59.3. Paul. IV respons. 
oC. Paulus respondit unum ex mandatoribus in solidum 
eligi posse, etiamsï non sit conceasum in mandato: 
(3 
post condemnation.em autem in duorum personam mi 
collatam necessario ex causa iudicati singulos pro 
parte dimidia convenivi posse et debere. 
It may perhaps be inferred from W. that a 
party who accepted a, joint mandate from two other 
parties ordinarily required an express undertaking of 
solidary liability, but, if though this be so, the same 
period states with perfect distinctness that such an 
express undertaking was quite superfluous. The really 
that contained 
vital point of Paul's response is probablytkidamiumeni 
in period 3 but with the question here raised we 
3) 
have already dealt. 
sooec 
j Levy, Konk., p.272 n.4 
?) St Gi, 1 it(( r..4 . ( co - cu , d.0 
Co ,c 
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C,*(8.40(41) )23. R$sa,xx Diocletian. 
Reos principales vel mandatores tsim.iioiter crece 
Rig eligere vel pro parte convenire tvei satis non 
faciente contra quem egeras primo, post ad alium reverti 
cum nullus de his elections libereturA7liest. 
a,, 294. 
G, eod, 28 pr. Justinian. a, 2114 531. 
Generaliter sancimus, quemadmodum in mandatoribus 
statutum est, ut contestations contra unum ex his facta 
alter non liberetu-r, ita et in fideiussoribus observa,ri. 
The words quoted from Justiniar's constitution 
(period oC. ) are capable only of one interpretation, 
namely, that process -consumption originally did operate 
extensively as lax between mandatores, but latterly this 
had been altered by statute, and the new rule is now 
i 
applied as between fideiussores also We must however 
observe that while under the classical law fideiussores 
for the same principal debt stood in a process -consumption 
relation (accessory correality) whether they were taken 
bound $aixtkyntxxassmmamkiyx t+bgether or separately, 
mandatores for the same principal debt only stood in such 
a relation where a single joint mandate had been impart- 
ed, This distinction is based on the fact that a fide - 
Sasüsexuxxïaigs 
tix 
iussory obligation is formally accessory to the principal 
while a mandatory obligation is not, the accessority 
being here material only. 
The question now arises whether, as Levy 
thinks probable, Justinian or one of his immediate 
predecessors had prior to 531 abolished extensive process. 
consumption as between joint mandators, though the 
.7) 
cp. also sch.To ocu7'oU to Bas.XXIIIa1.44 (Heimb. II, p.641 
(3) Jam.); Levy, Monk,, p.200 f, 
2) 
Konk., p.200; Sponsio, p.211 n02. 
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constitution by which this was accomplished has not been 
preserved. As against this view two objsctions may be 
raised: (1) Why should extensive proeeas- consumption 
have been abolished as between joint mandatory before 
it had been abolished as between correal debtors? 
A 
(ii) If such mot a constitution as Levy imagines had 
actually been made, it is somewhat surprising that the 
compilors of the Code should not have regarded the same 
worthy of preservation. I therefore venture to conjecture 
that the reference in 0Q(8.40(41))28 pr. may be to 
C.00d.23. 
ilia The last mentioned cons citution. (period. ) 
cannot in its present form be genuine, and the awkward 
passage 'vel satis.m.iiberetur' may without hesitation 
r) this 
be attributed to the compilors. But even tkaxzÌt ztxxx 
elimination does not remove all difficulty from the 
constitution. In the first place, zla what is the 
precise significance of the words 'simpliciter acceptas', 
which we must assume to refer to 'crime mandatores' alone, 
though grammatically they might refer to 'reos principal. 
es' also? Levy interprets them in the sense that the 
ma,ndators have been taken bound simply consensu, no 
stipulation being interposed, and cites by was of 
comparison Ca(50*t 12)6 of the year 236, 'conventione 
simplici'. I venture however to regard it as more 
y 
probable that the absence of ant agreement giving the 
mandatory a beneficium excussionis is here referred to, 
in which case we can have little difficulty in attribut- 
ing the words in question to the compilers. In the 
second pi.a.ce, we note that the expression 'reos principal_ 
es vel mandatores eligere' cannot, as might at first 
J Levy, Konk., p. 201 f. 





sight be thought, mean'to elect one /of the various 
principal debtors and faloutxtmmamx mandators'; its only 
possible significance is 'to elect the principal debtors 
or the mandators', i.e. itzmiimisixtkaxpriumipzixduktarax 
istxxxxxx .. Rammoneramedx±kamixxxxtkitxmxxdatmaxximmxznymammx 
mixmariaxa2xxkam to choose between suing the one group 
(lax or any one or more members thereof) or the other 
group ( or any one or more members thereof). Accoddingly 
we seem entitled to conjecture that Diocletian's original 
decision may have proceeded on somewhat the same/lines as 
that of Alexander C.(5.57)1. 
Be all this as it may, the fact remains clear 
that the compilors interpolated period"( , so as to 
eliminate extensive process -consumption both as between 
principal debtors and as between joint mandators Y Under 
these circumstances I venture that the words 'quemadmodum 
in mandatoribus statutum max est' in , may simply refer 
top( . It seems very likely that c.28 in its present 
form is the work of the revisors of the Code in 534. 
Justinian's original constitution abolishing extenseive 
process -consumption as between fideiussores may have begun 
with the words 'generali lege sancimus' in 1, and it 
seems almost z certain that the abolition of extensive 
process-consumption as between principal correal debtors 
was accomplished by means of a separate constitution 




2, Certainly the rference to c.23 as having 
abolished extensive process -consumption between joint 
mandators was not very happy, for this constitution 
might equally well be referred to as having abolished 
No process. -consumption relation ever existed between 
a principal debtor and a mandator ; vide supra 
e 
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extensive pm process-consumption as between principal 
correal debtors, though this latter reform was actually 
carried by 2 of o,28 itself, Experience, however, 
teaches us that we may expect anything from the compilors, 
(6 ) D, (46,1) 52. 3, Papinian. XI respons, 
cC. Plures 2iusdem pecuniae credenda,e mandatores <7-2 
z 
si unus gdicio eligatur, rabsolutioneJ C`°7 quoque 
secuta .4-/' non kikaamntg libera,ntur [sod] omnes 
Lliberantur pecunia solutal. 
Any attempt to uphold the genuineness of this 
paragraph in its present form is out of the question. 
Under the classical law, if litiscontestation with the 
one mandator,M.11 does not free the other, S,, any suggest- 
ion that an absolutory judgment in favour of M. could do 
so,borders on absurdity. Under the Ï Justinianian law, 
extensive 
on the other hand, the abolition of /process -consumption 
brings the question as to the f effect of an absolutory 
judg4ment into prominence. Suppose M. and S. are 
correal debtors and the creditor sues M. in solidum, 
littscontestation in this action does not now free S.; 
but what is the position if the judge absolves M. on a 
grovrid which is not merely personal to the latter alone, 
but amounts to a denial of the existence of the obligat- 
ion as a whole? If S. is subsequently sued, can he 
plewd M,'s absolution as res/iudicata in his favour? 
To this question a negative answer is given in the pres- 
wnt fazgxm paragraph. Accordingly as the paragraph 





323 37 ctd. 
but makes excellent sense from that of the Justinianian 
law, we are amply justified in attributing it, in its 
present form, to the compilors. The whole question 
then comes to be, what did Papinian probably write? 
A 
$ccording to the view commonly entertained at 
the presenu day, Papinian simply wrote: plures eiusdem 
pecunias credendae mandatores, si unus iudicio eligatur, 
omnes liberaalbtur;' Here i u is assumed that the mandate 
is joint, and the elementary result is stated that 
litiscontestation with one mandator frees the rest. 
But to this restoration there are a number of objections. 
In the first place , it is almost inconceivable that 
such an elementary point as is here brought out should 
nave come to figure in X Papinian's responsa. In the 
second place, the restoration in question is far from 
elegant; we should have expected Papinian to have 
written 'ex pluribus mamtxtmsiägsgxxx.... mandatoribus. .. ' 
In the third place, as minx= a case of 'credit-mandate' 
is expressly in point, the words of the restoration are 
hardly compatible with Papinian's mum own statement in 
D,(27.7)7 that the mandatorsAhave a beneficium divisionis: 
nam et si mandato plurium pecunia credatur, asque dividi- 
tur actio. 
2 
Accoddingly, in my opinion the view of Eisele 
is much more probable that Papinian was here dealing 
with the case of separate mandates directed to the same 
end, and that the denial of process -consumption is 
genuine. In point of fact the structure of the paragraph 
=wwa...s:.4®rnw.ltCww..4a4waweRwfmwmm-csmcGGoR,00...saa.-e.G m1.0 <s...e..® 
%See Levy, Honk., p.202 f.; Sponsio, p.214 f, Kruger, 
Dig. wrongly attributes this restoration to Eisele. 
$ Archiv. f. d. Civil ,Prax.,77. p.461. 
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it seems hibaly probable that something has been omitted 
after'mandatores', and I Ummaitara suggest that Papinian 
here r cr acZG,,, , 
may have written: ex diversis ma.ndbtia obligati aunt or 
the like. 
If this ini ia,l conjecture be accepted, xi then 
we may take Pa,pïnian.D, (46 ®3)9501® as a model for our 
restoration, and I accordingly would reconstruct period 
thus: si unus iudicio eligatur condemnations quoque 
somata et ypecunia solutes non liberantur omneeo Obviously 
however the mandatary, after having obtained full satis- 
faction of his interest from oneof the mandatory cannot 
in equity recover anything further from the others, and 
of 
nence the amilOpoint zv: the decision as restored must 
be that the mandator who has made payment may still 
obtain a cession of the mandatary's rights of action 
against the other mnandatei.rs for the purpose of workiníout 
proportionate regress. We may therefore assume that 
Papinian continued somewhat as follows: sed it ei qui 
condemnnatus solvers t creditor actiones suas a o 
v 
advere s ceteros praestare debet. So restored the 
paragrph agrees with our a priori conceptions as to the 
result where two or more parties give independent mandates 
directed to one and the same end. Legal solidarity, 
whether ootreal or simple, is excluded through absence of 
unity of cause, and accordingly at law the result is 
cumulation. 
Let us take a concrete case. Gaius asks Titius 
for a loan of X; T. gets M. and S., each independently 
of the other to give him s mandates to lend X to G.; 
T. would be perfectly entitled to treat these mandates 
as quite unrelated, and on the strength of both to lend 
XX to G. But ex hypothesi G. only wtshes to borrow X, 
i 
supra p. 44 
325 37 ctd, 
and so on the strength of both mandates a, single sum 
of this amount alone is lent. If G. duly repays the 
X., then clearly nothing is duo under wither mandate, 
but suppose he fails to do so, what is the result? At 
first sight we might be inclined to say that T. must 
attribute V to the one mandate and V to the other. 
This solution must however be rejected; poetittimmxist 
iftmaxikkazItitkmaxxxitxxcaxamma we cannot have prxtiíic 
partition without unity of cause. M. and S, have each 
given a separate mandate to lend X, and each is respons- 
ible for the full amount. We next think of simple 
solidarity, but this result again is we believe, 
excluded in the absence of unity of cause. The only 
alternative if is legal solidarity with equitable 
intervention to prevent the mandatory recovering twice 
over, If T. recovers the full amount from one of the 
mmadztaxi ms mandatory, and subsequently sues the other, 
the iudex in the exercise of his bonae fides ïatäxx 
officium is clearly bound to dismiss the action. 
Moreover, ele-pfeeel-lefi, we think, the same result must, take 
place even where T. nas merely joined issue with the one. 
As we have seen reason to believe, equity follows the 
law in gtxiagx admitting extensive process- consumption 
under ordinary circumstances at any rate. But neither 
solutio nor litiscontestatio prejudices the right of 
a mandator who makes payment to claim an assignment of 
the oreditorts rights of action against the others for 
the pot purpose of enabling him to work out proportion- 
ate relief. 
'u triusque mandatum intui tus' ; perhaps Ulpian was thinking 
of the case of separate mandates when he wrote the final 
words of D.(17.1)21: quemadmodum, si duo mi hi mandassem 
ut tibi crederem, utrumque haberem obligatum. 
Z.) 
supra p. !`i4, z e 
